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As for what motivated me, it is quite simple; I would hope that in the eyes of some 
people it might be sufficient in itself. It was curiosity – the only kind of curiosity, 
in any case, that is worth acting upon with a degree of obstinacy: not the curiosity 
that seeks to assimilate what it is proper for one to know, but that which enables 
one to get free of oneself. After all, what would be the value of the passion for 
knowledge if it resulted only in a certain amount of knowledgeableness and not, 
in one way or another and to the extent possible, in the knower’s straying afield 
of himself? 
 
Michel Foucault 
 
 
I can never provide the account of myself that both certain forms of morality and 
some models of mental health require, namely, that the self deliver itself in 
coherent narrative form. The “I” is the moment of failure in every narrative effort 
to give an account of oneself. It remains the unaccounted for and, in that sense, 
constitutes the failure that the very project of self-narration requires. Every effort 
to give an account of oneself is bound to encounter this failure, and to founder 
upon it. 
 
Judith Butler 
 
 
Recovery no longer seems like picking up the pieces of a shattered self (or 
fractured narrative). It’s facing the fact that there was never a coherent self (or 
story) there to begin with. No wonder I can’t seem to manage to put myself 
together again. I’d have to put myself, as the old gag goes, “together again for the 
first time.” 
 
Susan Brison 
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Abstract 
 
This thesis presents a multi-disciplinary analysis of the ethics and politics of narrating 
trauma in institutional contexts. Drawing on the philosophical works of Michel Foucault 
and Judith Butler, this thesis studies the norms, discourses and power relations that impact 
survivors’ narrations of trauma in, for example, medical and legal settings. Through a use 
and application of Foucault’s ideas, it is argued that while self-narration is a diversified 
activity, discourses and power relations function to regulate, circumscribe and constrain 
the forms in which traumatised individuals must narrate trauma in order for their narrative 
to be favourably treated by institutions who encounter trauma. Building on Foucault’s 
views and feminist applications of his work, it is shown how possibilities of resistance – 
or, of narrating otherwise – are co-existent with exercises of power, despite the power 
imbalance that typically characterises the encounter of traumatised individuals with 
institutions. This thesis also focuses on Butler’s work as complementing Foucault’s views 
on how self-narration is entangled with discourses and power relations, and considers 
how her ideas on vulnerability, precariousness and relationality inform her account of 
self-narration. Butler’s critique of the conception of self-narration based on the 
sovereignty, coherence and mastery of the narrating subject is elaborated further in 
relation to issues in trauma theory, where it is argued that narrative coherence often 
functions as a hegemonic norm. This analysis of narrative coherence is pursued by a study 
of how survivors’ testimonies of sexual trauma in legal and political contexts is 
circumscribed, facilitating certain forms of self-narration while silencing others. 
Narrative coherence is also shown to be a dominant norm in the psychological sciences, 
whose theories and practices have an influential bearing on how trauma is narrated by 
traumatised individuals. This thesis also presents an analysis of the different levels of 
inequality that determine the worth and currency of trauma narratives in the asylum 
seeking process. Tying together the different concerns pursued throughout this work, the 
thesis concludes with a critical consideration of the discursive and socio-political factors 
that govern the narration of trauma in contemporary times. 
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Introduction: Narrating Trauma 
 
This thesis is an interdisciplinary study that, although rooted in philosophy, draws on 
works from sociology, psychology, critical legal studies and political theory to analyse 
the philosophical, ethical and political implications of narrating traumatic experiences in 
institutional settings such as medical and legal contexts. The starting point of the study is 
the recognition of the centrality of the activity of narrating one’s self in human life. One 
narrates aspects of one’s life, freely or under coercion, in a variety of contexts. Such 
practices of self-narration constitute a significant part of human social interaction, and 
occur in different forms, for different reasons, and with different stakes and outcomes, 
ranging from revealing one’s thoughts to a friend, to justifying oneself in the courts, or 
speaking to a doctor or psychologist. The different contexts within which self-narration 
happens raise specific analytical concerns that need to be analysed in their specificity 
rather than in a general way. Not all kinds of practices of narrating one’s self are analysed 
in this study; fundamentally, the scope of this thesis is the encounter between self-
narration and medical and legal institutions. 
 
An analysis of the institutional take-up or treatment of self-narratives considers how the 
activity of narrating oneself happens in dialogue with and through the various discourses 
that are available to the individual, and within a network of power relations where 
institutions (such as the law courts or the clinic) employ techniques to shape the activity 
of self-narration in specific ways. Of course, non-institutional forms of self-narration do 
exist, and it may be the case that in such contexts the effect of power relations and 
discourses is less pronounced. However, such non-institutional settings of self-narration 
are not completely outside of the realm of discourses and power relations. The point is 
not to strictly differentiate between institutional contexts where power relations exist and 
non-institutional contexts that are free from social pressures. While the grip of discourses 
and power may be stronger in some contexts, there is no area of social life which lies 
completely outside the realm of discourse and power relations, if discourse and power 
relations are that which enable social reality and govern the realm of the intelligibility of 
objects, concepts and, ultimately, human subjects. 
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With the emphasis on institutional settings, the thesis will adopt a primarily – though not 
exclusively – philosophical approach to traumatic self-narration, that is, the narration of 
trauma by traumatised individuals or survivors. Trauma can be defined in a preliminary 
way as a momentary or prolonged experience that presents intense suffering to the 
individual. Trauma can happen to an individual or to a group, or even to individuals 
because they form part of a particular group. The source of trauma can be another human 
or non-human. The kind of traumas I will consider include human-caused traumas that 
can be but are not necessarily tied to political, religious or gender-based persecution, such 
as sexual violence, physical and psychological abuse, and torture. Thus, trauma is not 
being considered as a uniform category, and it is not always easy or necessary to 
distinguish between traumas that are politically motivated and those that are not. Indeed, 
this study often problematises the political/non-political distinction by calling attention to 
the socio-political dimensions that influence narrations of trauma that may not be 
immediately regarded as political. 
 
The activity of narrating one’s experiences is a significant component of social life that 
enables the individual to understand oneself, to make oneself understandable to others, 
and to survive and flourish in a society. Without seeking to negate the richness of this 
activity, this thesis foregrounds the various ways in which the activity of narrating oneself 
is limited, circumscribed and constrained, or demanded in specific forms. In this regard, 
this thesis adopts a theoretical outlook broadly influenced by the work of Michel Foucault. 
Foucault’s works are drawn upon to analyse how the various limitations that operate on 
practices of self-narration do not primarily, necessarily, or essentially function by overtly 
censoring or prohibiting an individual from narrating oneself. Neither do such limitations 
operate by restricting the activity of narrating oneself only to certain individuals. The 
accessibility of the activity of self-narration is not the primary issue being debated; 
although some narrations do receive more attention than others, self-narration is a 
pervasive activity that is performed by individuals irrespective of their position of power. 
This thesis considers self-narration at the level of discourse, that is, of how the production, 
dissemination and reception of utterances and statements occur and are controlled in a 
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society, also taking into account the function ascribed to self-narration. Furthermore, 
following Foucault’s work, this thesis recognises that discourses and the rules that govern 
them are historically formed and transformed. Self-narration too is a practice informed by 
historically transforming discourses; although the activity of narrating oneself has existed 
in one form or another for millennia, is not a monolithic activity that has always existed 
in the same way. Rather, it has been constituted differently in history by various 
techniques, practices and aims, and has been governed by different norms that enabled it 
to happen in different ways. Such norms do not simply include socially accepted ways of 
behaving and of being but also, on a deeper level, discursive and conceptual conditions 
that allow the narrating self to speak in certain ways and to conceive of itself in certain 
ways. 
 
The effects or products of discourses – what they enable, what they disable, what they 
encourage, what they discourage – are, ultimately, manifestations of power relations. For 
Foucault, power is not simply a quality that is possessed by an individual or a group, or 
that functions primarily in a negative way by setting and enforcing prohibitions; rather, 
power operates in a more widespread way by producing and regulating the spheres of the 
thinkable, the speakable, the conceivable, the intelligible, the acceptable, the normal. Self-
narration as an activity is not being considered as a site where the individual freely 
presents itself, but as an activity which, to a great extent, is enabled by the discourses and 
power relations that frame what constitutes self-narration, how the self must be presented, 
and how narrations are socially received. Discourse and power, then, are two crucial 
dynamics that shape the analysis of self-narration in this thesis. However, they are not the 
sole factors. As Foucault argues, there are three axes or domains through which an 
experience can be analysed.1 Discourse and power feature in the first two axes. The first 
axis is the domain of knowledge, that is, the statements and concepts of the sciences and 
knowledges that refer to a particular experience and explain its historical development. 
Since the experience being studied is that of self-narration, this domain broadly 
                                               
1 See Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure: The History of Sexuality Volume 2, trans. Robert Hurley 
(London: Penguin Books, 1992 [1984]), 4 and Michel Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview 
of Work in Progress,” in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth: The Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 
Volume 1, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley et al. (New York: The New Press, 1997), 262. 
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corresponds to the discourses that encroach on the activity of self-narration, such as 
discourses of autobiography, psychology, and law. The second domain is the axis of 
power relations, including actions which enable the categorisation of an experience as 
normal or deviant, and practices that operate on one’s field of possible action and that 
inform the way in which one may conduct oneself. In this regard, an analysis of self-
narration would consider the ways in which institutions (medical and legal, for example) 
make use of scientific knowledge, and how they contribute to the shaping and moulding 
of the linguistic resources that one employs when narrating oneself. The third axis through 
which an experience could be analysed is the domain of ethics or subjectivity, which 
Foucault understands as the way one relates to oneself. 
 
An analysis of self-narration could easily take this latter axis of subjectivity as its starting 
point by assuming that it is the most significant axis having a bearing on the activity of 
narrating oneself. However, doing so would result in presenting a unilateral analysis that 
misses the important insights that the notions of discourse and power relations afford to 
this analysis. While the first-person perspective, where the individual actively shapes his 
or her own life narrative, is a crucial component of the activity of self-narration, the part 
it plays should not be overstated at the expense of neglecting the domains of discourse 
and power. This point is especially relevant since this thesis analyses practices of self-
narration not just as acts, but also considers the ways and means in which self-narration 
is acted upon, shaped and transformed by norms, practices and discourses. Such norms, 
practices and discourses are not only outside the individual’s domain of choice but 
constitute what and how an individual might choose to narrate. Even when discussing 
what he calls “‘techniques’ or “technology of the self,’”2 by which he means practices 
whereby the individual actively participates in his or her own self-fashioning and self-
determination, Foucault always emphasises that such techniques are not and cannot be 
dissociated from the effects of power with which they are entangled. 
 
                                               
2 Michel Foucault, About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self: Lectures at Dartmouth College, 
1980, eds. Henri-Paul Fruchaud and Daniele Lorenzini, trans. Graham Burchell (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2015), 25. 
5 
 
Despite the intricate effects of normalisation that power relations generate, self-narrations 
are not to be treated solely as scripted products of power, which would thereby eliminate 
the domain of subjectivity. However, neither are self-narrations autonomous productions 
of narrators, despite the personal and intimate nature of some of the content which the 
individual may choose to narrate. One might be tempted to say that self-narration is an 
activity over which the individual has the utmost control; after all, it is one’s own 
experiences that one is narrating. This is, to an extent, true. However, this thesis contends 
that because self-narration is situated within the domain of the discursive – and it must be 
for communication to occur – there are discursive rules that structure and shape how this 
activity takes place. Given this structuring and shaping, particularly in evidence when 
self-narration encounters institutional settings, narration is clearly situated within the 
realm of power relations. However, following Foucault, I emphasise that power co-exists 
with possibilities of resistance. No matter how limited and precarious, narrations of 
trauma are not entirely engulfed by power relations that seek to normalise and homogenise 
narratives. The possibility to narrate otherwise exists, even if it is from a subaltern 
position, and this possibility is a possibility of resistance and subversion – what Foucault 
calls parrhesia, or courageous truth-telling. 
 
The thesis also turns, in its second part, to the work of Judith Butler, and for two reasons. 
First, her account of subjectivity supplements Foucault’s ideas on how power and norms 
function, particularly in processes of subject-formation. Butler’s use of the notions of 
performativity, precariousness, and corporeal vulnerability inform the analysis of self-
narration and trauma in this study. These notions afford further insights into the way 
power relations affect the way trauma is spoken about and narrated. Butler’s work also 
emphasises that the self is vulnerably exposed to and constituted by norms, discourses 
and relationships that exceed the self. Her work challenges conceptions of self-narration 
that are linear, coherent, self-sufficient and closed, and instead highlights the relational 
constitution of the self. 
 
This leads to the second main reason why Butler’s work is considered at length. Butler’s 
account of self-narration suggests that narrative coherence is, at best, an impossible 
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fantastical ideal and, at worst, a hegemonic norm. This thesis pursues this line of inquiry 
to analyse why and in what ways the demand for narrative coherence can function 
hegemonically. Butler’s critique of narrative coherence is read in relation to narratives of 
sexual trauma to highlight that, despite the fact that most trauma survivors seek a form of 
coherence in their life in reaction to the deep rupture that traumatic episodes leave in their 
wake, survivors often feel that narrative coherence is an impossible expectation that is 
placed upon them. This is analysed, for example, in cases where rape survivors have to 
repeatedly narrate their traumatic experience in court. In such instances, the demand for 
narrative coherence is shown to function as a powerful and problematic norm, perpetuated 
also by the psychological sciences, that influences how trauma narratives are received by 
the institutions that are in place supposedly to listen to and respond responsibly to trauma 
survivors. Butler’s work is also drawn upon to propose a critical analysis of narrations of 
trauma in medical and legal institutional contexts, as well as in the asylum seeking 
process. 
 
Multiple analytical and disciplinary perspectives could have been adopted in such a study 
of the narration of trauma. Philosophically, such a study can take the form of an inquiry, 
inspired by phenomenological or hermeneutical approaches on accounts of narrative 
selfhood, including the radical criticisms of such accounts from, for example, feminist 
and poststructuralist-informed approaches.3 The question of the degree to which selfhood 
                                               
3 In the philosophical literature on the ‘narrative self’, works that consider the extent to which the self is 
constituted narratively, along with the implications and criticisms of this view of selfhood, include Seyla 
Benhabib, “Sexual Difference and Collective Identities: The New Global Constellation,” Signs 24, no. 2 
(Winter 1999): 335-361; Jakub Čapek, “Narrative identity and phenomenology,” Continental Philosophy 
Review 50, no. 3 (September 2017): 359-375; Adriana Cavarero, Relating Narratives: Storytelling and 
Selfhood, trans. Paul A. Kottman (London: Routledge, 2000 [1997]); Steph Lawler, “Stories, Memories, 
Identities,” in Identity: Sociological Perspectives, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity, 2014 [2008]), 23-44; Alasdair 
MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 3rd ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2007 [1981]); Catriona Mackenzie and Kim Atkins, eds., Practical Identity and Narrative Agency (New 
York: Routledge, 2008); Diana Tietjens Meyers, “Corporeal Selfhood, Self-Interpretation, and Narrative 
Selfhood,” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 
17, no. 2 (2014): 141-153; Jacqui Poltera, “Self-narratives, story-telling, and empathetic listeners,” 
Practical Philosophy 10, no. 1 (2010): 65-79; Paul Ricoeur, “Narrative Identity,” Philosophy Today 35, no. 
1 (1991): 73-81; Marya Schechtman, “The Narrative Self,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Self, ed. Shaun 
Gallagher (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 394-415; Margaret R. Somers, “The narrative 
constitution of identity: A relational and network approach,” Theory and Society 23, no. 5 (1994): 605-649; 
Galen Strawson, “Against Narrativity,” Ratio XVII (2004): 428-452; Dan Zahavi, “Self and Other: The 
Limits of Narrative Understanding,” in Narrative and Understanding Persons, ed. Daniel D. Hutto 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 179-201. 
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is narratively constituted, or the extent to which the human is “essentially a story-telling 
animal”4 is not a primary concern in this thesis. Although storytelling is a crucial human 
activity that accounts for a significant part of what humans do or how they think, I do not 
subscribe to a privileging of narrative as the feature through which subjectivity is to be 
understood. This thesis approaches practices of self-narration in their diversity as 
historically transforming technologies of the self that are significantly entangled with 
power relations. Narration is indeed a pervasive technique that sheds significant light on 
what it means to be human; however, what interests me more about self-narration in this 
thesis is its amenability as a tool of power and a means for the governing of conduct. 
 
Alternatively, a study of traumatic self-narration could root itself in the psychological 
sciences, engaging with the abundant work on narrative, trauma and psychology that 
argues that identity-formation and development are akin to a developing story, where the 
cohesion of the self-story corresponds to the suitable development of the self.5 Of course, 
there are dissenting voices within this same literature that contest the possibility and 
desirability of the ‘narrative model’ of the self, and argue that comparing the self to a 
story does not do justice to the constitutive fragmentation of selfhood.6 This thesis draws 
on such literature, particularly in relation to Butler’s critique of narrative coherence. 
                                               
4 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 216. 
5 In the literature of the psychological sciences, which will be discussed more directly in chapter 7, works 
that discuss the role of narratives in the formation of subjectivity, as well as the role of story-telling in 
therapy, include Jerome Bruner, Making Stories: Law, Literature, Life (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 2002); Michele L. Crossley, Introducing Narrative Psychology: Self, Trauma and the Construction 
of Meaning (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000); Michael White and David Epston, Narrative 
Means to Therapeutic Ends (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1990); John McLeod, Narrative and 
Psychotherapy (London: Sage Publications, 1997); Donald E. Polkinghorne, Narrative Knowing and the 
Human Sciences (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988); Theodore R. Sarbin, “The Narrative as a Root Metaphor for 
Psychology,” in Narrative Psychology: The Storied Nature of Human Conduct, ed. Theodore R. Sarbin 
(Connecticut: Praeger, 1986), 3-21; Roy Schafer, Retelling a Life: Narrative and Dialogue in 
Psychoanalysis (New York: Basic Books, 1992); Brian Schiff, “Fractured Narratives: Psychology’s 
Fragmented Narrative Psychology,” in The Travelling Concepts of Narrative, eds. Matti Hyvärinen, Mari 
Hatavara, and Lars-Christer Hydén (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2013), 245-264; 
Donald P. Spence, Narrative Truth and Historical Truth: Meaning and Interpretation in Psychoanalysis 
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1982). 
6 See, for example, Mark Freeman, “Identity and Difference in Narrative Inquiry: A Commentary on the 
Articles by Erica Burman, Michelle Crossley, Ian Parker, and Shelley Sclater,” Narrative Inquiry 13, no. 2 
(2003): 331-346; Kenneth J. Gergen, The Saturated Self: Dilemmas of Identity in Contemporary Life (New 
York: Basic Books, 2000 [1991]); Matti Hyvärinen, Lars-Christer Hydén, Marja Saarenheimo, and Maria 
Tamboukou, eds., Beyond Narrative Coherence (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2010); 
Dan P. McAdams, “The Problem of Narrative Coherence,” Journal of Constructivist Psychology 19, no. 2 
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Yet another approach that such a study of self-narration could have taken is a 
sociologically-attuned approach that recognises that self-narratives, like most narratives, 
are influenced by cultural practices – and are, indeed, themselves cultural practices – and 
thus need to be understood in their social situatedness and emergence.7 Moreover, such a 
study could also have drawn on the ample literature on social research methods that collect 
and analyse narratives in order to study how different narratives are socially received and 
adjudicated.8 
 
This thesis is inspired and draws upon different aspects of these various theoretical, 
disciplinary and methodological approaches to the ways in which power relations bear on 
practices of narrating trauma, particularly within institutional settings. One might even 
say that in an analysis of trauma, a degree of eclecticism is unavoidable – even a cursory 
look at the extensive literature (academic and otherwise) shows how engagements with 
trauma feature in psychiatry and the psychological sciences as much as in cultural studies, 
political and literary theory. This broad range of academic disciplines that engage with 
trauma is reflected in Dominick LaCapra’s contention: “No genre or discipline ‘owns’ 
trauma as a problem or can provide definitive boundaries for it.”9 Roger Luckhurst echoes 
this sentiment when he maintains that “[t]rauma is also always a breaching of 
disciplines.”10 Therefore, although this thesis is rooted in philosophy as a ‘discipline’, it 
                                               
(2006): 109-125; Jefferson A. Singer and Blerim Rexhaj, “Narrative Coherence and Psychotherapy: A 
Commentary,” Journal of Constructivist Psychology 19, no. 2 (2006): 209-217. 
7 In the sociological literature, research that has emphasised the social character of narratives, and how 
narratives are differentially treated in a society includes Michael Bamberg and Molly Andrews, eds., 
Considering Counter-Narratives: Narrating, resisting, making sense (Amsterdam: John Benjamins 
Publishing Company, 2004); Catrina Brown, “Women’s Narratives of Trauma: (Re)storying Uncertainty, 
Minimization and Self-Blame,” Narrative Works: Issues, Investigations, & Interventions 3, no. 1 (2013): 
1-30; Paul John Eakin, “Breaking Rules: The Consequences of Self-Narration,” Biography 24, no. 1 (2001): 
113-127; Arthur W. Frank, The Wounded Storyteller: Body, Illness, and Ethics (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1995); Matti Hyvärinen, “Narrative and Sociology,” Narrative Works: Issues, 
Investigations, & Interventions 6, no. 1 (2016): 38-62; Francesca Polletta, Pang Ching Bobby Chen, Beth 
Gharrity Gardner, and Alice Motes, “The Sociology of Storytelling,” Annual Review of Sociology 37 (2011): 
109-130; Ken Plummer, Telling Sexual Stories: Power, Change and Social Worlds (London: Routledge, 
1995). 
8 See, for example, Molly Andrews, Corinne Squire, and Maria Tamboukou, eds., Doing Narrative 
Research (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2008). 
9 Dominick LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2001), 
96. 
10 Roger Luckhurst, The Trauma Question (London: Routledge, 2008), 4. 
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cannot avoid looking at other disciplines. While this study is rooted in philosophical ideas, 
particularly those of Foucault and Butler, in order to flesh out the implications of their 
respective accounts of self-narration, it considers their views in light of social scientific 
and psychological studies of trauma. In this way, the ideas of Foucault and Butler are 
brought to bear on concrete situations and the studies on trauma in other disciplines are 
subjected to critical scrutiny. 
 
Reflecting on trauma in this way presented methodological challenges, most of which 
were not anticipated in advance. I came to this study with a philosophical interest in 
practices of self-narration, attuned to the fact that such practices are entangled with ethical 
and political considerations. I approached the activity of self-narration with an outlook 
that holds that both the ‘self’ and ‘narration’ are historical and discursive correlates, and 
my interest in this activity is to explore this entanglement. Thus, in the spirit of 
genealogical inquiry inspired by Foucault’s work, I seek to understand the history of the 
present configuration of trauma and its narration, and, in so doing, I aim to allow 
considerations of power relations to come to the fore of this inquiry. This concern with 
power relations that impact the narration of trauma in contemporary times led, quite early 
on in this analysis, to consider more closely the discursive conditions that are presently 
shaping what can be narrated, which and whose trauma is to be narrated, and how such 
narration must happen. To do so means to deeply consider trauma from multiple analytical 
vantage points, from philosophical and psychological to sociological. With that said, 
however, I feel that a more philosophical approach is the one most capable of achieving 
the critical distance from dominant discourses required in order to gauge how such 
discourses exert dominance over narrating subjects as well as other disciplines that study 
trauma. This implies that, while in-depth exploration and use of empirical studies from 
other disciplines – such as social scientific studies, anthropological fieldworks, 
psychological literature – is an important task, the critical aims of this thesis cannot be 
entirely determined and constrained by discipline-specific norms of inquiry, namely the 
social sciences. This is because certain norms and prejudices replicated in empirical social 
scientific studies themselves are the object of this study. Throughout this research, I felt 
that the ‘methodological flexibility’ afforded by philosophical inquiry was equally a curse 
10 
 
and a blessing. The ‘epistemic profile’ of philosophy can be critiqued as inferior 
especially when it seeks to confront authoritative discourses that present themselves as 
having superior scientific credentials. But, although philosophy may no longer claim to 
be the epistemological ‘mother of all disciplines’ in the contemporary university, it can 
nonetheless present a unique discursive space in the contemporary economy of 
knowledge. Not being pinned down to a strict methodological outlook can enable, as I 
hope this thesis does, critical reflection on the politics of knowledge itself, that is, on how 
the creation, regulation and use of knowledge is contributing to contemporary processes 
of government in the wide sense of the term. The way in which trauma as an object of 
study was approached in this thesis recognises the importance of social scientific methods 
but insists that aspects of philosophical and conceptual theorising cannot be – and perhaps 
ought not to be – reduced to such methodologies. Rather than posing this issue as requiring 
a choice between a ‘theoretical’ approach and an ‘applied’ one, the method adopted 
throughout this thesis seeks to problematise any neat division between the two while 
appreciating that critical work requires facets of both outlooks. 
 
It is for these reasons, therefore, that this thesis switches from philosophically-informed 
analyses, for example of power and subjectivity, when theorising self-narration to more 
empirical studies of the narration of trauma in courts or the asylum process. No amount 
of theorising about Foucault or Butler is sufficient for a study how contemporary power 
actually functions on survivors in institutional contexts in which trauma is narrated; in the 
same way that no social scientific approach or ‘data collection’ allows one to theorise 
narrative identity or think through the effects of discourses and power relations on 
processes of subjectification. Besides theoretical rigour, it is also a responsibility of this 
study to pay attention to occurrences of actual narrations of trauma, and not solely rely on 
theorisation, in order to analyse what actually influences and affects narrations of trauma, 
and the manner in which these influences work upon traumatised individuals. The 
different analytical gestures that constitute this thesis highlight the plural ways in which 
power functions on survivors of trauma, influencing how trauma is narrated, determining 
how narratives of trauma are socially received, and privileging notions of subjectivity and 
self-narration as more acceptable than others. However, in the same way that Foucault 
11 
 
analysed resistance as co-existent with power, and explored non-normalising techniques 
of the self, this thesis too explores the critical potential within narratives of trauma. This 
possibility of trauma survivors to narrate otherwise is emphasised throughout since these 
other forms of traumatic self-narration may trouble the way in which dominant discourses 
obfuscate the activity of self-narration. 
 
*** 
 
Chapter 1 provides a genealogical overview of trauma from the mid-19th century onward, 
highlighting the key figures and phases in the modern history of trauma up to contemporary 
trauma theory. In so doing, this chapter presents the background against which the theoretical 
concerns of the thesis can be understood, both to highlight continuities and also to emphasise 
the specific interests of this study. Chapter 2 identifies the different references Foucault 
makes to practices of self-narration in his early works up to the late 1970s, particularly through 
his ideas on discourse, power and confession. Through an analysis of the cases of Pierre 
Rivière and Herculine Barbin, and a consideration of Foucault’s motivation in publishing their 
dossier, this chapter shows how self-narration is caught up in a struggle of discourses and 
power relations, which also implies co-existent possibilities of resistance inherent in practices 
of self-narration. Chapter 3 explores Foucault’s references to practices of self-narration in 
his 1980s work, especially his lecture courses, to delineate his genealogical account of 
practices of confession, spiritual direction and techniques of self-examination from classical 
antiquity to early Christian practices. This chapter also considers Foucault’s work on self-
writing and parrhesia as presenting an alternative to a normalising and confessional truth-
telling. Chapter 4 considers how feminist analyses of practices of self-narration, such as 
consciousness-raising techniques, have fruitfully extended Foucault’s views on self-narration. 
Such analyses are used to highlight the relation between the private and public dimensions of 
traumatic self-narration, showing how although narratives of trauma can be swayed toward 
hegemonic truth-telling they can also harbour a critical and subversive potential. Chapter 5 
turns to Butler’s views on performativity, precariousness, vulnerability and relationality to 
show that her ideas complement and enrich Foucault’s account of the relation between power 
relations and subjectivity. Butler’s work is also discussed in relation to her critique of the 
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conception of self-narration based on the sovereignty, mastery, unity and coherence of the 
subject. Chapter 6 sustains this critique by reading Butler’s ideas on self-narration, 
particularly her critical account of narrative coherence, in relation to issues in trauma theory. 
This chapter argues that narrative coherence functions as a possibly hegemonic norm in legal 
and political contexts, facilitating the reception of some forms of narrating trauma while 
making it harder for other forms of traumatic self-narration to be considered as viable or 
legitimate. Chapter 7 further analyses the norm of narrative coherence by considering its role 
in the psychological sciences, focusing on the ways in which the relation between the self, 
narrative and trauma is theorised in different approaches to psychology. Narrative coherence 
is shown to be a privileged norm that operates not only at the level of theories of psychology, 
but also on how trauma is narrated by traumatised individuals. Chapter 8 brings together the 
concerns pursued in the thesis by analysing the narration of trauma in the asylum seeking 
process, a process in which psychological, legal and political discourses function alongside 
each other. This chapter explores the different levels of inequality and power relations that 
govern self-narration in the asylum process, and determine the worth and currency of trauma 
narratives in contemporary times. 
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Chapter 1 Theorising Trauma: From Railways to Camps to the TV 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the modern history of trauma from the mid-19th 
century onward by considering – in the form of an engaged literature review – the major 
sources and commentaries on the genealogy of trauma. The books discussed in this 
chapter include those by (in the order of publication) Judith Herman,1 Allan Young,2 Ruth 
Leys,3 Roger Luckhurst,4 E. Ann Kaplan,5 and Didier Fassin and Richard Rechtman.6 This 
review is not exhaustive since what is attempted here is not a detailed account of the 
history of trauma, and does not enter into the debates on ‘what trauma is’ or try to 
adjudicate on competing models of trauma. Rather, by indicating the key episodes, players 
and issues in the history of trauma, this chapter highlights the major phases of trauma 
theory through key literature on the topic. In doing so, this chapter presents the 
background against which the concerns in trauma pursued throughout the thesis can be 
understood, both to highlight continuities and also to emphasise the specific interests of 
this study. 
 
1.1 The Modern Births of Trauma 
 
As a study that hopes to be Foucaultian in spirit, this thesis is sensitive to the genealogical 
origins of trauma, and its rich and animated history. For this reason, this study cannot 
settle for an understanding of trauma as prescribed by contemporary scientific knowledge 
which, in the latest fifth edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), is codified in the diagnosis of Post-
                                               
1 Judith Herman, Trauma and Recovery: The Aftermath of Violence – From Domestic Abuse to Political 
Terror (New York: Basic Books, 2015 [1992]). 
2 Allan Young, The Harmony of Illusions: Inventing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995). 
3 Ruth Leys, Trauma: A Genealogy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000). 
4 Luckhurst, The Trauma Question. 
5 E. Ann Kaplan, Trauma Culture: The Politics of Terror and Loss in Media and Literature (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2005). 
6 Didier Fassin and Richard Rechtman, The Empire of Trauma: An Inquiry into the Condition of Victimhood, 
trans. Rachel Gomme (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009 [2007]). 
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Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).7 Rather, a genealogical approach to trauma is 
undertaken in order to foreground the politics of trauma; that is, the multifarious social 
and political factors that have determined and regulated the meaning of trauma in different 
historical contexts. Such a genealogical approach enables a better understanding of the 
complex dynamics – medical, psychological, political, economic – that lay behind the 
development of contemporary understandings of trauma, such as those inscribed in the 
PTSD diagnosis. A genealogical approach, that is, an approach that regards developments 
in thought or knowledge as necessarily implicated in struggles of power, to the historically 
shifting categories of mental disorders enables an analysis of the social and political 
implications of being diagnosed. A genealogical approach considers medical, legal and 
political discourses in their multiple interrelations as they come to bear upon trauma as an 
experience and object of inquiry. Such an approach to trauma shows how, more often than 
not, no matter how deep-rooted they may seem, concepts have a history, and did not 
always mean and imply what they do now. In this regard, trauma is no exception. 
 
The etymological lineage of the word ‘trauma’ is from the ancient Greek word that means 
“to break, cut, hurt, injure, scathe, sear or (most commonly) to wound.”8 The medical 
meaning of the term ‘trauma’, introduced in English in the 17th century, signifies a 
physical wound, typically a severe blow caused by an external agent.9 The contemporary 
use of the term ‘trauma’ emerged later, more precisely in the late 19th century, when the 
meaning of trauma “shift[s] from soma to psyche”10 following what Ian Hacking calls “the 
                                               
7 The latest (fifth) edition of the DSM defines PTSD in terms of eight distinct diagnostic criteria, these 
being: A. Direct, vicarious or repeated extreme exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury or 
sexual violence; B. Presence of at least one intrusion symptom associated with the trauma, such as 
distressing memories, nightmares, flashbacks or triggering; C. Persistent avoidance of stimuli, memories or 
reminders associated with the trauma; D. Negative alternations in cognitions and mood associated with the 
traumatic event, such as amnesia, persistent negative emotional states, inability to experience positive 
emotions, and distorted cognitions; E. Marked alterations in arousal and reactivity associated with the 
trauma, such as irritable behaviour, hypervigilance, exaggerated startle response, and sleep disturbance; F. 
Disturbance duration of longer than one month; G. Disturbance causing distress or impairment in social and 
occupational functioning; H. Disturbance not attributable to the physiological effects of a substance, such 
as medication or alcohol. See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders, 5th ed. (Washington: American Psychiatric Publishing, 2013), 271-272. 
8 Patrick Duggan, Trauma-Tragedy: Symptoms of Contemporary Performance (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2012), 15. 
9 See Luckhurst, The Trauma Question, 2. 
10 Laura Marcus, Dreams of Modernity: Psychoanalysis, Literature, Cinema (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), 43. 
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psychologization of trauma.”11 Leys presents a characterisation of this dominant 
understanding of modern trauma; a characterisation which persists in contemporary times:  
 
owing to the emotions of terror and surprise caused by certain events, the mind is 
split or dissociated: it is unable to register the wound to the psyche because the 
ordinary mechanisms of awareness and cognition are destroyed. As a result, the 
victim is unable to recollect and integrate the hurtful experience in normal 
consciousness; instead, she is haunted or possessed by intrusive traumatic 
memories.12 
 
Various commentators on the history of trauma have noted a significant relation between 
trauma and modernity; there is something particularly modern about trauma. Lerner and 
Micale suggest that the concept of trauma, particularly its expansion to capture 
physiological phenomena and, eventually, psychological experiences “was 
simultaneously responsive to and constitutive of ‘modernity.’”13 Emblems of modernity, 
Luckhurst argues, are the city, urban activity, technology, machinery and, most notably, 
the railway. Besides being “the icon of British modernity” and a piece of “engineering 
genius,”14 the railway became notorious for its dangers and accidents. In fact, Ralph 
Harrington contends, if the steam engine on a railway can be considered as a symbol of 
the 19th century, “a steam engine running off a railway and dragging its train to destruction 
behind it might serve equally well.”15 For this reason, the work of British physician John 
Erichsen from the 1860s on railway injuries, or ‘railway spine’, is often taken to be a 
significant reference point in the modern history of trauma.16 Erichsen’s work sought to 
                                               
11 See Ian Hacking, Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1995), 183-197, cited in Marcus, Dreams of Modernity, 43. See also Luckhurst, 
The Trauma Question, 2-3. 
12 Leys, Trauma, 2. 
13 Paul Lerner and Mark S. Micale, “Trauma, Psychiatry, and History: A Conceptual and Historiographical 
Introduction,” in Traumatic Pasts: History, Psychiatry and Trauma in the Modern Age, 1870-1930, eds. 
Mark S. Micale and Paul Lerner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 10. 
14 Luckhurst, The Trauma Question, 21. 
15 Ralph Harrington, “The Railway Accident: Trains, Trauma, and Technological Crises in Nineteenth-
Century Britain,” in Traumatic Pasts: History, Psychiatry and Trauma in the Modern Age, 1870-1930, eds. 
Mark S. Micale and Paul Lerner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 31 [emphasis in original]. 
16 Although Erichsen’s work on railway spine is often cited as highly influential in the development of the 
modern notion of trauma, Leys – following Young – cautions against tracing a linear relation between his 
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study the causes of physical and psychological disorders developed by seemingly healthy 
individuals in the aftermath of a railway accident in which they were uninjured. Erichsen 
theorised railway spine as a condition brought about by the violent jolt to the spinal cord 
during the incident, the physical and psychological effects of which developed in the days 
following the incident. Symptoms of railway spine included: “‘giddiness, loss of memory, 
pains in the back and head’, ‘tingling and numbness of the extremities, local paralysis, 
paraplegia, functional lesions of the kidney and bladder’, and even ‘slowly ensuing 
symptoms of intellectual derangement’.”17 
 
Besides the medical community, Erichsen’s work was influential within legal contexts, 
particularly in litigation cases. Discourses of trauma flourished not only in the psychiatric 
literature, but especially in medico-legal settings amid the scientific disciplines associated 
with forensic medicine that were emerging at the time.18 In fact, Fassin and Rechtman 
report that “Erichsen himself battled with railroad companies to force them to compensate 
the injured, even when they presented no physical injuries.”19 Since its modern origins, 
the entanglement between medical and legal discourses has characterised 
conceptualisations and perceptions of trauma. The protestations of powerful institutions 
– in this case, railway companies – who wanted to dismiss the claims of the victims 
contributed to the development of scientific knowledge of trauma. The drive to utilise 
scientific knowledge in order to dismiss the narrative of the trauma survivor is an impulse 
that has been present since the modern births of trauma. Interestingly, Foucault’s point on 
the reversibility of power relations and the co-existence of resistance and power finds 
                                               
work, later work by Freud, and later developments of trauma as PTSD, since trauma does not constitute a 
timeless intrinsic unity. Interestingly, despite the centrality ascribed to Erichsen’s work in most histories of 
trauma, Leys only mentions him once in her book on trauma, and only to make her point on erroneous 
approaches to the history of trauma. See Leys, Trauma, 3-6. In her genealogy of trauma, Leys offers a 
detailed analysis of the history of trauma and its conceptualisation. She discusses the role of Freud’s work 
in the history of trauma, Morton Prince’s work on traumatic dissociation through the case of Miss 
Beauchamp, as well as Sándor Ferenczi’s views on psychic trauma and Pierre Janet’s work on traumatic 
memory and dissociation in the context of the First World War. She then considers the work of Abram 
Kardiner and William Sargant in the context of how trauma was conceptualised in view of the Second World 
War. The book culminates in a rather polemical engagement with contemporary trauma theories, principally 
Bessel van del Kolk’s neurobiology of trauma and how these views were taken up by Cathy Caruth’s 
deconstructionist works on trauma. 
17 Harrington, “The Railway Accident,” 40. 
18 See Luckhurst, The Trauma Question, 24. 
19 Fassin and Rechtman, The Empire of Trauma, 35. 
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clear support in the history of trauma and how medical knowledge was used to defend as 
well as dismiss trauma victims, as can be seen in the reception of Herbert Page’s work on 
trauma. In the 1880s, Page responded to Erichsen’s work, and whereas Erichsen was 
ambiguous on whether the causes of railway spine were organic and somatic or not, Page 
focused more on the mind by arguing that “the emotion of fear alone was sufficient to 
inflict severe shock on the nervous system, and he saw the psychological effects of 
involvement in a railway accident as quite capable of inducing nervous illness and 
collapse.”20 However, although Page’s motivation was to dissociate the condition of 
railway spine from its reliance on an organic cause, his work was used as a defence by 
railway companies to justify their claim that this condition “had no basis in actual 
injuries.”21 
 
Importantly, these debates on railway spine were happening contemporaneously with the 
debates on hysteria (which were debates of medical interest, but also had great socio-
political implications), and efforts were made to distinguish between the two conditions 
despite their apparent similarities. Fassin and Rechtman write: “The clinical signs [of such 
railway and other industrial accidents] were similar to those of hysteria: fatigue, 
nightmares, pseudo-paralysis, and diffuse pain with no neurological basis.”22 However, 
the equation of railway spine and similar conditions (whose victims were typically male) 
with the feminising diagnosis of hysteria was not warmly received. In response to such a 
suggestion, Erichsen wrote: 
 
In those cases in which a man advanced in life, of energetic business habits, of 
great mental activity and vigour, in no way subject to gusty fits of emotion of any 
kind, – a man, in fact, active in mind, accustomed to self-control, addicted to 
business, and healthy in body, suddenly, and for the first time in his life, after the 
infliction of a severe shock to the system, finds himself affected by a train of 
symptoms indicative of serious and deep-seated injury to the nervous system, – is 
                                               
20 Harrington, “The Railway Accident,” 50. 
21 Harrington, “The Railway Accident,” 52. 
22 Fassin and Rechtman, The Empire of Trauma, 37. 
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it reasonable to say that such a man has suddenly become “hysterical” like a love-
sick girl?23 
 
This is an early manifestation of the politics of trauma, which highlights that the way in 
which trauma was conceptualised was greatly determined by socio-political factors and 
discourses that added a normative dimension to the medical definition of trauma. In fact, 
the development of the term ‘traumatic neurosis’ in the late 1800s by Berlin neurologist 
Hermann Oppenheim was an attempt to distinguish it from hysteria despite the similarity 
of symptoms.24 Despite working independently of one other, with only a few being aware 
of the others’ work, different theorists of trauma in the late 19th century all emphasised 
the shattering of the personality due to extreme terror or fright. Jean-Martin Charcot was 
among the first to contest the prejudice against hysteria, and his work was highly 
influential on Sigmund Freud’s early work on hysteria and Pierre Janet’s work on 
traumatic memory and dissociation. In their work, trauma was theorised as an experience 
that shattered the victim’s cognitive-perceptual capacities, making the traumatic scene 
unavailable to a certain kind of recollection. Hypnosis was used as a therapeutic technique 
to retrieve the forgotten, repressed and dissociated recollections by bringing them to 
consciousness and into language.  
 
The centrality of Freud’s work in the history of modern trauma is often noted.25 Around 
the 1890s, Freud’s work on ‘hysterical females’ revealed that sexual exploitation, or 
‘seduction’, was at the heart of hysteria. Freud and Josef Breuer outlined the seduction 
theory in their 1895 book on hysteria in which they posit: “Hysterics suffer mainly from 
reminiscences.”26 Freud reiterated this theory in a 1896 paper on the aetiology of hysteria 
when he wrote that “at the bottom of every case of hysteria there are one or more 
                                               
23 Harrington, “The Railway Accident,” 52. 
24 See Young, The Harmony of Illusions, 20. 
25 For a comprehensive account of Freud’s views on trauma, see John Fletcher, Freud and the Scene of 
Trauma (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), as well as Young, The Harmony of Illusions, 36-38, 
Kaplan, Trauma Culture, 25-32, Leys, Trauma, 18-40 and Luckhurst, The Trauma Question, 45-49. 
26 Josef Breuer and Sigmund Freud, “On the Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena: Preliminary 
Communication (1893),” in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 
vol. 2, ed. James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press, 1955), 7 [emphasis in original]. 
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occurrences of premature sexual experience.”27 After 1897, Freud abandoned the 
seduction theory and instead focused on the effects of repressed erotic infantile wishes 
and fantasies, thereby denying (or, at least, heavily underplaying) the significance of 
actual trauma on the individual psyche. Freud’s abandonment of the seduction theory is 
often explained in terms of the development in his psychoanalytic framework. However, 
Herman provides a further explanation: Freud acknowledged and listened to the life 
stories of his female ‘hysterical’ patients but “[w]hat he heard was appalling.”28 Herman 
claims that Freud was shocked by the implications of his own discovery, namely that 
sexual acts with children, particularly girls, were pervasive. However, Freud “was 
increasingly troubled by the radical social implications of his hypothesis,”29 and opted not 
to investigate them. Leys contests such an interpretation by arguing that Freud rejected 
from the outset a straightforward causal analysis of trauma.30 She points out that Freud’s 
position was that trauma arose in the delayed revival of the experience as memory after 
the individual had entered sexual maturity and could grasp the actual sexual meaning of 
the event; Freud termed this nachträglichkeit, or deferred action.31 For Freud, traumatic 
memory is inherently unstable and mutable owing to the role of unconscious motives that 
confer meaning on it. Leys contends that Freud’s rejection of trauma as a direct cause and 
his emphasis on psychosexual meaning has to be understood in the context of a tendency 
within psychoanalysis to interiorise trauma, according to which the external trauma 
derived its force solely from internal psychic processes shaped by earlier psychosexual 
desires and fantasies. 
 
 
 
                                               
27 Sigmund Freud, “The Aetiology of Hysteria (1896),” in The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 3, ed. James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press, 1962), 
203 [emphasis in original], quoted in Herman, Trauma and Recovery, 13. 
28 Herman, Trauma and Recovery, 13. 
29 Herman, Trauma and Recovery, 14. For more on this point, see Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, The Assault 
on Truth: Freud’s Suppression of the Seduction Theory (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1984). 
30 “Freud’s theory of seduction was never the simple causal theory of trauma that contemporary critics, such 
as Van der Kolk, Herman, Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, and others have portrayed it to be.” Leys, Trauma, 
19. 
31 See Leys, Trauma, 20. 
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1.2 Trauma at War 
 
The World Wars were important episodes in the history of trauma and its 
conceptualisation. The First World War marked a return of interest in the significance of 
‘the event’ in trauma. Psychologists and psychiatrists endeavoured to understand the 
emotional reactions (flashbacks, shell shock, military neuroses) of veterans who returned 
traumatised after being exposed to military combat. The traumatic neuroses of war forced 
Freud to reconsider his position on the primordial importance of infantile psychosexual 
drives: “Were not the thousands of cases of combat hysteria observed in apparently 
healthy men the direct result of external trauma of trench warfare?”32 This made it clearer, 
against tendencies of the time that tried to locate the cause of such suffering in organic 
damage, that victims of shell shock fell ill not from organic lesions but from psychical 
causes.33 
 
The condition of ‘shell shock’, a term coined by the British psychologist Charles Myers, 
highlights the gendered history of trauma. Myers observed that prolonged exposure to 
warfare and death was resulting in men – honourable and glorious soldiers – breaking 
down and manifesting a neurotic syndrome with symptoms that were similar to hysteria: 
“many soldiers began to act like hysterical women. They screamed and wept 
uncontrollably. They froze and could not move. They became mute and unresponsive. 
They lost their memory and their capacity to feel.”34 Since, in the male-dominated spheres 
of medicine and warfare, it was inconceivable to admit that soldiers were behaving like 
hysterical women, notions such as war or combat neurosis developed to differentiate it 
from hysteria. Nonetheless, the gendered politics of hysteria was still replicated in cases 
of combat neurosis where “the moral character of the patient”35 was emphasised and 
attacked. The British psychiatrist Lewis Yealland, for example, “advocated a treatment 
                                               
32 Leys, Trauma, 21. 
33 Many medical professionals at the time turned to the therapeutic methods of catharsis developed by Freud 
and Breuer. However, these events also challenged Freud to combine experiences of shell shock with his 
theoretical system of libido theory and the theory of psychosexual origins of neuroses; his notion of the 
death drive, through which he explained a human instinct for aggression beyond the pleasure principle, was 
a move in this direction. See Leys, Trauma, 21-27. 
34 Herman, Trauma and Recovery, 20. See also Luckhurst, The Trauma Question, 49-52. 
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strategy based on shaming, threats, and punishment,”36 threats of court martial, and 
extraordinary treatments such as electric shocks. More progressive and liberal figures, 
such as William H. R. Rivers (whose most famous patient was the poet Siegfried Sassoon) 
advocated more humane treatments that acknowledged “that combat neurosis was a bona 
fide psychiatric condition that could occur in soldiers of high moral character.”37 The 
American psychiatrist Abram Kardiner – whose 1941 work The Traumatic Neuroses of 
War was, according to Herman, instrumental “to develop[ing] the clinical outlines of the 
traumatic syndrome as it is understood today”38 – acknowledged that war neuroses was a 
form of hysteria. The gendered dimension of the history of trauma can also be seen in the 
way this change of outlook on war neurosis prompted a change of attitude with regard to 
the term ‘hysteria’ itself. Kardiner argued against the tendency to use the term ‘hysteria’ 
in a pejorative sense, and contested the use of the term ‘hysteria’ to discredit patients.39 
 
After the two World Wars and the Vietnam War,40 interest in trauma persisted through the 
work of figures such as Adolf Meyer, William Sargant, Herbert Spiegel, Roy Grinker, 
John Spiegel, Lawrence Kolb and Robert Jay Lifton, who identified and studied trauma-
related conditions such as chronic ‘concentration camp syndrome’, ‘survivor syndrome’ 
and ‘Post-Vietnam Syndrome’.41 However, these scientific efforts were not enough to 
arouse widespread interest in trauma since, for Leys: 
 
it was largely as the result of an essentially political struggle by psychiatrists, 
social workers, activists and others to acknowledge the post-war sufferings of the 
Vietnam War veteran that the third edition of the American Psychiatric 
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (1980) 
accorded the traumatic syndrome, or PTSD, official recognition for the first time.42 
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The inclusion of PTSD in the DSM was a turning point in the social recognition of trauma 
since it meant that veterans who returned home traumatised could no longer be accused 
of malingering or cowardice because the symptoms of PTSD signified a ‘real’ condition 
that deserved attention and treatment. Moreover, the possibility of such a diagnosis had 
economic implications, as PTSD sufferers could claim compensation money for damages 
suffered as a result of the war. This economic entanglement at the birth of the PTSD 
diagnosis is a significant one within the genealogy of trauma, especially in view of the 
fact that issues surrounding the economic utility of PTSD are still very much alive today.43 
 
Leys claims that PTSD “is fundamentally a disorder of memory,”44 complementing 
Young’s succinct characterisation of PTSD as “a disease of time.”45 Various studies, 
particularly from the fields of anthropology and critical psychology, have adopted a 
genealogical approach to PTSD itself as an object of inquiry. Young’s The Harmony of 
Illusions: Inventing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder is among the most prominent in this 
regard. Young argues that although “[a]s far back as we know, people have been 
tormented by memories that filled them with feelings of sadness and remorse, the sense 
of irreparable loss, and sensations of fright and horror,”46 the modern view of trauma as 
PTSD does not represent a timeless intrinsic unity. For Young, the conception of trauma 
underlying PTSD “is glued together by the practices, technologies, and narratives with 
which it is diagnosed, studied, treated, and represented and by the various interests, 
institutions, and moral arguments that mobilized these efforts and resources.”47 In this 
regard, Leys notes how Young follows Hacking’s work in arguing that “PTSD is a way 
of ‘making up’ a certain type of person that individuals can conceive themselves as being 
and on the basis of which they can become eligible for insurance-reimbursed therapy, or 
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compensation, or can plead diminished responsibility in courts of law.”48 Luckhurst 
echoes this genealogical point when he claims that “every version of trauma, from railway 
spine via traumatic neurosis and shell shock to PTSD, has always been in major part a 
medico-legal concept bound up with economic questions of compensation, its treatment 
determined by medical and welfare costs.”49 Fassin and Rechtman also adopt a 
genealogical approach in their study on trauma when they claim that the premise of their 
book: 
 
is not whether or not an individual who has experienced or been exposed to a 
dramatic event is suffering from post-traumatic stress, and hence whether he or 
she merits psychological care and financial compensation. Our goal is rather to 
understand how we have moved from a realm in which the symptoms of the 
wounded soldier or the injured worker were deemed of doubtful legitimacy to one 
in which their suffering, no longer contested, testifies to an experience that excites 
sympathy and merits compensation.50 
 
Common to these major sources (Leys, Young, Hacking, Fassin and Rechtman) on trauma 
theory and history is their – implicit or explicit – reliance on and adoption of Foucaultian 
approaches, particularly genealogical approaches to history, the power of discourses and 
processes of subject-formation. Although these different sources have their respective 
research aims and directions, they all inform this study insofar as they illuminate what a 
genealogical approach to trauma involves. It is in relation to these studies that this thesis 
situates its concern with how trauma is narrated and how trauma narratives are treated, 
received and recognised by the institutions that encounter and interact with them. 
However, although this thesis builds on such a Foucaultian approach to critical issues 
surrounding trauma narration, it has to be noted that trauma theory within the humanities 
has been largely dominated by other theoretical approaches, as the next section shows.  
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1.3 Trauma in the Academy 
 
Before delving deeper into what motivated the move of trauma theory into the humanities, 
it is useful to situate this move within Leys’ genealogy of trauma theory (itself a 
contribution to trauma theory in the humanities). Leys’ main claim in relation to the 
history of trauma is that, despite the non-linearity and singularity of events, it has always 
been structured by tensions or oscillations between what she calls the mimetic and 
antimimetic tendencies or paradigms.51 The mimetic and antimimetic tendencies cannot 
be strictly separated from each other; for Leys, the contradiction between these tendencies 
has continued to shape psychology and psychoanalysis: “from the moment of its invention 
in the late nineteenth century the concept of trauma has been fundamentally unstable, 
balancing uneasily – indeed veering uncontrollably – between two ideas, theories or 
paradigms.”52 The mimetic theory of trauma accords a central position to “the problem of 
imitation, defined as a problem of hypnotic imitation.”53 This approach to theorising 
trauma foregrounds the hypnotised subject as the template for early psychoanalytic 
theories of traumatic memory, due to the tendency of the hypnotised individual to imitate 
or repeat (hence, mimesis) what is suggested to them. The association of trauma with 
mimesis was troubling since it threatened to destabilise the modern ideals of individual 
autonomy, sovereignty and responsibility.54 Leys summarises the mimetic theory as 
follows: 
 
[It] holds that trauma, or the experience of the traumatized subject, can be 
understood as involving a kind of hypnotic imitation of or regressive identification 
with the original traumatogenic person, scene, or event, with the result that the 
subject is fated to act it out or in other ways imitate it. Trauma is understood as an 
experience of violence that immerses the victim in the scene so profoundly that it 
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precludes the kind of specular distance necessary for cognitive knowledge of what 
has happened. The mimetic theory explains the tendency of traumatized people to 
compulsively repeat their violent experiences in nightmares or repetitive forms of 
acting out by comparing the traumatic repetition to hypnotic imitation. […] An 
aspect of the mimetic theory that should be stressed […] is that mimesis or 
unconscious imitation leads to doubts about the veracity of the subject’s testimony, 
since the identificatory process is thought to take place outside of, or dissociated 
from, ordinary awareness.55 
 
The rival antimimetic paradigm of trauma regards traumatic memories as linked not to 
the unconscious processes of the subject’s inner world, but as the unmediated (and 
unassimilable) records of traumatic events that come from outside the subject. These 
memories come to occupy an area of the mind that precludes their retrieval. According to 
this model, rather than the psychical dissociation from the self, trauma is the record of an 
unassimilable event which is dissociated from memory. According to antimimetic theory, 
victims of trauma are not blindly immersed in the scene of shock but, argues Leys: 
 
remain aloof from the traumatic experience, in the sense that he remains a 
spectator of the scene, which he can therefore see and represent to himself. […] 
[T]he trauma is a purely external event that befalls a fully constituted if passive 
subject. Whatever damage there may be to the victim’s psychical integrity, there 
is in principle no problem about his eventually recovering from the trauma, though 
the process of bringing this about may be long and arduous.56 
 
With this prelude in mind, how is the migration of trauma theory to the humanities, 
particularly in analyses informed by Derridean deconstruction, to be understood? The 
migration of trauma theory to the humanities, although more prominent in the 1980s, was 
stimulated by an interest in issues surrounding the Holocaust. Many studies of trauma 
within non-medical fields centre on the question of bearing witness to a traumatic event. 
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For example, a lot of academic work has drawn on issues raised in the autobiographical 
works of Holocaust survivors, such as Primo Levi, Elie Wiesel, Charlotte Delbo, Jean 
Améry, and on other works on survivor literature from this era by Terrence Des Pres, 
Giorgio Agamben and, in the world of cinema, by Claude Lanzmann.57 The key issues 
that emerge from this ‘phase’ of trauma theory revolve around the difficulties of bearing 
witness to such a terrible event, or the possibility of representing this event in a just 
manner. Kaplan suggests that the unexpected consideration of trauma in the humanities 
in the late 1980s took place “perhaps because trauma theory provided a welcome bridge 
back to social and political concerns in an era when high theory had become abstract.”58 
Susannah Radstone suggests a similar explanation when she writes that trauma theory 
“aimed to help the humanities move beyond the crises in knowledge posed by 
poststructuralism and deconstruction […] without abandoning their insights.”59 
 
An important episode that marked the migration of trauma theory to the humanities was 
the formation of the Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies at Yale 
University in 1979. The aim of this project was to create an archive of recorded eyewitness 
accounts from Holocaust survivors. Dori Laub, a psychiatrist, child survivor of the 
Holocaust and co-founder of the video archive, explains how the archive played an 
important role because “survivors did not only need to survive so that they could tell their 
stories; they also needed to tell their stories in order to survive. There is, in each survivor, 
an imperative need to tell.”60 Associated with this Archive was also Geoffrey Hartman, a 
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professor in the comparative literature department at Yale and a member of the Yale 
School of deconstruction influenced by Derrida’s work. This project brought together 
figures from the medical realm (such as Laub) and the humanities (such as Shoshana 
Felman, a literary critic at Yale) to collaborate on questions of trauma and testimony. One 
important project of this collaboration was the publication of Testimony: Crises of 
Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History in 1992.61 In this collaborative 
book, Laub, building on his training as a psychiatrist and his experiences as a survivor, 
reflects on the notion of bearing witness, on testimony and surviving, and on the 
imperatives to tell and listen to trauma testimonies. In her contributions to this book, 
Felman recounts the effects on her students of a university class on trauma testimonies, 
as well as providing readings of texts by Albert Camus, Paul de Man and Paul Celan, and 
Lanzmann’s documentary on Shoah witnesses. 
 
Another significant contribution to trauma theory in the humanities is the work of Cathy 
Caruth. Caruth is a product of the Yale school of deconstruction who received her PhD 
from Yale University in 1988, amid the flourishing of the Yale School of deconstruction 
with which de Man was associated when he went to Yale in the 1970s until his death in 
1983. Caruth’s view, elaborated in her 1996 book Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, 
Narrative, and History, is that “trauma is not locatable in the simple violent or original 
event in an individual’s past, but rather in the way that its very unassimilated nature – the 
way it was precisely not known in the first instance – returns to haunt the survivor later 
on.”62 Caruth’s claim, which she proposes through a series of readings of Freud’s texts in 
relation to works of literature, is that the force of trauma does not lie in the event itself but 
in the event remaining ‘unclaimed’ at the time it happens which results in traumatic 
repetitions. This leads her to argue that it is the belated arrival of the memory of the event 
itself that renders a particular memory traumatic. Radstone argues that Caruth’s views 
distance her from alternative re-interpretations of Freud – such as that of Laplanche and 
Pontalis – that suggest that, rather than the belated memory of the event, it is the meanings 
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conferred on the event afterwards that traumatises, that is, the unconscious production of 
associations clustering around a memory, and not the qualities intrinsic to certain events. 
Radstone summarises such re-interpretations of Freud, in tension with Caruth’s, as 
holding that “a memory becomes traumatic when it becomes associated, later, with 
inadmissible meanings, wishes, fantasies, which might include an identification with the 
aggressor.”63 Luckhurst writes that it is for this reason that “Laplanche has translated 
Freud’s term [nachträglichkeit] for belated or deferred action as ‘afterwardsness’, a 
deliberately awkward word that foregrounds the odd temporality of an event not 
understood as traumatic until its return.”64 
 
For Leys, the emphasis on the unclaimed nature of the traumatic experience is a 
problematic aspect of the antimimeticism that, according to her, influenced trauma studies 
in the humanities. She reads the rise of antimimetic trauma theory as fuelling the defence 
of an ideological commitment to the sovereignty and autonomy of the subject. As an 
example of how the tension between the mimetic and antimimetic approaches to trauma 
manifests itself, Leys cites the APA’s 1987 decision to remove survivor guilt (explained 
by mimetic theory through the assumption that identification is always ambivalent, 
structured by hate and love, rivalry and guilt) from the criteria of PTSD. For Leys, this 
move exemplifies the antimimetic dimension that enforces a strict dichotomy between the 
autonomous subject and the external trauma, preserving the coherence of the individual 
subject. She argues that a similar antimimetic tendency “lends itself to various positivistic 
interpretations of trauma epitomized by the neurobiological theories that have won 
widespread acceptance today.”65 
 
Radstone similarly criticises the trauma theories of Caruth and Felman and Laub for 
arguing that it is the unexperienced nature of the event that traumatises since, for her, this 
leads to a depthless topography of the mind, which entails the abandonment of Freud’s 
emphasis on the mediating role of unconscious processes in the production of memory. 
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She claims that although proponents of trauma theory in the humanities base their ideas 
on theoretical approaches such as psychoanalysis, structuralism, poststructuralism and 
deconstruction, they nonetheless seem to downplay the emphasis on the subject’s lack of 
sovereignty that is central to such theories. She argues that these theoretical approaches 
“all problematize, in different ways and to different degrees, those very notions of 
autonomy and sovereignty which lie at the heart of bourgeois constructions of 
subjectivity.”66 Consequently, Radstone thinks that it is paradoxical that contemporary 
trauma theorists, such as Caruth, rely on an antimimetic emphasis on catastrophic events 
which seems to present a theoretical defence of a model of subjectivity critiqued by the 
very same theoretical approaches they use. Radstone argues that there are tendencies 
within contemporary trauma theory that attempt to determine whether “one has either 
been present at or has ‘been’ traumatized by a terrible event or one has not.”67 She claims 
that this distinction is avoided in psychoanalysis, which emphasises a continuum of 
psychical states and which “takes the ‘darker side of the mind’ for granted, emphasizing 
the ubiquity of inadmissible sexual fantasies.”68 She refers to the work of the clinical 
psychologist Caroline Garland who argues that in psychoanalytic theory and practice 
“there is no such thing as an accident, there is no such thing as forgetting and there is no 
such thing as an absence of hatred, rage or destructiveness […] in spite of the urge in 
survivors to attribute all badness to the world outside them that caused their misfortune.”69 
Radstone concludes – and this is a conclusion that is explored in more detail in subsequent 
chapters – that despite going beyond modernity’s supposition of a coherent, autonomous, 
knowing subject (without rendering subjectivity incoherent, unknowing and fragmented), 
contemporary trauma theory still holds onto – in a relatively hidden way – a notion of a 
sovereign yet passive subject. 
 
Although such theoretical debates on trauma in the humanities in the 1980s, particularly 
reliant on psychoanalytic theory, are central to the history of trauma theory, they lie 
outside the main scope of this study. While this thesis is situated within such 
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contemporary debates on trauma theory, it aims less to theorise trauma, but is more 
interested in the social and institutional reception and dissemination of survivors’ trauma 
narratives. In this regard, the feminist movement and feminist analyses of trauma reached 
outside the confines of academia to develop a more socio-politically grounded approach 
to trauma and its narration. 
 
1.4 Trauma and Sexual Violence 
 
The widening of the term ‘trauma’ to recognise sexual trauma, domestic violence and 
child abuse was an impactful episode in the history of trauma and trauma theory. Herman 
notes how the women’s movement in the 1970s highlighted “that the most common post-
traumatic disorders are those not of men in war but of women in civilian life.”70 Herman’s 
contribution to trauma theory is primarily as a psychiatrist but, as she makes clear, her 
book Trauma and Recovery “is written from a feminist perspective […] in a language […] 
that is faithful both to the dispassionate, reasoned traditions of my profession and to the 
passionate claims of people who have been violated and outraged.”71 It is for this latter 
reason that the history of trauma she provides is a political history that is attuned to how 
(gendered) power played a significant role in how trauma has been theorised and spoken 
about. Herman emphasises the important role played by feminist consciousness-raising 
groups to create safe spaces – physically and discursively – where women could talk about 
their struggles to sympathetic others and, in virtue of this collective sharing, instigate 
socio-political transformations. It is within such contexts that more work was done, 
primarily by female psychiatrists and researchers, on the psychological effects of sexual 
trauma. Such research gave rise to notions such as ‘rape trauma syndrome’ and ‘battered 
women syndrome’.72 
 
Despite the heightened awareness that this movement brought about, the tendency to 
dismiss and discredit trauma victims, particularly female victims, persisted in this period 
                                               
70 Herman, Trauma and Recovery, 28. 
71 Herman, Trauma and Recovery, 4. 
72 See Herman, Trauma and Recovery, 31-32. 
31 
 
(and, it could be argued, remains with us today as can be seen in how survivors who speak 
out about their past traumas are met with a general aura of suspicion). The 1990s brought 
with them the so-called ‘Memory Wars’ regarding traumatic memories, particularly of 
incest, that had been forgotten by the victim only for such memories to be retrieved later 
in life. The vigorous debates about such matters involved victims, medical professionals 
as well as individuals accused of sexual abuse. One side argued that traumatic memories 
could be retrieved through therapeutic techniques, thus lending support to individuals who 
were claiming to have retrieved memories of sexual abuse that had occurred, for example, 
in their childhood. The other side argued that memories are malleable and subject to 
therapeutic suggestion and confabulation, thus contributing to the development of 
organisations such as the False Memory Syndrome Foundation in 1994 which created “an 
alliance of sceptical psychologists and fathers accused of abuse.”73 
 
It is therefore not a coincidence that a proliferation of autobiographical writing and a 
memoir boom, including traumatic life writing, could be seen around the same time.74 
Luckhurst identifies five spheres in which trauma narratives flourished in the late 1980s 
and 1990s: 
 
feminist revisions of autobiography and the particular impact of recovered 
memory on the memoir form; the AIDS diary; the rise of the illness memoir, 
christened ‘pathography’ in the early 1990s; the trend for confessional 
journalism; the metastasis of celebrity confession across media, from the 
autobiography focused on revealing ‘private’ trauma to The Oprah Winfrey 
Show.75 
 
Leigh Gilmore too analyses the ‘boom’ in traumatic autobiographical works. She points 
toward the shaping force of the literary market as well as academic work (and genres such 
as personal criticism) in stimulating the attention turned onto autobiographical writing. 
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She also identifies social and political movements that since the 1970s “have made it 
possible for a broader range of people to publish accounts of their life experiences.”76 
Besides, Gilmore refers to the permeation of contemporary culture by the media 
confessional, with interventions that include celebrity confessions as well as the 
proliferation of talk shows which featured “the dysfunctional and downtrodden, the 
cheated-on and cheating, the everyman and everywoman of the bad times that keep on 
coming.”77 
 
The proliferation of discourses and narratives of trauma in memoirs, TV shows and 
academic criticism can be clearly traced back to the 1960s feminist consciousness-raising 
practices whose aim was to sensitise the public and politicise seemingly private matters 
of abuse. However, paradoxically, the proliferation of trauma narratives also had the 
reverse effect. Rather than facilitating the credibility of survivors, this culture of trauma 
hardened the aura of suspicion that has always haunted traumatised individuals. This is 
because, critics of the trauma culture argue, the signifier ‘trauma’ was widened so much 
that it lost its significance. In addition to criticism of this kind, more likely to proceed 
from critics of feminism, Luckhurst notes that there was also damning criticism of the 
trauma culture by feminist critics who observed that “[w]hat had been an exercise in 
situating women’s utterances within social and political problematics in order to expose 
patriarchal logic now risked being reduced to private therapeutic acts of self-
improvement.”78 Susan Sontag – whose work on the politics of photography79 has been 
influential in strands of trauma theory – reiterates this sentiment (albeit in a different 
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context): “Politics […] has been replaced by psychotherapy.”80 These words by Sontag 
were written for The New Yorker issue of 24th September of 2001, three days after 9/11, 
and were intended to highlight how the reaction of various politicians to the terrorist 
attacks was aimed at restoring confidence in the United States and grief management, thus 
privatising rather than politicising the trauma.81 The study of the relations between trauma, 
media and politics, clearly highlighted in 9/11 and analyses of it, marks a significant 
episode in the history of trauma theory. 
 
1.5 Trauma on TV 
 
While the link between trauma and TV had already been explored in the context of talk 
shows, the televised trauma of 9/11 in the age of the Internet enabled the exponential 
growth of footage, witness accounts and live on-the-spot news reporting.82 As Kaplan 
writes, “9/11 was perhaps the supreme example of a catastrophe that was experienced 
globally via digital technologies (Internet, cell phone) as well as by television and radio.”83 
The trauma of 9/11 was, consequently, encountered from different positions with more or 
less proximity and immediacy:  
 
At one extreme there is the direct trauma victim while at the other we find a person 
geographically far away, having no personal connection to the victim. In between 
are a series of positions: for example, there’s the relative of trauma victims or the 
position of workers coming in after a catastrophe, those who encounter trauma 
through accounts they hear, or clinicians who may be vicariously traumatized now 
that increasingly counseling is offered to people who survive catastrophes. People 
encounter trauma by being a bystander, by living near to where a catastrophe 
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happened, or by hearing about a crisis from a friend. But most people encounter 
trauma through the media.84 
 
Vicarious traumatisation – that is, being traumatised in an indirect, second-hand or 
derivative way – is also referred to by Fassin and Rechtman who report that “the 
proportion [of people suffering from post-traumatic stress] was higher among those who 
had had prolonged exposure to television coverage of the attacks on the Twin Towers.”85 
 
This marks a further expansion of the realm of trauma to capture not just victims and 
survivors but a broader cultural imaginary, explaining why the last two or three decades 
saw a boom of trauma studies within cultural studies. In fact, Kaplan opens her book on 
trauma, titled precisely Trauma Culture, by suggesting that “[t]his book is about the 
impact of trauma both on individuals and on entire cultures or nations.”86 Trauma culture 
is what brings together under the expansive category of ‘trauma’ radically different 
concerns ranging from Holocaust survivors, Vietnam veterans, victims of genocides and 
terrorist attacks, domestic violence survivors, narratives of domestic abuse, the culture of 
psychotherapy, self-help books, best-selling memoirs, celebrity confessions or deaths, 
illness memoirs and much more.87 For Mark Seltzer, this constitutes a ‘wound culture’, 
which he defines critically as “the public fascination with torn and opened bodies and torn 
and opened persons, a collective gathering around shock, trauma, and the wound.”88 Ann 
Cvetkovich expresses the ambivalence surrounding the notion of a culture of trauma, with 
some embracing it while others are more sceptical:  
 
Sometimes people say we’re living in a trauma culture – that it’s a time of crisis, 
and that the crisis is manifest in people’s feelings, whether numbness or anxiety, 
lack of feeling or too much feeling. And sometimes they say that calling it a trauma 
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culture is a symptom rather than a diagnosis, a quick-fix naming of the zeitgeist 
that misrecognizes a structural condition as a feeling.89 
 
Others have noted that it is not just the ‘pathological public sphere’ (in Seltzer’s words) 
that perpetuates this wound culture, but also works of academic criticism, specifically so-
called ‘trauma theory’, and the proliferation of studies on historical and cultural traumas, 
and non-fictional as well as fictional and cinematic portrayals of trauma. John Mowitt 
critiques such academic work on trauma by pointing to its moralistic and “troubling 
contemporary tendency to displace the political with the ethical; a tendency – though 
hardly unique to Trauma Studies – that, to my mind, speaks volumes about the failure of 
its institutional success.”90 Mowitt contends that studies on trauma are ridden with “trauma 
envy,”91 transforming trauma theory into “a discipline envious of the specifically moral 
advantages imaginatively extended to anyone who can lay claim to a significant wound; 
it is an envy of the wound as possessing the power to silence the demands or resentments 
of all others.”92  
 
LaCapra too discussed the possible dangers of an all-encompassing culture of trauma 
which results in problematic conflations and prevents necessary distinctions from being 
made: “the significance or force of particular historical losses (for example, those of 
apartheid or the Shoah) may be obfuscated or rashly generalized. As a consequence one 
encounters the dubious idea that everyone (including perpetrators or collaborators) is a 
victim, that all history is trauma, or that we all share a pathological public sphere or a 
‘wound culture’.”93 LaCapra cautions against the appropriation of other people’s traumas 
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by granting the one who listens to the trauma survivor the same status of victim. Instead, 
regarding secondary traumatisation brought about by exposure to survivors’ narratives of 
trauma, he writes that “desirable empathy involves not full identification but what might 
be termed empathic unsettlement in the face of traumatic limit events, their perpetrators, 
and their victims.”94 Whereas it might be plausible to concede that people who have had 
direct contact with traumatised individuals have a claim to vicarious traumatisation, 
LaCapra contends that: 
 
it may be hyperbolic to argue that all those who come into contact with certain 
material, such as Holocaust videos, undergo at some level secondary or muted 
trauma. […] [I]t is blatantly obvious that there is a major difference between the 
experience of camp inmates or Holocaust survivors and that of the viewer of 
testimony videos.95 
 
LaCapra’s position seems to be at odds with views expressed by psychiatrists such as 
Laub who argue that “the listener to trauma comes to be a participant and a co-owner of 
the traumatic event: through his very listening, he comes to partially experience trauma 
in himself.”96 Colin Davis voices concerns with such co-option of trauma which, for him, 
can be ethically problematic; he claims that “we do not participate in or co-own the other’s 
trauma; and the sense or desire that we do should be resisted because it gives us the 
potentially self-serving illusion of empathic understanding.”97 Auschwitz survivor Primo 
Levi presents an even more radical view of the impossibility of co-owning others’ trauma 
when he writes: 
 
Let me repeat that we, the survivors, are not the true witnesses. This is a 
troublesome notion that I became aware of gradually by reading other people’s 
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memoirs and rereading my own years later. We survivors are an anomalous and 
negligible minority. We are the ones who, because of our transgressions, ability, 
or luck, did not touch bottom. The ones who did, who saw the Gorgon, did not 
come back to tell, or they came back mute. But it is they, the “Muselmänner,” the 
drowned, the witnesses to everything – they are the ones whose testimony would 
have had a comprehensive meaning. They are the rule, we are the exception.98 
 
Thus, Joseph Farrell argues that even Levi, “who had a deep sense of his obligations as a 
witness-survivor, was aware of the paradox, developed by Agamben, that the real witness 
was the Muselmann, who by definition could not deliver testimony.”99 For this reason, 
Levi himself was hesitant and unsure about his status as an authentic witness who can 
speak on behalf of the perished. 
 
This section has highlighted another dimension of the ethical and political conundrums 
surrounding trauma and trauma theory, particularly thorny issues pertaining to the 
representation of trauma, and claims and responses to it. However, as this whole chapter 
suggests, these intricate entanglements with power and hegemony have been inherent in 
trauma at least since its modern births in the 19th century. The next section considers a 
further strand of contemporary research on the ethics and politics of trauma which 
traverses the humanities to include political, anthropological and sociological analyses of 
trauma. These studies highlight the contemporary political and hegemonic currency of 
trauma in its entanglement with international power relations. 
 
1.6 The Humanitarian Empire of Trauma 
 
The multi-layered pervasiveness of trauma culture indicates that trauma is constantly 
present among us. The American psychoanalyst Robert Stolorow writes: “I describe our 
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era as an Age of Trauma because the tranquilizing illusions of our everyday world seem 
in our time to be severely threatened from all sides – by global diminution of natural 
resources, by global warming, by global nuclear proliferation, by global terrorism, and by 
global economic collapse.”100 Indeed, trauma has become the lens through which 
contemporary international affairs and global politics are viewed. As James Brassett and 
Nick Vaughan-Williams highlight in their introduction to a journal issue on the 
government of traumatic events in contemporary times: 
 
it seems that trauma is fast becoming a paradigmatic lens through which the 
dynamics of contemporary international politics are framed, understood, and 
responded to [and] our understanding/understandings of trauma and the traumatic 
event tend to be dominated by the ascendancy of managerialist discourses of 
humanitarianism, psychology, and the newly emergent frame of resilience 
planning.101 
 
This approach to theorising trauma considers notions such as ‘trauma’, ‘victim’, 
‘disaster’, ‘resilience’, ‘therapy’, ‘stress’, ‘PTSD’ and similar vocabulary as techniques 
of governing in contemporary times whereby “trauma can be understood as a normalizing 
discourse of power.”102 In a genealogical and Foucaultian spirit, rather than taking these 
discourses as authoritative and neutral scientific knowledge, such analyses of trauma 
highlight the interplay of these discourses with other practices and institutions. This 
interplay works to crystallise ways of narrating traumatic episodes, modes of experiencing 
trauma, and measures of responding to traumatic events, as well as criteria that regulate 
how and which events are classified as traumatic in the first place. As Brassett and 
Vaughan-Williams put it: “power relations […] produce and are sometimes sustained by 
trauma;”103 there is an “increasing incidence of events produced as traumatic […,] 
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important historical markers […] and an established (and highly emotive) accompanying 
vocabulary of shock, devastation, anger, and blame;”104 “traumatic events are always 
already ‘governed’ or known;”105 “generalized knowledge/knowledges of the traumatic 
event […] overlap with – and performatively produce – particular experiences and 
subjects of trauma.”106 
 
The meaning of trauma is informed and determined by the powerful role played by 
Western psychological and psychiatric discourses. Other critics suggest that, despite the 
constructionist power of such discourses and practices to regulate the realm of the 
traumatic, the authority of the PTSD diagnosis is starting to wane. For Alison Howell, the 
demise of PTSD is being brought about by two factors: “first, the resurgence of 
biomedical models of trauma, and second, as a consequence of increasingly powerful 
models of resilience which privilege ‘prevention’ in the face of trauma.”107 Thus, 
significant changes are taking place in the contemporary governance of trauma not just in 
the military sphere – which has traditionally contested the politics of PTSD perhaps due 
to its politically charged origin in the aftermath of the Vietnam war – but also in “civilian 
contexts and institutions, including disaster preparedness, universities, schools, and 
national health systems.”108 This also complements the shift from a politicised collective 
claim for treatment by traumatised individuals to a depoliticised and individualised 
neoliberal “responsibilisation”109 of traumatised individuals. The omnes et singulatim 
logic of simultaneous individualisation and totalisation described by Foucault110 applies 
to the contemporary governance of trauma in the interplay between the assumption that 
everyone is to some extent at risk and susceptible to trauma and the moral economy of 
blame that obliges one to take responsibility for oneself by fostering adequate techniques 
of resilience. 
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This concern with trauma is captured by a strand of research that critiques the role of 
trauma as a tool of global governance and highlights the ethnocentrism that characterises 
dominant conceptions of trauma and PTSD. Howell writes that the diagnosis of PTSD is 
presented as a universally applicable mental disorder rather than as a culturally and 
geographically specific phenomenon. This results in the diagnosis being applied to 
various populations experiencing disasters “despite resistance by those who question the 
application of Western concepts of trauma, and more broadly the validity of notions of 
PTSD, mental illness, or psychiatric expertise (especially given the active involvement of 
psychiatry in colonization).”111 Luckhurst points toward the work of Patrick Bracken and 
Celia Petty on the dangers of ‘exporting’ Western discourses and conceptions of trauma 
and applying them uncritically to other populations; Bracken and Petty’s work, he writes, 
“took aim at the ethnocentrism of terms developed for Western models of the self in which 
individual psychology and intrapsychic conflict predominated over the collective or 
sociosomatic self often found outside the West.”112 
 
The work of Fassin and Rechtman in The Empire of Trauma: An Inquiry into the 
Condition of Victimhood is a culmination of the concerns in trauma research discussed in 
this section. As their book title suggests, trauma is considered as “a major signifier of our 
age”113 that instructs how we respond to suffering and violence. Fassin and Rechtman 
reflect on how the label of ‘trauma’ is a historical construction that is put to various 
political uses. Their scope is not to shed sceptical light on trauma to argue that trauma is 
a commodified object with political utility; rather their aim is to provide a “moral 
genealogy of trauma”114 which they situate within “a political and moral anthropology of 
contemporary societies.”115 Fassin and Rechtman refer, for example, to the accepted 
ordinariness of having thousands of mental health specialists intervening to offer support 
to survivors, witnesses and residents in the wake of 9/11. They reflect on the shifts – at 
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the levels of discourses, practices, attitudes, perceptions and sentiments – that over time 
have led to this response to violence becoming the taken-for-granted reaction: “No one 
expresses surprise at the huge number of psychologists and psychiatrists present at the 
scene of tragedy.”116  
 
Fassin and Rechtman study how the contemporary moral economy has changed with 
regard to trauma and how it is reacted to, classified, narrated and governed. They select 
three events as emblematic of the contemporary politics of trauma: 1) an explosion at a 
chemical factory in Toulouse in 2001; 2) the boom in humanitarian psychiatry in the 
aftermath of disasters or wars, for example in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
since 2000; 3) the work of non-governmental organisations with asylum seekers and 
victims of torture. Through the first case study, Fassin and Rechtman study the politics of 
reparation and the development of psychiatric victimology, asking: “When the concept of 
trauma allows the survivors of an industrial accident to speak of their a priori right to 
compensation, regardless of any evaluation a posteriori of the facts in their individual 
cases, how are the management of damage and the administration of evidence altered?”117 
Through the second case study, the authors discuss the politics of testimony and 
humanitarian psychiatry through questions such as: “When witnesses testify publicly to 
the plight of the Palestinian people on the basis of cases reported by psychologists, how 
are the representation of their situation and the defense of their cause affected?”118 Via the 
third case study, Fassin and Rechtman analyse what they call the psychotraumatology of 
exile and the politics of proof in the adjudication of asylum seekers and torture victims by 
posing such questions as: “When more credence is given to a medical certificate attesting 
to post-traumatic stress than to the word of an asylum seeker, what conception of the law 
and of the subject is operating?”119 This question on the role of trauma narratives in the 
asylum process will be directly engaged with in the last chapter of this thesis. 
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Fassin and Rechtman’s study brings together a number of concerns in trauma theory and 
its history: their interest in the historical development of trauma echoes genealogies and 
histories of modern trauma; their concern with the rise of PTSD and its utility echoes 
political considerations of trauma; their analysis of how modern media and news agencies 
frame trauma connects back to concerns with the contemporary culture of trauma. Indeed, 
the work of Fassin and Rechtman brings together several of the interests in trauma that 
this thesis pursues, ranging from the discourses that give meaning to trauma, to the power 
relations with which these discourses become entangled in institutional practices, to the 
influence that such discourses have upon how traumas are experienced, received and 
narrated, and, finally, to how such concerns point toward a broader political ethics of 
trauma.  
 
*** 
 
The aim of this opening chapter has been to present the varying interests in trauma and 
trauma theory, both to give an account of the major sources and issues in the history of 
trauma and trauma theory, and to establish a contextual background for the issues pursued 
in the rest of the thesis. This chapter has identified major ‘stages’ in the history of trauma 
which stimulated different ‘phases’ in the history of theorising trauma. To summarise 
schematically: the modern births of trauma shed light on its links to modernity and 
psychoanalysis, while major wars prompted the development of novel notions of trauma 
and post-traumatic stress; in the 1980s, academic interest inspired by psychoanalytic and 
deconstructive approaches, in trauma focused on issues surrounding the representation 
and witnessing of trauma, while socio-political currents, heralded by feminist concerns, 
foregrounded the sexual and gendered dimensions of trauma. In the last two or three 
decades, trauma theorists have considered the culture of trauma from the memoir boom 
to the proliferation of trauma discourses and images in the digital age. The chapter ended 
by showing how aspects of these different concerns come together in analyses of the 
political and hegemonic currency of trauma in humanitarian and global contexts. 
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Some of the following chapters build upon some of these concerns in trauma theory, 
whereas others open up different problematics. For example, the next two chapters focus 
on Foucault’s work and use his genealogical approach on discourse, power and 
subjectivity in order for these views to be later contextualised within trauma theory. As 
the history of trauma presented in this chapter shows, trauma has always been caught up 
amid conflicting (though, oftentimes mutually reinforcing) discourses of medicine and 
law that impose their classifications upon society, determining who qualifies as a properly 
traumatised subject or not. Since Foucault’s work has been a significant contribution to 
studies of the constitutive power of such discourses, adopting a Foucaultian outlook to 
trauma yields critical results. Foucault’s various approaches to self-narration – ranging 
from self-narration as subjugating confession to self-narration as critical self-fashioning 
– are read alongside feminist studies on self-narration (which, as this chapter has shown, 
have been crucial in the history of trauma) to highlight how practices of self-narration, 
including traumatic self-narration, are caught up with hegemonic discourses and practices 
but can nonetheless function as instances of critical subversion. 
 
Subsequent chapters further develop this approach to trauma and traumatic self-narration 
through Butler’s philosophical ideas. Butler’s work extends Foucault’s concerns with how 
discourses, power relations and norms bear upon subjectivity, determining who or what – 
in the context of gender, for example – constitutes a legitimate, real and recognisable 
subject. Butler’s work on the activity of self-narration is also drawn upon to further enrich 
this study. Using her philosophical notions of vulnerability, precariousness and 
relationality, this study problematises the meaning of ‘narrating oneself’ by asking what 
it means to narrate oneself and what the inherent limits of this activity are. Since, as this 
chapter showed, the narration of trauma plays such a central role in the history of trauma 
and trauma theory, it is imperative to probe deeper into the opportunities and limitations 
of self-narration. 
 
The final three chapters then are more ‘applied’ and utilise the theoretical approach 
developed in the earlier chapters to conduct an analysis of the ethics and politics of trauma. 
This is done specifically in relation to how trauma is narrated and how trauma narratives 
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are received by medical and legal institutions. Butler’s work, complementing Foucault’s, 
is used to critically consider the politics of narrating trauma in legal contexts. The 
narrative norms and expectations placed on sexual trauma survivors are analysed to 
highlight how hegemonic portrayals of trauma are upheld. Narrative coherence is one 
such expectation imposed on traumatised individuals – an expectation that will be 
philosophically and politically problematised through Butler’s work. The hegemonic role 
of narrative coherence is also analysed in the context of the psychological sciences, and a 
critical review of psychological literature in a subsequent chapter highlights how narrative 
coherence is favoured when trauma is narrated by survivors. The final chapter considers 
critical issues surrounding the narration of trauma by asylum seekers, highlighting how 
norms and power relations circumscribe traumatic self-narration and determine the value 
of trauma narratives. The range of these various analytical gestures – from philosophical 
analyses of the ideas of Foucault and Butler on self-narration to a critical consideration of 
empirical studies on trauma narratives – is a move toward a holistic engagement with the 
wide range of critical issues, oftentimes poignant, that surround trauma and its narration. 
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Chapter 2 Foucault on Discourse, Power and Self-Narration: Rivière 
and Barbin Narrate 
 
This chapter identifies references made by Foucault to practices of self-narration in his 
early works up to the late 1970s. Foucault’s account of discourse is outlined to show that 
self-narration can be considered as a rule-governed activity, heavily structured and 
regulated by schemas of intelligibility that govern the plausibility and legitimacy of 
certain instances of self-narration over others. The chapter then turns to actual ‘case 
studies’ in self-narration considered by Foucault, namely the cases of Pierre Rivière and 
Herculine Barbin. Through an analysis of Rivière’s case, and a consideration of 
Foucault’s motivation in publishing his dossier, it is shown that discourses are entangled 
in different power struggles among the various realms (law, medicine, morality) that seek 
to impose intelligibility and meaning on human subjects. This chapter highlights how, 
despite its precariousness, Rivière’s self-narration functioned, at least partially, as a form 
of resistance. Thus, resistance is co-existent with power, and in the same way that 
practices of self-narration are heavily regulated by power, there remain possibilities of 
resisting and narrating otherwise. This analysis of self-narration is extended by a 
consideration of Foucault’s account of confession in The Will to Knowledge and his work 
on Barbin’s memoir. 
 
2.1 Discourse as Power 
 
Foucault commences “The Order of Discourse”, his 1970 inaugural lecture at the Collège 
de France, by claiming that an anxiety surrounds discourse in its spoken and written 
material reality. This anxiety results from awareness that the conditions for the possibility 
of discourse are not of one’s choosing, and the intelligibility and currency of discourse 
are determined “according to a time-scale which is not ours.”1 Discourse, he says, 
harbours “powers and dangers that are hard to imagine.”2 These powers are a result of the 
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unpredictability and uncontrollability of discourse, “despite its greyness and 
ordinariness.”3 In response to these powers of discourse, Foucault argues, an active effort 
toward ordering discourse is made. He proposes a hypothesis: “in every society the 
production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a 
certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain 
mastery over its chance events.”4 In the rest of the lecture, and indeed in most of his works, 
he outlines the various mechanisms by which the ordering of discourse happens. “The 
most obvious and familiar”5 procedure of exclusion is the prohibition, the essence of 
which is to restrict and minimise what can be spoken of and how. Censorship and taboo 
would be means of this procedure of exclusion. Other forms of exclusion are the 
production of oppositions or divisions, such as the formation of discourses of madness 
resulting from its division from and opposition to reason,6 and the opposition between 
truth and falsity, which – following Nietzsche7 – Foucault considers as a historically 
constituted division motivated by a will to truth that “tends to exert a sort of pressure and 
something like a power of constraint […] on other discourses.”8 
 
Besides these procedures that control and delimit discourse by operating “from the 
exterior,”9 Foucault also considers “internal procedures, since discourses themselves 
exercise their own control.”10 The commentary, that is, the mechanism of recounting, 
reciting, repeating or commenting on certain texts is one such internal procedure for 
controlling discourse that he refers to. A further mechanism that regulates discourse 
internally is the discipline, which “is defined by a domain of objects, a set of methods, a 
corpus of propositions considered to be true, a play of rules and definitions, of techniques 
and instruments.”11 The discipline implies that new propositions can be formulated 
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irrespective of its use; indeed, because of its anonymity, the discipline is available to 
whoever can use it. Foucault argues, however, that in order to be instated into a discipline, 
a proposition must complement the accepted theoretical horizon: “a proposition must 
fulfil complex and heavy requirements to be able to belong to the grouping of a discipline; 
before it can be called true or false, it must be ‘in the true’, as Canguilhem would say.”12 
In this way, the discipline functions as a principle of control that polices the production 
of statements within discourses. 
 
The notion of the author – which Foucault considers to be “a principle of grouping of 
discourses, conceived as the unity and origin of their meanings, as the focus of their 
coherence”13 – is another procedure through which discourse is ordered. In “What is an 
Author?”,14 an essay from the same period as “The Order of Discourse,” Foucault further 
develops his ideas on the author function, claiming that “the fact that the discourse has an 
author’s name […] shows that this discourse is not ordinary everyday speech that merely 
comes and goes, […] but is a speech that must be received in a certain mode and that, in 
a given culture, must receive a certain status.”15 Foucault’s ideas on authorship and 
disciplinarity have a bearing on how to consider the activity of self-narration. Authorship 
of life writing – an autobiography, for example – raises issues regarding the author’s 
identity and reliability. A published life account which does not identify the author would 
appear to be a strange one. In The Will to Knowledge, Foucault discusses precisely such 
a memoir: an anonymously-authored voluminous book of a Victorian man’s sexual 
encounters titled My Secret Life.16 He argues how, despite its anonymous authorship, the 
book reveals the anonymity of discourses, in this case of sexuality. Discourses precede 
and exceed the self in such a way that My Secret Life is more a work on how desires were 
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problematised and spoken about in the 19th century than on the specificity of the 
anonymous author’s desires.  
 
Foucault again discusses anonymity in relation to authorship in a 1980 interview where 
he considers the notion of the author as having a constraining effect on the audience since 
it exercises control over how a written work is received and evaluated. It is in this spirit 
that he proposes, perhaps somewhat ironically, “a game: that of the ‘year without a name.’ 
For a year, books would be published without their authors’ names.”17 He anticipates that 
the reaction to such a game would be a chaotic one, precisely because what would be 
missing is a crucial mechanism that enables critics to cope with the mass of discourse and 
that facilitates their reception of discourse. Writing on the condition of anonymity thus 
has the potential to trouble and expose the power that can be associated with the author 
function. 
 
The notion of genre too functions as a principle of ordering discourse. Although not 
directly analysed by Foucault, genre can be seen as an organising principle of seemingly 
disparate works.18 Works of life writing, particularly autobiography, are assessed and 
judged according to the extent to which they satisfy the institutional criteria for what 
constitutes an autobiographical work. In this light, reflecting on what is expected of an 
autobiographical work, Smith and Watson remark: “Are we expecting fidelity to the facts 
of their biographies, to experience, to themselves, to the historical moment, to social 
community, to prevailing beliefs about diverse identities, to the norms of autobiography 
as a literary genre itself?”19 
 
                                               
17 Michel Foucault, “The Masked Philosopher,” in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth: The Essential Works of 
Foucault 1954-1984 Volume 1, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley et al. (New York: The New Press, 
1997), 321. 
18 See Anis Bawarshi, “The Genre Function,” College English 62, no. 3 (2000): 335-360. 
19 Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson, Reading Autobiography: A Guide for Interpreting Life Narratives, 2nd 
ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 15 [emphasis added]. In this book, Smith and 
Watson consider how various theoretical approaches, including Foucault’s, can inform the understanding 
of autobiographical works. They also account historically for the development of autobiography as a genre, 
and propose numerous genres of life writing. 
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Besides impositions on how a text is received, Foucault notes how discourse is also 
controlled through impositions being made on who can qualify to participate in certain 
modes of speaking and writing. This amounts to “a rarefaction […] of the speaking 
subjects; none shall enter the order of discourse if he does not satisfy certain 
requirements.”20 In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault considers this issue by 
specifically referring to medical biographical accounts as enunciative modalities 
operating in the discourse of the 19th century. Such a discursive mode entailed restrictions 
on how it was made, and who could engage in it: 
 
who is speaking? Who, among the totality of speaking individuals, is accorded the 
right to use this sort of language (langage)? Who is qualified to do so? Who 
derives from it his own special quality, his prestige, and from whom, in return, 
does he receive if not the assurance, at least the presumption that what he says is 
true? What is the status of the individuals who – alone – have the right, sanctioned 
by law or tradition, juridically defined or spontaneously accepted, to proffer such 
a discourse?21 
 
The rarefaction of speaking subjects highlights how individuals can be either disqualified 
from engaging in a particular discursive mode, or else, that participation in such discourse 
can only happen by submitting oneself to the authority of an authoritative agent who can 
channel or interpret what an individual says or does through the appropriate discursive 
rules. Thus, any discursive mode, including self-narration, is a domain that is regulated 
by external and internal mechanisms that control and order the remit of what can be 
intelligibly said. 
 
                                               
20 Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,” 61-62. 
21 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Discourse on Language, trans. A. M. Sheridan 
Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972 [1969], 50. Interestingly, the probing questions Foucault asks in 
this 1969 book are echoed, almost exactly, in his late lectures on parrhesia. Although new emphases are 
added to the analysis, the fundamental concerns remain constant, as can be seen in this quote from a lecture 
he delivered in Berkeley in 1983: “Who is able to tell the truth? What are the moral, the ethical, and the 
spiritual conditions which entitle someone to present himself as, and to be considered as, a truth-teller? 
About what topics is it important to tell the truth? […] What are the consequences of telling the truth? […] 
What is the relation between the activity of truth-telling and the exercise of power?” Michel Foucault, 
Fearless Speech, ed. Joseph Pearson (California: Semiotext(e), 2001), 169-170. 
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It is interesting to note though that in “The Order of Discourse”, Foucault takes his cue 
from the implicit power of discourse, its capacity to destabilise and to defy easy ordering. 
Although Foucault’s works are perhaps more easily associated with analyses of how 
speech and actions are circumscribed and regulated, he recognised their potential to 
subvert and be otherwise. The mechanisms employed to control disorderly discourse – 
what can be called mechanisms of power – come into effect precisely because of the 
uncertain terrain in which discourse freely flows. That is, the presence of stringent 
controlling mechanisms is not only a sign of repression but, equally, a confirmation that 
in that same regulated terrain lies the possibility of freedom. Foucault echoes this idea in 
an interview held in 1984:  
 
power relations are possible only insofar as the subjects are free. […] [I]n power 
relations there is necessarily the possibility of resistance because if there were no 
possibility of resistance […], there would be no power relations at all. […] [I]if 
there are relations of power in every social field, this is because there is freedom 
everywhere.22 
 
This chapter will now extend the characterisation of discourse as intimately entwined with 
relations of power by turning to Foucault’s engagement with Rivière’s case. The 
publication of Rivière’s medico-legal dossier and his memoir can be considered as a ‘case 
study’ through which Foucault exemplifies his views on discourse and power as well as, 
in this case, on self-narration. The central point being emphasised is that although 
restrictions that surround discourse powerfully function to circumscribe what the 
individual can say and how it is said, nonetheless, the possibility of resistance remains 
and, as attested by the Rivière memoir, self-narration can trouble the power relations that 
come to bear on discourse, and can thwart their intended outcomes. 
 
                                               
22 Michel Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom,” in Ethics: Subjectivity 
and Truth: The Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 Volume 1, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley 
et al. (New York: The New Press, 1997), 292. 
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2.2 Discourse, its Limits and Struggles 
 
Foucault’s publication of Rivière’s memoir in 1973, in the midst of a dossier made up of 
medical, legal, journalistic and administrative documents, exemplifies his interest in the 
activity of self-narration as an operation of discourse and power relations. Foucault’s 
analysis presents self-narration as an activity that is significantly regulated and 
circumscribed by the various discursive formations in a given historical moment. Such 
limitations amount to an exercise of power that controls the form that self-narration can 
take. However, the relation between self-narration and power is not an exclusively 
negative one; that is, power does not only diminish the possibilities of self-narration. 
Power also gives shape to self-narration, and can enable and create particular forms of 
narrating oneself. Subjects come to make sense and give an account of their life through 
the schemas of intelligibility that discourses and power enable. 
 
Thus, although Foucault’s account of self-narration may seem deterministic, suggesting a 
human subject who is passively constituted by predominant discourses, it is not the case. 
Discursive constitution is not a unilateral or infallible process. Moreover, construction is 
not equal to strict determination.23 For the most part, discourses establish a smooth and 
ordered normalisation. Yet, perpetuated norms can fail, can be reversed and subverted. 
Were this not the case, then a phenomenon would be self-evident, unquestionable and 
inescapable, but discourses and power relations are more prone to function in unstable 
points where events and behaviours can sway in various ways. If, according to Foucault, 
the nature of power is that “it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more 
difficult; it releases or contrives, makes more probable or less,”24 then the aims of the 
supposed exercise of power can be frustrated. Self-narration can occupy this uneasy 
position too. Although the various discourses that describe – and, in so doing, create – 
facets of human subjectivity regulate practices of self-narration according to the desired 
criteria, there can be instances of self-narration that highlight the lack of fixity of 
                                               
23 For a fine elucidation on the meaning of discursive or social construction, see Judith Butler, Bodies That 
Matter: On the discursive limits of “sex” (London: Routledge, 2011 [1993]), xi-xxx. 
24 Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” in Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, Volume 
3, ed. James D. Faubion, trans. Colin Gordon et al. (New York: The New Press, 2000), 341. 
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discourses and their inability to tie an individual to an identity. Foucault’s approach to 
publishing Rivière’s dossiers, and Rivière’s own self-narration among them, was 
precisely to highlight how discourses and their entanglement with power facilitate 
processes of subject-formation, but also to show that subjection is a complicated 
phenomenon that can fail due to the individual’s attempts, wittingly or not, to resist the 
imposed strictures. The failures of subjection, however, are not merely celebratory acts of 
resistance but can have catastrophic implications and, as Rivière’s case shows, can result 
in institutional maltreatment or in making a life unliveable. 
 
I The Story 
 
On 3 June 1835, aged twenty, Rivière, the son of a peasant, killed his mother, sister and 
brother using a pruning bill (a sickle-like tool) in their home in Normandy. He fled to the 
woods and, after a month-long search, was arrested several miles away in Langannerie on 
2 July 1835. In the preliminary investigation held on 9 July 1835, when asked what his 
motive was, his first replies were that they were persecuting his father. Presenting himself 
as a devoted reader of the Bible and sacred texts, he describes the murders – which he had 
premeditated for two weeks – as ordered by God. Rivière recounts how when his father 
consulted a priest, his father was told to pray to God to relieve him of his troubles. 
Therefore, Rivière assumed that had he not murdered his relatives, God’s existence and 
justice would be put in doubt, so he took it upon himself to avoid this. Upon being told 
that God would never order such a thing, and that he should know that he could not avoid 
the punishment inflicted on parricides, and that he is deceiving the law by presenting 
contradictory stories (for example, claiming to not have read anything after he fled 
whereas he was actually seen with a book in his hands prior to his arrest), Rivière counters: 
 
I wish no longer to maintain the system of defense and the part which I have been 
acting. I shall tell the truth, I did it to help my father out of his difficulties. I wished 
to deliver him from an evil woman who had plagued him continually ever since 
she became his wife, who was ruining him, who was driving him to such despair 
that he was sometimes tempted to commit suicide. I killed my sister Victoire 
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because she took my mother’s part. I killed my brother by reason of his love for 
my mother and my sister.25 
 
The preliminary investigation ends with Rivière promising to elaborate in writing that 
which he had just said. In the dossier published by Foucault, this exchange is followed by 
a series of witness statements on Rivière. In these statements, Rivière is described in 
various negative terms: “a hothead, an obstinate fellow,”26 “had no friend,”27 “he was held 
to be an idiot in his village,”28 “he seemed to have a skew in his imagination,”29 “he 
sometimes swore at his horse for no good reason,”30 engaged in “bizarre behaviour,”31 
“often made a game of frightening children,”32 “often displayed cruelty towards birds and 
frogs, he flayed the frogs and nailed the birds alive to trees,”33 “laughing without any 
reason,”34 and, crucially, for one of the witnesses, “he was mad.”35 By the second 
interrogation, held nine days later on 18 July 1835, Rivière had presented a manuscript 
which, he claimed, contained the truth. In this second interrogation, the examining judge 
presses Rivière on his reported tendency to relish in animal cruelty and frighten children 
on multiple occasions, seeming keen to portray Rivière as a sadistic individual prone to 
behaving cruelly. Suddenly, the judge shows Rivière the instrument he had used in his 
crime and, noticing Rivière’s lack of emotion, asks him how such a sight does not make 
him feel regretful. Rivière replies that he does feel remorse, and that “an hour after my 
crime my conscience told me that I had done evil and I would not have done it over 
again.”36 
 
                                               
25 Michel Foucault, ed., I, Pierre Rivière, Having Slaughtered My Mother, My Sister, and My Brother: A 
Case of Parricide in the 19th Century, trans. Frank Jellinek (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982 
[1973]), 23-24. 
26 Foucault, I, Pierre Rivière, 24. 
27 Foucault, I, Pierre Rivière, 24. 
28 Foucault, I, Pierre Rivière, 25. 
29 Foucault, I, Pierre Rivière, 25-26 [emphasis in original]. 
30 Foucault, I, Pierre Rivière, 27. 
31 Foucault, I, Pierre Rivière, 30. 
32 Foucault, I, Pierre Rivière, 31. 
33 Foucault, I, Pierre Rivière, 33. 
34 Foucault, I, Pierre Rivière, 33. 
35 Foucault, I, Pierre Rivière, 33. 
36 Foucault, I, Pierre Rivière, 38. 
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The subsequent document in the dossier confirms that “[t]he investigation has gone 
carefully into Rivière’s past, and it has been found that from his earliest youth he had the 
cruellest propensities.”37 This highlights the tendency of the day, prompted by the birth of 
the discourses of criminology, to seek a psychological causality that unites the 
individual’s past, present and predictable future. As Andrade puts it: “A psychological 
causality is sought that binds the offender to his crime by means of a bundle of complex 
threads: instincts, drives, tendencies, temperaments, character. With this, criminal and 
psychiatric discourses cross their borders.”38 Thus, when self-narration happens, priority 
is given not to the individual but rather to a whole set of factors outside of the individual’s 
choosing through which the individual’s speaking or writing about one’s self and one’s 
actions is made intelligible. Indeed, Foucault’s account of power/knowledge rests on this 
point: “There is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of 
knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time 
power relations.”39 The circumscription and regulation of the discourses available to the 
individual – that is, power relations – happen at the same time as the production of 
knowledge, in this case about the individual, is made possible. 
 
The process, however, is not seamless. Rivière’s memoir did not function to strengthen 
and confirm the profile that the various authorities tried to construct. The medical and 
legal authorities which Rivière encountered required that Rivière’s actions and psyche be 
ordered in such a way as to permit their discourses to handle, explain and, therefore, 
punish him. Yet Rivière’s memoir troubled this configuration. The memoir took the 
authorities by surprise since it could not be easily fit into their schemas. As described by 
the Royal Court in a pre-trial court, Rivière “could certainly not have been supposed 
capable”40 of producing such an orderly and methodical account. The first part of the 
account, which Rivière presented in the form of a written memoir, describes how his 
mother continually harassed his father, and the second part provides an account of 
                                               
37 Foucault, I, Pierre Rivière, 40. 
38 Daniel Pereira Andrade, “Vidas paralelas Foucault, Pierre Rivière e Herculine Barbin,” Tempo Social 19, 
no. 2 (November 2007): 245 [quotation translated]. 
39 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin 
Books, 1991 [1975]), 27. 
40 Foucault, I, Pierre Rivière, 44. 
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Rivière’s character. Regarding the second part of the memoir, the Royal Court comments 
that it was “drawn with a vigor which is simply astonishing and makes it most regrettable 
that Rivière has by an atrocious act rendered henceforth useless to Society the gifts so 
liberally imparted to him by nature without any assistance whatever from education.”41 
The extraordinary nature of Rivière’s memoir even made it into the newspaper coverage 
of his trial, with one source describing it as a “a very remarkable memoir […] wholly 
rational and written in such a way that it is impossible to say which is the more 
astonishing, its author’s memoir or his crime.”42 
 
In the dossier, the documents of the preliminary investigation are followed by the memoir 
itself, which occupies almost half of the 170 pages of the dossier. Irrespective of its length, 
Foucault argues that “Rivière’s own discourse on his act so dominates, or in any case so 
escapes from every possible handle, that there is nothing to be said about this central point, 
this crime or act, that is not a step back in relation to it.”43 The memoir performed different 
functions for different readers; for Foucault, the memoir was “a text in whose beauty some 
were to see a proof of rationality (and hence grounds for condemning him to death) and 
others a sign of madness (and hence grounds for shutting him up for life).”44 Although it 
stimulated the interest of the authorities and was a crucial piece of evidence, the memoir 
contradicted the institutions’ will to order and intelligibility, revealing limits to the power 
of discourses, and an inherent tension and struggle in how this power functions. 
 
II The Limits and Struggles of Discourse 
 
Rivière’s memoir is succeeded by the medico-legal opinions that informed the trial and 
the jury. The judgements on Rivière’s sanity reached by the various medical doctors 
conflict; whereas the witnesses tended to describe Rivière in terms of weirdness and 
imbecility, the doctors aimed to establish his madness or otherwise: “I observed no sign 
                                               
41 Foucault, I, Pierre Rivière, 45. 
42 Foucault, I, Pierre Rivière, 52. 
43 Michel Foucault, “I, Pierre Rivière,” in Foucault Live (Collected Interviews, 1961-84), ed. Sylvère 
Lotringer, trans. Lysa Hochroth and John Johnston (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996 [1989]), 203. 
44 Foucault, I, Pierre Rivière, xi. 
56 
 
of mental derangement,”45 one argues; “I have never seen a more manifest case of insanity 
among the hundreds of monomaniacs I have treated,”46 another contends. The trial 
concludes that Rivière is not mad because, apart from lack of evidence of brain damage, 
“his mental state cannot be classified in any of the categories accepted by the relevant 
authorities,”47 and was thus sentenced to the penalty for parricides: death. However, this 
sentencing provoked a public outcry; even the jurymen protested “the excessive 
severity”48 of the sentence, and started a petition calling for a royal prerogative of mercy. 
The presiding judge admitted that “the memoir seems to have had a considerable effect”49 
on its readers, troubling their ability to judge. The memoir seemed to acquire a literary 
life too; as indicated in one report: “The Memoir composed by Rivière in prison is on sale 
at Mancel’s, bookseller at Caen, rue Saint Jean, 75 c.”50 The co-existence of Rivière’s 
actions and his memoir produced conflicting opinions, “all equally trustworthy.”51 Despite 
attempting suicide around this time, Rivière agreed to appeal the sentence, and the 
Minister of Justice submitted a report to the King on 10 February 1836, asking whether 
he would commute the death penalty to life imprisonment which, as reported a week later, 
the King accepted. On the morning of 20 October 1840, five years and five months after 
he committed the murders, Pierre Rivière committed suicide by hanging while in isolation 
in prison. Referring to the effect that the press had on commuting his original sentence, 
one report claims that the manner of Rivière’s death “completely confirms its opinion of 
Rivière’s mental condition,”52 thus supposedly confirming his madness. 
 
In the foreword to the edited volume, Foucault claims that the volume is the outcome of 
a joint research project of a Collège de France seminar he conducted. The aim of the 
project was to the study the relations between psychiatry and criminal justice. In doing 
so, the research team came across Rivière’s case. Various features of the Rivière case 
surprised the researchers: the full documentation about the case and, especially, “the 
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48 Foucault, I, Pierre Rivière, 141. 
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beauty of Rivière’s memoir.”53 The memoir “disconcerted the doctors and their 
knowledge,”54 resulting in a conglomeration of discourses working on, with and against 
each other in a site of conflict, despite their aim to coherently account for and correctly 
judge Rivière. Referring to this conglomeration, Foucault writes:  
 
in their totality and their variety they form neither a composite work nor an 
exemplary text, but rather a strange contest, a confrontation, a power relation, a 
battle among discourses and through discourses. And yet, it cannot simply be 
described as a single battle; for several separate combats were being fought out at 
the same time and intersected each other.55 
 
The aim of the publication of this volume, then, was not to establish a truth about Rivière 
which the medico-legal institutions of the 1830s could not capture. Rather, the volume 
enabled its compilers to show how the discourses that the institutions employed 
functioned as “weapons of attack and defense in the relations of power and knowledge.”56 
Foregrounding this site of conflict in which discourses function shows how discourses, 
even discourses that speak about human subjects, “may be both tactical and political, and 
therefore strategic.”57 Whereas some discourses may manage to achieve the desired order 
and regulation, sometimes these aims are frustrated, deferred or suspended, and 
Foucault’s presentation of Rivière’s case is intended to manifest these possible failures of 
discourse. Hence, although Rivière’s self-narration could have fitted the categories 
enforced by the dominant discourses of the day if presented in other ways (or, in this case, 
if not presented at all or in such detail), it instead destabilised these categories. It did so 
not by being radically incommensurable with the established categories. Were it so 
radical, it would have been rendered totally incoherent and undecipherable. Yet, Rivière’s 
text was articulate enough in form and in content to be understood and analysed by the 
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authorities without being acceptable enough to fit into the role demanded and expected of 
the ‘village idiot’.  
 
It is this ambivalence which Foucault admired in Rivière’s text. He writes how the 
research team “fell under the spell of the parricide with the reddish-brown eyes,”58 and in 
his own piece within the set of seven notes that follow the dossier, he describes the memoir 
as singularly strange and beautiful.59 What strikes Foucault is how, despite approaching 
the text a century and a half after the murders, the current knowledge makes readers none 
the wiser in understanding it and Rivière. It is for this reason that Foucault writes that in 
publishing the dossier and the notes, the aim is “not to interpret it and not to subject it to 
any psychiatric or psychoanalytic commentary.”60 This is because to do so would amount 
to relying on the same discourses – medical, legal, psychological, criminological – whose 
historical formation and whose investment in power relations was being manifested and, 
indirectly, investigated. Foucault describes this type of analysis in terms of entrapment. 
Had Foucault’s research team attempted to analyse Rivière’s discourse, they would have 
“brought it within the power relation whose reductive effect we wished to show, and we 
ourselves should have fallen into the trap it set.”61 Discussing his interest in Rivière’s 
dossier in an interview following its publication, Foucault says:  
 
the book was a trap. […] [T]o publish this book was for me a way of saying to the 
shrinks in general (psychiatrists, psychoanalysts, psychologists): well, you’ve 
been around for 150 years, and here is a case contemporary with your birth. What 
do you have to say about it? Are you better prepared to discuss it than your 19th 
century colleagues? […] [T]hey were literally reduced to silence: not a single one 
spoke up and said: “Here is what Rivière was in reality. And I can tell you now 
what couldn’t be said in the 19th century.”62 
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In another interview, Foucault reiterates that “what is astonishing is that this text, which 
left the experts silent at the time, has struck them equally dumb today.”63 
 
III Rivière’s Memoir: Confessional, Resistant, Tragic, or Otherwise? 
 
Foucault emphasises that, for Rivière, the text “was neither confession nor defense, but 
rather a factor in the crime.”64 For this reason, he describes Rivière as being an author in 
two different ways: an author of the deed and of the text. Rivière had prefigured the 
writing of the memoir, and intended to compose it before even committing the murders; 
in his own words: 
 
I intended at first to write down the whole life of my father and my mother 
practically as it is written here, to put an announcement of the deed at the 
beginning and my reasons for committing it at the end, and the way I intended to 
flout the law, that I was defying it, that I was immortalizing myself and so forth; 
then to commit my deed, to take my letter to the post, and then to take a gun I 
would hide beforehand and kill myself.65 
 
This plan did not work because his sister found him writing one day and insisted on 
reading whatever he was writing. To avoid revealing the contents, Rivière burned his 
draft, and decided to write his parents’ biographies overtly while hiding the section in 
which he explains his intended murders. This plan too was foiled, as Rivière was too 
fatigued to get the writing done. The plan he eventually followed was to write the memoir 
after committing the murders. According to Rivière, this is what explains the coldness of 
the memoir since most of it was committed to memory before the murders, and so the 
murders did not really introduce significant layers to the memoir – hence the lack of 
excessive guilt which the authorities expected to find. Foucault argues that Rivière 
managed to play by the rules of the (language) game of the law so well that his actions 
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were deemed to be too intelligible and thus “monstrous rather than insane”66 by the 
majority of the jury. Yet, Foucault realises that it is not only Rivière’s discursive game 
that governed his case. This is because the speech of the accused did not have the same 
authoritative status as the discourses employed in the context of criminal justice and, 
moreover, “the discourses were not the same type of event and did not produce the same 
effects.”67 The discourse of Rivière’s memoir was subjected to other discourses that spoke 
of and tried to account for Rivière’s personality dispositions, his education, his behaviour, 
and his physicality. 
 
For this reason, Rivière and his text had no strength in their encounter with institutions. 
Despite Foucault’s fascination with the memoir, and his description of the memoir as 
beautiful and glorious, one needs to be cautious not to romanticise the odd nature of 
Rivière’s case. Naturally, just because Rivière’s memoir can be used, as is being done in 
this case, to highlight the instability with which different authoritative discourses operate 
and the tendency of these discourses to subjugate Rivière’s own discourse, this does not 
imply that Rivière’s text is any purer or his actions are in any way justified. Moreover, 
the subversive character of Rivière’s self-narration too had its limits. After all, Rivière’s 
case was an unremarkable one that was lost in the archives for years before Foucault and 
his research team decided to do something with it. Despite the transgressive trace that 
Rivière’s memoir contains, it should be emphasised that Rivière’s discourse was, to an 
extent, not meant to exist. It should have been, according to discursive schemas of the 
day, a priori impossible. Rivière was meant to be disqualified as a discursive agent, and 
what fascinated his contemporaries so much was that he in fact made some sense. It would 
have been easier for the apparata of power/knowledge of his day if Rivière had not spoken 
or, better yet, if he had spoken gibberish.  
 
It should also be remarked that, despite the possibility of reading Rivière’s text as an 
example of how resistance can sometimes be found in unlikely places, Rivière’s life is a 
tragic one that ended in suicide, and rather than as a sign of agency to determine his own 
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fate, his death was interpreted as a confirmation of the discourses that certified Rivière as 
mad. It is true that Foucault speaks and writes joyfully and in awe of the power of 
Rivière’s text and its ability to, even if unwittingly, foreground failures, instabilities and 
tactical deployments of discourses. But also, on the other hand, the tragic nature of the 
memoir and the person involved cannot be overlooked: if Rivière’s actions subverted the 
authorities’ aims to impose intelligibility, at the same time his life was rendered 
unbearable. 
 
2.3 Power as Confession: Victims of Identity 
 
The previous section considered how discourses struggle against each other, resulting in 
either a human subject who is normalised into the dominant discourses or a subject who, 
by speaking, can subvert the impression of order and coherence (that is, an identity) that 
is imposed on it. This section examines the relation between speaking about oneself and 
power from another perspective, namely, by looking more closely into the practice of 
confession in its history and the different ways in which it came to determine how 
individuals think about themselves and their identities. Identity is, of course, a contentious 
and rich notion in philosophy, psychoanalysis, sociology and cultural theory, and no 
discussion of self-narration can afford to disregard it.68 Inherent in any activity of self-
narration is at least a basic sense of a self who is narrating and a subject that is being 
narrated. To the extent possible, in a smooth self-narration, the two – the narrator and the 
narrated – coincide. When one is narrating oneself, one is employing an implicit 
understanding of what one is and what one is not, acknowledging what one identifies and 
wants to be identified as, while disavowing what one considers a misidentification or 
mismatch between what one feels one is and what one is understood to be by others. Much 
more can be said to further analyse the inter-related ontological, linguistic and political 
difficulties inherent in self-narration.69 However, since this study places more emphasis 
on the socio-political formation, valence and mediation of self-narration, this section will 
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pursue questions on how one comes to understand one’s identity socially , or what facets 
of oneself are considered to be legitimate material for narration and how these must be 
narrated, and to whom.  
 
This section will consider Foucault’s discussion of identity within the history of modern 
sexuality that he puts forward in The Will to Knowledge, insofar as it brings together his 
insights into how subjectivity comes to be understood through power/knowledge 
mechanisms, and how one communicates one’s self to others. Of interest in this respect 
is Foucault’s account of confession and of how, over time, identity has increasingly 
become something that can be – if not ought to be – confessed to others. Whereas the 
previous section emphasised how, despite cracks and resistance, techniques of 
power/knowledge act in a totalising manner by seeking to give an exhaustive account of 
the individual, this section explores another facet of power/knowledge: the facet of power 
as individualising. As Foucault explains, “the state’s power (and that’s one of the reasons 
for its strength) is both an individualizing and a totalizing form of power.”70 Foucault 
contests the view that the notion of individuality as discrete and atomised is a natural and 
unchanging notion, and instead argues that it is a historically specific notion upheld by 
modern techniques of power/knowledge. The correlation of power and knowledge 
facilitated and propagated techniques of confession by which the individual manifests and 
confesses the supposed truth of their identity. This ‘truth’ is not just a neutral 
epistemological concern but plays a dominant social role, to the extent that schemas of 
truth can be used to justify intrusive or exclusionary measures that can have potentially 
hurtful and violent implications, as the below analysis of Barbin’s case shows. By 
considering the relation between confessional practices and modern sexuality, Foucault 
identifies the confessional discursive register as a techniques of power that impacts 
practices of self-narration. 
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I A Confessing Animal: Sexuality and Power 
 
The first volume of Foucault’s The History of Sexuality, sub-titled The Will to Knowledge, 
is a particularly remarkable book. The shortest of Foucault’s published monographs, it is 
an inexhaustible text that can be read in various ways: as an account of how power 
functions in modern societies, as a history of modern sexuality, or as – quite literally – the 
introduction of biopower as an analytical or sociological category. This section considers 
The Will to Knowledge for its ideas on the relation between power and identity, and for 
how it foregrounds confessional self-narration as a predominant technology of the self 
that shapes modern subjectivity. Moreover, a detailed consideration of Foucault’s 
discussion of confession in The Will to Knowledge enables an understanding of the 
theoretical context which in the 1980s led him to turn from the historical periods he had 
tended to analyse (16th to 19th century) toward antiquity to broaden his analysis of 
subjectivity. This shift in Foucault’s work, and the new ways of analysing practices of 
self-narration that this shift implies, are considered in the next chapter. 
 
As is often noted, the introduction to Discipline and Punish – a gruesome 18th century 
account of the public execution of Damiens due to his attempted regicide, counterpoised 
by an early 19th century list of rules for a Parisian youth prison – is a memorable one.71 
The opening of The Will to Knowledge is similarly noteworthy, in which Foucault presents 
an account of what he calls “the ‘repressive hypothesis.’”72 This hypothesis is a historical 
narrative that Foucault challenges on a historical, political and philosophical level 
throughout the book. He introduces the repressive hypothesis with a hint of irony: “For a 
long time, the story goes, we supported a Victorian regime, and we continue to be 
dominated by it even today.”73 For a writer with a strong historical sensibility, the terms 
“for a long time” and “the story goes” sound brash. Some have argued that this 
characterisation of the repressive hypothesis shows Foucault’s inclination to present the 
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hypothesis as a kind of unquestioned received wisdom.74 It is not immediately clear who 
or what is the source of the repressive hypothesis, although it is hinted that this position 
can be attributed to figures such as Freud and Wilhelm Reich. It may also be attributed to 
the Freudo-Marxist Herbert Marcuse who, despite his complete omission from The Will 
to Knowledge, is elsewhere criticised by Foucault for equating power with a solely 
repressive function.75 
 
Foucault characterises the repressive hypothesis as the historical narrative that presents 
sexual practices and mores as becoming increasingly regulated, controlled and repressed 
from the 17th century. According to the repressive hypothesis, whereas sex was not 
excessively concealed or prohibited at the beginning of the 17th century, it came to be 
consigned to secrecy, assigned the stigma of indecency, and thus increasingly fell under 
prohibition. This ‘Victorian’ blanket of silence over sex is seen as easily fitting into a 
broader explanation of the rise of capitalism, where economic growth and production are 
favoured over the interruptions of sex. Moreover, the repressive hypothesis seems to have 
a certain allure. If power functioned by repressing, then the individual who speaks about 
the prohibited subject is automatically placing him or herself on the side of freedom and 
liberation. This is what Foucault called “the speaker’s benefit,”76 whereby the speaker 
stands at a distance from the repressive workings of power and through uttering a true 
discourse, guides oneself and other individuals to their liberation. 
 
Foucault challenges this configuration of the relationship between sex and power. He 
raises three questions – historical, theoretical, political – with the aim of showing the 
shortcomings of the repressive hypothesis. These questions can be summarised as follows: 
Is it true that sexual repression is an established historical fact pertaining to the 17th 
century? Is it true that power has primarily functioned through repression in modern 
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industrialising societies? Is it true that efforts that presented themselves as critically 
opposing repressive mechanisms have actually functioned in opposition to repressive 
power rather than facilitating the operations of that same power, wittingly or not? To these 
questions, Foucault answers negatively. This does not mean that Foucault subscribes to 
the opposite hypothesis, that is, the historical narrative of increasing liberation: “it is not 
a matter of saying that sexuality, far from being repressed in capitalist and bourgeois 
societies, has on the contrary benefitted from a regime of unchanging liberty; nor is it a 
matter of saying that power in societies such as ours is more tolerant than repressive.”77 
Foucault’s aim instead is to study the history of sexuality in a wider and more complex 
way, in which the repressive hypothesis would be just one component among others in 
the general economy of discourses that governed sexuality. 
 
In Foucault’s analysis, the term ‘sexuality’ itself would be an object of study rather than 
a conceptual tool with which to analyse history. True to Foucault’s aims as discussed in 
previous sections, such an analysis would study the links between power and discourse, 
investigating the effects of power enabled by current discourses as well as the discourses 
enabled by the power relations of the day. Moreover, such an analysis sheds light on the 
knowledge that was formed as a result of the differing historical linkage between 
discourse and power. For Foucault, the modern notion of sexuality as implying a 
psychological unity of sex, desire and identity is itself shown to be a historical correlate 
rather than a natural given, enabling the proliferation (rather than the reduction) of 
discourses that profiled identities and etymologised categories such as “homosexual[s],” 
“perverts,” “zoophiles,” “auto-monosexualists,” “sexoesthetic inverts,” and “dyspareunist 
women.”78 This echoes Foucault’s tendency to read power relations and knowledge 
together to study the extent to which and the ways in which they are correlative to and 
constructive of social phenomena, grids of intelligibility and human subjects. 
 
Indeed, Foucault considers and defines sexuality as such a correlative; as an unnatural (or 
denaturalised) assemblage rather than as a natural phenomenon: 
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Sexuality must not be thought of as a kind of natural given which power tries to 
hold in check, or as an obscure domain which knowledge tries gradually to 
uncover. It is the name that can be given to a historical construct: not a furtive 
reality that is difficult to grasp, but a great surface network in which the stimulation 
of bodies, the intensification of pleasures, the incitement to discourse, the 
formation of special knowledges, the strengthening of controls and resistances, are 
linked to one another, in accordance with a few major strategies of knowledge and 
power.79 
 
The full scope of Foucault’s argument on the nature or otherwise of sexuality will not be 
laid out here; important work has been done in this regard.80 Of particular interest to this 
thesis is what Foucault calls “the ‘putting into discourse of sex’,”81 that is, how identity 
came to be a feature which can be deduced and investigated on the basis of what the 
individual utters. Foucault notes how, to facilitate this demand, a science of sexuality 
developed with the remit to determine the truth about sex. This presumed truth is thought 
to correspond to the truth about the individual that is deciphered by the authorities who 
employ this knowledge. All individuals in society became subject to this product of the 
will to knowledge which sought to categorise and classify individuals accordingly. For 
Foucault, this impulse to verbalise one’s intimate matters in order to be classified and 
judged – thus, to confess – has a long history (to be discussed in the next chapter). As a 
technique, confession functioned within a broader complex organisation that contributed 
to the proliferation of discourse about sex. The incitement to speak about sex functioned 
both to produce greater amounts of information about sex in social circulation, and to 
instil the idea that what individuals utter reflects their true identity. This alleged truth is, 
in turn, rendered decipherable by the apparata of power/knowledge. 
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These apparata developed as clusters within various disciplines, such as medicine, 
psychiatry, criminal justice, and other social controls of public and family health, the aim 
of which was to study, judge and classify sex and the sexuality of individuals. While their 
efforts oftentimes resulted in creating new unities and profiles, other times these struggled 
against each other. It is within this context that Foucault controversially discusses the case 
of Jouy, a “simple-minded”82 farmhand from the village of Lapcourt whose “few caresses 
from a little girl”83 landed him in the offices of doctors, judges and other experts whose 
task it was to decipher the “thoughts, inclinations, habits, sensations, and opinions [of] 
[…] this village halfwit who would give a few pennies to the little girls for favors the 
older ones refused him.”84 Whereas such actions would at the time normally be overlooked 
as trivial matters requiring no further scrutiny, at a certain point in history, these matters 
were given more significance, even landing Jouy in a psychiatric hospital until the end of 
his life. Foucault decries: “What is significant about this story? The pettiness of it all; the 
fact that this everyday occurrence in the life of village sexuality, these inconsequential 
bucolic pleasures, could become, from a certain time, the object not only of a collective 
intolerance but of a judicial action, a medical intervention, a careful clinical examination, 
and an entire theoretical elaboration.”85 More can be said on the case of Jouy and 
Foucault’s unfortunate choice of vocabulary to discuss this case.86 Yet the point I wish to 
emphasise relates to how Foucault reads the history of how the modern individual came 
to understand and speak about itself as a sexual subject in terms of the exponential growth 
in the number of discourses pertaining to sex, and the interrelations between the different 
spheres which these discourses occupied, namely medicine, psychiatry, ethics and 
politics. 
 
                                               
82 Foucault, The Will to Knowledge, 31. 
83 Foucault, The Will to Knowledge, 31. 
84 Foucault, The Will to Knowledge, 31-32. 
85 Foucault, The Will to Knowledge, 31. 
86 For a more detailed discussion of the Jouy case by Foucault, see Michel Foucault, Abnormal: Lectures at 
the Collège de France 1974-1975, ed. Arnold I. Davidson, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador), 
291-321. For commentaries on Foucault’s discussion of Jouy’s case, and for critical analyses of this case 
by feminist scholars, see Kelly H. Ball, “‘More or Less Raped’: Foucault, Causality, and Feminist Critiques 
of Sexual Violence,” philoSOPHIA 3, no. 1 (Winter 2013): 52-68; Merritt Rehn-DeBraal, “Translating 
Foucault: A Critique of Sexuality for Trauma Survivors,” philoSOPHIA 3, no. 1 (Winter 2013): 69-83; 
Shelley Tremain, “Educating Jouy,” Hypatia 28, no. 4 (Fall 2013): 801-817. 
68 
 
These discourses existed within a culture of confession, thus crystallising the central role 
occupied by confessional technologies and practices concerning sexuality. Beyond the 
practice of religious confession, the logic of confession manifested itself in phenomena 
such as the development of scientific discourses on sex that obliged individuals to recount 
and reveal their ‘true sex’. This drive toward establishing the truth of sex and sexuality – 
culminating in the work of people such as Charcot, Richard von Krafft-Ebing and 
Hermann Rohleder in the 19th century – grounded what Foucault calls scientia sexualis 
(the knowledge of sex). Scientia sexualis formed the basis of an apparatus whose aim was 
the production of truth about individuals, identifying their true self and explaining their 
inclinations by appealing to the truth of who they were. Foucault contrasted scientia 
sexualis with another procedure of truth production about sex, namely the ars erotica 
(erotic arts) of societies in ancient China, Japan, India, Rome, and the Arabo-Moslem 
societies, which he characterised as centring on the intensity of sexual pleasure, its 
esoteric and unconfessional nature.87 The contrast Foucault drew between scientia 
sexualis and ars erotica is one that he later came to regret, perhaps because of its 
Orientalist undertones; as he says in a late interview: “I should have opposed our science 
of sex to a contrasting practice in our own culture.”88 Within the realm of scientia sexualis, 
“sex was constituted as a problem of truth,”89 and the means to get to that truth was through 
confessional procedures. Self-narration, then, became the prime locus through which 
power functioned by deciphering and thereby creating governable identities. For Foucault, 
practices of confession are pervasive and central to the history of Western subjectivity at 
large: 
 
[T]he confession became one of the West’s most highly valued techniques for 
producing truth. We have since become a singularly confessing society. The 
confession has spread its effects far and wide. It plays a part in justice, medicine, 
education, family relationships, and love relations, in the most ordinary affairs of 
everyday life, and in the most solemn rites; one confesses one’s crimes, one’s sins, 
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one’s thoughts and desires, one’s illnesses and troubles; one goes about telling, 
with the greatest precision, whatever is most difficult to tell. One confesses in 
public and in private, to one’s parents, one’s educators, one’s doctor, to those one 
loves; one admits to oneself, in pleasure and in pain, things it would be impossible 
to tell to anyone else, the things people write books about. One confesses – or is 
forced to confess. […] Western man has become a confessing animal.90 
 
Foucault thus presents such confessional practices as being individualising (targeting the 
individual in their individuality and establishing ‘the truth’ of their identity) as well as 
totalising (encapsulating everyone within its logic); heterogeneous (can take various 
forms in different settings) as well as homogenising and normalising (seeking to reduce 
everyone to the same confessing ground). Such practices include religious confession, 
discourses of sexology, psychoanalysis, as well as autobiographical narratives.91 Despite 
the dominant association of truth with freedom (‘the truth will set you free’), Foucault 
inverts this association by arguing that a political history of truth reveals that the 
production of truth is “thoroughly imbued with relations of power”92 and procedures of 
subjection. Confessional practices contribute to the subjection of individuals by 
necessitating an interlocutor (actual or virtual) who serves as an authoritative figure:  
 
the authority who requires the confession, prescribes and appreciates it, and 
intervenes in order to judge, punish, forgive, console, and reconcile; a ritual in 
which the truth is corroborated by the obstacles and resistances it has had to 
surmount in order to be formulated; and finally, a ritual in which the expression 
alone, independent of its external consequences, produces intrinsic modifications 
in the person who articulates it: it exonerates, redeems and purifies him; it 
unburdens him of his wrongs, liberates him, and promises him salvation.93 
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This confessional technology obliges the individual (and the authorities who come into 
contact with him or her) to adopt a hermeneutic – and possibly suspicious – attitude 
towards him or her self. The self is constituted as a phenomenon to be interpreted and 
constantly deciphered. According to this scheme, the activity of self-narration is not just 
an activity that is heavily regulated by the apparatus of power/knowledge and the 
discourses through which it is formulated, but also an activity that exposes the individual 
to social regulation and normalisation, rendering the individual vulnerable to the 
surveilling gaze of society which classifies and orders individuals, and which results in 
the individual being tied – voluntarily or by the occasionally violent will to knowledge – 
to a fixed identity.  
 
II Victim of Truth: Herculine Barbin 
 
Within this context, Foucault’s work on the memoir of Herculine Barbin sheds further 
light on his account of self-narration and confession. Barbin was a 19th century French 
intersex person (or what was referred to at the time as ‘hermaphrodite’) whose memoir 
Foucault published in 1978 alongside a medico-legal dossier about her.94 His interest in 
‘hermaphrodites’, seen also in Abnormal, his 1975 lecture course, led Foucault to consider 
publishing an additional volume or anthology on hermaphrodites which, however, never 
came to fruition.95 I follow Gilmore in considering the Barbin dossier as a sort of case 
study of the ideas Foucault puts forward in The Will to Knowledge: “Herculine Barbin 
follows the first volume of The History of Sexuality almost as an illustration of Foucault’s 
interest in sexuality.”96 The format of the Barbin publication resembles the Rivière one: 
Foucault does not let his status as editor of the text get in the way by imposing order on 
it. Besides his editorship, his only contribution to the Barbin book is a short introduction 
he wrote for the English translation of the volume, which is missing from the original 
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publication in French. The Barbin book opens with “My Memoirs”, the memoir found in 
1868 at the bedside of Herculine – by then called Abel – who was found dead in her home 
after committing suicide at age 30 by inhaling gas from a stove. The dossier then consists 
of a series of medical and legal documents, results of medical examinations, court 
documents, and press reports pertaining to her life. The book closes with “A Scandal at 
the Convent”, a fictional story based on the life of Barbin written 25 years after her death. 
 
Herculine was assigned the sex of female at birth but in her early twenties, after a series 
of ‘revelations’, was legally compelled to change her sex to male, resulting in 
complications and imposed expectations on her social life, love life and self-
understanding. For Foucault, Barbin’s suicide highlighted the violence and exclusion 
inherent in the will to knowledge which poses as an innocent and neutral quest for truth: 
“it can hardly come as a surprise that, eight years later, his-her corpse was discovered, a 
suicide or, rather, to Foucault’s mind, the victim of a new passion for the truth of sexual 
identity.”97 As is apparent in her memoir, Barbin’s experience of herself did not tally with 
the explanation of her identity given by ‘experts’ through the authoritative discourses in 
the spheres of medicine, law and morality. Her encounter with these discourses suggests 
that truth can serve as a coercive instrument that oppresses identities from being, and 
promotes particular identities over others. Through Barbin’s writing, another form of truth 
appears; her memoir was a tool with which Herculine tried to come to terms with the 
different explanations that were given of herself, while countering some of these same 
explanations. Her own account of herself was not the authoritative one, but an account 
that competed with the others. Her act of accounting for oneself through writing can be 
seen as a final act of desperation, or desperate resistance, in response to how her sense of 
self was rendered incoherent and unliveable. As Aurora Laybourn-Candlish puts it: 
“Herculine Barbin can be interpreted as the champion of Foucault’s theories and a tragic 
example of what it means to fall outside of intelligible norms.”98 
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As with the Rivière case, rather than engaging in a comprehensive interpretative and 
critical analysis of the case, Foucault gives centre stage to Barbin’s memoir, allowing it 
to exist in a self-affirming way as well as in its vulnerability, frailty and, ultimately, in its 
tragedy. For the purposes of this study, the Barbin memoir (and Foucault’s aims in 
presenting it the way he did) raises similar concerns as did the one by Rivière: the 
incompatibility between some people’s sense of self and the discourses that proclaim to 
capture the meaning of their identity; the struggle between the different discourses seeking 
to impose their grid of intelligibility on the case; the ambivalence which the memoir itself 
introduces amid the discourses and power relations operating on it. While most of these 
issues were discussed in detail in relation to the Rivière case, what is specific to the Barbin 
case is the central role of sexuality and confession in this tragic ordeal. The time in which 
Barbin lived – the 19th century – corresponds to the time Foucault discusses in The Will 
to Knowledge, where scientific and cultural discourses intertwined to constitute a culture 
in which confessional technologies and practices were employed with the aim of 
establishing ‘the truth’ about individuals, especially about their sexuality, classifying and 
judging them accordingly. Barbin’s memoir was written at a time, the 1860s, where 
investigations into the truth of sexual identities were carried out intensively. 
 
This leads Foucault to open his introduction to the Barbin book in this way: “Do we truly 
need a true sex?”99, hinting that an excessive concern with the truth of one’s sexuality is 
both unnecessary and potentially dangerous. Foucault continues that in the realm of sex, 
“where one might have imagined that all that counted was the reality of the body and the 
intensity of its pleasures,”100 modern Western societies introduced a truth-producing 
apparatus which reduced individuals such as Barbin into problematic objects of 
fascination to medicine and law. He remarks mockingly: “Wake up, young people, from 
your illusory pleasures; strip off your disguises and recall that every one of you has a sex, 
a true sex. […] At the bottom of sex, there is truth.”101 Foucault sees Barbin’s memoir as 
a testament to a mode of thinking where “everything took place in a world of feelings – 
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enthusiasm, pleasure, sorrow, warmth, sweetness, bitterness – where the identity of the 
partners and above all the enigmatic character around whom everything centred, had no 
importance.”102 In this mode of thinking he describes – “a world in which grins hung about 
without the cat”103 – the will to truth that characterises the modern understanding of 
sexuality as incorporating one’s sex, gender, desires and psychological features did not 
hold, and actually marked a regress of sorts. 
 
This evocation by Foucault, as well as his claim that what Barbin’s memoir “evokes in 
her past is the happy limbo of a non-identity,”104 have been contested and criticised, and 
some of these critiques even drew on Foucault’s own ideas to make their critical point. 
Butler argues that “Foucault’s theory of sexuality offered in The History of Sexuality, 
Volume I is in some ways contradicted by his short but significant introduction to the 
journals he published of Herculine Barbin.”105 Butler criticises Foucault’s tendency to 
romanticise “Herculine’s sexuality as the utopian play of pleasures prior to the imposition 
and restrictions of ‘sex’.”106 Marc Lafrance too claims that Foucault’s introduction to the 
Barbin dossier can be challenged on the ground of his own ideas on sex and power. He 
contests Foucault’s assertion that the sexual identity of Barbin’s partners had no 
importance: “I submit that the identity of Barbin’s sexual partners was highly significant: 
Barbin desired women. She did not desire men.”107 Furthermore, he questions Foucault’s 
portrayal of Barbin’s happy limbo of non-identity since, as per Foucault’s own views, 
“one’s sexual identity is inevitably embedded in technologies of power. And though one 
can resist the effects of power, one can never – according to Foucault – inhabit a subjective 
space outside power.”108 For Lafrance, what Foucault should have spoken about was 
Barbin’s identity as a counter-identity rather than a non-identity. This leads him to 
conclude that while the introduction to the dossier “provides the student of Foucauldian 
thought with an outstanding crystallisation of his views on sex, power and knowledge, it 
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also provides that student with a unique and meaningful opportunity to read Foucault 
against himself.”109 One can reply to this critique by saying that, if anything, what Foucault 
might have meant by “non-identity” in that context is more of an absence of a kind of 
identity, namely the one enabled by the modern apparatus of sexuality, rather than that 
there was no other apparatus through which identities were regulated. 
 
It is true, at least to some extent, that Foucault does tend to romanticise Barbin’s pleasures 
– in the same way as he tends to romanticise the purity of madness in The History of 
Madness, the literature of Raymond Roussel, Nietzsche’s spark, the revolutionary spirit 
of the 1978 Iranian Revolution, the beauty of Rivière’s memoir, the ars erotica, and some 
ancient Greek and Roman practices. It must also be recalled that Foucault admitted 
various instances where he thought he had overly romanticised or uncritically embraced 
something.110 However, I think that more can be said on this matter than simply examining 
his philosophical consistency. It is relevant to note that Foucault published the Barbin 
book in a series, published by Gallimard, which he titled Parallel Lives. The series title is 
a reference to Plutarch’s 2nd century AD collection of short biographies with the title of 
Lives of the Noble Greeks and Romans.111 Plutarch’s motivation was to present the 
illustrious and exemplary profiles and moral character of these lives to show their 
commonalities. Foucault counters this reasoning in his motivation to name the series 
Parallel Lives. In a brief note explaining the series title, he writes that in contrast to 
parallel lives that have a connecting thread, “[i]magine others that, indefinitely, diverge. 
No meeting place, no place to collect them. Often they had no other echo than that of their 
condemnation […]. It would be necessary to rediscover the flashy and instantaneous trail 
that they left when they rushed into obscurity where ‘it no longer counts’ and where all 
‘reputation’ is lost.”112 Foucault is aware that the lives of both Rivière and Barbin faced 
                                               
109 Lafrance, “The Struggle for True Sex,” 181. 
110 See Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics,” 259 on the ars erotica mistake, and Michel Foucault, “Truth 
and Power,” in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon 
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similar tragic endings. They completely lost the struggle against power, and the 
predominant discourses managed to silence them and condemn them to obscurity. Yet, by 
acknowledging “the insurrection of subjugated knowledges,”113 Foucault wanted to 
present the memoirs as they trouble and struggle with medical, legal and administrative 
discourses.  
 
The memoirs Foucault studied and published are a nod to a hope that things can be 
otherwise. Therefore, the tone he sometimes adopts towards these memoirs can be 
interpreted as a gesture more rhetorical than philosophical. Moreover, as Andrade writes, 
Foucault’s interest was in “the tactical productivity of these autobiographies,”114 that is, 
in what they can enable or what they can dislodge despite the fact that they were 
completely dis-abled by the social order. Foucault seems to imply that there is something 
liberating in witnessing the authorities’ inability to easily capture both Rivière and Barbin 
within the dominant schemas of identification. In their sometimes unwitting and unwilling 
confrontation with power/knowledge, both transgress the limits of what is acceptable, and 
they both performed this transgression by means of a written memoir. In both cases, then, 
although their lives were greatly suppressed, constrained and, ultimately, extinguished, 
they foregrounded the various mechanisms with which practices of self-narration are 
governed, regulated, facilitated or made difficult. Despite their tragic nature, the parallel 
lives of Rivière and Barbin highlight the lack of necessity in regularised narratives; they 
used and, on occasion, relied on the same norms that subjugated and subjectified them, 
yet with different aims. 
 
*** 
 
This chapter considered how Foucault’s views on discourse and power can inform how 
the activity of narrating oneself can be theorised. By focusing on the rationale behind 
Foucault’s publication of the medico-legal dossier and memoirs of Pierre Rivière and 
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Herculine Barbin, this chapter highlighted the struggle inherent in discourses especially 
when competing authoritative discourses engage with each other. Moreover, Barbin’s 
case enabled a more detailed consideration of Foucault’s analysis of modern sexuality, 
particularly in relation to his views on confession as a form of power. The central insight 
guiding this chapter is that although practices of self-narration are entangled with 
techniques of power, they can also have a destabilising effect that can function as a form 
of resistance to dominant discourses that come to bear on the self-narrating individual. 
 
This chapter discussed self-narration through Foucault’s 1970s works; this ‘period’ of 
Foucault’s works is typically associated with his genealogical ‘phase’, during which he 
studied connections between discourse and power relations as they manifest themselves, 
for example, in disciplinary practices and in conceptualisations of modern sexuality. 
Foucault’s work in the 1980s is often said to have undergone a so-called ‘ethical turn’ to 
an engagement with Greco-Roman antiquity. While there are notable shifts in Foucault’s 
later work, it is less correct to speak of ‘breaks’ or ‘turns’ than of fruitful developments.115 
In fact, the next chapter turns to Foucault’s later works to trace how they introduce new 
(but complementary) dimensions to his account of self-narration. Foucault’s later work 
on ethics and truth-telling contains insights that supplement the concerns of this chapter. 
The next chapter will dwell further on how self-narration can also function as an act of 
resistance and self-creation, emphasising how practices of self-narration can be, to some 
extent, dislodged from subjugating and normalising practices of power, and constitute 
more creative and self-fashioning techniques of the self. Whereas this chapter focused 
more on the political aspect of self-narration as it interacts with power, the next chapter 
relies on Foucault’s understanding of ethics as “the kind of relationship you ought to have 
with yourself, rapport à soi.”116 As an integral part of his analysis of ancient ethics, 
Foucault introduces the notion of ‘technologies of the self’, which are practices that one 
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draws on to effect change or transformation within oneself.117 Practices of self-narration 
will be considered as technologies of the self which although culturally situated – and thus 
imbued with power relations – can be regarded as possible tools of self-constitution and 
critical transformation. The subsequent chapter will then apply Foucault’s views on self-
narration to analyse the narration of trauma by survivors. 
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Chapter 3 Confession and Beyond: Self-Writing and Parrhesia 
 
This chapter picks upon the previous chapter and explores Foucault’s references to 
practices of self-narration in his later work, especially his lecture courses. It delineates 
Foucault’s genealogical account of confessional practices and related technologies of the 
self, such as spiritual direction and techniques of self-examination, in Christian and pre-
Christian pagan contexts. The chapter then traces an important gesture in Foucault’s work 
that will guide subsequent chapters, namely the indication that there are alternatives to the 
confessional mode of self-narration; alternatives that may even counter the power 
relations at play in demands for confessional self-narration. This is explored through 
Foucault’s views on self-writing and parrhesia, which show that practices of self-narration 
are not necessarily and always complicit with technologies of power that seek to normalise 
and subjugate individuals, but may themselves be a form of creative resistance. Inasmuch 
as self-narration can sway toward normalised homogenisation, it may also function 
subversively as a form of critique. 
 
3.1 The Birth of Confession and Governing through Truth 
 
I Turning to Antiquity 
 
Although Foucault’s engagement with antiquity in his later works is more of a ‘return’ 
than a ‘turn’ (since his first lecture course at the Collège de France had already dealt with 
antiquity), he considers ancient Greco-Roman philosophy and culture more systematically 
in his work from the 1980s. Different motivations surround Foucault’s return to antiquity 
in the 1980s, and he himself proposes various reasons for this return, depending on the 
way he characterised his philosophical project in different interviews and lectures. At 
times, the return to antiquity is situated as part of his long-term engagement with the 
relation between subjectivity and truth;1 at other times, as a continuation of the concern 
with government as the conduct of conduct;2 at still other times, as an elaboration of the 
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third genealogical axis of ethics.3 Moreover, Foucault’s return to antiquity happened 
between the publication of the first volume of The History of Sexuality and the second and 
third volumes. In fact, one must look at The History of Sexuality series in order to better 
understand what prompted Foucault’s engagement with antiquity. In this regard, Stuart 
Elden is right to argue that Foucault’s last decade is characterised by a “long-standing 
interest in the question of confession,”4 and that this question must be foregrounded if one 
wants to properly understand the multiple shifts and apparent digressions in The History 
of Sexuality series. In Foucault’s Last Decade, which Elden describes as “a book about a 
book, a history of the History of Sexuality,”5 he provides an intellectual history of this 
book series, paying particular attention to the question of confession in Foucault’s later 
work. 
 
While working on the different volumes in the sexuality series, Foucault often 
reconsidered when, where and how to publish the material he was working on. But no 
volume caused him to reconsider his whole plan for the series on sexuality more than the 
projected second volume, the volume that inadvertently led him to a detailed engagement 
with antiquity. In The Will to Knowledge, Foucault notes that the Christian emphasis on 
verbalisation will be the object of his study in the next volume of The History of Sexuality 
series, which at the time he titled La Chair et le corps.6 Elden notes that Foucault was not 
satisfied with the material he was compiling on confession in the Middle Ages for the 
projected second volume of The History of Sexuality, particularly because “of the more 
sweeping claims [that] may not have been sustainable on more detailed examination,” and 
Foucault’s reliance “on relatively few sources, and primarily secondary accounts.”7 In 
August 1977, Foucault revised his manuscript of the projected book on confession by 
                                               
3 See Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics,” 262-263. 
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title also appears on the back cover of La Volonté de savoir, alongside the titles of the other projected 
volumes, none of which were eventually published. In the English translation of La Volonté de savoir, the 
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working on the early Church Fathers, and this line of research occupied him throughout 
the subsequent years. 
 
By early 1980, when Foucault returned to the question of confession, he drew on sources 
that had not been extensively considered in his earlier work, especially early Christian 
texts. This can be clearly seen in Foucault’s 1979-80 lecture course, On the Government 
of the Living as well as in the 1980 lectures on the beginning of the hermeneutics of the 
self which he delivered at Berkeley and Dartmouth College, and in Wrong-Doing, Truth-
Telling, the 1981 series of lectures he gave in Louvain. Elden notes that through these 
lectures, one gets a glimpse of how the planned volume on Christianity (by then renamed 
as Les aveux de la chair) might have turned out at that time, that is, starting from a 
discussion of how the pagan obligation to know oneself in antiquity was radically 
transformed by an early Christian, monastic obligation to confess one’s thoughts to a 
superior. In fact, Elden notes that “a draft of Les Aveux de la chair was completed around 
this time.”8 Foucault did not publish it around 1981 since he “remained unhappy with the 
introductory material to this volume, which he says discussed antiquity;”9 as Foucault puts 
it, this was “because what I had said about pagan ethics were only clichés borrowed from 
secondary texts.”10 This would explain why all of Foucault’s subsequent lecture courses 
dealt with antiquity. At the time of his death, he was in a position to publish the material 
on antiquity in the form of two books, and was almost ready to publish the book on 
Christianity. 
 
Foucault’s extensive engagement with antiquity resulted in a significant transformation 
of the order in which he wanted to present the volumes of The History of Sexuality. 
Although initially intended as introductory material to the book on Christianity, his 
research on antiquity prompted the inclusion of a volume that focused specifically on 
antiquity. Foucault had a draft of this volume, titled L’Usage des plaisirs, ready by March 
1983. This draft was intended as the second volume in the revised plan for The History of 
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Sexuality series, and so, according to Foucault’s plan in early 1983, L’Usage des plaisirs 
would be the book on antiquity that precedes Les Aveux de la chair, now intended as the 
third volume. At this time, Foucault also conceived of another book, on ancient practices 
of the self, which he planned to publish apart from The History of Sexuality series, under 
the title of Le Souci de soi. As we know, this is the title of the third volume of The History 
of Sexuality that was actually published in 1984. This happened because Foucault had yet 
again changed his mind on how the volumes would be presented.11 In August 1983, 
Foucault decided to divide the manuscript of L’Usage des plaisirs into two volumes, 
retaining the title for the second volume, naming the third volume Le Souci de soi, and 
planning to publish Les Aveux de la chair as the fourth volume. Although this is the order 
with which he actually went, Elden notes that Foucault had “to be persuaded that this was 
the best plan, instead of the publication of Les Aveux de la chair first or all three parts 
together in a single volume.”12 After publishing The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the 
Self, Foucault once again turned to his work on the book on Christianity, despite his 
deteriorating health. Less than a month before his death, he thought he had “one or two 
months’ work left to do, expecting publication in October [1984].”13 Foucault died in June 
1984. Elden contends that, for this reason, Les aveux de la chair is the book that Foucault 
constantly deferred but never published.14 Nonetheless, he holds that given how this book 
motivated several shifts in the overall project on sexuality, it “may well be the key to the 
whole History of Sexuality series.”15 
 
Foucault’s consideration of Christianity as a significant episode in the history of Western 
subjectivity sheds important light on his account of self-narration. His analysis of the 
relations between power and confession must be understood in conjunction with his 
                                               
11 In an interview with Dreyfus and Rabinow in April 1983, Foucault announces Les aveux de la chair as 
the third volume of The History of Sexuality that will follow L’Usage des plaisirs. Foucault later edited the 
transcript of this interview and revised the order of the volumes, and listed Les aveux de la chair as the 
fourth volume of the series after L’Usage des plaisirs was divided into two books, with Le Souci de soi 
becoming the third volume. Compare Michel Foucault, Dits et Écrits 1954-1988, tome IV 1980-1988 (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1994), 385 and 611. 
12 Elden, Foucault’s Last Decade, 171. 
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various discussions of Christianity.16 Foucault explores the way elements from Christian 
practices form a historical background that contributes to the understanding of the history 
of sexuality. As part of this history, he analyses the development of a particular obligation 
that was developed by the Christian pastorate: that of “passing everything having to do 
with sex through the endless mill of speech.”17 This emphasis on confession and 
verbalisation led him to consider further the nature and history of this precept.  
 
As a genealogist, Foucault’s motivation is not only to show how modern technologies of 
the self that pertain to speaking truthfully about the self (in the spheres of psychology, for 
example) are derived from similar Christian technologies of the self, but also to show the 
transformations that occurred in earlier ancient practices of truth-telling. As Foucault 
says, “we do not have to wait until Christianity, until the institutionalization of the 
confession at the start of the thirteenth century, until the organization and installation of 
a pastoral power, for the practice of telling the truth about oneself to rely upon and appeal 
to the presence of the other person who listens.”18 Foucault was interested in the multiple 
ways in which avowal or confession as a technique of truth-production was problematised 
in different moments in history, be it in the relation between ancient and early Christian 
practices of truth-telling, or the role of torture in processes of justice, or obtaining sworn 
court testimonies, or confession being codified as a sacrament in the Middle Ages. These 
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Collège De France 1983-1984, ed. Arnold I. Davidson, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012), 5. 
83 
 
same techniques remain present, in modified forms, in later history and are considered by 
Foucault as a constitutive feature of the experience of modern sexuality. Referring to the 
new apparatus of sex that developed towards the end of the 18th century, Foucault 
maintains that it “went back to methods that had already been formed by Christianity, but 
of course not without modifying them.”19 Thus, Foucault’s late explorations of antiquity 
were prompted by his interest in practices of confession that predated the practices of 
Christian confession established in the Middle Ages, and practices that predated even 
Christianity itself, in order to analyse the origins of the obligation to speak the truth about 
oneself. This was the focus of Foucault’s work in the early 1980s, which connects his 
earlier work on power/knowledge to his later “Greco-Latin ‘trip’.”20 This chapter 
considers this genealogy of the obligation to speak the truth about oneself proposed by 
Foucault. 
 
II On the Government of Truth-Telling 
 
After the illuminating detours to concerns with governmentality and neoliberalism made 
by Foucault in his 1978 and 1979 lecture courses, Foucault returns to the question of 
confession in his lectures from the early 1980s. The 1981 Louvain lectures, published as 
Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling: The Function of Avowal in Justice,21 are a condensed 
version of insights from the previous year’s Collège de France lecture course, On the 
Government of the Living.22 For this reason, the two lecture courses – On the Government 
of the Living and Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling – as well as a pair of lectures Foucault 
                                               
19 Foucault, The Courage of Truth, 117. 
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See Michel Foucault, Mal faire, dire vrai: Fonction de l’aveu en justice, eds. Fabienne Brion and Bernard 
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delivered at Berkeley and Dartmouth in late 1980 are considered in relation to each other 
since they deal with overlapping material, and represent Foucault’s approach in his early 
1980s work on truth-telling and subjectivity. The lectures exemplify Foucault’s approach 
to practices of truth-telling before this analysis was more explicitly situated within the 
broader concern with ancient ethics of care of the self in the second and third volumes of 
The History of Sexuality. 
 
The Louvain lectures, like On the Government of the Living, point backward to Foucault’s 
earlier theoretical concerns, and also point forward towards lines of research that Foucault 
pursued later in his final years. For example, his interest in crime, criminal psychiatry and 
imprisonment echoes Discipline and Punish. Concerns from The Will to Knowledge are 
echoed in his concern with how the apparatus of modern sexuality as an exercise of power 
entails governing individuals through various forms of truth, such as medical, psychiatric 
or legal discourses, as well as conceiving of sexuality as key to deciphering a truth 
inherent in the individual. However, this lecture course should not be read as the 
culmination of some of Foucault’s earlier interests. This study of avowal was not meant 
to be published in this form but was tangential or, as he says, “purely instrumental for 
something else.”23 Thus, the material Foucault delivered in Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling 
on confession may have been intended to be presented within the broader problematic of 
The History of Sexuality rather than as a study in its own right. Nonetheless, beyond 
Foucault’s last published volumes of The History of Sexuality, these lecture courses offer 
a glimpse of another formulation of Foucault’s analysis of the relationship between 
subjectivity and truth, the subject’s relation to itself and techniques of the self. This is 
particularly noteworthy due to the centrality of the questions of confession and truth-
telling about the self in these lecture courses. 
 
                                               
23 Foucault, Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling, 255. It is not definitively clear what Foucault means by “for 
something else” here. It could refer to Les aveux de la chair; however, the editors of Wrong-Doing Truth-
Telling surmise that the material Foucault presented in the Louvain lectures echoes a project (on issues 
pertaining to the relation between confession and torture in, for example, Greek law) that Foucault had 
announced in a footnote in La Volonté de savoir with the title of Pouvoir de la verité. See Foucault, Wrong-
Doing, Truth-Telling, 271-272. 
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In the first of the Louvain lectures, Foucault maintains that the scope of his study is to 
analyse the relation between truth-telling and jurisdiction. Rather than truth-telling, 
Foucault prefers the neologism véridiction, translated as ‘veridiction’, in order to retain 
the two senses of the Latin ver- (truth) and diction (speaking, pronouncing, telling).24 He 
specifies that he wishes to study the problem of avowal within the context of penality, 
thus analysing the relationship between veridiction and jurisdiction. Rather than tracing 
the history of avowal from its origins to the present, in these lectures he focuses on three 
particular movements within its history: Greek law, the medieval and Christian realm, and 
the early modern and modern periods.25 Foucault first provides a reading of a Homeric 
text and Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex to highlight how the judicial avowal was conceived. 
This is followed by material taken from On the Government of the Living, on the transition 
from ancient Greek and Greco-Roman forms of the examination of conscience to early 
Christian forms of penance and veridiction in the monastic institutions of the 4th and 5th 
centuries. To conclude the lecture course, Foucault applies these insights to modern issues 
of criminal justice and penality. His guiding theme throughout this course is how exercises 
of power are related to and dependent upon manifestations of truth that regard the 
individual as both a subject and object of knowledge. 
 
Foucault declares that the scope of these lectures is to elaborate on the notion of the 
government of humans by truth.26 Foucault’s interest in this notion complements his claim 
that what he would like to do is to “write a history of the force of truth, a history of the 
power of the truth, a history, therefore, to take the same idea from a different angle, of the 
will to know.”27 It could be said that such an engagement with the force and power of truth 
or, in other words, the history of the will to know, has been a guiding theme since his 
early work. Both “The Order of Discourse” and Lectures on the Will to Know (his first 
                                               
24 See Foucault, Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling, 19, translator’s note. 
25 See Foucault, Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling, 29-31. 
26 See Foucault, Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling, 24 and Michel Foucault, On the Government of the Living: 
Lectures at the Collège De France 1979-1980, ed. Arnold I. Davidson, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: 
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lecture course at the Collège de France) contain references to this notion.28 The title of the 
first volume of The History of Sexuality (The Will to Knowledge) attests to Foucault’s 
continual interest in this theme. Moreover, in a footnote in La Volonté de savoir, the 
original French version of The Will to Knowledge, Foucault had announced a separate 
study which he intended to publish as Pouvoir de la verité (“The Power of Truth”).29 Thus, 
Foucault’s engagement with the will to knowledge is one of the ways in which his later 
works can be read as a continuation of his earlier theoretical concerns rather than as a 
break from them. This may lead one to conclude, not incorrectly in my view, that all of 
Foucault’s works can be considered as a lifelong engagement with truth, its history and 
its powers. 
 
In On the Government of the Living, Foucault elaborates on the analysis of government 
through truth by introducing the notion of alethurgy. He derives this neologism from the 
term alethourges, which is an adjective used by the 1st century grammarian Heraclitus to 
describe someone who speaks the truth.30 Foucault describes alethurgy as “the 
manifestation of truth as the set of possible verbal or non-verbal procedures by which one 
brings to light what is laid down as true as opposed to false, hidden, inexpressible, 
unforeseeable, or forgotten;”31 or, as he puts it in Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling, as “a ritual 
procedure for bringing forth alēthes: that which is true.”32 This study of alethugy, thus, is 
not limited to the kind of analyses – associated more with Foucault’s earlier analyses of 
epistemes and power/knowledge – of the intricate ways through which forms of 
knowledge are institutionalised or legitimated. The study of alethurgy enables Foucault 
to consider how manifestations of truth are always tied up with the exercise of power, or 
the government of humans. Foucault’s object of study in his lectures from the early 1980s 
                                               
28 See Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,” 52-56 and Michel Foucault, Lectures on the Will to Know: 
Lectures at the Collège de France 1970-1971 with Oedipal Knowledge, ed. Arnold I. Davidson, trans. 
Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 224. 
29 Foucault, La Volonté de savoir, 79. Reference to this publication is not included in the English translation. 
Compare Foucault, La Volonté de savoir, 79 with Foucault, The Will to Knowledge, 59. On this issue, see 
also Elden, Foucault’s Last Decade, 132-133. 
30 See Foucault, On the Government of the Living, 7. 
31 Foucault, On the Government of the Living, 7. This seems to be Foucault’s first reference to the notion of 
alethurgy. He also explores this notion later in Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling, 39 and The Courage of Truth, 
1-3. 
32 Foucault, Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling, 39. 
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is thus the history of the relation between government and truth. His interest lies less in 
how truth is used in order to exercise power but, rather, in how the ‘I’ is inserted in these 
procedures of alethurgy. This insertion marks the interlocking of truth-telling with 
subjectivity in such a way that the utterance of truth culminates in the manifestation of 
subjectivity. To emphasise the old history of the reliance of government on alethurgy, in 
On the Government of the Living Foucault considers the relation between truth and the 
exercise of power in Oedipus Rex. He argues that: 
 
Sophocles’ play shows that […] the circle of alethurgy will be closed only when 
it has passed through individuals who can say ‘I,’ when it has passed through the 
eyes, hands, memory, testimony, and affirmation of men who say: I was there, I 
saw, I did, I gave with my own hand, I received into my own hands.33  
 
Foucault uses this prelude on Oedipus and ancient Greek alethurgy in order to analyse the 
different historical configurations of this relationship between government and the 
manifestation of truth in the form of subjectivity. Doing so enables him to approach the 
question of how and why it is that in modern society, there is this crucial bond between 
exercises of power and the insertion of subjectivity within the procedures of manifestation 
of truth.34  
 
To describe how the subject is inserted into procedures of alethurgy, Foucault employs an 
expression that was used by theologians of the Middle Ages: the truth act. According to 
Foucault, a truth act has three facets: the role of the subject as the operator, spectator, and 
object of the alethurgy.35 The role of the operator of alethurgy is when, for example, 
through a sacrificial ritual, an act or a speech act, the subject reveals the truth of something 
to spectators. The subject may also occupy the role of the witness in the alethurgy by 
claiming that one was there in a particular episode and saw it with one’s very eyes, and 
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can still argue that such an experience of Western subjectivity is not a homogeneous or clearly definable 
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35 See Foucault, On the Government of the Living, 81. 
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thus can recount and account for the veracity of a claim. Thirdly, and most crucially, the 
subject may be the object of the alethurgy. In such instances, the truth act is a reflexive 
one whereby the relations between power and truth bear upon subjectivity. In this lecture 
course, Foucault engages most with this latter sense of alethurgy as self-alethurgy through 
the question of confession, taking early Christianity as his focus for analysis. 
 
Foucault emphasises his concern with confession in order to differentiate his approach to 
Christianity from analyses of the relations between government and truth in Christianity 
that focus primarily on the system of Christian dogma. Although the system of dogma, 
faith and belief make up a “regime of truth”36 that occupies a central role in Christianity, 
Foucault favours the study of the truth act that is based on another regime of truth: “this 
is a regime defined by the obligation for individuals to have a continuous relationship to 
themselves of knowledge, their obligation to discover, deep within themselves, secrets 
that elude them, their obligation, finally, to manifest these secret and individual truths.”37 
This is the regime of truth that is organised around the truth act as an act of confession. 
Foucault does not settle at the understanding of confession as the “verbalization of sins 
committed, a verbalization that has to take place in an institutional relationship with a 
partner, the confessor, who is qualified to hear it, to fix a penalty, [and] to grant 
remission.”38 He shows how this verbal organisation of confession is a setup that was 
established at the end of the Middle Ages. Although this modality has come to occupy a 
predominant role in Christianity, he argues that this is only one way among several other 
earlier ways in which the individual was obliged to manifest the truth about itself. 
Although Foucault is not always consistent in the use of terms, he employs the French 
term aveu to broadly signify various forms of confession and self-disclosure beyond that 
                                               
36 See Foucault, On the Government of the Living, 94-101. For an elucidation of this notion, see Daniele 
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institutionalised by Christianity since the end of the Middle Ages in the sacrament of 
confession (for which the French term confession is reserved).39  
 
It is these earlier Christian practices which occupy Foucault in the early 1980s, such as 
baptism, penance, and spiritual direction. Foucault traces the genealogy of the obligation 
to speak the truth about oneself in Christianity through these practices by outlining: i) the 
role of baptism in early Christian practices, ii) the development of exomologesis as an 
early Christian practice of penance, iii) practices of spiritual direction in the first Christian 
monasteries in the 4th century that placed emphasis on exagoreusis, that is, the 
verbalisation of sins within the monastic institution, culminating in the institutionalisation 
of confession. The next section considers each of these in turn, although given the focus 
of this thesis, it is the latter practice that will be given most prominence, due to the central 
role it accords to practices of self-narration. 
 
III Baptism, Penance, Spiritual Direction 
 
Baptism 
 
With regard to baptism, Foucault considers the transformations that Tertullian made to 
this practice in the 2nd century. Foucault notes how the changes made highlight the 
movement towards the individual’s obligation to recognise itself as an object of 
knowledge. Prior to Tertullian, the preparation for baptism was described, by Clement of 
Alexandria for example, as a process of teaching that illuminates the subject, and 
culminates in the purifying moment of baptism. With Tertullian, the preparation for 
baptism became a process of purification. Besides being a process that gradually qualifies 
the individual as a subject of knowledge, the preparation for baptism becomes equally a 
process that renders the individual’s soul as an object of knowledge. The individual must 
ensure that one’s soul is pure enough to approach the practice of baptism. This marks a 
transformation in how baptism was regarded, because purification originally depended 
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upon God whereas Tertullian shifts the burden onto the individual. In this way, the access 
to truth and purification that baptism promises is transformed into a test that centres upon 
one’s subjectivity.40  
 
This test was intensified by Tertullian’s emphasis on the notion of original sin. Foucault 
shows how through Tertullian’s elaboration of ideas on the possible presence of evil 
within one’s soul, associated with the fall of mankind, the practice of baptism undergoes 
a further transformation: “From then on, the central function of baptism would be to ward 
off the satanic element lurking in the inscrutable depths of the Christian’s soul.”41 This 
marks the introduction of risks and suspicions around procedures of alethurgy, which 
intensified over time. This practice established an obligation to verbalise one’s thoughts, 
and subject oneself to a spiritual director capable of deciphering any traces of evil in one’s 
soul. Over time, with the widespread practice of confession, manifestations of truth 
developed in a way that placed an emphasis on the obligation to speak the truth about 
oneself. Thus, although the practices that Foucault considers in these lecture courses are 
still far away from the institutionalisation of the sacrament of penance in the 13th century, 
they are part of a history of truth and government that increasingly emphasised the 
insertion of the subject into the manifestation of truth. In such practices, truth, power and 
subjectivity are intertwined and constitute a basis for modern subjectivity. 
 
Penance 
 
From the practice of baptism, Foucault turns to practices of penance. The appearance of 
practices of penance was a prelude to the later establishment of institutionalised 
confession marked by the increased emphasis on the individual to speak the truth about 
oneself. Foucault shows how practices of penance originated in early Christianity out of 
concern with what must be done when an individual who was already baptised – and, thus, 
cannot undergo baptism again – breaks with the truth of Christianity. This transgression 
against the truth could occur for a variety of reasons, such as individuals committing grave 
                                               
40 See Foucault, On the Government of the Living, 115-117. 
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sins or renouncing their faith in order to avoid the persecution that Christians faced around 
the 3rd century. In response to this, canonical penance was introduced, not exactly as a 
second baptism (although this term is sometimes used, loosely and with metaphoric 
license) but as a one-time event through which the individual can repeat the procedures 
of penance undergone in preparation for baptism.42 This practice entailed various truth 
acts and implied a status that concerned the whole individual, not just a set of actions to 
be performed. It implied, for example, an external, objective examination of the sinner’s 
actions. Canonical penance also introduced and emphasised a reflexive truth act, which 
he defines as those acts “by which the penitent himself manifests his truth as sinner or his 
truth as penitent.”43 This obligation to show and manifest oneself garners a significant 
place within practices of penance of the catechumenal institution.  
 
These acts of penance within early Christianity were referred to as exomologesis, derived 
from the Greek verb that means ‘to manifest one’s agreement’. Exomologesis, later 
translated into Latin as confession, was the status that was required from the penitent, 
which involved “the manifestation of one’s agreement, the acknowledgement, the fact of 
admitting something, namely one’s sin and the fact of being a sinner.”44 Tertullian 
described this practice as publicatio sui, that is, one’s public exposure of oneself. This 
practice is later displaced by the increasing emphasis on expositio casus, which was a 
practice of penance that took a verbal and juridical form, later institutionalised into the 
sacrament of penance. However, in the 3rd century, although exomologesis entailed a 
relationship between subjectivity and the manifestation of truth, its form was different 
from that which confession as the verbalisation of sins would later establish. 
Exomologesis consisted in a particular episode at the moment of the sinner’s reintegration 
where penitents dramatically reveal themselves, linking self-punishment with true self-
expression. Foucault refers to a 3rd century correspondence that explains that this practice 
required penitents to “prove their suffering, show their shame, make visible their humility, 
and exhibit their modesty.”45 Rather than the verbal confession and analysis of sins, 
                                               
42 See Foucault, On the Government of the Living, 194. 
43 Foucault, On the Government of the Living, 198. 
44 Foucault, On the Government of the Living, 202. 
45 Foucault, About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self, 59. 
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exomologesis was characterised by dramatic emphasis, maximum theatricality, somatic 
and symbolic expression. This status bore upon most aspects of the penitent’s life: what 
food one ate, what clothes one wore, what sexual relations one had. In this way, 
exomologesis implied a general status placed on the individual’s existence, and was not 
simply an act one did in order to make up for a sin one had committed (a judicial principle 
of correlation). Its aim was to serve as a representation of death or of dying, whereby 
sinners express a will to renounce their own body and flesh, and themselves as sinners, in 
order to obtain the state of purity they had at baptism, and gain access to a pure spiritual 
life.46 Thus, although exomologesis was not explicitly a verbal confession, Foucault’s aim 
is to show that it is an important piece in the history of the obligation to manifest the truth 
about oneself. 
 
Spiritual Direction: Examination of Conscience and Confession 
 
Foucault considers the practice of spiritual direction in the first Christian monasteries in 
the 4th century as an essential part of the history of the obligation to tell the truth about 
oneself. It is in this context that Foucault identifies the clearest formulations of the 
obligations to speak and decipher the truth about oneself. This marks the increased 
prominence given to the obligation to verbalise one’s thoughts to a person of authority. 
This practice eventually disseminated beyond the strictly monastic context to form the 
basis of the sacrament of penance in the 13th century. Such confessional practices 
highlight the importance of “first, the detailed verbalization of the sin by the subject who 
committed it and, second, the procedures of knowledge, discovery, and exploration of 
oneself.”47 Foucault contends that these practices are not present in early Christianity in 
this form, but emerge later on within the Christian context, specifically from practices of 
spiritual direction within the monastic institution. Although not in the confessional form 
they came to occupy in the Middle Ages, practices of spiritual direction played a crucial 
role in pagan antiquity as well. For this reason, Foucault analyses the specificity of these 
practices within the Christian context by comparing and contrasting them with similar 
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practices in antiquity to highlight how the obligation to verbalise the truth about oneself 
developed historically. Foucault analyses these shifts in techniques of spiritual direction 
between antiquity and Christianity in various sources between 1980 and 1981, often using 
the same or overlapping material, particularly in his discussion of what he considered as 
the two most important techniques of the self in the history of Western spiritual direction: 
the examination of conscience and confession.48 
 
The activity of spiritual direction was common to both antiquity and early Christianity. 
However, the structure, aims and means of this activity were not always the same. 
Foucault argues that the aim of spiritual direction in antiquity was to guide the individual 
towards self-transformation in order for one to be the master of oneself. This spiritual 
direction was not intended to be a constant and regular activity, but rather episodic, 
circumstantial and provisional. Individuals sought spiritual direction in times of personal 
trouble or anguish: “One solicits or one accepts the advice of a master or of a friend in 
order to endure an ordeal, a bereavement, an exile, or a reverse of fortune.”49 Since the 
aim of such a practice was to foster the autonomy of the directed, a binding relationship 
of obedience to one’s master was not demanded of the directed. Neither was the 
exhaustive exploration of oneself and the obligation to verbalise one’s innermost thoughts 
a necessary feature of spiritual direction in antiquity. This does not mean that the 
veridiction of oneself or the obligation to tell the truth about oneself were non-existent in 
antiquity, or that this was a Christian innovation. Techniques of the self that concerned 
the manifestation of truth did exist in pagan antiquity. These were later taken up and 
adapted by Christianity whereby such practices garner new meanings. These 
transformations can be clearly seen if one considers the importance given to verbalisation 
in these techniques. Foucault argues that whereas “[i]n antiquity, the one who spoke was 
obviously the master,”50 in the Christian monastic context this scheme was inverted, and 
the obligation to speak – about one’s thoughts, desires, doubts – was the duty of the 
disciple. In antiquity, the master spoke because he possessed knowledge of values or 
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principles of conduct. The disciple, on the other hand, manifested obedience by remaining 
silent and listening. The aim of this interaction was for the disciple to, eventually, master 
himself, discover the same truths and be in a position (of power) to speak too. In monastic 
practices, the disciple’s speech was a sign of his obedience; thus, verbalisation was 
enveloped within the necessary condition of subjection.51 
 
Techniques of the examination of conscience also manifest the differences between 
ancient pagan and early Christian practices of self-examination and confession. Foucault 
emphasises that although techniques of the self that aimed at the discovery of the truth 
about oneself – such as the examination of conscience – are more usually associated with 
Christianity, such techniques predate Christianity. Foucault refers to how the invention of 
the examination of conscience is often attributed to Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans. In 
fact, these Pythagorean verses were often cited in antiquity: “Do not allow sweet sleep to 
slide under your eyelids before you have examined each one of your daily actions. What 
have I done wrong? What have I done? What have I omitted that I should have done?”52 
Foucault notes how the aim of this Pythagorean practice was one of purification, whereby 
one purifies oneself before sleeping, before coming into contacting with the spiritual 
world through one’s dreams. He shows how this practice later developed into the Stoic 
examination of conscience, exemplified in section 36 of the third book of Seneca’s De 
Ira: 
 
What is more beautiful […] than this custom of investigating one’s day? What 
blessed sleep is it that follows this review of one’s actions. So calm, profound, 
and free is one’s rest when the soul has received its portion of praise and 
criticism and, subject to its own control and its own censor, it secretly conducts 
a review of its own behaviour. I exert this authority over myself and every day 
I call upon myself, I summon myself when the light has faded and my wife is 
finally quiet. I examine myself and take stock of my acts and words. I hide 
nothing. I overlook nothing. Why, indeed, would I fear anything among my 
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errors when I can say to myself: ‘Make sure not to do it again. I forgive you 
today. In such a discussion, you spoke too aggressively: you did not correct the 
one who you were criticizing; you offended him.’53 
 
Foucault notes that although the language employed in the Stoic examination of 
conscience seems to be primarily judicial, whereby the judicial scene is rehearsed and the 
subject is both the judge and the accused with regard to oneself, in fact “the vocabulary is 
far more administrative than judicial.”54 This means that the function of the Stoic 
examination of conscience is akin to the administration and inspection of oneself in order 
to ensure that one’s actions are carried out correctly and, if not, that such mistakes and 
faults are rectified accordingly. Rather than a search for a hidden truth within the subject, 
the form of the Stoic examination of conscience is the memorisation of the acts one 
committed during the day. This memorisation was not demanded for its own sake, but 
primarily in order to reactivate the moral principles that ought to guide the Stoic’s life. 
This ensures that one’s conduct is in accordance with the set of guiding principles one has 
adopted: “One cultivates this art of memory, or rather one performs an act of memory in 
order to remember and reactualize, to better inculcate in one’s thought and in one’s 
conduct, the rules and codes that must govern in general one’s behaviour in life.”55 In this 
way, the Stoic examination of conscience aims at autonomy. By examining himself, the 
Stoic ensures that his conduct is guided by rational rules in line with the principles of 
universal reason that govern the world. 
 
Besides the examination of conscience as a form of confession to oneself, Foucault 
considers Stoic practices of confessing to others. These practices took the form of, for 
example, consulting friends for advice. Such practices were widespread in ancient 
philosophical and medical schools, such as in Epicurean schools, Galen and Plutarch. 
Foucault treats in further detail De tranquillitate animi, a text in which Seneca advises his 
young friend, Serenus. Serenus sought out Seneca to confess his state of malaise to him. 
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However, Serenus’ confession does not disclose his faults or shameful desires. Instead, 
Serenus confesses information related to the three important moral domains of the free 
men of Greco-Roman antiquity: “the domain of riches, the domain of political life, and 
the domain of glory; to acquire riches, to participate in the affairs of the city, to gain public 
opinion.”56 Seneca’s reaction to Serenus’ disclosures does not take the form one might 
expect of a master who tries to uncover the secret details of the disciple’s thoughts. Nor 
does he attempt to bind Serenus in a relation of submission to him. Instead, using 
arguments, demonstrations and examples, Seneca affirms the force of the truth of the 
moral principles that they share in their pursuit of attaining the status of sage. Serenus’ 
aim is to tell Seneca what it is that pleases him or not, in order to consult Seneca for 
guidance on how to further activate the force of the truth of the moral knowledge he 
already possesses.57 
 
Foucault argues that these techniques of the self constitute the background for the 
Christian practices of the examination of conscience and confession. He refers to a text 
by John Chrysostom, a 4th century archbishop and early Church Father:  
 
Let us call on our conscience, let us get it to give an account of actions, words, and 
thoughts. Let us examine what profits us or harms us, what evil we have spoken, 
what thought has led us to cast glances that are too free, what harmful fate we have 
prepared. Let us cease spending at the wrong time. Let us endeavor to replace 
harmful expense with useful investment.58 
 
Foucault remarks that the administrative language of this examination of conscience is 
strikingly similar to Seneca’s. Foucault reads this as “an obvious transfer of several 
technologies of the self in Christian spirituality from practices of pagan philosophy.”59 
However, he argues that around the 4th century, within and because of the monastic 
institution, the Christian examination of conscience develops a different structure, 
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different objects and different ends than in antiquity. What necessitated these 
transformations were “two fundamental elements of Christian spirituality: the principle of 
obedience, and the principle of contemplation.”60 
 
The principle of obedience refers to how Christian spiritual direction was characterised 
by absolute passivity, non-resistance and the discipline’s dependency upon and 
submission to a master. Christian obedience also entailed humility, which consisted in 
debasing oneself to a status beneath that of others, and accepting their orders. Therefore, 
rather than autonomy, which was the aim of ancient spiritual direction, obedience was the 
key feature of Christian spiritual direction, such that a failure to obey amounted to a grave 
transgression. This can be seen through the adage, well-known in monastic literature: 
“everything that one does not do on order of one’s director, or everything that one does 
without his permission, constitutes a theft.”61 Obedience, as a permanent condition of 
Christian spiritual direction, implied total submission to one’s superiors in such a way that 
one may only act upon the orders one is given. Foucault exemplifies the severity of this 
principle by referring to a claim by Cassian, a 4th century monk, that “[t]he young not only 
must not leave their cell without the knowledge of the person in charge, but they must not 
even presume his authorization to satisfy their natural needs.”62 Foucault also cites the 
story of Dositheus, who was a disciple of Saint Barsanuphius, a 6th century monk: 
“Dositheus was a young man who was dying from tuberculosis but who obviously could 
not die without the permission of Saint Barsanuphius. Saint Barsanuphius refused 
permission for a time, at the end of which he told him: ‘I now authorize you to die,’ at 
which point, relieved, Dositheus passed into the other world.”63 
 
The principle of contemplation further highlights the specificity of the Christian 
examination of conscience. Whereas in Seneca the object of consideration was one’s 
actions, this is no longer the sole point of focus in Christianity. In the Christian context, 
the objects of examination also include one’s thoughts and one’s reflections: 
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“cogitationes, the nearly imperceptible movements of the thoughts, the permanent 
mobility of soul.”64 The Christian examination of conscience is fuelled by a principle of 
suspicion towards one’s thoughts since one’s reflections may be contaminated with 
illusion and evil, the products of Satan. As a result, the Christian was obliged to adopt 
discretion and vigilance towards oneself to battle one’s susceptibility to deception. This 
concern with the nature, quality and substance of thoughts was crucial to the Christian, 
especially since the objective of the monastic life was the contemplation of God. To 
explain this vigilance, Foucault refers to Cassian’s use of three metaphorical comparisons. 
Cassian compares the Christian examination of conscience to, firstly, the activity of the 
miller sorting good grains from bad ones; secondly, to the officer allotting tasks to soldiers 
according to their capacities; and, thirdly and most importantly, to the moneychanger who 
examines coins so as to verify their authenticity.65 Likewise, the Christian must examine 
and interpret one’s thoughts to determine their quality and origin. 
 
But, the question remains, how is one to perform this hermeneutics of the self? Cassian 
and his contemporaries proposed that this must be done through the continuous confession 
of one’s thoughts. This is what was referred to as exagoreusis, that is, “the perpetual 
putting oneself into discourse,”66 or the “permanent avowal of oneself.”67 Foucault 
contrasts exagoreusis as a form of confession with the earlier practice of exomologesis. 
Although both practices relate to manifestations of truth, exomologesis did not consist of 
a detailed confession of one’s fault, but instead demanded the dramatic display of one’s 
sinful being through one’s gestures, clothing, fasting practices, or prayer. The alethurgy 
of exagoreusis instead consisted in “an analytical and continuous verbalization of the 
thoughts.”68 Foucault notes that, paradoxically, this manifestation of one’s truth 
simultaneously amounts to a renunciation of oneself. This, he argues, is the essence of 
Christian subjectivation whereby the aim of the examination of conscience was to 
determine the true nature of one’s thoughts, while renouncing the illusory and evil 
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thoughts one had. In the same way that exomologesis points towards the model of 
martyrdom by obliging the penitent to sacrifice one’s being as sinner, exagoreusis implies 
the obligation to verbalise one’s thoughts to one’s master in a relationship of submission 
and obedience.69 
 
This section highlighted how Foucault traces the historical development of techniques 
that manifest the truth about oneself. He shows how, after various historical 
transformations of ancient techniques of the self, Christianity placed the utmost 
importance on the obligation to verbalise the truth about oneself, a practice which 
originated in the monastic institutions around the 4th century. This obligation, Foucault 
argues, has been a constant presence in Christian culture ever since, and has permeated 
the mode of governing through truth in Western societies. However, one must pay 
attention to the genealogical motivations behind Foucault’s analysis. By genealogy, 
Foucault did indeed mean to provide the historical roots of the present; however, 
importantly, by genealogy Foucault also meant that one can turn to history to reveal the 
contingent roots of the present. Ultimately, this was also Foucault’s motivation for 
retrieving the historical importance of the notion of care of the self in antiquity. Foucault’s 
genealogy of this notion reveals how the injunction to care for the self was central to 
ancient ethics. It had as much, if not more, centrality as the Delphic maxim ‘know thyself’ 
which history has privileged at the expense of displacing the notion of care of the self.70 
Similarly, although Foucault emphasised that the relationship between subjectivity and 
truth-telling came to be heavily determined by a Christian hermeneutics of the self, his 
point is that it could be otherwise: “[m]aybe the target nowadays is not to discover what 
we are but to refuse what we are.”71 In this regard, Foucault considers himself an optimist 
who is emboldened in the face of the contingency of history.72 The ethos of genealogical 
inquiry is not to use history to learn lessons or find solutions for contemporary problems; 
Foucault makes it clear that “you can’t find the solution of a problem in the solution of 
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100 
 
another problem raised at another moment by other people.”73 Nonetheless, Timothy 
O’Leary notes that, due to a similarity of problems Foucault observed in the ancients and 
in contemporary times,74 Foucault “insists that their [the ancients’] example can be an 
inspiration to our own efforts.”75 In this spirit, alternatives to confessional truth-telling 
practices76 that have come to determine modern subjectivity are considered in the next 
sections, which turn to Foucault’s analysis of ancient practices of self-writing and of 
parrhesia. This strengthens the claim pursued in this thesis that, despite being significantly 
impacted by power relations that sway practices of self-narration toward normalising and 
subjectifying self-decipherment, the activity of narrating oneself can nevertheless contain 
self-creative and possibly subversive traces. 
 
3.2 Writing the Self 
 
As attested by his genealogical interest in the obligation to tell the truth about oneself, 
Foucault turned to antiquity in his final work to explore different practices of truth-telling 
about oneself. Practices of self-writing were one such concern for Foucault. Self-writing 
was a notion close to Foucault’s heart, as can be seen in his studies on the role of writing 
as a technique of the self,77 as well as in how he explicitly considered his own writings as 
a project of self-transformation and self-creation.78 Foucault discusses self-writing in the 
most direct manner, albeit in a short text, in the 1983 essay titled “Self Writing”. He 
presents this essay as “part of a series of studies on ‘the arts of oneself,’ that is, on the 
aesthetics of existence and the government of oneself and of others in Greco-Roman 
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Press, 2000), 239-246. For a reading of Foucault’s own working ethos in light of his account of ethics, see 
O’Leary, Foucault and the Art of Ethics, 121-153. 
101 
 
culture during the first two centuries of the empire.”79 Foucault referred to such a “series 
of studies” in different ways in the 1980s. In April 1983, he announced a book separate 
from The History of Sexuality series with the title of Le Souci de soi (the title Foucault 
eventually used for the third volume):  
 
Le Souci de soi, a book separate from the sex series, is composed of different 
papers about the self – for instance, a commentary on Plato’s Alcibiades in which 
you find the first elaboration of the notion of epimeleia heautou, “care of the self,” 
about the role of reading and writing in constituting the self, maybe the problem 
of the medical experience of the self, and so on.80 
 
Around the same time, Foucault also conceived of a project to be titled Le Gouvernement 
de soi et des autres. This is the main title under which he eventually grouped his 1983 and 
1984 Collège de France courses. Daniel Defert notes that this project was to form part of 
the Éditions du Seuil collection Des travaux [Works], which Foucault edited with Paul 
Veyne and François Wahl. Of this collection, Defert writes:  
 
It’s an old project of Foucault’s, to promote academic research outside of the 
mediatized circuits of general publishing. It’s in this collection that he plans to 
publish Le Gouvernement de soi et des autres [The Government of Self and 
Others], a work that would link together ethics and politics, and for which he had 
outlined several plans around Alcibiades, or the idea of care of the self and political 
life; Epictetus, on listening, writing, and the practice of the self; self and others.81 
 
As yet, none of these ‘side projects’ have been published in this way, although drafts of 
them do exist. What is clear, as can be seen in the emphasis in the quotations above, is 
that Foucault was highly interested in practices of self-writing. The “Self Writing” essay 
                                               
79 Michel Foucault, “Self Writing,” in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth: The Essential Works of Foucault 
1954-1984 Volume 1, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley et al. (New York: The New Press, 1997), 207. 
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offers a glimpse into how Foucault might have gone on to study these practices further. 
In this essay, Foucault argues that the fascination with self-writing was not a novelty of 
the 16th century. Although such practices were consolidated through an increase in 
autobiographical, confessional and self-revelatory writing, they can be traced back to the 
establishment of Christianity, where an attitude of self-decipherment was encouraged and 
also manifested itself in writing about oneself. However, Foucault argues that these 
features were also present in some way before Christianity in literature concerning the 
philosophical cultivation of the self, such as writings of Seneca, Plutarch and Marcus 
Aurelius. For Foucault, such writings, although manifesting similar regulatory aims, had 
“very different values and follow[ed] altogether different procedures.”82 His approach to 
ancient practices of self-writing can thus be situated within his broader interest in 
antiquity. This can be seen in his attempt to extrapolate features of ancient self-writing so 
as to shed light on how self-writing can constitute something other than a hermeneutics 
of the self characterised by self-berating confessional practices. 
 
Foucault maintains that since ancient ethics emphasised that the individual must strive to 
make a beautiful entity (tekhne tou biou) out of their life, it necessitated training and 
exercise in the art of living. This form of askesis, a work of the self on itself, was 
predominant in ancient Greek schools of thought, such as the Pythagoreans, the Socratics 
and the Cynics. This art of living entailed practices of “abstinences, memorizations, self-
examinations, meditations, silence, and listening to others.”83 At a later stage, the act of 
writing came to play an important role in the art of self-cultivation. Figures such as Seneca 
and Epictetus emphasised that besides reading, meditating and training, the art of living 
must also involve writing. One writes in order to transform and cultivate oneself into an 
ethical subject. One does not passively write accepted principles; in the realm of care of 
the self, one writes whatever one writes to memorise the principles and to continuously 
and actively take up these principles while inscribing them in one’s soul as learned 
material that guides and governs one’s actions and dispositions. For Plutarch, for example, 
writing has an ethopoietic function: “it is an agent of the transformation of truth into 
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ēthos”84 or, as Foucault puts it, “the fashioning of accepted discourses, recognized as true, 
into rational principles of action.”85 
 
As representatives of this form of writing, Foucault considers in further detail the 
hupomnemata. ‘Hupomnemata’ usually meant record-keeping documents such as public 
registers. However, as a practice of the self, the hupomnemata also referred to a common 
practice among ‘cultivated’ individuals who kept individual notebooks that served as 
memory aids. As Foucault describes them: 
 
One wrote down quotes in them, extracts from books, examples, and actions that 
one had witnessed or read about, reflections or reasonings that one had heard or 
that had come to mind. They constituted a material record of things read, heard, 
or thought, thus offering them up as a kind of accumulated treasure for subsequent 
rereading and meditation.86 
 
Although the hupomnemata served the function of supporting memory, this was not their 
sole function. They also served as the basis of a framework for spiritual exercises aimed 
at effecting one’s transformation. They were not just meant to be near at hand, but also 
proximate to one’s soul. One took note of ethical principles to make use of them in 
everyday life and testing times. The written words constituted a set of helpful discourses 
that, through use, would become deeply lodged in the soul and push one toward the 
subjectivation of discourse, thus embodying the meaning of the written phrase. The phrase 
does not solely remain wise advice that one had noted down, but would also be 
transformative. Through them, one transforms oneself in a way that makes one worthy of 
being an authentic utterer of those wise words. With the help of the hupomnemata, the 
individual becomes an ethical subject who utters and acts according to the principles 
embraced by ethical individuals, not simply because those are the principles that ethical 
individuals utter, but because he himself has actually become an ethical individual. 
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The hupomnemata shift between being disparate and being unifying. Their disparate 
character results from their being, essentially, a textual patchwork constituted by words 
others said or by “a timeless discourse accepted almost everywhere.”87 In order for the 
contents of the hupomnemata not to dissipate meaninglessly, Seneca stressed that 
excessive and extensive reading can be exhausting and may have a scattering effect. As a 
result, it was suggested that reading be coupled with writing in order to gather and collect 
one’s thoughts, and counter mental agitation and quick change of opinions. Epictetus 
suggested another way not to succumb to the heterogeneity of the content one compiled 
in the personal notebook. He argued that it did not matter whether one knew the entire 
work of a philosopher and can reconstruct his every argument, as long as one could 
identify “‘the local truth of the precept’ and ‘its circumstantial use value.’”88 Thus, what 
writing could accomplish was the combination of traditional authority of what was already 
said with the singularity of one’s circumstances. This combination transcends the 
hupomnemata since the written material “becomes a principle of rational action in the 
writer himself.”89 The cultivation of the self as an ethical agent was the ultimate aim of 
writing as a tool or technique of the self. In this essay on self-writing, Foucault also 
situates his analysis of ancient personal correspondence among friends, previously 
discussed in relation to the genealogy of the obligation to tell the truth about oneself, 
within this context of practices of the self. In personal correspondence with a friend who 
asks for advice or shares any of his troubles or daily life, one could draw on the material 
from his hupomnemata that acts on the one seeking advice. The letter also acts on its 
author; as Seneca remarked, “when one writes one reads what one writes, just as in saying 
something one hears oneself saying it.”90 Personal correspondence was therefore not a 
simple extension of the hupomnemata, but also constituted a way of manifesting oneself, 
both to oneself and to others, and of showing oneself and exposing oneself to the gaze of 
others. 
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In his brief genealogy of self-writing, then, Foucault presents at least three models of self-
writing which, rather than forming a neat progression, present overlapping and disparate 
techniques and modalities. First, Foucault notes how Cicero’s letters from the 1st century 
BC manifest a form of self-narration through which he presented himself as a subject of 
action in relation to friends or enemies, fortunes and misfortunes. Second, in later work 
such as Seneca’s from the 1st century and Marcus Aurelius’ from the 2nd century AD, 
Foucault sees a form of self-narration that “is the account of one’s relation to oneself”91 
which privileges the areas of the health of the body and the soul, and leisure activities. It 
is in relation to this that Foucault studies Seneca’s practices of self-examination and daily 
recollection, his letters on illness, solitude and friendship to Lucilus, or Marcus Aurelius’ 
letters to Fronto, material which he also discusses in The Hermeneutics of the Subject 
lectures in 1982. Third, Foucault refers to the model of self-writing found in the work of 
the 4th century AD bishop Athanasius of Alexandria, characterised by “scrupulous 
attention to what occurs in the body and in the soul […] a matter of dislodging the most 
hidden impulses from the inner recesses of the soul, thus enabling oneself to break free of 
them.”92 Foucault thus creates a distinction between ancient practices of writing such as 
Seneca’s and later practices of accounting for oneself such as the early Christian writing 
of the first centuries AD. Unlike the hupomnemata, the latter literature is characterised by 
tropes of temptations, struggles and downfalls aimed at constituting a confessional 
narrative of oneself to reveal the unspeakable and that which is hidden in the depths of 
one’s soul. This demanded work of decipherment by an external authority who castigates 
the self and bears witness to the defects of the individual. 
 
Around the same time that “Self Writing” was published, Foucault delivered the Regents’ 
Lecture in Berkeley in April 1983, titled “The Culture of the Self”.93 He ended this lecture 
with a brief reflection on the role of writing in the ancient practices of care of the self. He 
asks how this culture of the self appears to have disappeared from the experience of 
modern subjectivity, despite having been such a prominent component of the ancient 
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Greco-Roman ethics of care of the self, whose institutions, methods, techniques and 
exercises were constitutive of individual and collective experiences of selfhood. One of 
the reasons he cites for this disappearance is that Christianity introduced an ethical 
paradox in its account of asceticism, namely that concern for the self came to take up the 
form of sacrifice and renunciation rather than self-cultivation. This has transformed care 
of the self into self-disclosure. Moreover, this self-disclosure has been taken up as the 
domain of the human sciences, particularly in their assumption that the predominant 
relationship of the self to itself, and of others to the self, has to be a relationship of 
knowledge. Techniques of the self in modernity, Foucault argues, fall under the domain 
of educational, pedagogical, medical and psychological techniques, and their authoritative 
or disciplinarian structure. Thus, the role of self-writing in self-fashioning and creative 
and critical self-transformation was diluted and replaced by an attitude of self-
decipherment assisted by the development of normalising human sciences.  
 
Apart from practices of writing the self, one could also consider Foucault’s discussion of 
speaking the truth under risky conditions as complementing the current analysis of how 
practices of self-narration can function otherwise than by subjugating and normalising. 
Foucault’s studies on the ancient notion of parrhesia highlight how self-narration had the 
ability to function in ancient Socratic and Hellenistic contexts as a practice that preserves 
the possibility of a resistance that connects ethical self-cultivation with political critique.  
 
3.3 Alternative Truth-Telling: The Risks of Parrhesia 
 
In the first lecture of The Courage of Truth, Foucault situates his aims in the course in 
relation to the different trajectories he pursued in his research. He clarifies that, contrary 
to the epistemological analysis of discourses of truth, the study he wishes to conduct in 
this lecture course concerns: 
 
the conditions and forms of the type of act by which the subject manifests 
himself when speaking the truth, by which I mean, thinks of himself and is 
recognized by others as speaking the truth. […] [T]his would involve analyzing 
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the form in which, in his act of telling the truth, the individual constitutes 
himself and is constituted by others as a subject of a discourse of truth, the form 
in which he presents himself to himself and to others as someone who tells the 
truth, the form of the subject telling the truth.94 
 
These two forms of analysis correspond to the different kinds of analysis Foucault 
conducted in his works. His earlier work dealt with discourses and practices through 
which, for example, madness or delinquency were made intelligible, and with discursive 
practices that constituted the speaking, labouring and living subject as an object of 
knowledge. Foucault recognises that, at a later phase of his research, he shifted the 
emphasis onto the discourses and practices through which the subject speaks about him 
or herself within the realms of penality and sexuality, such as avowal, confession and 
examination of conscience.95 Although it is true that the emphasis of Foucault’s analysis 
changed throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, the central issue he engaged with – 
the question of the relations between the subject and truth was consistent. This degree of 
continuity clearly emerges in his analysis of parrhesia. His different analyses throughout 
the years can, in fact, all be seen as grappling with the three genealogical axes he identifies 
– the axis of truth or knowledge, power relations and subjectivity.96 His study of parrhesia 
enabled him to bring together these different axes without either foregrounding one 
particular axis over the others or reducing the different axes to each other. As he says, 
“[c]onnecting together modes of veridiction, techniques of governmentality, and practices 
of the self is basically what I have always been trying to do.”97 
 
The first discussion of parrhesia by Foucault is found in his 1982 lecture course, The 
Hermeneutics of the Subject. The first appearance of this notion is found in his discussion 
of the Epicurean practice of spiritual direction, where Foucault argues that Epicurean 
guidance was only possible on the condition of an intense friendship between the guide 
and the guided, and this necessitated a way or attitude of speaking. This way of speaking, 
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generally translated as ‘frankness’, is parrhesia, which Foucault preliminarily defines as 
“opening the heart, the need for the two partners to conceal nothing of what they think 
from each other and to speak to each other frankly.”98 The responsibility of parrhesia fell 
on the master, not on the student, insofar as it is the master who must deliver true speech 
in order to effectively bring about the transformation and improvement in the disciple. 
Foucault highlights further characteristics of parrhesia by considering Stoic parrhesia. 
Seneca affirms that parrhesia “is a matter of showing (ostendere) what I feel (quid 
sentiam) rather than speaking (loqui).”99 For Seneca, the truth of parrhesia must also be 
complemented by the conduct of the individual: ‘This is the essential point […]: let us say 
what we think and think what we say; let speech harmonize with conduct.’100 For Foucault, 
Christian spiritual direction is different since it shifts the essential obligation of truth-
telling onto the guided. The Christian model requires the guided to confess – ‘This is what 
I am’ – whereas in the Greco-Roman model, the one who guides must be present within 
the true discourse in order to be able to say: ‘This truth I tell you, you see it in me.’101 
 
Thus, in his first discussion of the notion in The Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault 
studies parrhesia as a practice of the self within the ancient Greco-Roman ethics of care 
of the self. In the subsequent lecture course, On the Government of the Self and Others, 
he discusses ancient parrhesia as a fundamentally political notion, rooted in political 
practice and the problematisation of democracy. A year later, in The Courage of Truth, 
his aim was to study parrhesia within the context of ethical practices of truth-telling about 
oneself, in which parrhesia was diverted “towards the sphere of personal ethics and the 
formation of the moral subject.”102 
 
The Courage of Truth opens with Foucault’s analysis of parrhesia through Socrates’ last 
moments as a risky truth-telling in relation to the care of the self. A crucial feature of 
Socratic parrhesia that Foucault highlights is the symphony of discourse and action; the 
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harmony between logos and bios. For Socrates, parrhesia as an ethical notion is a question 
of the way one lives – it is an attitude, an ethos, the style of one’s living; in other words, 
it is the care of the self. Socratic parrhesia concerns the ability to give an account of 
oneself, not merely to justify oneself by saying who one’s teachers were or what works 
one has done, but rather to manifest the relationship between one’s words and deeds. It is 
this harmony, Foucault says, which defines Socratic parrhesia, whereby one’s free speech 
is authenticated by one’s mode of living: “The mode of life appears as the essential, 
fundamental correlative of the practice of truth-telling.”103 This emphasises the necessary 
link between parrhesia, the ethics of epimeleia heautou (care of the self) and the mode or 
style of life associated with it. The ancient ethics of the care of the self required one to 
submit one’s life to a test in order to be able to sift good actions from bad ones. Foucault 
highlights how this facet of Socratic parrhesia implies an emphasis on stylistics, or an 
aesthetics of existence: “I have tried therefore to find, with Socrates, the moment when 
the requirement of truth-telling and the principle of the beauty of existence came together 
in the care of the self.”104 For Foucault, in the history of subjectivity this emphasis on the 
aesthetics of existence has been overshadowed by a focus on the metaphysics or ontology 
of the soul built on knowledge of the self:  
 
Foucault extends his analysis of parrhesia by considering the Cynics and their 
understanding of the notion of ‘the true life’. Foucault’s interest in the Cynics lies in how 
they radicalised the Socratic notion of parrhesia. Cynic parrhesia was characterised by the 
practice “of truth-telling which pushes its courage and boldness to the point that it 
becomes intolerable insolence.”105 Foucault notes that in several ancient texts by, for 
example, Diogenes Laertius, Dio Chrysostom and Epictetus, the word ‘parrhesia’ 
(denoting both free-spokenness but also insolence) was often applied to the Cynics.106 
Cynic parrhesia goes beyond the establishment of a harmony between life and discourse. 
The Cynic is designated as the one who bears witness to the truth. The Cynic is contrasted 
with the Platonic conception of the true life. The Platonic true life was founded on a notion 
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of truth as aletheia, understood in a fourfold way as that which is not concealed or hidden, 
that which is unalloyed, that which is straight, and that which remains beyond any change 
and is, thus, incorruptible.107 Foucault argues that this formulation of the true life was 
transformed by the Cynics’ consideration of the advice that the Delphi oracle gave to 
Diogenes: ‘Change the value of the currency’. Foucault notes that Cynics are regularly 
associated with money, and various sources refer to an incident of falsifying money 
concerning Diogenes and his father (a money changer).108 The oracle’s advice to alter the 
currency was generally understood to mean challenging customs or break up conventions. 
Foucault goes further with this interpretation, suggesting that the change in currency 
implied by the Cynic model of the true life involves a difference from the way in which 
people generally lead their lives. The Cynic ethic implied a life lived otherwise. The 
otherness (altérité) of the Cynic other life (une vie autre) is, as Graham Burchell notes, to 
be understood “in the sense of the mode of existence of the true life in this world, which 
is radically other than common or traditional forms of existence.”109 This sense of ‘other 
world’ (un monde autre) must be distinguished and distanced from the metaphysical 
understanding of the other world in the sense of a Platonic transcendent world of forms 
or the Christian afterlife (l’autre monde). With this distinction in mind, Foucault asks, 
“May not, must not the philosophical life, the true life necessarily be a life which is 
radically other?”110 
 
He attempts to answer this question by considering the ways in which the Cynic life 
radically transforms the meaning of the Platonic true life, while retaining the four general 
features of the true life based on the understanding of truth as aletheia outlined above. 
Firstly, with its emphasis on being unconcealed, the Platonic true life prohibits shameful 
actions to be censured by others. Taking this idea of the true life to the crude extreme, the 
Cynics embodied the disregard for the code of propriety and conventions. This can be 
seen in the various practices that Diogenes is claimed to have performed, breaking the 
distinction between activities that are conventionally done in private, such as satisfying 
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basic needs, and those that are not. Secondly, the true life as the unalloyed life implied 
lack of mixture with that which is impure, in order to prevent one from being dependent 
upon external and uncertain events. Cynics radicalised this feature of the Platonic true life 
by living a life of extreme poverty seeking further destitution. Reversing this feature of 
the true life that aims at purity and self-sufficiency, Foucault says that the Cynic’s life is 
“scandalous, unbearable, ugly, dependent, and humiliated poverty.”111 This reversal 
extends in such a way as to become a systematic practice of dishonour, which was 
otherwise unheard of in ancient Greek society. Foucault, however, points out that this 
practice was different from a Christian humiliation that aimed at self-renunciation 
because, through this practice, the Cynic asserts his self-mastery.112 The third feature of 
the Platonic true life is that it is a straight life lived in a balanced and organised way in 
accordance with nature and customs. The Cynics transgress this organisation and 
conformism by basing their behaviour only on the domain of nature. This manifested itself 
in, for example, the consumption of raw food and their rejection of any ban on incest.113 
Lastly, the true life was an unchangeable and sovereign life which implies possession of 
and pleasure in oneself. Within this framework, Foucault considers the assertion that the 
Cynic is the true king. Foucault argues that in the meeting between Diogenes and 
Alexander, Diogenes emerges as the truly sovereign king (without formal power, of 
course) for several reasons. For example, unlike Alexander, Diogenes needs no army to 
exercise his sovereignty, and did not depend on inheriting the monarchy or on training in 
order to be able to rule. Furthermore, Diogenes maintains that Alexander’s rule can be 
lost due to a misfortune; thus, by ridding himself of all the elements upon which the 
satisfactions of the ‘king of men’ depend, Diogenes emerges as the true king. The true life 
also implies that the sovereign subject assists and cares for other people. Foucault 
maintains that this feature is present in the Cynic life too, since the Cynic willingly tries 
to cure other people and rid them of their disturbances. However, unlike the Platonic 
model of care for others, this takes a polemical and militant form since the Cynic advice 
is often harsh and inappropriate. 
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*** 
 
This chapter continued the reconstruction of Foucault’s account of self-narration begun 
in the previous chapter, this time by considering how and why his later work from the 
1980s led him to look at the ancient origins of the obligation to speak the truth about 
oneself. This detailed consideration of Foucault’s late work highlighted the ways in which 
practices of self-narration have not always meant and need not mean normalising power 
inherent in confessional discourses. Following Foucault, this chapter considered the ways 
in which, beyond normalising confession, practices of self-narration can take the form of 
ethical self-constitution as well as parrhesia, that is, courageous truth-telling that can 
subvert hegemonic understandings of normalcy and social ordering.  
 
The next chapter uses the insights from Foucault’s ideas on self-narration, as well as 
feminist extensions of Foucault’s work, to study the narration of trauma in institutional 
contexts. The aim of this application is to show how Foucault’s work helps to raise 
pressing and urgent critical questions in an area that he did not consider directly. In the 
same way that this chapter and the previous one developed a dual approach to Foucault’s 
notion of self-narration – one that aligns it with confessional discourses, and another with 
critical resistance and self-fashioning – the next chapter goes beyond the unilateral 
characterisation of traumatic self-narration as normalising and confessional to also 
consider how some trauma narratives can potentially be instances of parrhesia and, thus, 
instances of courageous truth-telling that may – wittingly or not – serve to trouble and 
destabilise the hold of regulative norms on the activity of self-narration. 
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Chapter 4 Foucault, Feminism and the Government of Trauma 
 
This chapter extends Foucault’s analysis of practices of self-narration, using feminist 
analyses to argue that the activity of narrating one’s self and trauma is implicated in 
entrenched power relations, and even those facets of oneself that one might assume to be 
the most private and intimate are shown to be greatly influenced by socio-political factors. 
What this chapter also reveals is that, importantly, there is a flip side, namely that besides 
being confessional and possibly hegemonic, practices of self-narration also contain a trace 
of the possibility of resistance. Feminist practices of consciousness-raising are analysed 
as forms of self-narration to highlight the precarious but rich point where the personal 
meets the political, and the implications of this point of encounter for self-narration are 
explored. This chapter also considers the extent to which narrations of trauma by survivors 
can function as instances of critical parrhesia. 
 
4.1 Self-Narration as Confession, as Hegemony, as Subversion 
 
As the previous chapter emphasised, confessional practices have existed in different forms 
and with different aims. Individuals narrated themselves through various mechanisms in 
different historical contexts, and there is no linear thread seamlessly linking these various 
practices of self-narration. Thinking otherwise would amount to taking a “transhistorical 
view of confession,”1 as Chloë Taylor describes it. This view claims that humans have 
always had an impulse to confess, and that such confessions relieve one of an internal 
weight. This view presents confession as an activity that remained, for the most part, 
unchanged over times in its aims, format and psychological efficacy. The transhistorical 
view of confession identifies Augustine’s Confessions as a founding literary 
autobiographical confession, and traces the propagation of this mode of self-disclosure 
through the codification of Christian penance as a sacrament, through Rousseau’s 
confessional work, to Breuer and Freud’s exploration of the ‘talking cure’ or ‘chimney-
                                               
1 Taylor, The Culture of Confession, 1. 
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sweeping’2 in psychoanalysis. In a book that allocates such a central role to Foucault in 
its title, and that is subtitled “A Genealogy of the ‘Confessing Animal’” in clear reference 
to Foucault, it becomes immediately clear that the transhistorical view of confession will 
be contested, in a manner reminiscent of Foucault’s treatment of the ‘repressive 
hypothesis’. In his various writings on the topic, which Taylor considers as “fragments of 
a genealogy of confession,”3 Foucault was ever suspicious of references to innate or 
natural impulses, liberatory aims, and activities that proclaimed to be power-neutral. A 
genealogical approach such as Taylor’s considers the significant continuities and 
discontinuities in the modalities that confession took over time. As she notes, Foucault 
recognises that the link between the different manifestations of this activity “is one of 
developing and unpredictable disciplinary power, and not one of continual and unshifting 
discipline, nor an ahistorical response to an innate psychological need.”4 Thus, despite 
acknowledging similarities between confessional practices in different historical 
moments, he outlines the novelties that distinguish, for example, ancient pagan 
confessional practices from ancient and medieval Christian practices, and that 
differentiate such practices from the psychoanalytic dialogue. Over-hastily equating these 
practices beneath one rubric of ‘confession’ is a totalising gesture that elides the 
significant variations in such practices and masks the transformations introduced by 
different power/knowledge arrangements, such as the institutional codification of 
confession in Christianity and the birth of psychological knowledge. 
 
In her book, Taylor proposes a genealogy of the ‘confessing animal’, in reference to 
Foucault’s claim that “Western man has become a confessing animal.”5 Taylor critically 
considers and revises the totalising historical grand narrative that posits a universal and 
necessary notion (such as ‘instinct’, ‘nature’, or ‘desire’) that supposedly explains the 
transhistoricity of confession. A genealogy of confession weakens the solidity of 
historical narratives by emphasising the contingency at their heart and, therefore, the 
                                               
2 Josef Breuer and Sigmund Freud, “Case Histories,” in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 2, ed. James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press, 1955), 30. 
3 Taylor, The Culture of Confession, 3. 
4 Taylor, The Culture of Confession, 2. 
5 Foucault, The Will to Knowledge, 59. 
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possibility of things to be otherwise. If, for example, the compulsion to confess and its 
various articulations are shown to be historical effects – rather than causes – that 
underwent significant changes over time, the possibility of things being otherwise is 
introduced. There is a transformative power in the realisation that phenomena which are 
taken for granted, privileged, and made to appear as timeless are, in fact, more recent and 
less fixed than we had imagined, and are thus more open to contestation, transformation 
or refusal. A genealogy of confession, then, shows how the present understanding of 
confession, conceived as “an inevitable outcome not only of our psychological makeup 
and of our social bonds (familial, erotic, punitive), but also of our system of values or 
morality,”6 can be subject to critique and rethinking. 
 
Influenced by Taylor’s genealogical and feminist analysis of practices of self-narration, 
the next sections consider how feminist philosophers and theorists have used and extended 
Foucault’s views to study practices of self-narration. Through this Foucaultian and 
feminist lens, practices of self-narration are seen to be caught up in various relations and 
networks of power that manoeuvre individuals into subjugation. However, such practices 
also contain within them the possibility of agency, critical resistance and self-creation. 
Moreover, in later sections, feminist analysis is used in order to consider the narration of 
trauma. Sexual abuse and domestic violence have been, and still are, key feminist 
concerns. Feminist reflections on the narration of these traumas highlight how social 
power can function to solidify the reproduction of disempowering and hegemonic 
narratives that continue to subjugate traumatised individuals; nonetheless, the co-existent 
potential of trauma narrations to subvert and challenge such narratives remains and must 
not be overlooked. 
 
I Self-Narration as Confession or as Technology of the Self? 
 
Feminist theory has been particularly receptive to Foucault’s work, engaging productively 
both with his views on discourse and power relations, and his later work on ethics and 
technologies of the self. Aside from commenting on the usefulness or otherwise of 
                                               
6 Taylor, The Culture of Confession, 7. 
116 
 
Foucault’s account of power relations and sexuality for feminist theorising,7 some 
feminist theorists have turned to Foucault’s late work to either charge his ethical work 
with being masculinist8 or androcentric9 or, on the contrary, to see whether there are 
conceptual resources in this work that complement or extend feminist aims. Margaret A. 
McLaren’s work on Foucault is in the latter camp. In a chapter in her book on feminist 
applications of Foucault’s work, she analyses the implications of Foucault’s later work on 
technologies of the self and parrhesia for feminist practices.10 She particularly focuses on 
practices of self-narration, both insofar as such practices echo Foucault’s account of 
confession and, more interestingly, to analyse how these practices contain significant 
traces that can destabilise current configurations of power relations and can result in the 
development of creative practices of the self. 
 
Self-narration is one example of what Foucault calls practices (or technologies) of the 
self.11 Technologies of the self do not necessarily amount to critical or subversive acts. 
Indeed, various practices of self-narration can function as extensions of the power to 
subjectify, objectify and categorise according to dividing practices. Yet, as seen for 
example in Foucault’s analyses of ancient hupomnemata, correspondence among friends 
in antiquity and acts of parrhesia, it is possible to speak of practices of self-narration that 
are not reducible to confessional or normalising subjection. Self-narration occupies this 
ambivalent space; as McLaren writes, “[c]onfession, Foucault says, has a double sense of 
subjection; one is compelled to tell the truth about oneself by institutionalised religious 
norms, but at the same time the speaking subject constitutes herself through this 
articulation. Confession is, at least in part, about the subject’s participation in her own 
                                               
7 See, for example, Caroline Ramazanoğlu, ed., Up Against Foucault: Explorations of Some Tensions 
between Foucault and Feminism (London: Routledge, 1993) and Susan J. Hekman, ed., Feminist 
Interpretations of Michel Foucault (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996). 
8 See Jean Grimshaw, “Practices of freedom,” in Up Against Foucault: Explorations of Some Tensions 
between Foucault and Feminism, ed. Caroline Ramazanoğlu (London: Routledge, 1993), 51-72. 
9 See Kate Soper, “Productive contradictions,” in Up Against Foucault: Explorations of Some Tensions 
between Foucault and Feminism, ed. Caroline Ramazanoğlu (London: Routledge, 1993), 29-50. 
10 See Margaret A. McLaren, Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity (Albany: State University of 
New York, 2002), 145-164. 
11 “It seems to me, that all the so-called literature of the self – private diaries, narratives of the self, and so 
on – cannot be understood unless it is put into the general and very rich framework of these practices of the 
self.” Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics,” 277. 
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self-construction.”12 Despite contrary interpretations, Foucault did not deny this latter 
active possibility, arguably not even in his earlier work, as seen in the analyses of 
Rivière’s and Barbin’s self-narrations. In his account of ancient practices of writing and 
self-writing, Foucault points toward (but, admittedly, leaves underdeveloped) the extent 
to which narrative practices, including practices of self-narration, can function as 
techniques of self-formation that can defy the normalising tendencies of power relations.  
Confessional practices thus ambivalently position the subject “both as producer of and as 
produced through her discourse.”13 Writing too, as a technology of the self, can be 
ambivalently identified both as an active self-constituting activity and as the tool that 
enables the writing of objectifying ‘case histories’. Self-narration, then, has to be 
considered as both a form of productive self-writing and, ambivalently, a form of 
confession. Furthermore, there is a politically subversive dimension in the work of self-
transformation. Since self-understandings develop and emerge within socio-cultural and 
historical contexts, self-transformation is not just a dandy, self-absorbed aesthetic activity, 
as some have characterised it,14 but “involves a critique of historical, as well as current, 
social conditions and norms.”15 
 
Autobiography too as an act of self-narration can function ambivalently as a confessional 
exercise or a work of self-writing. If autobiographical self-narration aims solely or 
predominantly at discovering an inherent truth about oneself, then it qualifies as an 
example of normalising confession according to Foucault’s account. Conversely, 
autobiographical self-narration can function as a critical practice of active subject-
formation (or active subjectification, as opposed to passive processes of subjection or, 
worse, subjugation) if it reflects critically on the processes of subjectification themselves, 
or if it seeks to reveal the discursive conditions and practices of power that enable a 
particular self-characterisation over others. By presenting identity as multifaceted, 
complex, dynamic and not static, autobiography can challenge fixed identity categories, 
                                               
12 McLaren, Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity, 146 [emphasis added]. 
13 McLaren, Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity, 149. 
14 See Pierre Hadot, “Reflections on the notion of ‘the cultivation of the self’,” in Michel Foucault: 
Philosopher, ed. François Ewald, trans. Timothy J. Armstrong (Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992 
[1989]), 225-231. 
15 McLaren, Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity, 151. 
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while also remaining an activity that is restricted by historico-cultural conditions that 
determine identities. Of course, it is not always easy or desirable to break away from these 
conditions of social recognisability as this can be painful for the individual, even if these 
conditions themselves are a source of pain. 
 
A theoretical outlook that combines Foucault’s work with feminist concerns emphasises 
that the personal or subjective is always (if not always already) tied to the social or 
political. This concern is perfectly captured in the feminist slogan from the 1960s, ‘the 
personal is political’, the aim of which was to highlight how problems that women might 
have thought were their individual problems – such as a case of domestic violence or 
sexual abuse – are, in fact, a reflection of wider socio-political structures. The next section 
elaborates this insight, paying particular attention to how this feminist reflection informed 
feminist practices of self-narration. 
 
II Narrating between/beyond the Personal and the Political 
 
Except for occasional references in interviews to practices of friendship or sexual 
pleasure,16 Foucault did not dwell much on how contemporary practices of the self can 
function critically rather than hegemonically. One of the reasons why McLaren’s work is 
fruitful is that she identifies feminist practices of autobiography and consciousness-raising 
that can be analysed through Foucault’s ideas on confession and parrhesia. McLaren 
proposes that:  
 
Women’s autobiography can be viewed as a feminist technology of the self 
because the subject plays an active role in her own self-constitution. Yet 
autobiography can also be confessional. Confessional autobiography reiterates 
normalizing discourses and ties one to one’s identity. Autobiography, then, can be 
either an exercise in subjection, if it produces the required truth about oneself, or 
                                               
16 See Michel Foucault, “Sex, Power, and the Politics of Identity,” in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth: The 
Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 Volume 1, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley et al. (New York: 
The New Press, 1997), 163-173. 
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it can be a process of subjectification, if one critically examines how one came to 
be as one is with reference to normalizing discourses.17  
 
As an example of autobiography in the critical sense, McLaren cites the work of 
Morwenna Griffiths, who coined the notion of critical autobiography: “an autobiography 
will add to reliable knowledge if it makes use of individual experience, theory, and a 
process of reflection and re-thinking, which includes attention to politically situated 
perspectives. This is a ‘critical autobiography’.”18  
 
Besides feminist autobiography, McLaren identifies feminist consciousness-raising 
groups as entailing possible critical and subversive practices of self-narration. McLaren 
identifies these practices as technologies of the self which, although imbued with power 
relations that may sway them toward hegemonic practices that sediment power’s grip on 
the individual, can also function critically as creative practices of personal and social 
transformation. McLaren recognises that an emphasis on “techniques of the self as 
political does not reduce politics to the personal, or preclude collective action or structural 
changes.”19 This critique, often voiced by critics of so-called ‘identity politics’, overlooks 
the utility and necessity of rooting macro-analyses of society in individuals’ experiences. 
Moreover, micro and macro perspectives are not mutually exclusive; on the contrary, they 
can reinforce each other in such a way that self- and social transformation are theorised 
together. Consciousness-raising occupied a central role in second wave feminist practices 
and, as McLaren writes, “is often viewed as the cornerstone of the women’s liberation 
movement in the United States [and] originated with the second wave of the women’s 
liberation movement in the late 1960s.”20 Despite its prominent status, feminist 
consciousness-raising was a highly contested practice within the women’s movement. 
Some of its critics argued that it was not properly political (whatever that means) because 
of its insistence on the personal. Other critics attacked the practice on the basis that it 
                                               
17 McLaren, Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity, 152. 
18 Morwenna Griffiths, “Autobiography, Feminism and the Practice of Action Research,” Educational 
Action Research 2, no. 1 (1994): 76.  
19 McLaren, Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity, 145. 
20 McLaren, Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity, 155. 
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assumed a false homogeneity among the experiences of women and obscured individual 
differences of race, class, and sexual orientation.21 Another line of criticism of such 
practices argues that an excessive zooming in on individuals’ lives “can result in a 
stultifying political correctness,”22 and that “[t]his displacement of the political by the 
personal may lead to a merely individualistic concern with lifestyle.”23 This section does 
not rehearse such criticisms of consciousness-raising practices and identity politics but, 
rather, focuses on how such practices of self-narration resisted being drawn toward, or 
limited by, individualising confessional discourse. 
 
Proponents of practices of consciousness-raising argued that the strength of these 
practices lay in how women were empowered by the realisation that the daily struggles 
they encountered were shared by other individuals too and, as such, “were not personal 
pathologies, but reflected a larger pattern of social and political discrimination.”24 
Through such practices of consciousness-raising, one’s experiences of discrimination 
were not seen as referring back to a truth about the individual’s identity; instead, this 
experience was connected to broader social realities that perpetuated these 
discriminations. The shareability of concerns among women, although surely subject to 
individual differences, could have an empowering function by leading to the creation of 
discourses and social movements that motivate social and institutional change. This 
empowering capacity of consciousness-raising, and its ability to root personal experiences 
in social factors, are expressed by various proponents of the practice: ‘Consciousness-
raising is one of the most political acts in which one can engage. In consciousness-raising, 
women learn that economics, politics, and sociology mean on the most direct level: as 
they affect their lives;’25 ‘Consciousness-raising is many things, but one thing it is not is 
psychotherapy, or any other kind of therapy. Therapeutic processes have been employed 
mostly to encourage participants to adjust to the social order. Consciousness-raising seeks 
                                               
21 See McLaren, Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity, 157-158. 
22 McLaren, Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity, 159. 
23 McLaren, Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity, 159. 
24 McLaren, Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity, 155. 
25 Claudia Dreifus, Women’s Fate: Raps From a Feminist Consciousness-Raising Group (New York: 
Bantam Books, 1973), 6, quoted in McLaren, Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity, 156. 
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to invite rebellion;’26 ‘[t]he total group process is not therapy because we try to find the 
social causes for our experiences and the possible programs for changing these.’27 The 
dissociation of consciousness-raising practices from therapeutic ones is instructive. Many 
(psycho)therapeutic practices foreground an individual’s ‘ailments’ in isolation from their 
social causes and the contexts in which they are immersed. For this reason, they can be 
considered as confessional in the sense of having individualising tendencies. 
 
Displacing this individualising emphasis with a broader socio-political outlook can have 
implications for a critical analysis of self-narration. On one hand, it shows that self-
narration is always already caught up in dominant discourses and, thus, it is futile to think 
that self-narration can ever be a power-free and neutral activity. On the other hand, this 
entanglement is not fixed once and for all. Rather, self-narrations can occupy different 
configurations in relation to dominant discourses, resisting some of its effects and creating 
new counter-discourses. Poststructuralist, particularly Foucaultian, accounts of truth, 
power and subjectivity have been assiduous in detailing this uneasy balance between 
discursive co-option of self-narratives and critical resistant self-narration, as the next 
section shows.  
 
III Is Truth-Telling, like the Subject, Dead? 
 
Taking her cue from the heated feminist debates on the political utility and philosophical 
possibility of practices of truth-telling and self-narration, Mariana Valverde claims that:  
 
 [t]he 1960s consciousness-raising group may have gone out of fashion, but many 
of the speech practices associated with it have become ubiquitous in both feminist 
and nonfeminist sites. Support groups, political gatherings, self-help meetings, 
informal conversations, and radio and television call-in programs are just some of 
                                               
26 Dreifus, Women’s Fate, 7, quoted in McLaren, Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity, 156. 
27 Pamela Allen, Free Space: A Perspective on the Small Group in Women’s Liberation (New York: Times 
Change Press, 1970), 30, quoted in McLaren, Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity, 157 
[emphasis added]. 
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the arenas in which various forms and styles of ‘truth telling’ are practiced by 
women.28 
 
Valverde notes that such practices, crucial in so-called second wave feminism, became 
caught up in the polarising debates between feminists who “sing the praises of any and all 
autobiographical accounts”29 and feminists who express postmodern scepticism about the 
value and possibility of such truth-telling since they “tend to see the quest for authenticity 
as deluded, and the construction of a unified humanist feminist subject as an ideological 
and political trap.”30 This important feminist debate has reached an impasse, Valverde 
claims, with theorists lumping such practices “under a single banner and [are] either 
praised or derided in toto.”31 
 
Valverde offers a sensible intervention in this debate. She argues that a critical account of 
practices of self-narration must be able to distinguish between classic confessional 
practices, and practices of truth-telling that have – or can have – different social and 
ethical effects. To account for the critical potential harboured in such practices, one must 
hold on to the critical and politically progressive potential implicit in various forms of 
self-narration and truth-telling. It is crucial to question the either/or format of setting a 
humanist truth-telling (whose aim it is to get to the root of a ‘deep self’) against a 
posthumanist mode of truth-telling (that follows the critique of transparent self-
knowledge offered by thinkers like Foucault, Butler, Derrida and others). Such a binary 
would problematically imply that confessional discourse is unilaterally opposed to some 
form of truth-telling that is radically subversive or outside the ‘humanist trap’.  
 
Valverde rhetorically poses some questions often associated with the ‘postmodern’ 
theoretical attacks on truth-telling practices, which is worth quoting at length: 
 
                                               
28 Mariana Valverde, “Experience and Truth Telling in a Post-humanist World: A Foucauldian Contribution 
to Feminist Ethical Reflections,” in Feminism and the Final Foucault, eds. Dianna Taylor and Karen 
Vintges (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 67. 
29 Valverde, “Experience and Truth Telling,” 67. 
30 Valverde, “Experience and Truth Telling,” 67. 
31 Valverde, “Experience and Truth Telling,” 67. 
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Isn’t experience always linguistically and culturally constructed? Don’t we always 
resort to stereotyped narrative forms in telling our story, so that a transgressive 
tale of coming out as a lesbian ends up sounding remarkably like an evangelical 
conversion experience, and is to that extent hardly authentic? Isn’t “the subject” 
dead? If Man is dead, does that mean that Woman is equally defunct? If we are 
not autonomous subjects who create meanings, as eighteenth-century European 
intellectuals believed, but rather mere effects of discursive and cultural practices, 
then what is the status of the tales we tell? Can honesty and sincerity be a sound 
basis for knowledge as well as ethics, if, as Jacques Lacan tells us, not only is self-
knowledge impossible but, more disturbingly, self-identity is but a perpetual 
illusion?32 
 
Valverde thinks that the ‘postmodern’ approach represented in these rhetorical questions 
pours cold water over truth-telling and practices of self-narration and, in so doing, (to 
retain the water metaphor) risks throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Although she 
is sympathetic to such deconstructive critical thought, as is this thesis, Valverde argues 
that there remains the appeal of a particular kind of subjectivity and a particular kind of 
confessional truth-telling. This is not nostalgic or naïve thinking, but a source of critical 
possibilities; as she aptly puts it:  
 
“breaking the silence,” however trite as a book title, and however problematic as 
a theoretical project in the post-Foucauldian age, remains a real, meaningful 
imperative for many ordinary women facing up to the old problems of oppression, 
violence, sexual shame, and so on. After all, most women who become feminists 
do so not by reading postmodern theory but by participating in some kind of truth-
telling activity, such as coming out as a lesbian or going to a support group in 
which one learns that one’s experience of rape or incest is part of a large collective 
problem.33 
 
                                               
32 Valverde, “Experience and Truth Telling,” 68. 
33 Valverde, “Experience and Truth Telling,” 69. 
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In view of this reflection, Valverde proposes an approach that goes beyond the impasse 
that has exhausted such debates on feminist practices of truth-telling. She argues that both 
extreme sides of the debate hold untenable assumptions: whereas the ‘humanist’ 
proponent of truth-telling practices might be neglecting the insights brought about by a 
critical deconstruction of the subject, likewise the ‘posthumanist’ (or ‘antihumanist’) 
assumes that any practice of truth-telling rests on humanist assumptions. Valverde thus 
contends that not all practices of truth-telling are necessarily confessional or refer back to 
a ‘deep truth’ about subjectivity. One may hold on to the relevance of practices of self-
narrations – as this thesis does – without holding on to notions of ‘absolute truth’ or 
‘transparent self-knowledge’. 
 
This leaves room for a realm of non-confessional truth-telling or, better still, confessional 
truth-telling that moves beyond the politically and ethically debilitating effects of a 
particular form of confessional discourse. We know that Foucault explored such forms of 
truth-telling in, for example, Stoic practices of self-examination and in practices of 
parrhesia, as explored in the previous chapter. These practices do not operate at the level 
of the confessional; rather, Valverde claims, they are to be seen as operating “at a level 
that one could call Deleuzian – the level of de-centred ethical assemblages”34 that go 
beyond the self as articulated by the disciplinary psychological disciplines. Like Deleuze, 
Foucault experiments with non-territorialising ways of thinking about selves, bodies and, 
ultimately, ethics: “he looked through ancient sources in order to find inspiration and 
resources for his desire to develop a post-psychological, post-disciplinary, post-Romantic 
ethics.”35  
 
However, Valverde notes that, when it comes to his analysis of such non-confessional 
practices, Foucault privileges ‘high culture’ and masculine sources, as attested by his 
various analyses of antiquity. For this reason, Valverde turns to practices in the feminist 
archive to shift this imbalance. She remarks that “women – and men – can and do much 
ethical work, and much truth-telling work, that does not fit the Rousseauian paradigm of 
                                               
34 Valverde, “Experience and Truth Telling,” 71. 
35 Valverde, “Experience and Truth Telling,” 71. 
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authenticity and truth-telling.”36 Practices of self-narration, therefore, are “not the 
monopoly of that long confessional tradition that goes from Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
through 1960s pop psychology to Oprah Winfrey.”37 For example, she analyses feminist 
consciousness-raising groups in light of the tension between the confessional and the non-
confessional. She argues that consciousness-raising groups constitute a site for 
Foucaultian askesis, or spaces for utilising technologies of the self and self-making. 
Consciousness-raising support groups function, Valverde claims, to create a strong link 
between individual stories and political demands, as well as to show how broader political 
analyses are rooted and manifest themselves in the life stories and bodies of actual 
individuals: “‘Wife assault’ or ‘gendered violence’ as a major worldwide issue can be 
embodied, made real, through individual storytelling; and by the same token, an individual 
who has gone through years of abuse can begin to see herself as a large collective rather 
than an isolated, dysfunctional individual.”38 This dual function of such consciousness-
raising groups shows, for Valverde, that such practices of truth-telling or self-narration 
need not automatically amount to confession in Foucault’s negative sense of the term, 
even if such practices do entail a confessional dimension. What Valverde is emphasising 
is that not all claims rooted in first-person experience are necessarily confessional truth-
telling. As she puts it: “Truth telling becomes confessional only under certain 
circumstances, in situations in which the institutional and cultural context and the 
speaker’s own analytic tools favor such a move.”39 
 
In this way, Valverde does not concede that the ‘postmodern camp’ has won the debate 
and that we need to do away with notions of authenticity. Instead, the philosophically 
more interesting and politically more progressive move is to recognise that “there are 
many different practices of truth telling and, therefore, many different kinds of selves, and 
that these can easily coexist, even in the same person.”40 Valverde hits on a strong point 
                                               
36 Valverde, “Experience and Truth Telling,” 73. For a similar analysis of feminist practices of self-
narration, see also McLaren, Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity, 145-164 and Taylor, The 
Culture of Confession, 191-235. 
37 Valverde, “Experience and Truth Telling,” 71. 
38 Valverde, “Experience and Truth Telling,” 82. 
39 Valverde, “Experience and Truth Telling,” 83 [emphasis added]. 
40 Valverde, “Experience and Truth Telling,” 73. 
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here. Rather than insisting on strictly measuring the degree of veracity of the pro- and 
anti-self-narration theoretical camps, we could instead agree that both harbour important 
truths. For Valverde, different genres or ways and contexts of speaking raise different 
ethical problematics. It is not a matter of having to choose whether to be theoretically for 
or against first-person experiential accounts; as Valverde puts it: “Earnest accounts of 
one’s experience of victimization do not have to be dismissed as naive by those of us who 
feel more comfortable with cosmopolitan irony: it is possible to respect both.”41 Not all 
ethico-political aims can be reached with the same set of practices or discourses. 
Moreover, no matter how confident and self-assured we are about our chosen set of 
practices, the aims of our struggles can very easily be frustrated or deferred. Valverde 
concurs with this point and argues that “if telling personal stories, to oneself or to others, 
is not one thing with a single meaning […] then it follows that telling one’s story for a 
political purpose cannot be regarded as a distinct act with a single, predictable effect.”42 
Despite the theoretical robustness that may motivate one’s practices, it is not up to the 
individual to predict their reception and efficacy. As put by Foucault in personal 
communication with Dreyfus and Rabinow: “People know what they do; frequently they 
know why they do what they do; but what they don’t know is what what they do does.”43 
It is in this light that I argue, with Foucault’s ideas, that practices of self-narration occupy 
a rich but unstable space. 
 
Valverde illustrates her point on the polymorphous nature of truth-telling, as well as the 
unclear determination between the confessional and non-confessional, by drawing on 
three modes of truth-telling: psychological, sociological, and antiscientific. The first mode 
of truth-telling draws on tenets of ‘liberal psychology’ to provide accounts that appeal to 
an individual’s personality traits such as self-esteem, introversion, and so on. The second 
mode of truth-telling, Valverde claims, is a form of ‘leftwing sociologism’ in which an 
individual unburdens oneself by externalising the cause of one’s suffering through an 
economic or sociological explanation. A third form of truth-telling is identified by 
                                               
41 Valverde, “Experience and Truth Telling,” 74. 
42 Valverde, “Experience and Truth Telling,” 87 [emphasis added]. 
43 Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2nd ed. 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983), 187 [emphasis added]. 
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Valverde in the form of accounts that do not seek to unravel any causal explanations of 
their current predicament, but instead draw on ‘antiscientific’ accounts that draw on 
notions of luck or ‘the stars’.44 Valverde’s overarching point is that there is no reason why 
such different modes of truth-telling and self-narration cannot co-exist in the same person. 
Indeed, she claims, the critical ethico-political potential of diverse self-narrating practices 
remains largely untapped “in the overly abstract debates about ‘confession.’”45 Although 
the ambivalence brought about by the possible incommensurability of truth-telling modes 
might not contribute “to building up what is grandiosely called ‘feminist methodology,’ 
[it] is very useful in everyday life.”46 Perhaps this is one of those scenarios where ‘robust 
theorising’ can learn a lot from everyday seemingly mundane practices, in the same way 
that such practices may be better informed if viewed through a critical theoretical lens. 
 
Valverde’s position presents an interesting position in the heated identity politics debates 
by loosening the rigidity of the extreme binary positions. Not all self-narration is 
confessional, and not all confessional discourse is necessarily ‘bad’: “Acknowledging that 
‘identity’ (personal history, antecedents, biography) matters, and matters politically, does 
not have to mean accepting all the baggage of ‘identity politics.’”47 Self-narration is not a 
unitary and univocal activity; it happens in a variety of contexts, through a variety of 
techniques, and for a variety of aims. It would be philosophically and politically counter-
productive to regard all such practices as confessional in the undesirable sense. Stressing 
the importance of embracing the diversity of self-narrating practices does not eliminate 
the possibility or desirability of critically evaluating norms and practices that are clearly 
more damagingly normalising than others. If, as stated above, “[t]ruth telling becomes 
confessional only under certain circumstances,” and such circumstances are imbued with 
power relations that constrict individuals’ potential for self-expression and self-
transformation, then the unravelling of these circumstances and their hegemonic effects 
remains a critical task. 
 
                                               
44 See Valverde, “Experience and Truth Telling,” 83. 
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The next section applies the views discussed in this chapter more specifically to narrations 
of trauma by survivors in institutional contexts. Trauma narrations proliferate in society, 
and intervene in a social context permeated with cultural discourses that make such 
narrations intelligible. Discourses and power relations come to bear on trauma narrations, 
regulating their intelligibility and governing their form and dissemination. However, 
beyond a merely ‘negative’ understanding of such an analysis, a key point being 
emphasised is that, despite their fragility and possible co-option, trauma narrations can 
function critically and subversively by revealing the power of norms and opening up new 
ways of being and narrating.  
 
4.2 Governing the Narration of Trauma 
 
I Subversive Stories and Hegemonic Tales 
 
What the preceding sections highlight, ultimately, is that since self-narratives are socio-
cultural products, they can be studied sociologically. In fact, the analysis of self-narration 
and of narratives of trauma in this section follows the sociology of narratives proposed by 
Patricia Ewick and Susan S. Silbey, particularly in their distinction between subversive 
stories and hegemonic tales.48 Ewick and Silbey study the conditions according to which 
a self-narrative can function in counter-hegemonic ways. They refer to a dual function of 
narrative: an epistemological role through which narratives reveal social and cultural 
meanings, and a political role whereby narratives are mobilised with subversive or 
transformative aims to counter culturally dominant ways of organising and interpreting 
social realities. This countering gesture is not to be understood as mere opposition: it is 
not clear where a narrative becomes a counter-narrative. Narratives, including counter-
narratives, reflect – indeed, to an extent, are – power relations that facilitate particular 
ways of ordering reality while maintaining dominant social practices and their currency 
in place. “Narratives,” Ewick and Silbey argue, “can function to sustain hegemony or, 
                                               
48 See Patricia Ewick and Susan S. Silbey, “Subversive Stories and Hegemonic Tales: Toward a Sociology 
of Narrative,” Law & Society Review 29, no. 2 (1995): 197-226. 
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alternatively, subvert power.”49 It is not easy to neatly delineate where hegemony ends 
and subversion begins; indeed, the two phenomena are, by their complex nature, not 
clearly demarcated in this convenient way. 
 
To unpack this difficult tension, Ewick and Silbey analyse what they call the social 
organisation of narrative by suggesting that “narratives are told for a variety of reasons, 
to a variety of audiences, with a variety of effects.”50 They highlight that narratives are 
not told in a random manner; there are contexts that regulate (by eliciting as well as by 
discouraging) when a narrative is given. Even if it is determined that it is a right context 
for narration, social norms and conventions govern the narrative content, that is, what gets 
narrated. Not any type of content is expected and treated favourably. Ewick and Silbey 
cite an example from the courts where narratives that defy the court’s definitions of a 
coherent and persuasive account tend to be treated “as filled with irrelevancies and 
inappropriate information.”51 This also raises questions on whether narratives need to 
fulfil certain performative conditions in order to be treated as credible. Ewick and Silbey 
note that, especially in court contexts, true accounts are disbelieved simply because they 
do not satisfy the implicit presentation requirements. From a critical theory perspective 
that seeks to reveal how power relations function, it is crucial to analyse how a subject’s 
credibility is tied to specific discursive norms, and the follow-up question should ask 
about who has access to such knowledge of norms, and what kind of narratives are being 
precluded from the start by these norms. Thus, “[t]he social organization of narrative or 
storytelling regulates not only when and what kinds of stories can be told, it also governs 
[…] how stories are told.”52 Lastly, alongside the when [context], the what [content] and 
the how [presentation], narratives are also socially organised with regard to their intention, 
that is, with regard to their why: “storytelling is strategic. Narrators tell tales in order to 
achieve some goal or advance some interest. […] We tell stories to entertain or persuade, 
to exonerate or indict, to enlighten or instruct.”53 
                                               
49 Ewick and Silbey, “Subversive Stories,” 200. 
50 Ewick and Silbey, “Subversive Stories,” 205. 
51 Ewick and Silbey, “Subversive Stories,” 207. 
52 Ewick and Silbey, “Subversive Stories,” 208 [emphasis in original]. 
53 Ewick and Silbey, “Subversive Stories,” 208. 
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These different dimensions of narratives operate simultaneously. To some degree, 
narratives must satisfy some narrative and social expectations if they wish to be 
intelligible and efficacious; otherwise, they are condemned to unintelligibility or triviality. 
Inevitably, narratives rely on social conventionality, which means that “[b]ecause of the 
conventionalized character of narrative, then, our stories are likely to express ideological 
effects and hegemonic assumptions.”54 The hegemonic contribution of narratives take 
place through various means, for example when they reproduce existing structures of 
meaning and power, or when narratives stifle and preclude alternative narratives by 
presenting themselves as the only viable or credible narratives. Narratives also function 
hegemonically when “they conceal the social organization of their production,”55 and hide 
the fact that their significance and reach are cultural phenomena, and thus are not 
unquestionable. 
 
Importantly, Ewick and Silbey emphasise that narratives contribute to existing 
hegemonies “by effacing the connections between the particular and the general.”56 This 
echoes McLaren’s characterisation of feminist consciousness-raising groups as possibly 
embodying parrhesia by resisting individualising power. Foucault highlights how power 
does not only act in a totalising manner by aspiring to give, despite cracks and resistance, 
an exhaustive account of the individual; power is also individualising, that is, it uses the 
notion of individuality as a vehicle for normalisation and subjection.57 Narratives can be 
studied in a similar way. Besides offering totalising schemas of interpretation, power 
functions hegemonically on narratives by individualising. Ewick and Silbey argue that 
this happens, for example, in the legal system: 
 
In fact, given the ideological commitment to individualized justice and case-by-
case processing that characterizes our legal system, narrative, relying as it often 
does on the language of the particular and subjective, may more often operate to 
                                               
54 Ewick and Silbey, “Subversive Stories,” 212. 
55 Ewick and Silbey, “Subversive Stories,” 214. 
56 Ewick and Silbey, “Subversive Stories,” 215. 
57 See Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 332. 
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sustain, rather than subvert, inequality and injustice. The law’s insistent demand 
for personal narratives achieves a kind of radical individuation that disempowers 
the teller by effacing the connections among persons and the social organization 
of their experiences.58 
 
This point goes some way toward suggesting what constitutes a counter-hegemonic or 
subversive narrative. Counter-narratives, thus, are not the absolute opposite of hegemonic 
narratives; it might be the case, following Foucault’s formulation, that there is no ‘outside’ 
to power relations,59 and that counter-narratives work through the same logic of power 
relations and ‘merely’ thwart or frustrate the intended outcomes of power. Ewick and 
Silbey characterise narratives as subversive insofar that they emplot a connection between 
“biography and history.”60 This does not amount to reducing an individual’s narrative to 
the broader socio-historical conditions that give rise to it, nor does it generalise an 
individual’s narrative. Rather, “subversive stories recount particular experiences as rooted 
in and part of an encompassing cultural, material, and political world that extends beyond 
the local.”61 According to Ewick and Silbey, subversive stories: 
 
are those that break the silence. Stories that are capable of countering the hegemonic 
are those which bridge, without denying, the particularities of experience and 
subjectivities and those which bear witness to what is unimagined and unexpressed. 
[…] Subversive stories are narratives that employ the connection between the 
particular and the general by locating the individual within social organization.”62 
 
But this is not a straightforward matter; it is not up to the individual narrator to emplot 
such a connection between the individual and the social organisation. Narratives, of 
trauma for example, can veer between hegemonic normalisation and subversive 
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parrhesiastic truth-telling despite the aims of the speakers, as the following section on 
survivors’ discourse shows. 
 
II Swaying Survivors’ Discourse 
 
In their excellent analysis of survivors’ discourse through a Foucaultian theoretical lens, 
Linda Alcoff and Laura Gray locate a tension that surrounds and haunts trauma narratives. 
On the one hand, narratives of trauma can function critically and subversively to reveal 
and disrupt existing hegemonic discourses and practices. But, equally, on the other hand, 
the flexibility of power relations can neutralise this subversive potential by transforming 
it into another technique by which power functions. Reflecting on the constantly emerging 
narratives of rape, incest and sexual assault, Alcoff and Gray ask: “Is this proliferation 
and dissemination of survivor discourse having a subversive effect on patriarchal 
violence? Or is it being co-opted: taken up and used but in a manner that diminishes its 
subversive impact?”63 The authors acknowledge that practices of ‘speaking out’ and 
‘breaking the silence’ have great critical potential in calling for and effecting political 
transformation, but they also recognise that such practices ought to be analysed as 
discursive acts that, like any discursive event, are subject to entanglement and co-option 
by power relations that can sterilise and commodify such practices. 64 
 
Alcoff and Gray draw on Foucault’s account of discursive and confessional power to show 
how, beyond the conscious intentions of speakers, power functions through: 
 
                                               
63 Alcoff and Gray, “Survivor Discourse,” 261. 
64 This point may also illuminate analyses of the ‘Me Too’ movement. Some analyses, particularly critical 
ones, have used Foucault’s ideas to regard the movement as possibly a manifestation of confessional power: 
“the act of confessing isn’t an act of political liberation. From the confessional, to the therapist’s couch, we 
are a deeply confessional society. The moment of release, however, comes at a price. As French philosopher 
Michel Foucault lays out in the History of Sexuality, the confessional has long been a space where power is 
exercised over individuals by compelling them to name their experiences, to reveal some hidden truth. 
#MeToo is the technological equivalent of the confessional. Instead of a couch, though, we have social 
media platforms, and the confessor is the audience that we post for and the platforms that collect the 
information we post. Not only do we hand over our power when we confess, but we subject ourselves to 
surveillance.” Samatha Rose Hill, “Why #MeToo Is Not For Me,” Medium, November 4, 2017, 
medium.com/amor-mundi/why-metoo-is-not-for-me-a8472da49034.  
133 
 
multiple and subtle mechanisms by which dominant discourses have co-opted our 
collective speech and whether this tendency toward co-optation can be effectively 
resisted. One of our central concerns will be how the tendency of the confessional 
structure to disempower the [person confessing] can be overcome.65 
 
Alcoff and Gray “explore the transgressive character of survivors’ speech”66 not to 
conclude that survivors’ narratives are unilaterally powerful, but to show how survivors’ 
discourse constitutes a site of unstable conflict. Despite efforts – systematic, structural, or 
cultural – to silence and discredit survivors, their discourse persists in, echoing Cynic 
parrhesia, “disgusting and disturbing […] the listeners’ constructed sensibilities.”67 
Moreover, survivor speech intervenes at a discursive level by introducing into the realm 
of the thinkable categories such as “‘rapist father’ or ‘rapist boyfriend’ as an object of 
discussion or analysis.”68 Survivor speech also positions itself as demanding to be heard, 
posing a challenge to “conventional speaking arrangements: arrangements in which 
women and children are not authoritative.”69 
 
However, although survivors’ narratives of trauma can function to rattle and disconcert, 
“the speaking out of survivors has been sensationalized and exploited by the mass media, 
in fictional dramatizations as well as ‘journalistic’ formats such as […] television talk 
shows.”70 These techniques amount to the silencing of the subversive potential of trauma 
narratives, or serve “to channel it into nonthreatening outlets.”71 Such nonthreatening 
outlets include an excessive focus on the individualising facet of the narrative which 
places the prime emphasis on the individual narrative while failing to regard how the 
trauma suffered connects to wider structural issues. In the spirit of consciousness-raising 
practices discussed above, connecting individual narratives to wider social causes does 
not amount to obscuring the individual, or writing him or her out of the narrative. Rather, 
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the point is to show how individual experiences are made possible by broader social 
conditions, and that a therapeutic emphasis on the former may fail to capture the role of 
the latter. Another nonthreatening outlet is to transform survivors into “docile, self-
monitoring bodies who willingly submit themselves to (and thus help to create and 
legitimate) the authority of experts,”72 allowing such experts to position themselves as 
possessors of universal truths. In such circumstances, “[i]t is the expert rather than the 
survivor who will determine under what conditions the survivor speaks and whether the 
survivor’s speech is true or acceptable within the dominant discourse’s codes of 
normality.”73 
 
It is in the midst of this unstable terrain that survivors’ narratives of trauma exist, with 
their potential to subvert being continuously subject to intricate recuperation tactics. 
‘Speaking out’ as a political tactic loses its critical efficacy if and when it amounts to 
passing everything having to do with trauma “through the endless mill of speech.”74 As 
Alcoff and Gray ask, while recognising that there is no one clear answer to their questions: 
 
has it [the growth of the phenomenon of speaking out] simply replayed 
confessional modes which recuperate dominant patriarchal discourses without 
subversive effect, or has it been able to create new spaces within these discourses 
and to begin to develop an autonomous counterdiscourse, one capable of 
empowering survivors? Given that power operates not simply or primarily through 
exclusion and repression but through the very production and proliferation of 
discourses, should we not be more than a little wary of contributing to the recent 
proliferation of survivor discourse?75 
 
This wariness complements Foucault’s own hesitance in uncritically regarding any 
seeming practice of resistance as obvious, unilateral and actual resistance, without 
acknowledging that this presumption of subversion would, in fact, be mistaking power for 
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its ruse and rashly confusing the cure with its lure. As Foucault cautions at the end of The 
Will to Knowledge: “The irony of this deployment [of sexuality] is in having us believe 
that our ‘liberation’ is in the balance.”76 Thinking that one is placing oneself outside the 
ruse of power could mean that one might be contributing to the solidification of power 
relations, despite one’s best intentions. 
 
Alcoff and Gray’s analysis does not pour cold water over any attempt to subvert the grip 
of hegemonic power. Rather, they speak from the position of survivors motivated by 
concerns of justice and empowerment, who recognise that human experience is imbued 
with theory and discourses, and thus “always already political.”77 In conclusion to their 
charged analysis, they highlight how “[a]s survivors, we must develop and identify 
methods and forums in which emotional expression can activate the subversive potential 
of our rage,”78 amid attempts to discredit survivors’ narratives on the basis of their 
emotional presentation as either ‘too much emotion’ (and thus manipulative) or ‘too little 
emotion’ (and thus as not credible). Ultimately, the subversive potential of survivors’ 
narratives of trauma can be unleashed if the depoliticising and silencing strategies of 
power that channel the narratives through the authoritative and familiar discourses are 
overridden. Managing this may elevate trauma narratives from the realm of the subjugated 
confessional to the status of critical witnessing: “to speak out, to name the unnameable, 
to turn and face it down.”79 This empowered and empowering use of trauma narratives is 
a way “to make survivor discourse public in such a way as to minimize the dangers of 
speaking out for survivors yet maximize the disruptive potential of survivor outrage.”80 
Narrating from a position of outrage in a sociality that resists listening to one’s suffering, 
or that is only able to hear suffering on its own terms can be a risky form of truth-telling. 
The next section considers the courageous truth-telling typical of such practices of self-
narration as instances of parrhesia. 
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III The Subversive Truth-Telling of Trauma: Survivors as Parrhesiasts 
 
Despite the popularity and boom of autobiographical trauma memoirs in recent decades, 
trauma narratives are not always well-received. There is a tendency for the utterances of 
traumatised individuals to be ignored, intentionally misinterpreted, or treated with 
suspicion. It seems that narratives of trauma must first conform to the socially desired 
schemas before they can be received with empathy. If not in conformity with the desired 
framework of meaning, such narratives by shattered selves are perceived as a possible 
threat. However, despite these risks and pressures that surround the narratives of 
traumatised individuals, narratives of trauma still harbour the potential to threaten 
hegemonic effects of power. Despite their fragility, narrations of trauma can constitute a 
socially engaged practice of parrhesia. 
 
Jenny Edkins argues that trauma is characterised not just by the feeling of utter 
powerlessness associated with it, but also by a betrayal of trust when one’s community is 
a site of danger rather than shelter. This betrayal of trust, she writes: 
 
can be devastating because who we are, or who we think we may be, depends very 
closely on the social context in which we place and find ourselves. […] If that 
order betrays us in some way, we may survive in the sense of continuing to live as 
physical beings, but the meaning of our existence is changed.81 
 
Améry, an Auschwitz survivor, captures this point in his poignant remark: “Every 
morning when I get up I can read the Auschwitz number on my forearm. […] Every day 
anew I lose my trust in the world.”82 Referring to Améry’s quote, Edkins remarks that “[i]t 
has become plain to a survivor that the appearance of fixity and security produced by the 
social order is just that: an appearance.”83 Nonetheless, Edkins continues, the survivor is 
dependent upon that same social, political and discursive order to tell his tale: “This is the 
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dilemma survivors face. The only words they have are the words of the very political 
community that is the source of their suffering.”84 Yet, following Foucault’s 
characterisation of discourse as risky, strategic and tactical, the use of language by trauma 
survivors may disentangle the taken-for-granted meanings of terms. Traumatised 
individuals’ narratives of what they endured can have a politically subversive role:  
 
The testimony of survivors can challenge structures of power and authority [and] 
strip away the diverse commonly accepted meanings by which we lead our lives 
in our various communities. They reveal the contingency of the social order and 
in some cases how it conceals its own impossibility. They question our settled 
assumptions about who we might be as humans and what we might be capable 
of.85 
 
Des Pres echoes this point in his incisive description of the subversive character of 
survivors’ testimonies: “The survivor, then, is a disturber of the peace. He is a runner of 
the blockade men erect against knowledge of ‘unspeakable’ things. About these he aims 
to speak, and in so doing he undermines, without intending to, the validity of existing 
norms. He is a genuine transgressor, and here he is made to feel real guilt.”86 Survivors’ 
testimonies, then, emerge as untimely, unusual, irregular and unwanted because of their 
untamed character. Testimonies can be a coping mechanism for survivors, an opportunity 
to finally render in speech that which has haunted them. Trauma testimonies persist; as 
Des Pres puts it, they are “given in memory, told in pain and often clumsily, with little 
thought for style or rhetorical device.”87 Narratives of trauma are told with hesitance, 
urgency and brutality. It is for this reason that, for the sake of preserving the stability of 
the social order, it would be better if survivors remained silent; otherwise they may be 
forcibly silenced. Survivors’ testimonies are risky endeavours; thus, they can qualify as 
acts of parrhesia. Beyond the stable, secure and regulated (and regulatory) truth, the truth 
typical of survivors’ testimonies destabilises. The same can be said of the affective 
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dimension of survivors’ voices – the anger, delusion, bitterness, hopelessness: “Their 
anger was not new. It was ‘old, atavistic. We were angry as all civilised men who have 
ever been sent to make murder in the name of virtue were angry.’”88 These emotions 
present a risk to normalising processes of subject formation. 
 
In the so-called Western world, the regulation of this domain of emotions falls under the 
monopoly of the predominant psychological discourses. The aforementioned anger and 
emotions of survivors find themselves expressed in a depoliticised and depoliticising 
psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s office, and find themselves contributing to the survivors’ 
diagnosis of, say, PTSD. This is one of the techniques of power by which the destabilising 
effects of survivors’ narratives are neutralised. Such diagnosing, enabled by the category 
of PTSD (which, ironically, was partly fuelled by veterans’ lobbying in order to be eligible 
for compensation if injured in combat) amounts to pathologisation and is a form of 
depoliticisation. As Edkins writes: “Those who survive often feel compelled to bear 
witness to these discoveries. On the whole, the rest of us would rather not listen. A 
frequent excuse is that the horrors survivors testify to are too terrible. They are 
‘unimaginable’: we need not listen because we cannot hear.”89 Agamben too considers the 
silencing effect that is brought about when the Holocaust is given a quasi-mystical or 
ineffable status:  
 
I was accused of having sought to “ruin the unique and unsayable character 
of Auschwitz.” I have often asked myself what the author of the letter could 
have had in mind. The phenomenon of Auschwitz is unique. […] But why 
unsayable? Why confer on extermination the prestige of the mystical? […] 
To say that Auschwitz is “unsayable” or “incomprehensible” is equivalent 
to euphemein, to adoring in silence, as one does with a god. Regardless of 
one’s intentions, this contributes to its glory.90 
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To avoid this depoliticising and silencing effect, Edkins adopts a Foucaultian genealogical 
approach to power to show how trauma can be used as an instrument of power, rather than 
as critical resistance. Normalisation and medicalisation of survivors amounts to their 
depoliticisation by silencing or neutralising them: “[I]n contemporary culture victimhood 
offers sympathy and pity in return for the surrender of any political voice.”91 When 
unleashed, the political voice of the survivor has the potential to alter dominant, 
particularly liberal, conceptions of selfhood and sociality. Edkins maintains that trauma 
highlights the self’s dependence on the social order, challenging the notion of the modern 
individual as a “separate, autonomous, sovereign individual.”92 She proposes a 
psychoanalytically-informed (and, to an extent, one could also say poststructuralist) 
understanding of subjectivity and the state as built upon the pretences of security, 
wholeness and closure, features which, she claims, are impossible to achieve.93 Narratives 
of trauma can thus serve as counter-narratives on multiple fronts. Like Edkins, Meg 
Jensen argues that “testimony can challenge a state’s version of events,”94 particularly in 
relation to how an event or a trauma is commemorated. Erected public monuments may 
function to perpetuate the state narrative of a particular event, but can also function as 
“counter-monumental gestures”95 that trouble the version of events presented by the state. 
Jensen compares such gestures to acts of risky truth-telling described by Foucault as 
parrhesia. The parrhesiast’s speech is dangerous insofar as s/he speaks from an inferior 
position of power, and risks dangerous consequences. Despite the difficulties it entails, 
such speech is subversive since it can challenge that which is institutionally regarded as 
true. 
 
Testimonies of trauma can also challenge institutional pressures by, for example, not 
succumbing to the pressures to testify or confess in accepted ways, or not reiterating the 
expected narrative, either in its content or in its format. Complexities, dangers and 
pressures surround, and will continue to surround, traumatic self-narration in whichever 
                                               
91 Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of Politics, 9. 
92 Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of Politics, 11. 
93 See Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of Politics, 10-11. 
94 Meg Jensen, “Post-traumatic memory projects: autobiographical fiction and counter-monuments,” 
Textual Practice 28, no. 4 (2014): 701 [abstract]. 
95 Jensen, “Post-traumatic memory projects,” 702. 
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form it is made, be it in the form of memoir-writing, or in therapeutic settings, or in legal 
testimonies, or in the form of memorialisation of a historical traumatic event. Self-
narration is caught up in institutional processes and power relations that favour specific 
forms of self-narration over others. These complexities, dangers and pressures 
surrounding the practice of self-narration, however, do not automatically transform it into 
a suspect activity. Various survivors of trauma regard the ability to provide a self-narrative 
in the aftermath of trauma as empowering; the need to present a coherent account of 
oneself after trauma persists and must be acknowledged. Such a need presents itself as a 
response to the pain that the traumatised subject suffers due to its fragmented sense of 
self. Nonetheless, this does not mean that such a need cannot be critically evaluated in 
light of hegemonic institutions, structures and rules that regulate self-narration with which 
this need to self-narrate may become intricately related. It only goes to show how attempts 
at (traumatic) self-narration will persist in their necessity, difficulty and pain. 
 
*** 
 
The opening chapter delineated the various strands of research on trauma history and 
theory to indicate the different phases of work done in these areas, but also to situate the 
concerns pursued in this thesis. Subsequent chapters turned to Foucault’s works to outline 
his views on self-narration, and to develop a theoretical approach inspired by his views 
that can be adopted to analyse narrations of trauma. This chapter and the preceding ones 
were motivated by Foucault’s claim that “one of the main political problems would be 
nowadays, in the strict sense of the word, the politics of ourselves.”96 Power was shown 
to function intricately and intimately through practices of narrating oneself, and the fact 
that the possibility of resistance lies in such ‘small practices’ was also emphasised. It was 
argued that practices of self-narration can be swayed to the hard grip of normalising 
power, but they can also reveal the fallibility of power, its finitude, and can present critical 
and creative opportunities. This critical potential was further explored through Foucault’s 
later works in the 1980s on the beginnings of the hermeneutics of the self and his studies 
of ancient practice of self-writing and parrhesia. Through these works, it was argued that 
                                               
96 Foucault, About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self, 76. 
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self-narration could amount to an exercise in self-fashioning rather than referring back to 
a subjectifying inherent truth that could then be a tool of subjugation. The insights from 
Foucault’s work were then brought into dialogue with feminist analyses of practices of 
consciousness-raising in order to apply them to the study of narration of trauma by 
survivors. Traumatic self-narration was analysed through a theoretical lens informed by 
Foucault’s varied approaches to practices of self-narration, concluding that although there 
is always a risk that trauma narratives may normalise confessional discourses, the truth-
telling of survivors’ narratives of trauma can be compared to the courageous truth-telling 
of parrhesia in virtue of their possible ability to subvert norms. 
 
The following chapters further enrich the theoretical approach to trauma developed in this 
thesis through a close consideration of Butler’s work. Complementing Foucault’s views 
on discourse, power and subjectification, Butler’s work informs the critical approach 
adopted in this thesis to the ethical and political stakes of narrating trauma in institutional 
contexts. The next chapter identifies and delineates notions in Butler’s work – such as 
precariousness, vulnerability and relationality – to add further theoretical layers to the 
Foucaultian analysis of self-narration proposed in the previous chapters. The subsequent 
chapter then considers how Butler’s views on self-narration, particularly her critical 
emphasis on narrative coherence and its inherent difficulties, add further insights to the 
study of the ethics and politics of narrating trauma. The theoretical outlook developed in 
dialogue with Foucault’s and Butler’s work will then be applied to analyse contexts where 
trauma is narrated, namely in courts, in psychotherapeutic settings and within the asylum 
seeking process. 
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Chapter 5 Precarious Accounts of Oneself: Butler on Vulnerability and 
the Ethics of Self-Narration 
 
This chapter turns to the philosophical works of Judith Butler to enrich the theoretical 
approach to trauma developed in previous chapters. Butler’s work is explored in 
conversation with Foucault’s insofar as her work too emphasises how power relations 
play a crucial role in the constitution of subjectivity. This chapter examines how Butler’s 
development of the notions of performativity, precariousness, vulnerability and 
relationality inform her account of self-narration, expounded most systematically in 
Giving an Account of Oneself. Butler’s account of self-narration, which she develops in 
the context of her discussion of ethical subjectivity, troubles the conception of self-
narration built around a sovereign subject who has full control and mastery over itself. 
According to her, relational self-constitution troubles closed and coherent self-narration. 
These ideas from Butler’s work are used to study the ethics and politics of traumatic self-
narration in the subsequent chapter, building on the preceding analysis of the same theme 
through Foucault’s work. 
 
5.1 From Performativity to Precariousness 
 
I Gender Performativity and Vulnerability 
 
Butler’s early work is renowned for her revolutionary account of gendered identity, which 
she develops through the notion of performativity.1 In Gender Trouble, Butler presents 
her critique of the metaphysics of substance which conceives of identity as a manifestation 
of a stable inner essence or core. She follows Nietzsche’s argument that challenged the 
doubling involved in conceiving of a ‘doer behind the deed’.2 Yet although, over time, 
the appearance of a stable interiority is formed, Butler reverses the causal relation and 
                                               
1 Excellent commentaries on Butler’s work, particularly her earlier work, include Gill Jagger, Judith Butler: 
Sexual Politics, Social Change and the Power of the Performative (London: Routledge, 2008); Vicki Kirby, 
Judith Butler: Live Theory (London: Continuum, 2006); Moya Lloyd, Judith Butler: From Norms to Politics 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2007). 
2 See Butler, Gender Trouble, 22-34. 
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considers subjective interiority as an effect of exteriority. Butler contends that the 
emphasis on interiority reflects political motivations to regulate, control and police 
sexuality: “acts and gestures, articulated and enacted desires create the illusion of an 
interior and organizing gender core, an illusion discursively maintained for the purposes 
of the regulation of sexuality within the obligatory frame of reproductive 
heterosexuality.”3 Butler argues that this approach sets the boundaries on which identities 
can count and be valued, and – echoing Foucault – maintains that such an approach 
establishes disciplinary and normalising strategies that delineate, regulate and police the 
acceptable, separating it from the prohibited, the normal from the pathological.  
 
Against this conception of gender identity, Butler puts forward the idea of gender 
performativity. In her words: “Gender ought not to be construed as a stable identity or 
locus of agency from which various acts follow; rather, gender is an identity tenuously 
constituted in time, instituted in an exterior space through a stylized repetition of acts.”4 
Butler replaces the spatial metaphor of gender identity as being a sort of grounding with 
an emphasis on the temporal dimension that creates the illusion of a seamless identity 
over time, hiding the contingent groundlessness of gender. This contingency opens up 
gender to transformation. Butler here echoes Derrida’s account of iterability, whereby 
although repeatability is key to every sign, repetitions do not merely create more of the 
same. While repetitions conserve the original, each repetition can be seen as introducing 
something different, creating new possibilities for transformation. Herein lies the 
productive dimension of performativity. Butler follows Derrida’s critique of Austin and 
maintains that the performative produces that which it names, that is, the subject is not an 
autonomous agent who authors actions intentionally. The subject, however, is not 
unilaterally determined through a single act of constitution, but is brought into being 
through re-citation and repetition.5 
 
                                               
3 Butler, Gender Trouble, 185-186. 
4 Butler, Gender Trouble, 191 [emphasis in original]. 
5 For a discussion of the historical development of the concept of performativity, including Austin’s use of 
the term, Derrida’s critique, and Butler’s account of performativity, see James Loxley, Performativity 
(London: Routledge, 2007). 
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This has given rise to two remarkably opposed interpretations of Butler. First, some 
commentators have read Butler’s account of identity to imply a subjectivity that is 
completely determined by discourses and power relations, allowing no possibility for 
resistance (an old Foucaultian story). Against this interpretation, one could argue that no 
matter how far or deep determination and construction go, there always is surplus. No 
matter how clearly demarcated and policed the boundaries of gender are, these categories 
are not enough to comfortably capture the plurality of possibilities beneath stable gender 
identities or compulsory heterosexuality. Second, others, however, have read Butler’s 
analysis as implying a voluntarism of sorts, that is, that everyone is free to choose and 
change one’s gender as s/he pleases. In response to this interpretation of Butler’s views, 
it is important to consider that Butler is clearly not implying that any gender performance 
enjoys equal social treatment. Butler contends that gender and sexuality are highly 
regulated and policed arenas: “acts and gestures, articulated and enacted desires create the 
illusion of an interior and organizing gender core, an illusion discursively maintained for 
the purposes of the regulation of sexuality within the obligatory frame of reproductive 
heterosexuality.”6 The voluntarist interpretation of performativity has been further fuelled 
by Butler’s discussion of drag and parody, where she claims that “[i]n imitating gender, 
drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender itself – as well as its 
contingency.”7 Butler argues that practices of drag and cross-dressing can have a critical 
and subversive role since they show how gender at large is a practice, an imitation, a 
performance; that, therefore, there is no such thing as an ‘original’ gender which is 
imitated or copied in, say, drag or gay subjects. Through her theorising of drag as 
potentially subversive, Butler is shedding light on the power (sometimes violent) of norms 
and discourses to establish what counts as true and real; as she writes: 
 
As a young person, I suffered for a long time, and I suspect many people have, 
from being told, explicitly or implicitly, that what I “am” is a copy, an imitation, 
a derivative example, a shadow of the real. Compulsory heterosexuality sets itself 
                                               
6 Butler, Gender Trouble, 185-186. 
7 Butler, Gender Trouble, 187 [emphasis in original]. 
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up as the original, the true, the authentic; the norm that determines the real implies 
that “being” lesbian is always a kind of miming.8  
 
Butler’s performative account of gender identity denaturalises gender, highlighting the 
unnecessary policing of gender and sexuality. As speech act theory shows us, a speech act 
or a performative can be successful or not. Gender performance too is measured by 
degrees of success. Its failure, however, has great stakes insofar as it can lead to social or 
actual death. This highlights the risk involved in gender performance; power in society 
facilitates some gender performances while rendering impossible other gender 
performances.9 Butler highlights, therefore, how social existence entails various risks. 
Butler writes about the risk of becoming undone, the risk of not being secured within the 
current regimes of truth and order, the risk of being dehumanised, the risk of becoming 
socially unintelligible, the risk of being injured and harmed. There is also, however, the 
risk of something being denaturalised or subject to critique, when something can no longer 
be taken for granted. For Butler, this latter risk is what makes the practice of drag 
politically subversive, at least potentially. Critics have misconstrued Butler’s point as 
implying a simplistic approach promoting parody and drag as the key to changing the 
                                               
8 Judith Butler, “Imitation and Gender Insubordination,” in The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader, eds. Henry 
Abelove, Michèle Aina Barale, and David M. Halperin (New York: Routledge, 1993), 312. 
9 In Undoing Gender, Butler analyses various examples of individuals, particularly trans individuals, whose 
lives were rendered unliveable due to their gender performances: “Brandon Teena was killed on December 
30, 1993, in Falls City, Nebraska after being raped and assaulted a week earlier for being transgendered. 
Mathew Shephard was killed (beaten and tied to a post) in Laramie Wyoming on October 12, 1998, for 
being a ‘feminine’ gay man. Gwen Araujo, a transgendered woman, was found dead in the foothills of the 
Sierra mountains after being assaulted at a party in Newark, California, on October 2, 2002.” Judith Butler, 
Undoing Gender (New York: Routledge, 2004), 251n.2. Elsewhere, Butler discusses Charles Howard’s 
story: “I tell this story, when I’m trying to explain gender violence to people, about a guy in Maine who, I 
guess he was around eighteen years old [Charlie Howard was twenty-three years old when he was killed.] 
and he walked with a very distinct swish, hips going one way or another, a very feminine walk […] And he 
was teased by his classmates on the way to school and he got used to it and he just walked, and I think he 
even walked a little more outrageously the more he was teased. But one day he was walking to school and 
he was attacked by three of his classmates and [despite his pleas that he could not swim] he was thrown 
over a bridge and he was killed. And the question that community had to deal with […] was how could it 
have been that somebody’s gait, that somebody’s way of walking, could engender the desire to kill that 
person? […] And I think, if that young man could show that gender was that variable, it really raised the 
question for everybody else – and especially for those that attacked him – of whether their own genders 
were also perhaps not quite as stable or quite as fixed as they thought. […] I mean, a walk can be a dangerous 
thing. If you go for a walk, you’re also vulnerable socially. […] You assert your rights of mobility and you 
take a certain risk in public space.” See Judith Butler and Sunaura Taylor, “Interdependence,” in Examined 
Life: Excursions with Contemporary Thinkers, ed. Astra Taylor (New York: The New Press, 2009), 204-
205. 
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world for the better. As she says, “There are those who think that the text has belittled 
politics and reduced politics to parody; some claim that drag becomes a model for 
resistance or for political intervention and participation more generally.”10 Butler argues 
that drag can be subversive insofar as it shows gender to be imitative, thereby revealing 
the hegemony that gender produces, and challenging the claim of naturalness, reality and 
originality of heterosexuality.  
 
However, drag faces risks of its own. It can be subversive but, importantly, not all drag is 
necessarily subversive and has positive political implications. Clarifying possible 
misinterpretations of her argument in Gender Trouble, Butler sustains her discussion of 
drag in Bodies that Matter, where she analyses Paris is Burning, a 1990 documentary on 
the ball culture and vogue dancing in New York and the African-American and Latino 
gay and transgender communities in the 1980s.11 Such communities organised contests 
where they dress up, act and walk (as on a catwalk) in order to be judged on the criteria 
of how well they can perform their role and how ‘real’ their drag is. Butler argues that 
this documentary highlights how “drag is not unproblematically subversive.”12 As can be 
seen in the documentary, drag also tends to augment and re-idealise heterosexual norms 
without critically questioning them. Moreover, although such contestations can open 
gender up to further fluidity and flexibility, they are not free from violent and hateful 
responses, as Butler highlights through the case of Venus Xtravaganza. Venus was a trans 
woman performer, sex worker and aspiring model who was saving money for sex 
reassignment surgery. However, the failure to pass as a woman made her susceptible to 
violence from her clients who discovered what she called ‘her little secret.’13 This 
sometimes led to her having to run away through windows to avoid customers who felt 
betrayed and enraged for having been seduced by what they perceived to be a man. She 
was eventually killed on 21 December 1988, when she was strangled by someone, 
presumably by a client, who has never been found and brought to justice. 
 
                                               
10 Butler, Undoing Gender, 213. 
11 See Butler, Bodies that Matter, 81-97. 
12 Butler, Bodies that Matter, 176. 
13 Butler, Bodies that Matter, 89. 
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Butler’s early work contributes to a critique of identity as being a stable core, and of the 
subject as being an autonomous self-determining agent. Butler interrogates the conditions 
of possibility through which subjects emerge as intelligible or real subjects. Rather than 
free and autonomous, the subject emerges through norms and power relations. Since her 
early writings, Butler has considered the extent to which this susceptibility and 
dependence on norms exposes some lives to violence and bodily harm.14 The subject’s 
relation to norms is not a supplement to one’s independent existence, but points towards 
the subject’s dependence on such norms for its social intelligibility and survival. In this 
regard, Butler is reacting to views that conceptualise the subject as a self-enclosed, self-
transparent, unitary and autonomous entity that can easily give a coherent account of 
itself. This conception of the subject has been critiqued by Butler in different ways 
throughout all her works, and it is within this context that her views on vulnerability and 
precariousness must be understood.15 
 
Since her earliest work on how gender is performatively enacted and reiterated through 
acts of self-constitution,16 Butler asked – and was pushed to ask – questions such as: “What 
about being affected? What about the ways in which we are formed or acted on?”17 
Influenced by Foucault and others, Butler engaged with these questions through theories 
of cultural construction, whereby social and discursive norms act on subjects to structure 
the realm of the thinkable, the liveable and the speakable. Nonetheless, Butler says, “I 
didn’t have a way of explaining what that ‘acting on’ is.”18 This prompted her exploration 
of the notions of vulnerability, dependency, susceptibility and injurability. The point of 
this was not to posit a free and strong autonomous subject who constitutes itself as 
opposed to a vulnerably constituted subject. Indeed, throughout her work, Butler 
                                               
14 Butler emphasises this dimension of her analysis of gender in the Preface to the 1999 edition of Gender 
Trouble. 
15 In an interview, Butler describes how and why her earlier concerns with gender led her to a consideration 
of linguistic vulnerability and, later, of the role of vulnerability in ethics. See Aaron Aquilina and Kurt Borg, 
“The CounterText Interview: Judith Butler,” CounterText 3, no. 2 (2017): 122-123. For a longer discussion 
by Butler on the relation between gender performativity and the precariousness of life, see Judith Butler, 
Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2015), 24-65. 
16 See Judith Butler, “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and 
Feminist Theory,” Theatre Journal 40, no. 4 (1988): 519-531. 
17 Aquilina and Borg, “The CounterText Interview,” 122. 
18 Aquilina and Borg, “The CounterText Interview,” 123. 
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deconstructs the active/passive dichotomy in order to show how the subject can be thought 
of as simultaneously acting and acted upon.19 In recent work, Butler has similarly explored 
how vulnerability is not contrary to agency or resistance but, in fact, is its condition of 
possibility.20 
 
Although associated more with her post-2004 work, vulnerability had already been 
foregrounded by Butler in an earlier text from 1997, Excitable Speech, in which she refers 
to linguistic vulnerability. There, she argues that humans are dependent upon linguistic 
categories that name subjects and bring them into being as socially intelligible agents. 
These speech acts exceed the individual, and point to a frame of reference that is beyond 
one’s grasp. Linguistic vulnerability exposes subjects in such a way that interpellations 
name them irrespective of their choosing.21 Subjects are dependent upon such 
interpellations for social recognisability and survival; yet, in their perpetuation, these 
same interpellations can also be or become painful or intolerable.22 It could therefore be 
argued that the notions of vulnerability and precariousness have been operating in Butler’s 
account of subjectivity since her early works. However, an expansion in Butler’s use of 
these notions happens in Precarious Life, where she inscribes these notions in her account 
of subject-formation, particularly in how she develops this concept through notions of 
grief, loss, embodiment and precariousness. In Precarious Life, Butler inscribes the notion 
of precariousness within her account of subject-formation. To be a subject implies a 
corporeal state of being open to injury, a linguistic vulnerability that entails the possibility 
of being wounded; precariousness highlights the subject’s susceptibility to loss, its 
                                               
19 In this regard, Butler draws from the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, particularly his later work. See 
Judith Butler, “Merleau-Ponty and the Touch of Malebranche,” in Senses of the Subject (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2015), 36-62. 
20 See Judith Butler, “Rethinking Vulnerability and Resistance,” in Vulnerability in Resistance, eds. Judith 
Butler, Zeynep Gambetti and Leticia Sabsay (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), 12-27. 
21 For Butler’s use of the term ‘linguistic vulnerability’ in relation to Louis Althusser’s account of 
interpellation, see Judith Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (New York: Routledge, 
1997), 1-41. 
22 “There is no way to protect against that primary vulnerability and susceptibility to the call of recognition 
that solicits existence, to that primary dependency on a language we never made in order to acquire a 
tentative ontological status. Thus we sometimes cling to the terms that pain us because, at a minimum, they 
offer us some form of social and discursive existence. The address that inaugurates the possibility of agency, 
in a single stroke, forecloses the possibility of radical autonomy.” Butler, Excitable Speech, 26. 
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dependency on norms and social conditions for its recognition and survival, as well as the 
constitutive power of relationality. 
 
II Precarious Life: Precariousness and Precarity 
 
Written in the wake of 9/11, the essays in Precarious Life are “a response to the conditions 
of heightened vulnerability and aggression that followed from those events.”23 Butler 
argues that rather than taking the time to reflect deeply and seriously on the exposure to 
such vulnerability, the reaction of the United States in the aftermath of 9/11 was a 
heightening of nationalist discourse, surveillance mechanisms, human rights breaches and 
various forms of censorship. The events of 9/11 showed how easily human life can be 
expunged, and how vulnerable to injury the human body is. Such facts are surely 
reasonable causes of fear and grief since they foreground how that which one might hold 
on to dearly may be easily lost at the whim of another. In this case, the issue at hand is 
violence and terror, and Butler’s question in this regard is: “what, politically, might be 
made of grief besides a cry for war”?24 In Precarious Life, Butler considers this question 
from both the social and the personal perspective insofar as these perspectives cannot be 
clearly dissociated. Thus, her analysis shifts from, on one hand, a psychoanalytically-
informed understanding of loss, aggression and dependency to, on the other hand, 
reflections on the political reactions of the US in the aftermath of 9/11, such as human 
rights breaches in cases of indefinite detention and a lack of fair trials. Indeed, throughout 
the whole book, Butler’s main concern is to reflect on the inevitable interdependency that 
defines life in order to rethink and reimagine – without grand utopian conclusions – the 
basis for a global political community. 
 
Importantly, this rethinking amounts to conceiving of ethical and political responsibilities 
beyond the notions of self-sufficiency and sovereignty that have dominated philosophical 
and political discourses.25 This reimagining, although urgent, is made difficult by the 
                                               
23 Butler, Precarious Life, xi. 
24 Butler, Precarious Life, xii. 
25 See Butler, Precarious Life, xiii. 
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broad currency of the notions of self-sufficiency and sovereignty. These notions have 
determined the terms of political debate in such a way that certain explanations of the 
violence of 9/11 were not considered as proper explanations but rather as exonerations. 
Such events were framed in such a way that allowed particular kinds of questioning or 
historical inquiries while precluding others. This was even reflected in the terminology 
used, where the use of the term ‘terrorism’ by the US aimed at portraying itself as an 
undisputable victim of violence, therefore justifying the use of limitless aggression against 
targets deemed as responsible for such an attack.26 This framing of the event, Butler says, 
regulated and limited what counted as a legitimate critique in such a way that it influences 
“what we can hear.”27 The experience of the US being a victim in this unprecedented way 
represented a decentring of its ordinary dominant position.  
 
One way through which this decentring was rectified was through the narratives given. 
The first-person point of view was emphasised in order to re-assert its centrality within 
the international political domain. In this way, the wound caused by the public 
manifestation of vulnerability is reversed into a demonstration of US leadership and 
strength. Butler asks whether there could have possibly been other narratives propounded 
by the US. By this, she does not mean to understate the value of narratives that emphasise 
the pain and tragedy suffered in 9/11: “These stories have to be told, and they are being 
told, despite the enormous trauma that undermines narrative capacity in these instances.”28 
Rather, the challenge that Butler puts forward is to consider forms of narration that 
decentre the US from its supposed supremacy and, rather than acting as a self-sufficient 
autonomous agent to reach what it perceives to be just ends, collaborate in international 
coalitions, even those it does not lead, with the aim of fostering more global conditions of 
cooperation. Thus, while condemning the violence done against the US, Butler maintains 
that we can “consider our recent trauma to be an opportunity for a reconsideration of 
United States hubris and the importance of establishing more radically egalitarian 
international ties.”29 An important step toward this, Butler argues, is to step out of the 
                                               
26 See Butler, Precarious Life, 4. 
27 Butler, Precarious Life, 5. 
28 Butler, Precarious Life, 7. 
29 Butler, Precarious Life, 40. 
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narrative perspective associated with US supremacy and “consider the ways in which our 
lives are profoundly implicated in the lives of others.”30 This effort would constitute a 
response to efforts that were made to mask and hide the precariousness of life by denying 
the place of vulnerability in discussions of ethics and politics. 
 
Butler maintains that a non-violent ethics and politics can follow from an awareness and 
serious consideration of this fundamental vulnerability and the intricate ways in which the 
subject is not self-possessed, but is bound to others in such a way that one finds oneself 
not fully in control.31 She reads military political reactions as a denial of vulnerability, 
such as George W. Bush’s statement on September 21, just ten days after the events of 
9/11, that the time for grieving – a manifestation of one’s vulnerability and recognition of 
one’s dependency on others – is over and must be followed by resolute action in order to 
correct the suffered imbalance.32 In Precarious Life and later work, Butler seeks to rethink 
a reversal of this reaction by insisting on the subject’s fundamental dependency on 
external forces, be they social and cultural norms, other persons, or shared linguistic 
contexts. The challenge she thereby presents is how to conceive of political action and 
collective resistance which does not necessarily flow from a self-sufficient autonomous 
agent, but rather from a subject who is multiple, fractured and perhaps wounded. Butler’s 
challenge is also to the posture of invulnerability that pretends it has the power to dictate 
the adequate time to stop grieving and to muster resolute agency. 
 
Butler’s analysis of vulnerability can seem to imply that she is proposing vulnerability as 
an essential feature that defines the human. If this is so, one may say, as has been 
suggested by some,33 that she is proposing a new humanism, which would contradict her 
earlier critiques of universalism. In Precarious Life, Butler deals directly and critically 
with this suggestion when she writes: 
                                               
30 Butler, Precarious Life, 7. 
31 It seems that Butler will further elaborate this discussion of non-violence in her forthcoming book, titled 
The Force of Nonviolence: The Ethical in the Political. 
32 See Butler, Precarious Life, 29. 
33 See Sina Kramer, “Judith Butler’s ‘New Humanism’: A Thing or Not a Thing, and So What?,” 
philoSOPHIA 5, no. 1 (Winter 2015): 25-40; Drew Walker, “Two Regimes of the Human: Judith Butler and 
the Politics of Mattering,” in Butler and Ethics, ed. Moya Lloyd (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2015), 141-166. 
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By insisting on a “common” corporeal vulnerability, I may seem to be positing 
a new basis for humanism. That might be true, but I am prone to consider this 
differently. A vulnerability must be perceived and recognized in order to come 
into play in an ethical encounter, and there is no guarantee that this will 
happen.34 
 
Through her analysis, Butler does indeed invite a reconsideration of what it means to be 
human. Yet, in line with her critique of identity and the metaphysics of substance, she 
considers the ‘human’ as a category that is brought about and constituted through different 
iterations. The human is shown to be not merely a descriptive category, but also a 
normative one that is caught up in and framed by various power mechanisms and norms 
in such a way that it is not applied equally, and not everyone has the same kind of access 
to the category of the human. 
 
Butler highlights this point in her discussion of the heightened grievability of some lives 
over others, as shown for example in the prioritisation of particular obituaries (American 
soldiers or civilians, for example) over others (Palestinian civilians or US targets, for 
example).35 Hence, Butler writes, “[a] hierarchy of grief could no doubt be enumerated.”36 
Consequently, obituaries as acts of nation-building “stage the scene and provide the 
narrative means by which ‘the human’ in its grievability is established.”37 Butler shows 
how this hierarchy emerges clearly, for example, when considering the treatment of the 
loss of lives brought about by the US military, described through the dehumanising 
language of ‘collateral damage’, as well as in the treatment of certain lives lost on 9/11 
that were at the limits of human intelligibility: “The queer lives that vanished on 
September 11 were not publicly welcomed into the idea of national identity built in the 
                                               
34 Butler, Precarious Life, 42-43. For other instances where Butler addresses this critique, see also Butler, 
Undoing Gender, 1-16 and Judith Butler and Arne De Boever, “Arne De Boever interviews Judith Butler – 
Demonstrating Precarity: Vulnerability, Embodiment, and Resistance,” Los Angeles Review of Books, 
March 23, 2015, lareviewofbooks.org/av/demonstrating-precarity-vulnerability-embodiment-resistance. 
35 See Butler, Precarious Life, 34-38. 
36 Butler, Precarious Life, 32. 
37 Butler, Precarious Life, 38. 
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obituary pages, and their closest relations were only belatedly and selectively (the marital 
norm holding sway once again) made eligible for benefits.”38 Hence, although Butler 
wants to refer to a notion of a common human vulnerability, she does not overlook the 
fact that these features are not equally manifested or foregrounded: “I do not mean to deny 
that vulnerability is differentiated, that it is allocated differentially across the globe.”39 
This is a significant qualification and perhaps not an immediately clear one. On one hand, 
Butler is insisting on the commonality and shareability of human vulnerability in order to 
rethink the notion of subjectivity and consider how this may inform a rethinking of a non-
violent and more egalitarian global politics. However, on the other hand, Butler recognises 
that current socio-cultural realities imply that precariousness is unevenly distributed. As 
a result, Butler has been criticised as contradictorily holding that precariousness is a 
general existential condition equally applicable to all, as well as a particular condition that 
applies to some more than it does to others.40 
 
In clarifying this possible contradiction, in later work such as Frames of War, Butler 
sought to revise her elaboration of the notion of precariousness by highlighting its links 
and intersections with the notion of precarity. As she writes, “[t]he more or less existential 
conception of ‘precariousness’ is thus linked with a more specifically political notion of 
‘precarity’.”41 Although lives are fundamentally precarious due to their public exposure, 
which makes them susceptible to loss, the notion of precarity complicates the simple 
assimilation of the notion of precariousness into a universal feature of subjectivity. This 
is because precarity “designates that politically induced condition in which certain 
populations suffer from failing social and economic networks of support and become 
differentially exposed to injury, violence, and death.”42 The crucial political task that 
Butler identifies is to recognise precariousness in more egalitarian ways. This task is also 
the task of critique, which entails a difficult critical engagement with the frames through 
which precariousness is made visible and lives are recognised as liveable or worth living. 
                                               
38 Butler, Precarious Life, 35. 
39 Butler, Precarious Life, 30-31. 
40 See Catherine Mills, “Undoing Ethics: Butler on Precarity, Opacity and Responsibility,” in Butler and 
Ethics, ed. Moya Lloyd (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 47-49. 
41 Butler, Frames of War, 3. 
42 Butler, Frames of War, 25. 
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Such a task is complicated by the mechanisms employed in order to subdue and hide the 
effects of vulnerability, by retaining the appearance and feeling of self-mastery and self-
sufficiency. Moreover, precariousness cannot be properly or easily perceived and 
recognised because it refers to that feature of life which marks it as dependent upon 
relations to others, or being in the hands of others in such a way that the subject is 
impinged upon by its exposure to others whom one may or may not know. It is to a closer 
analysis of this latter point, as explained in Butler’s important essay “Violence, Mourning, 
Politics” (reprinted as Chapter 2 of Precarious Life), that I will now turn. 
 
III Grief, Dependency, Relationality 
 
In “Violence, Mourning, Politics,” Butler seeks to find a basis for community in what she 
considers to be two inarguable and inescapable dimensions of life: first, one’s exposure 
to and complicity in violence and, second, one’s vulnerability to loss and the mourning 
that follows. Butler claims that, despite being geographically and socially distributed 
unequally, experiences of losing something one had, or somebody one desired and loved, 
seem to be shareable in such a way that “[l]oss has made a tenuous ‘we’ of us all.”43 
Corporeal existence binds us together in this experience of loss because the body is both 
the site of agency but also that which exposes us to others and potential injury. The social 
vulnerability of the body, therefore, is a crucial aspect of political constitution that marks 
the subject as “attached to others, at risk of losing those attachments, exposed to others, 
at risk of violence by virtue of that exposure.”44 Thus, although typically associated with 
one’s private realm, the body as a social phenomenon has a public dimension: “my body 
is and is not mine. Given over from the start to the world of others, it bears their imprint, 
is formed within the crucible of social life.”45 The fundamental vulnerability highlighted 
by the public exposure brought about by bodily existence forces us to consider subjectivity 
as fundamentally interdependent rather than independent. This conception of corporeal 
existence emphasises the inevitable relationality of existence, not only as a descriptive 
                                               
43 Butler, Precarious Life, 20. 
44 Butler, Precarious Life, 20. 
45 Butler, Precarious Life, 26. 
155 
 
fact but as a normatively imbued dimension of social life. 
 
Butler’s discussion of vulnerability is framed in opposition to an account of political life 
that is built upon the presumption of autonomy.46 She argues that through grief one can 
become aware of the way in which one is relationally constituted. This is because, as 
Butler describes it, the loss of another in, say, a human relationship must not be 
understood as two clearly distinct agents who related together and now no longer do so. 
Rather, the subject is constituted through that attachment to another in such a way that 
when one loses another, one also loses a part of itself. Thus, in accounting for a 
relationship with another, the subject may find itself challenged since it is the very 
constitution of oneself as an autonomous self-sufficient agent that is called into question 
through the dependency of the ‘I’ on another: 
 
I tell a story about the relations I choose, only to expose, somewhere along the 
way, the way I am gripped and undone by these very relations. My narrative 
falters, as it must. 
Let’s face it. We’re undone by each other. And if we’re not, we’re missing 
something.47 
 
The notion of undoing is an important one in Butler’s account of the subject.48 The process 
of subject-formation is not a unilaterally constructive one. One is not only formed as a 
subject, as if this is a process that happens once and for all, but one may also be deformed 
or partially formed or may no longer count as a formed subject. Foregrounding the 
relationality at the heart of subjectivity counters the notion of an autonomous subject who 
is fully in control of one’s actions or fully cognizant of oneself. The language of social 
construction, in these writings more than in her earlier writings, paves way for a softer 
language that speaks of the subject as being ‘given over’: “One does not always stay 
                                               
46 It is important to emphasise that, in presenting this critique of autonomy, Butler is not implying that 
political movements struggling for rights of autonomy over one’s body should cease to employ such a 
discourse. See Butler, Precarious Life, 25-26. 
47 Butler, Precarious Life, 23. 
48 See, especially, Butler, Undoing Gender, 1-16. 
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intact. One may want to, or manage to for a while, but despite one’s best efforts, one is 
undone, in the face of the other, by the touch, by the scent, by the feel, by the prospect of 
the touch, by the memory of the feel.”49 Hence, it is not a simply a matter of emphasising 
a relational view of the self over an autonomy-based one. Relations dispossess the subject 
as much as they constitute it; one is not only done (that is, constituted) by one’s relations 
to others, but also undone and dispossessed by them. 
 
Butler’s notion of dispossession,50 according to which the subject is not a self-determining 
agent, echoes Butler’s earlier work on the question of agency, and on whether her ideas, 
fuelled by a poststructuralist or postmodern perspective, are complementary with the 
traditional feminist aims of emancipating women.51 In Precarious Life, Butler employs 
the notion of dispossession in her discussion of ec-stasy, a notion she had considered in 
relation to subject-formation in her first major work, Subjects of Desire.52 This is what 
Butler means by ec-stasy: 
 
To be ec-static means, literally, to be outside oneself, and thus can have several 
meanings: to be transported beyond oneself by a passion, but also to be beside 
oneself with rage or grief. I think that is I can still address a “we,” or include 
myself within its terms, I am speaking to those of us who are living in certain 
ways beside ourselves, whether in sexual passion, or emotional grief, or 
political rage.53 
 
In this sense, the precariousness of life points towards an ecstatic relationality that 
emphasises the ways in which one is dependent upon others and is bound to others. One’s 
                                               
49 Butler, Precarious Life, 24. 
50 For the different senses in which Butler uses the term ‘dispossession’, see Undoing Gender, 7, 16, 19, 
100, 111, 149 and, especially, Judith Butler, Dispossession: The Performative in the Political (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2013). 
51 See, for example, Butler, Gender Trouble, 194-203; Butler, Bodies that Matter, xi-xxx; Judith Butler, 
“Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of ‘Postmodernism’,” in Feminist Contentions: A 
Philosophical Exchange, by Seyla Benhabib, Judith Butler, Drucilla Cornell, and Nancy Fraser, (New York: 
Routledge, 1995), 35-57 and 127-143. 
52 See Judith Butler, Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1987), 43-59. 
53 Butler, Precarious Life, 24 [emphasis in original]. 
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life is necessarily implicated in the lives of others, and such entanglement complicates the 
extent to which one can sensibly or meaningfully speak of a self-enclosed ‘I’. This 
entanglement of subjectivity, relationality and interdependence has great implications for 
how to theorise self-narration. How does one narrate oneself if ‘one’ and ‘self’ turn out to 
be more complicated matters than originally assumed? Do vulnerability and 
precariousness have an ethical import? How can one account for oneself responsibly, 
ethically and politically, if subjectivity is relationally constituted irrespective of one’s 
immediate choosing? These are some of the questions with which Butler engages in 
Giving an Account of Oneself. This chapter will now turn to this text to analyse how the 
notions from Butler’s work discussed in this section – vulnerability, precariousness, 
relationality – impact her account of self-narration and ethics, or the ethics of self-
narration. 
 
5.2 Vulnerability and the Ethics of Self-Narration 
 
I Giving an Account of Oneself: Butler on Ethics and Self-Narration  
 
In Giving an Account of Oneself, Butler presents her account of subjectivity, vulnerability 
and dependency in terms of questions of moral philosophy. Annika Thiem argues that 
although the dimension of ethics or moral philosophy has characterised Butler’s writings 
since her earliest works, it emerges more explicitly in what were then (in 2008, when 
Thiem’s book was published) Butler’s most recent major works, namely Precarious Life, 
Undoing Gender and most prominently Giving an Account of Oneself. Principally, 
Butler’s concern is how to think of responsibility or accountability in relation to a subject 
who lacks control and mastery over oneself, and who is not the cause of its own 
emergence. In other words, if the ‘I’ is given over to others, is shaped by norms and power 
relations, and is constituted through the relations it has with others, how can it account for 
itself? How can moral agency and accountability be retained if one moves beyond the 
autonomous, self-sufficient subject of mastery? In response to such questions, Butler 
argues that when the ‘I’ tries to give an account of itself, it must necessarily end up doing 
so in terms of a set of relations to others and to norms. This fundamental dependency and 
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relationality, therefore, exceeds the subject’s capacities for narration in such a way that it 
cannot completely account for itself and for its emergence. Thiem situates Butler’s work 
within debates of moral philosophy by foregrounding the two key concepts of 
responsibility and critique to show how poststructuralist ideas, such as Butler’s, have a 
lot of insight to offer to questions of moral philosophy. This claim is bolder than it seems, 
especially if one considers it in the light of several denunciations of the utility of 
poststructuralism in moral questions “because of its trenchant criticisms of traditional 
moral philosophy and its centering on rational subjects and universal norms,” leading to 
its characterisation (or caricaturing) “as a philosophy of nihilism that has contributed to a 
perceived erosion of the ‘moral fabric’ of society.”54 
 
Butler shows that the remits of moral inquiry and critique are intertwined since both 
investigate the norms that regulate how and what subjects come to be. Butler declares at 
the outset that such questions of moral philosophy or ethics spill over to political concerns 
and social critique. Indeed, for her, ethics and politics are not two clearly distinct realms, 
especially since the issue of subject-formation pertains to both domains: “In this sense, 
ethical deliberation is bound up with the operation of critique. And critique finds that it 
cannot go forward without a consideration of how the deliberating subject comes into 
being and how the deliberating subject might actually live or appropriate a set of norms.”55 
Thus, Butler positions herself alongside thinkers like Foucault, other poststructuralist 
thinkers, and Adorno in explicitly associating ethics with social critique. Various 
instances in Giving an Account of Oneself attest to this: “It will be necessary to reconsider 
                                               
54 Annika Thiem, Unbecoming Subjects: Judith Butler, Moral Philosophy, and Critical Responsibility (New 
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55 Judith Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 8. 
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the relationship of ethics to social critique, since part of what I find so hard to narrate are 
the norms – social in character – that bring me into being;”56 “Foucault, like Adorno, 
maintains that ethics can only be understood in terms of a process of critique, where 
critique attends, among other things, to the regimes of intelligibility that order ontology 
and, specifically, the ontology of the subject.”57 In this regard, Butler’s views complement 
Foucault’s, in that both regard subject-formation as an essentially social and political 
process, and, moreover, ethics is an extension of such an inquiry insofar as it reflects on 
how the self came to be and how its existence is sustained through socio-political 
processes. 
 
For Butler, questions of ethics and politics do not only pertain to the ontological 
preconditions for the formation of the subject. Rather, such questions imply a critique of 
the discursive and socio-political conditions under which something is rendered real or 
intelligible. Butler further articulates the way in which she conceives of the relation 
between ethics and critique through Foucault’s views on how norms and discourses 
determine subjectivity. Although these norms do not completely determine the subject, 
they regulate and delimit such an activity since they provide a framework upon which the 
subject depends for social and self-recognition. Butler builds on Foucault’s point to argue 
that one’s relation to these norms and to the regimes of truth that govern norms is also a 
relation to oneself. This means that a critical engagement with norms is also a critical 
engagement with oneself: “Critique is not merely of a given social practice or a certain 
horizon of intelligibility within which practices and institutions appear, it also implies that 
I come into question for myself. Self-questioning becomes an ethical consequence of 
critique for Foucault.”58 It is for this reason that the activity of narrating one’s self has 
both an ethical and political dimension in such a way that makes it possible to speak of, 
and analyse, the political ethics of self-narration. 
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In Giving an Account of Oneself, Butler shows how her ideas on vulnerability and 
precariousness impact her approach to the nature, limits and stakes of self-narration. She 
maintains that one’s account of oneself, given in discourse, cannot fully express one’s self 
because the public nature of discourse exceeds the self. Echoing Foucault’s statement, 
often cited by Butler, “discourse is not life; its time is not yours,”59 she writes that 
discourse interrupts the activity of giving an account of oneself in the same way that the 
formative character of norms and relations to others dispossess the subject from its 
autonomy and self-sufficiency. This is because “[t]his ‘interruption’ contests the sense of 
the account’s being grounded in myself alone, since the indifferent structures that enable 
my living belong to a sociality that exceeds me.”60 Butler thus probes the extent to which 
the self can be narrated, that is, the narrativisability of the self, and the extent to which 
this narration can be coherent. What Butler means by ‘accounting for oneself’ goes 
beyond the strict connotations of moral or legal accountability in order to consider 
narrative accountability, that is, accounting for oneself in terms of a narrative; a story.  
 
In light of her reflections on vulnerability and on how the subject is given over to a wider 
sociality beyond one’s control, it comes as no surprise, therefore, that Butler does not 
ascribe to the subject the power to dictate freely and completely one’s own story about 
who one is or how one came to be: “this narrative will be disoriented by what is not mine, 
or mine alone. […] The narrative authority of the ‘I’ must give way to the perspective and 
temporality of a set of norms that contest the singularity of my story.”61 Thus, Butler 
complicates the idea of self-knowledge obtained through one’s self-transparency. It is not 
only the case that one does not know enough about oneself, as if more knowledge would 
do the trick. Rather, she implies that full self-knowledge is structurally impossible: “The 
‘I’ can tell neither the story of its own emergence nor the conditions of its own possibility 
without bearing witness to a state of affairs to which one could not have been present, 
which are prior to one’s own emergence as a subject who can know.”62 One cannot, 
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therefore, simultaneously be a subject and ‘look back’ to its starting point, articulating 
that point of origin in words. 
 
In view of this impossibility, does it mean that what remains of the attempt to construct a 
‘story’ or ‘narrative’ about oneself is merely a fictitious or invented account that bears no 
resemblance to reality? In various instances in Giving an Account of Oneself, Butler hints 
at this position when she cites various authors who claim that there is something in the 
process of offering a narrative account of oneself that corresponds to fiction. For example, 
referring to the possibility of self-narration in light of the impossibility of accounting for 
the conditions of the self’s emergence, Butler writes that “[n]arration is surely possible 
under such circumstances, but it is, as Thomas Keenan has pointed out, surely fabulous.”63 
Furthermore, referring to the powerlessness of the self with regard to recovering its 
origins, she maintains that “[t]he irrecoverability of an original referent does not destroy 
narrative; it produces it ‘in a fictional direction,’ as Lacan would say.”64 In this context, 
Butler writes, “I am always recuperating, reconstructing, and I am left to fictionalize and 
fabulate origins I cannot know.”65 Butler considers the possible objection that, in 
admitting a limited possibility of accounting for oneself in narrative form, she is still 
trying to account for the conditions that precede (in space and in time) the subject, that is, 
the prehistory of the subject. Challenging this objection, Butler writes that her position of 
acknowledging that “there is no final or adequate narrative reconstruction of the 
prehistory of the speaking ‘I’ does not mean we cannot narrate it; it only means that at the 
moment when we narrate we become speculative philosophers or fiction writers.”66  
 
For Butler, thus, there is a necessary failure at the heart of attempts to narrate oneself. 
Indeed, it is this failure that one must consider in order to get to the heart of Butler’s 
account of ethics. Butler’s views problematise the subject’s ability to grasp, know and 
master itself, and this lack of self-control and knowledge has often been associated with 
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failure. However, Butler argues “that what we often consider to be ethical ‘failure’ may 
well have an ethical valence and importance that has not been rightly adjudicated by those 
who too quickly equate poststructuralism with moral nihilism.”67 Butler insists that it is in 
virtue of such perceived lack of agency that ethical responsibility is incurred: 
 
This postulation of a primary opacity to the self that follows from formative 
relations has a specific implication for an ethical bearing toward the other. 
Indeed, if it is precisely by virtue of one’s relations to others that one is opaque 
to oneself, and if those relations to others are the venue for one’s ethical 
responsibility, then it may well follow that it is precisely by virtue of the 
subject’s opacity to itself that it incurs and sustains some of its most important 
ethical bonds.68 
 
The next section dwells further on the various references to ‘failure’ in Butler’s work to 
highlight the centrality of this notion to her account of self-narration, and of ethics and 
politics more generally. 
 
II The Virtues of Ethical Failure 
 
Butler concludes the first chapter of Giving an Account of Oneself by asking: “If I find 
that, despite my best efforts, a certain opacity persists and I cannot make myself fully 
accountable to you, is this ethical failure?”69 Butler acknowledges this failure as being at 
the heart of subjectivity and ethics, but considers it as a productive failure insofar as the 
failure brought about by the opacity of the self to itself is a necessary feature upon which 
ethics must be based. In other words, this ‘failure’ is an important conceptual tool that 
Butler uses in order to elaborate conceptions of ethics and responsibility that take into 
account the precariousness of life and the opacity of the subject to itself. As Catherine 
Mills highlights: 
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For Butler, it is not the achievement of autonomy – whether against or with 
others – that matters in ethics; rather, it is precisely the failure to achieve a 
condition approximating autonomy that is of primary significance. And 
notably, this failure is not occasional or circumstantial – it is a necessary feature 
of ethical subjectivity. 
The upshot of this is that her ethics are less an ethics of relationality than they 
are an ethics of failure. In Butler’s account of ethics, it is in the failure or 
incapacity to provide a full account of ourselves that our accountability 
emerges.70 
 
Such references to the notion of failure in Butler’s work are also present in some of her 
earlier work. In her critique of how discourses and power relations regulate a cultural 
matrix of intelligibility, she argues that failure to fit within such a matrix results in the 
production of abject bodies as necessary exclusions that uphold the socially accepted 
forms of being: “abject designates here precisely those ‘unlivable’ and ‘uninhabitable’ 
zones of social life which are nevertheless densely populated by those who do not enjoy 
the status of the subject, but whose living under the sign of the ‘unlivable’ is required to 
circumscribe the domain of the subject.”71 In relation to the cultural frameworks that 
regulate and define the space and meaning of an intelligible sexuality, Butler writes that, 
“precisely because certain kinds of ‘gender identities’ fail to conform to those norms of 
cultural intelligibility, they appear only as developmental failures or logical 
impossibilities from within that domain.”72 Butler shows how, despite its fragile and 
precarious position, this presumed failure can itself be an opportunity to subvert the rigid 
frames of intelligibility. Thus, although it is clear that failing to follow the social scripts 
of powerful norms exposes the individual to violence, there are nonetheless ethical and 
political opportunities tied with these perceived failures. 
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Other significant references to failure are found toward the end of Gender Trouble. Tying 
up her main argument, Butler argues that the predominant conception of gender identity 
imposes the fantasy of a seamless grounded identity. This hides the extent to which gender 
identity is not grounded in a substance (substratum) but, rather, is produced in time and is 
structured by repeated acts. Butler emphasises how this repetition might not necessarily 
replicate sameness, but might open up different outcomes, including outcomes that run 
counter to the desired aims that powerful norms uphold. Failure to repeat certain norms 
or, rather, failure to repeat certain norms in a particular way may have important 
transformative effects: “The possibilities of gender transformation are to be found 
precisely in the arbitrary relation between such acts, in the possibility of a failure to repeat, 
a de-formity, or a parodic repetition that exposes the phantasmatic effect of abiding 
identity as a politically tenuous construction.”73 This means that it is impossible for one 
to consistently repeat and embody social norms, and, in this regard, one will always fail. 
Norms themselves fail insofar as there is always excess that they cannot capture: “[t]he 
injunction to be a given gender produces necessary failures, a variety of incoherent 
configurations that in their multiplicity exceed and defy the injunction by which they are 
generated.”74 Butler’s point is that such failures are not individual failures or bad 
performances but, rather, point towards “a constitutive failure of all gender enactments 
for the very reason that these ontological locales are fundamentally uninhabitable.”75 This 
failure, like the failure to meet the socially regulated criteria of what constitutes an 
intelligible identity, is instructive and can shed light on new possibilities of subversion 
and resistance. This point complements Foucault’s view that no matter how pervasive the 
effect of power relations may be on the constitution of subjects, there is always – except 
in exceptional states of domination – room for resistance and possibilities of 
transformation which, although emerging from the power relations themselves, thwart the 
intended outcome and point towards other forms of truth, power and subjectivity.76 
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Butler further elaborates on the notion of failure in Bodies that Matter, where she invokes 
this notion in relation to one’s limited ability to provide a stable, authoritative and 
complete account of oneself, clearly anticipating her discussion of self-narration in Giving 
an Account of Oneself. Interestingly, Butler links the traumatic with that which cannot be 
narrated, whereby the unnarratable is that which fails to be discursively captured or 
recognised: 
 
This injunction [to be or get “sexed”], requires and institutes a “constitutive 
outside” – the unspeakable, the unviable, the nonnarrativizable that secures and, 
hence, fails to secure the very borders of materiality. The normative force of 
performativity – its power to establish what qualifies as “being” – works not only 
through reiteration, but through exclusion as well. And in the case of bodies, those 
exclusions haunt signification as its abject bodies or as that which is strictly 
foreclosed: the unlivable, the nonnarrativizable, the traumatic.77  
 
Butler elaborates further this point through an engagement with the work of Slavoj Žižek. 
Butler agrees with Žižek on the implications that the failure present at the heart of the 
processes of subject-formation has on the possibility of self-narration: “The subject is, as 
a result [of foreclosure], never coherent and never self-identical precisely because it is 
founded and, indeed, continually refounded, through a set of defining foreclosures and 
repressions that constitute the discontinuity and incompletion of the subject.”78 Žižek’s 
further claims that totalising and closed interpellations fail because of a trauma that haunts 
language and discursive formations. By ‘trauma’, what is meant here is a 
nonnarrativisable realm: 
 
Crucial to Žižek’s effort to work the Althusserian theory through Lacan is the 
psychoanalytic insight that any effort of discursive interpellation or constitution 
is subject to failure, haunted by contingency, to the extent that discourse itself 
invariably fails to totalize the social field. Indeed, any attempt to totalize the 
                                               
77 Butler, Bodies that Matter, 140 [emphasis added]. 
78 Butler, Bodies that Matter, 141. 
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social field is to be read as a symptom, the effect and remainder of a trauma 
that itself cannot be directly symbolized in language. This trauma subsists as 
the permanent possibility of disrupting and rendering contingent any discursive 
formation that lays claim to a coherent or seamless account of reality. It persists 
as the real, where the real is always that which any account of “reality” fails to 
include.79 
 
What, then, is to be made of these different references to ‘failure’ in Butler’s work? Rather 
than being a weakness or a shortcoming, these necessary or ‘structural’ failures play a 
productive role. For example, foreclosure is necessary for the subject to emerge; 
dependency, as opposed to self-mastery, is necessary for ethics; the failure to give a 
coherent account of oneself is necessary for a constitutive relationality; the possible 
failures of performativity are necessary for social transformation; and so on. Thus, 
Butler’s work has an implicit normativity that serves both as a critique of dominant 
conceptions – of subjectivity as coherent; of politics as programmatic and predictable; of 
ethics as categorical – and as a positive account of an ethics and politics of vulnerability.80 
The next section provides a sketch of such an ethics and politics, whereas the subsequent 
chapter then considers how these ethical and political insights from Butler’s work can 
illuminate an analysis of the ethics and politics of traumatic self-narration.  
 
III Normative Risks and Potentials: Towards an Ethics and Politics of Vulnerability 
 
Butler’s thought suggests that apprehension of precariousness and vulnerability has a 
normative potential to inspire an ethics and politics that cater for more liveable lives in a 
more inhabitable world. However, this apprehension only has normative potential and not 
strong ethical prescriptions. Thus, although Butler’s work does not seek to be prescriptive 
in this strong sense, questions can still be asked on the normative appeal of her views on 
vulnerability. Such questions include: What are the ethical obligations that follow from 
                                               
79 Butler, Bodies that Matter, 143 [emphasis added]. 
80 For a systematic account of Butler’s ethics and politics of vulnerability, which also situates Butler’s views 
within the broader literature on vulnerability, see Erinn C. Gilson, The Ethics of Vulnerability: A Feminist 
Analysis of Social Life and Practice (London: Routledge, 2014). 
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awareness of vulnerability, how strong are these obligations, and where do these 
obligations emerge from? What political potential does vulnerability entail, and what 
strategies must be adopted in order to actualise this potential? These questions seem 
particularly pertinent in light of Butler’s soft ethico-political language of failure discussed 
in the previous section. As with other poststructuralist ethical and political perspectives, 
Butler acknowledges that there is no necessary link between her theoretical ideas and her 
ethico-political aspirations. Nonetheless, the normative force of her work must not be 
underestimated. 
 
Throughout her writings, Butler has continuously sought to link her reflections on 
precariousness and the interdependency that constitutes subjects with the normative aims 
of an ethics of non-violence. She concedes that there is no necessary causal link between 
the two: “The postulation of a generalized precariousness that calls into question the 
ontology of individualism implies, although does not directly entail, certain normative 
consequences. It does not suffice to say that since life is precarious, therefore it must be 
preserved.”81 This means that the normative aims being presented can be consistently read 
from the ideas being put forward by Butler, but these aims are not the only possible 
outcome. An awareness of one’s, and especially others’, vulnerability can lead to violent 
abuse of others for one’s advantage rather than to an ethical sensibility. This marks a 
tension in the normative suitability of Butler’s aims. As Ann Murphy argues, despite the 
fact that Butler has articulated her ideas on precariousness in line with her aspiration for 
a less violent world, “she recognizes that attending to vulnerability can incite violence 
and/or hospitality in equal measure.”82 This contention follows on from her work in 
Precarious Life where Butler argues that the body is the site of touch and care but, equally, 
of injury and abuse. Mills too critiques Butler’s account of normative ethics, by arguing 
that the link she draws between precariousness and normative commitments to equality 
and justice is not sufficiently elaborated, and this thus: 
 
                                               
81 Butler, Frames of War, 33. 
82 Ann V. Murphy, “Corporeal Vulnerability and the New Humanism,” Hypatia 26, no. 3 (2011): 579. 
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places an onus on her [Butler] to provide some explanation of the relationship 
between the normative force of precariousness, and the political import of 
precarity. Moreover, some explanation of why precariousness has this 
normative force should also be forthcoming. […] [W]hile precariousness may 
thus give rise to an obligation, it does not determine the shape of that obligation, 
or tell us what it is. Thus, Butler’s claim that the recognition of precariousness 
entails a commitment to egalitarianism and the universalisation of rights 
appears to be without justification.83 
 
Mills acknowledges that Butler does not maintain that the recognition of precariousness 
necessarily generates clear normative commitments. Instead, what Butler maintains is that 
the acknowledgment of the generalised condition of the precariousness of life, at best, 
implies particular normative consequences in particular circumstances, and not that the 
concept of precariousness is necessarily and intrinsically normatively imbued.84 
 
Furthermore, in Frames of War, Butler writes that “[p]recariousness implies living 
socially, that is, the fact that one’s life is always in some sense in the hands of the other.”85 
This implies an ethics of cohabiting the world with strangers who might share different 
frames of significance. This unknowingness in the face of the other does not undermine 
responsibility, but is rather the space into which one is thrown, and from which 
responsibility emerges. One cannot choose to define – or can only do so by inflicting 
                                               
83 Mills, “Undoing Ethics,” 48. Similarly, Amy Allen argues that normative criteria are not clearly 
delineated in Butler’s work. Allen maintains that Butler “needs some normative concepts […] and to spend 
more time and energy defending the ones that are already working in her text.” See Amy Allen, The Power 
of Feminist Theory: Domination, Resistance, Solidarity (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999), 77, quoted in 
Thiem, Unbecoming Subjects, 208. Such a critique of Butler’s work is reminiscent of the Foucault-
Habermas debate, with Habermas’ characterisation of Foucault’s notion of genealogical critique as 
“cryptonormative,” and Fraser’s contention that Foucault’s work is “normatively confused.” See Habermas, 
The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, 276 and Fraser, “Foucault on Modern Power,” 284.  
84 Moya Lloyd too maintains that although Butler’s account of a vulnerable subject exposed to loss does 
open up possibilities for grounding ethical obligations, this is not enough to ensure ethical responses. While, 
she argues, ecstatic relationality and existential precariousness have the potential to lead to ethical openness, 
“[t]he problem is that it is not apparent exactly what, if anything, might be done to enable or encourage 
ethical action in conditions of precarity where the actual prospects for ethical responsiveness appear to be 
foreclosed.” See Moya Lloyd, “The Ethics and Politics of Vulnerable Bodies,” in Butler and Ethics, ed. 
Moya Lloyd (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 185. 
85 Butler, Frames of War, 14. 
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severe violence – the terms of co-existence with others. The collective ‘we’ is a contested 
space but is also necessary for social belonging and persistence. Butler argues that 
sociality implies that one’s life is implicated in the lives of others, strangers as well as 
familiar others. One’s ethical relations and obligations to others precede the individual 
sense of self in the same way that one’s subjectivity depends on factors and forces beyond 
one’s control, such as discourses, social norms, other people.86 Following Levinas, Butler 
argues that ethics is not grounded in a free agent who is responsible for the actions one 
chooses to author. Self-possession, in fact, hinders the possibility of ethics, according to 
Butler: “If I possess myself too firmly or too rigidly, I cannot be in an ethical relation.”87 
Instead, an ethics of vulnerability is dependent upon a subject who is given over to that 
which exceeds it – norms, power relations, regulatory practices and institutions. It is 
precisely from out of this unchosen and unwilled realm that ethical obligations arise: 
 
[s]omething impinges upon us, without our being able to anticipate or prepare 
for it in advance, and this means that we are in such moments affronted by 
something that is beyond our will, not of our making, that comes to us from the 
outside, as an imposition but also as an ethical demand. I want to suggest that 
these are ethical obligations that do not require our consent, and neither are they 
the result of contracts or agreements into which any of us have deliberately 
entered.88 
 
Reading Levinas alongside Arendt, Butler writes that one cannot decide with whom to 
co-exist. Indeed, she argues, “no one has the right to decide with whom to co-habit.”89 
Through Levinas’ analysis of the injunction ‘thou shalt not kill’, Butler brings out the 
point that not only are we obligated to preserve the lives of those with whom we cohabit 
the world, but also to affirm the plurality of the individuals involved without seeking to 
                                               
86 See Judith Butler, “Precarious Life, Vulnerability, and the Ethics of Cohabitation,” Journal of Speculative 
Philosophy 26, no. 2 (2012): 141. 
87 Butler, “Precarious Life, Vulnerability, and the Ethics of Cohabitation,” 142.  
88 Butler, “Precarious Life, Vulnerability, and the Ethics of Cohabitation,” 135. 
89 Judith Butler, “Is Judaism Zionism?” in The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere, eds. Eduardo 
Mendieta and Jonathan VanAntwerpen (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 85, quoted in Fiona 
Jenkins, “Sensate Democracy and Grievable Life,” in Butler and Ethics, ed. Moya Lloyd (Edinburgh: 
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reduce these differences into a universal category that regulates that which is recognisable. 
This challenges the predominant ways of identifying a ‘we’ to whom ‘I’ am responsible, 
showing that the construction of such a ‘we’ may depend on exclusions. 
 
Butler’s philosophical language is another dimension of her work that manifests its 
implicit normativity. In her discussion of vulnerability and precariousness, Butler 
employs a soft, cautious language that highlights that one must proceed with caution due 
to the inherent risks of reifying and repeating hegemonic structures or ways of thinking. 
As Foucault showed, the feeling of liberation and emancipation may, in fact, be merely a 
ruse of the very same power one seeks to oppose. Furthermore, there is always a lack of 
knowledge when it comes to anticipating in advance the efficacy and outcomes of political 
struggles or critique. As Butler writes: 
 
How will we know the difference between the power we promote and the power 
we oppose? Is it, one might rejoin, a matter of “knowing”? For one is, as it 
were, in power even as one opposes it, formed by it as one reworks it, and it is 
this simultaneity that is at once the condition of our partiality, the measure of 
our political unknowingness, and also the condition of action itself. The 
incalculable effects of action are as much a part of their subversive promise as 
those that we plan in advance.90  
 
The same unknowingness applies when considering the nature of ethical obligations in 
Butler’s work. Awareness of precariousness and precarity can instil in us a sense of ethical 
obligation, but in itself this is not necessarily a sufficient ground for ethics. As with 
political decisions, according to Butler, ethical decisions cannot be predicted or justified 
in advance but “they can be sketched, they can be schematized, they can be prepared 
for.”91 This preparation consists in taking heed of the precariousness that characterises 
life, which can move us to act. This movement has an affective dimension, which is a 
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crucial feature that can push us toward ethical behaviour: “only when we are sufficiently 
impressed by the injustice of some situation in the world that we are moved to change 
it.”92 Sara Rushing analyses the role of affect in Butler’s work, particularly in her ethics, 
and argues that although the affective dimension is underdeveloped in Butler’s work, she 
does consider the ethico-political import of affects such as generosity, humility and 
patience. However, Rushing thinks that these affects must be complemented with others 
such as love, care and hope, so as to cultivate the dispositions required in order to “move 
ethics from the refusal to react and towards the capacity to respond.”93 
 
What I am calling the softness of Butler’s ethico-political language characterises her 
philosophical language at large, which seems to have shifted from one text to the other. 
Whereas texts such as Gender Trouble and Bodies that Matter are more akin to 
philosophical treatises full of technical arguments, later texts such as Precarious Life and 
Giving an Account of Oneself – although equally technical – function more as appeals to 
affect, which is not to say that they are reduced to rhetoric. Some of her later texts do not 
seem to operate by seeking to convince the reader by presenting persuasive arguments. 
For example, in Precarious Life Butler writes, “I am arguing, if I am ‘arguing’ at all.”94 
Rushing picks upon this phrase and writes that Butler’s work: 
 
is working on us affectively, through her words, by repeatedly invoking a 
vocabulary of affect, vulnerability, interdependence, loss, grief and, somewhat, 
love and care. This body of words has aesthetic appeal, a certain poetry to it, 
which is meant not so much to communicate ideas to us as to induce an 
experience of precariousness, or to perform it iteratively across multiple texts 
and talks, and to solicit a community of solidarity.95  
 
                                               
92 Lloyd, “The Ethics and Politics of Vulnerable Bodies,” 183. 
93 Sara Rushing, “Butler’s Ethical Appeal: Being, Feeling and Acting Responsible,” in Butler and Ethics, 
ed. Moya Lloyd (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 81 [emphasis in original]. 
94 Butler, Precarious Life, 24. 
95 Rushing, “Butler’s Ethical Appeal,” 82. For a further discussion of Butler’s writing style and a 
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This affective way of articulating ethics calls for imagining and reimagining ways of 
thinking and living. As Murphy puts it, “the obligation imposed by precariousness is one 
that cries for a more equal and even realization of corporeal vulnerability.”96 There, 
perhaps, is no force in this model of ethics except for, precisely, a cry for an ethical and 
generous world. There might not be anything definitive in Butler’s account of 
vulnerability and precariousness that pushes one to act ethically; one can only be inclined 
to respond in this way. 
 
*** 
 
The principal aim of this chapter has been to show how Butler’s views on precariousness 
and vulnerability are crucial to her account of self-narration. However, the chapter did not 
draw just on Butler’s ‘later’ works where the role of notions of vulnerability and 
relationality are more pronounced, but also on Butler’s earlier works on performativity 
and subject-formation. Butler’s discussion of corporeal vulnerability, typically associated 
with Precarious Life, was connected back to her views on linguistic vulnerability in 
Excitable Speech; while her discussion of self-narration, most evident in Giving an 
Account of Oneself, was situated within her earlier work on the narrativisability and its 
failure in Bodies That Matter. This chapter considered the implicit normativity of Butler’s 
views on vulnerability through her emphasis on the unchosen character of ethical 
obligations and of sociality. Moreover, this chapter emphasised the intrinsic link between 
ethics and social critique in Butler’s work, whereby her account of vulnerability functions 
as a critique of the over-insistence on self-sufficiency and mastery. It was also argued that 
Butler presents a ‘performative demonstration’ of vulnerability through the soft 
philosophical language she employs in her writings. These different ‘gestures’ are further 
explored in subsequent chapters to demonstrate how narratives of trauma can function as 
instances of critique which, however, can have their critical potential thwarted. 
 
This chapter also presented Butler’s account of self-narration in detail, outlining the 
emphasis she places on the constitutive relationality that troubles self-sufficiency and the 
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coherence of self-narration. Self-incoherence (or self-opacity) was emphasised not as a 
shortcoming or a failure of the self but rather as “an ethical resource.”97 Conversely, 
Butler’s work shows how an excessive emphasis on narrative coherence amounts to a 
denial of vulnerability and dependency. The next chapter will use Butler’s work to adapt 
it more specifically to an analysis of the narration of trauma. Narrative coherence will be 
analysed as a possibly hegemonic norm that can function to circumscribe traumatised 
individuals their narratives. The politics of narrating trauma will be considered by 
analysing the institutional norms and discourses that impact survivors’ narrations of 
sexual trauma.
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Chapter 6 Butler and the Politics of Narrating Trauma 
 
This chapter reads Butler’s ideas on self-narration in relation to issues in trauma theory. 
Butler’s account of self-narration is read as a critique of the tendency of various strands 
of moral philosophy and psychology to place great importance on narrative coherence. 
Butler identifies this normative prejudice when she writes that one “can never provide the 
account of [one]self that both certain forms of morality and some models of mental health 
require, namely, that the self deliver itself in coherent narrative form.”1 Following Butler, 
narrative coherence within practices of self-narration is understood here as a tendency that 
pervades philosophical thinking, but that may also harden into a potentially hegemonic 
norm. Narrative coherence is paramount within various dominant therapeutic discourses, 
and is seen as empowering traumatised individuals by giving them more control over their 
lives. However, when subjected to closer scrutiny, the possibility of narrative coherence 
becomes open to critique on multiple levels. Butler’s ideas may be seen as incompatible 
with, or incapable of explaining the need for, narrative coherence expressed by various 
trauma survivors. But rather than undermining any notion of narrative coherence, Butler’s 
account of self-narration will be used to challenge the over-emphasis placed on a 
conception of self-narration based on mastery, unity and coherence. 
 
The chapter will go on to further analyse how the norm of narrative coherence functions 
by considering narrations of sexual trauma by survivors in institutional contexts. The 
autobiographical narratives of sexual trauma by Alice Sebold and Susan Brison are 
considered to show how narrative coherence functions in legal and political contexts of 
testifying as a possibly hegemonic norm that circumscribes how trauma is narrated by 
facilitating certain forms of self-narration while silencing other forms of narrating oneself. 
The chapter concludes by arguing that a reading of Butler’s work on self-narration in 
relation to insights derived from trauma theory on the difficulties of narrating life after 
trauma enables a critical ethico-political analysis of powerful hegemonic norms and 
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practices – such as the insistence on and over-valorisation of narrative coherence – that 
are currently operating on the activity of traumatic self-narration. 
 
6.1 Butler and Trauma Theory 
 
Narrating one’s life is made all the more complicated in the aftermath of traumatic 
incidents. The relation between trauma and narrative is often described in terms of a 
rupture. Trauma theorists refer to the urgent need felt by traumatised individuals to be 
able to narrate their life in a coherent way in order to counter the shattering effect of 
traumatic incidents and restore psychic stability. Trauma narratives are governed by 
discourses of psychological well-being, and particular forms of trauma narratives are 
privileged over others in form and in content. Narratives considered to be ‘failed stories’ 
are side-lined while individuals unable to articulate their story are ignored. Dominant 
therapeutic discourses respond to the rupture of trauma by emphasising the importance of 
restoring survivors’ mastery over their narratives, and of recovering narrative coherence 
to empower traumatised individuals by giving them more control over their own lives. 
This sense of control contributes to reinstating the subject as the master and sole author 
of its life narrative instead of leaving it to suffer the continuing debilitating effects of 
trauma. This impulse toward control and coherence is understandable in the context of 
how trauma disempowers the individual by disabling one’s sense of agency. However, 
subjected to closer scrutiny, the possibility of narrative coherence in self-narration 
becomes less easy to sustain without question. 
 
I Trauma as Rupture 
 
“I will always miss myself as I was;”2  
“I died in Vietnam;”3  
                                               
2 Migael Scherer, Still Loved by the Sun: A Rape Survivor’s Journal (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 
179, quoted in Susan J. Brison, “Trauma Narratives and the Remaking of the Self,” in Acts of Memory: 
Cultural Recall in the Present, eds. Mieke Bal, Jonathan V. Crewe, and Leo Spitzer (Hanover: University 
Press of New England, 1999), 39. 
3 Jonathan Shay, Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character (New York: 
Atheneum, 1994), 180, quoted in Brison, “Trauma Narratives and the Remaking of the Self,” 39. 
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“I died in Auschwitz, but no one knows it.”4 
 
These are some of the ways in which survivors describe themselves in the aftermath of 
trauma. Although the term ‘trauma’ is today used more frequently in reference to the 
psychological realm, the original medical meaning of trauma as a break, a laceration, a 
shattering in the physical body, or something which destroys a presumed unity remains. 
Trauma is understood as a rupture that strips the self of its familiar dwelling in the world, 
and reveals a painful fragmentation at the heart of subjectivity. One’s self and one’s 
relations to others are undone after trauma, leaving the survivor with the difficult task of 
recovering a sense of self, remaking one’s world, and rediscovering meaningful 
attachments to others. This characterisation of trauma complements Herman’s: 
 
Traumatic events call into question basic human relationships. They breach the 
attachments of family, friendship, love, and community. They shatter the 
construction of the self that is formed and sustained in relation to others. They 
undermine the belief systems that give meaning to human experience. They violate 
the victim’s faith in a natural or divine order and cast the victim into a state of 
existential crisis. The damage to relational life is not a secondary effect of trauma.5 
 
The survivor’s ability to narrate in words the traumatic episode, and to attempt to integrate 
the episode within a life story, is seen as a sign of agency whereby the survivor can 
exercise some form of control and mastery over the traumatic episode. With its emphasis 
on the opacity of the self to itself and, consequently, on the impossibility of self-narrative 
coherence, Butler’s account of self-narration can be seen as countering some central tenets 
in trauma theory and therapy. What the next section shows is that, rather than dismissing 
the validity of efforts to narratively reconstruct one’s self-narrative in the aftermath of 
trauma, Butler’s work calls attention to the possible hegemonic effects of certain norms – 
                                               
4 Delbo, Auschwitz and After, 267, quoted in Susan J. Brison, “Outliving Oneself: Trauma, Memory, and 
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such as the norm of narrative coherence – that place questionable demands on traumatised 
individuals. 
 
II Butler on Narrative Coherence 
 
At first glance, one may think that theoretical elaborations that emphasise, even promote, 
the opacity of the self to itself, such as Butler’s, do not really help to ease matters for 
individuals seeking narrative coherence in their lives. Unfair critics might argue that a 
negative portrayal of narrative coherence amounts to a dangerous postmodern flirtation 
with fragmentation or an insensitive celebration of non-closure. Catharine MacKinnon, 
for example, has harshly criticised the fancy for a fragmented self that she sees in the work 
of ‘postmodernists’ such as Butler and Rosi Braidotti; she writes, “Postmodernists ought 
to have to confront the human pain of the ideas they think are so much fun.”6 The need 
for narrative coherence is often expressed by traumatised individuals seeking to rebuild 
their life after a traumatic incident, individuals who do not and cannot ‘afford’ to relish 
any virtues that can be associated with a fragmented subjectivity. One could argue that to 
such individuals there is absolutely no positive potential seen in enduring incoherence; 
rather, incoherence is seen as entailing only painful repercussions. 
 
One must definitely pay heed to the negative repercussions of a felt sense of incoherence 
that follows traumatic events. Although Butler sheds doubt over the possibility of 
constructing an authoritative account of oneself – thus contesting the merits of certain 
phenomenological and hermeneutical accounts of narrative selfhood – she does not deny 
the importance of giving a narrative account of oneself: “We can surely still tell our 
stories, and there will be many reasons to do precisely that.”7 These various reasons for 
which one can tell a story about oneself range from a narcissistic self-absorption to, more 
interestingly, a felt need. Sometimes, the possibility of giving a coherent account of 
oneself is not a whimsical matter, but rather a matter of necessity, of need. Traumatised 
                                               
6 Catharine A. MacKinnon, “Points against Postmodernism,” Chicago-Kent Law Review 75, no. 3 (2000): 
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individuals may feel compelled to speak and write about their traumatic experience 
precisely in order to reestablish the coherence and bearability of their lives, despite the 
impossibilities and painful hardship that this entails. One can here consider Primo Levi’s 
description of how, after his release from the concentration camps, he resorted to writing 
in an almost obsessive way. As he describes it: 
 
You remember the scene: the Ancient Mariner accosts the wedding guests, who 
are thinking of the wedding and not paying attention to him, and he forces them 
to listen to his tale. Well, when I first returned from the concentration camp I 
did just that. I felt an unrestrainable need to tell my story to anyone and 
everyone! […] Every situation was an occasion to tell my story to anyone and 
everyone: to tell it to the factory director as well as to the worker, even if they 
had other things to do. I was reduced to the state of the Ancient Mariner. Then 
I began to write on my typewriter at night. […] Every night I would write, and 
this was considered even crazier!8 
 
In such cases, narrative paradoxically provides both comfort (due to the attempt at self-
coherence) as well as pain (due to the retraumatising memories). Butler does recognise 
that traumatised subjects might feel the need to coherently narrate one’s life. As she 
writes: 
 
[L]earning to construct a narrative is a crucial practice, especially when 
discontinuous bits of experience remain dissociated from one another by virtue of 
traumatic conditions. And I do not mean to undervalue the importance of narrative 
work in the reconstruction of a life that otherwise suffers from fragmentation and 
discontinuity. The suffering that belongs to conditions of dissociation should not 
be underestimated.9 
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Yet, despite this, Butler does not concede that the solution could be found in putting one’s 
faith in a conception of self-narration based on self-mastery, unity and coherence: 
“Conditions of hyper-mastery […] are no more salutary than conditions of radical 
fragmentation.”10 This is because such a conception amounts to a denial of the 
fundamental fragmentation that results from the impingement on the subject by others and 
by social norms. This does not mean, however, that Butler denies the possibility of 
speaking about oneself or, even, of giving a narrative account of oneself. What she 
challenges is a particular way in which the subject can narrate itself. Butler recognises 
that being able to give an account of oneself, even if not a singular, authoritative and 
complete one, can amount to continued social and psychic survival. Her contention lies 
with the aspiration toward a coherent and united narrative of oneself as posited, for 
example, by some strands of psychoanalytic thought and practice: 
 
Within some psychoanalytic circles, doctrines, and practices, one of the stated 
aims of psychoanalysis is to offer the client the chance to put together a story about 
herself, to recollect the past, to interweave the events or, rather, the wishes of 
childhood with later events, to try to make sense through narrative means of what 
this life has been, the impasses it encounters time and again, and what it might yet 
become. Indeed, some [such as Roy Schafer] have argued that the normative goal 
of psychoanalysis is to permit the client to tell a single and coherent story about 
herself that will satisfy the wish to know herself.11 
 
Butler does not consider narrative incoherence as a failure of the fantastical subject who 
is in complete control over oneself, but as a mark of the precariousness of life whereby 
the subject is given over to a sociality that is beyond its grasp, and to social relations that 
tie it to others beyond its choosing. This vulnerable exposure, “[t]his fundamental 
dependency on anonymous others is not a condition that I can will away,” she writes.12 
                                               
10 Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, 52. 
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Rather than a matter with which we must try to make do, in this same vulnerability, in its 
recognition and apprehension, lies an ethical potential: “perhaps, an ethics based on our 
shared, invariable, and partial blindness about ourselves.”13 It is this ethical potential that 
is lost in the tendency of strands of trauma therapy to rush toward narrative coherence. 
This urge can be viewed critically as a prejudice in mental health discourses; an 
assumption, with normative and political implications, regarding the possibility of a 
unitary non-fragmented subject.  
 
6.2 Rape and the Politics of Self-Narration 
 
The privileging of narrative coherence is not a tendency that happens solely in 
philosophical thinking. Narrative coherence functions as a norm that has an effect on how 
narratives are socially received and valued. A critical study of narrative coherence, then, 
shows how this norm manifests itself socially, and which of its operations can be 
politically contestable. The written narratives of Sebold and Brison, both survivors of 
sexual violence, highlight the potentially problematic privileging of narrative coherence. 
This section analyses these narratives alongside Butler’s critique of narrative coherence 
as case studies that foreground the politics of narrating trauma in institutional contexts. 
 
I Confessing Trauma in the Court 
 
Tara Roeder remarks how, despite the fact that the relationship between trauma and 
storytelling is not ordinarily a linear one, “[r]ape victims who choose to make their stories 
public and/or seek redress from the justice system, however, will indeed find themselves 
under intense pressure to tell clear, concise, and coherent accounts of the violence they 
have undergone.”14 Such an analysis emphasises how traumatic self-narration is not 
merely a personal or individual matter because, as a dialogical activity, it is always already 
implicated within a socio-political context. Roeder considers the harmful effects of the 
                                               
13 Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, 40-41. 
14 Tara Roeder, “‘You Have to Confess’: Rape and the Politics of Storytelling,” Journal of Feminist 
Scholarship 9 (2015): 18. 
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institutional treatment of traumatic self-narration on victims, such as “the type of linear, 
cohesive narrative privileged by the legal system.”15 Discussing how narratives of rape 
are conducted in the legal sphere, she claims that the rape victim narrates her story over 
and over again: the average rape victim “gives her account of the crime 57 times to various 
officials before the case even lands in court.”16 In the process, police, lawyers and other 
officials analyse the narrative for any inconsistencies, as well as reading the narrative 
through norms surrounding rape discourse in the public sphere, such as victim-blaming 
and doubting. The veracity of the victim’s speech is established not just on the basis of 
the narrative (and the evidence, on occasions) but on how the narrative is presented and 
how its presentation fits within the set of cultural and legal expectations: “the rape victims 
are expected to perform in particular ways if they wish to be believed.”17 Any shred of the 
narrative that seems not to hold water may lead to the dismissal of the victim’s narrative. 
 
Roeder frames her analysis as a consideration of the ways in which traumatic rape 
testimony is institutionally regulated in order to fit a culturally sanctioned narrative. This 
cultural sanctioning promotes the form that self-narration should take, and the narrator’s 
conformity with the victim profile which, in the case of rape, consists of “scripts of guilt, 
silence, forgetting, and forgiveness often forced upon female victims of sexual 
violence.”18 Narrative coherence is one such pre-existing schema that is valued by the 
legal institutions. As Andrew Taslitz writes, “the story of a case must be told in such a 
way as to satisfy a jury’s need for narrative coherence and fidelity.”19 This institutional 
and institutionalised pressure in favour of narrative coherence – as if trauma can be so 
easily and conveniently amenable – persists despite the theoretical difficulties that 
narrative coherence implies, let alone the well-documented difficulties that traumatised 
individuals face to meet these requirements of narrative coherence. 
 
                                               
15 Roeder, “‘You Have to Confess’,” 19. 
16 Abigail Goldman, “Rape still a crime where victim can share blame,” Las Vegas Sun, August 17, 2008, 
lasvegassun.com/news/2008/aug/17/rape-still-crime-where-victim-can-share-blame, quoted in Roeder, 
“‘You Have to Confess’,” 19. 
17 Roeder, “‘You Have to Confess’,” 21. 
18 Roeder, “‘You Have to Confess’,” 21. 
19 Andrew E. Taslitz, Rape and the Culture of the Courtroom (New York: New York University Press, 
1999), 6, quoted in Roeder, “‘You Have to Confess’,” 22. 
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Sebold reflects upon this tension in Lucky, a memoir in which she presents her account of 
how she was obliged to testify as a rape survivor while being aware of the institutional 
presuppositions and privileging surrounding traumatic testimony. She recounts how:  
 
It was a shaky start to the most important story I would ever tell. I began a sentence 
only to trail off and begin again. And this wasn’t because I was unaware exactly 
what happened in the tunnel. It was saying the words out loud, knowing that it was 
how I said them that could win or lose the case.20 
 
This issue of how the narrative is presented highlights the performative dimension of 
testifying. It reveals that trauma narratives are adjudicated upon criteria of success or 
failure, as if they are a performance or an examination. This performative dimension is 
foregrounded once again in the treatment of rape victims within contexts of cross-
examination, where rape victims are made all the more aware that narrative coherence is 
not just a matter pertaining to how they themselves relate to their traumatic incident, but 
a matter that determines their credibility as witnesses. After testifying, a court bailiff 
remarked to Sebold that she was “the best rape witness I’ve ever seen on the stand,”21 and 
Sebold is understandably relieved to hear so. Despite its accepted ordinariness and 
Sebold’s relief, this comment seems in particularly bad taste, and clearly brings out the 
rigid and undesirable criteria by which narratives are marked as a success or otherwise by 
the legal system. In another episode, Sebold recalls narrating her story to a friend, 
acknowledging the implicit operation of norms that allow for smoother reception of her 
narrative by listeners: “I told him everything I could bear to tell. I intended to tell him all 
the details but I couldn’t. I edited as I went, stopping at blind corners where I felt I might 
fall apart. I kept the narrative linear.”22 
 
 
                                               
20 Alice Sebold, Lucky (New York: Back Bay Books, 2002 [1999]), 174, quoted in Roeder, “‘You Have to 
Confess’,” 22 [emphasis in original]. 
21 Sebold, Lucky, 198. 
22 Sebold, Lucky, 79 [emphasis added]. 
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II Traumatic Relationality 
 
In her work, based also on her own experience of sexual trauma, Brison provides a rich 
analysis of the narration of trauma and the role of narratives in reconstructing a sense of 
self after the shattering effect of trauma. Brison writes that trauma, particularly when it is 
intentionally inflicted by other humans, damages one’s relational dwelling in the world: 
“When the trauma is of human origin and is intentionally inflicted, […] it not only shatters 
one’s fundamental assumptions about the world and one’s safety in it, but also severs the 
sustaining connection between the self and the rest of humanity.”23 This characterisation 
goes some way toward explaining why several trauma survivors express feeling that their 
life and their self can never be the same after the traumatic episode. It also explains why 
trauma survivors feel the need for narrative coherence in order to restore a viable sense of 
self and self-narrative. Brison’s work argues for a relational view of selfhood in light of 
how the self can be constructed and deconstructed through its exposure to a wider 
sociality: “The study of trauma, I suggest, provides support for a view of the self as 
fundamentally relational – vulnerable enough to be undone by violence and yet resilient 
enough to be reconstructed with the help of others.”24 
 
This emphasis on relationality echoes Herman’s classic study of trauma and recovery. 
This is not an incidental point: on various occasions in Aftermath, Brison outlines her 
process of recovery through the recovery stages outlined by Herman. For Herman, trauma 
ultimately is an experience that breaches one’s sense of being and persisting in the world, 
in such a way that a human subject must reconnect successfully with others and with a 
wider social context if it hopes to recover from the shattering effects of trauma. As she 
writes: “The core experiences of psychological trauma are disempowerment and 
disconnection from others. Recovery, therefore, is based upon the empowerment of the 
survivor and the creation of new connections. Recovery can take place only within the 
context of relationships; it cannot occur in isolation.”25 
                                               
23 Susan J. Brison, “Trauma Narratives and the Remaking of the Self,” 40. 
24 Brison, “Trauma Narratives and the Remaking of the Self,” 40. 
25 Herman, Trauma and Recovery, 133. 
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This formulation of trauma in terms of relationality bears comparison with Butler’s views. 
The works of Brison and Herman could be read alongside Butler’s work with fruitful 
outcomes. Brison’s and Herman’s emphasis on the relational constitution of subjectivity, 
and the relational damage that trauma brings with it complements Butler’s work on how 
the self is relationally and vulnerably given over to a broader sociality outside its 
choosing. The works of Brison and Herman also seem to converge with Butler’s on their 
shared concern over the impossibility of narrative coherence and control. Herman 
describes a “premature demand for certainty”26 which lead therapists to discount or 
trivialise patients’ traumatic experiences by forcefully imposing a demand for coherent 
narratives on trauma victims. She argues that a degree of uncertainty regarding basic facts 
in the narrative will always persist, and that this narrative ‘incoherence’ – or, rather, 
narrative openness – is inescapable: “In the course of reconstruction, the story may change 
as missing pieces are recovered. […] Thus, both patient and therapist must accept the fact 
that they do not have complete knowledge, and they must learn to live with ambiguity 
while exploring at a tolerable pace.”27 It is interesting to read this last quote through 
Butler’s ideas on self-narration, informed by her views on self-opacity and the ecstatic 
relationality which leave us partially blind to ourselves and each other. Brison too argues 
that trauma recovery highlights the impossibility of self- and narrative coherence. 
Referring to her long and arduous process of recovery, she writes: “Recovery no longer 
seems like picking up the pieces of a shattered self (or fractured narrative). It’s facing the 
fact that there was never a coherent self (or story) there to begin with.”28 This formulation 
is interestingly atypical insofar as it distances itself from the therapeutic meta-narrative of 
restoring self-mastery and coherence that usually shapes narratives of trauma recovery. 
 
Conversely, Brison’s and Herman’s work on traumatic self-narration can clarify some of 
Butler’s contentions on narrative coherence. Narratives by trauma survivors foreground 
the desire for narrative coherence, stability and control in order to recover a sense of 
                                               
26 Herman, Trauma and Recovery, 180. 
27 Herman, Trauma and Recovery, 179-180. 
28 Susan J. Brison, Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking of a Self (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2002), 116. 
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agency and empowerment. Incoherence in contrast may be seen as disempowering and 
often painful. Brison, for example, argues that “[i]n order to recover, a trauma survivor 
needs to be able to establish greater control over traumatic memories and other intrusive 
symptoms of PTSD, recover a sense of mastery over her environment (within reasonable 
limits), and be reconnected with humanity.”29 In no way is this an admission of the powers 
of individualistic mastery. Brison is precise in her theorisation when she affirms that any 
degree of control one achieves over one’s environment, recovery, and self-narrative will 
always be within limits. Moreover, Brison continues, “[w]hether these achievements 
occur depends […] on other people.”30 Ultimately, what all three thinkers (Butler, Brison, 
Herman) emphasise is that an exaggerated and unilateral emphasis on the coherence of 
one’s life narrative can function as a hegemonic norm that, on the individual level, does 
not really improve the survivor’s well-being, and on the social level, results in the 
privileging of one set of stories over others. This privileging can and must be contested 
on multiple levels, including the philosophical, psychological, and socio-political levels. 
 
6.3 Narrating Otherwise: Trauma and Critique 
 
What critical potential, then, is enabled by such a critique of narrative coherence in trauma 
narratives? Are there, after all, any ways in which narratives of trauma can highlight the 
unsuitability or undesirability of norms that influence how trauma narratives are socially 
received, interpreted, and circulated? We know more or less what trauma disables, but 
can it enable anything? I must emphasise that I think that there is nothing intrinsically 
noble in suffering. Suffering does not raise the victim to a heightened moral standing; nor 
does suffering automatically make the victim an exemplary person. Ascribing to the 
victim a state of innocence or purity implies a moral economy that equates goodness with 
suffering, as if suffering cleanses. It is not a celebration of self-abnegation or an ethic of 
virtuous traumatisation which I wish to propose. Rather, what can be done with trauma? 
Such a question does not imply that trauma can be useful. There is no economy or utility 
to trauma; indeed, trauma is that which defies all such economy. Trauma reveals a 
                                               
29 Brison, Aftermath, 71. 
30 Brison, Aftermath, 71. 
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heightened point of vulnerable exposure to a wider sociality and to a constitutive 
relationality. The great challenge is how one can regard this exposure positively when that 
same sociality and relationality turn out to be traumatic. It is not at all obvious that 
traumatic incidents are a gateway to a better understanding of relationality, as if trauma is 
just what we need in order to improve our sense of solidarity and our political discourses. 
In fact, trauma destroys the relational bonds of sociality, forcing the individual to retreat 
into the shelter of an atomised subjectivity, and this is to be respected, especially when 
trauma violates one’s intimate existence.31 A trauma victim cannot be blamed for desiring 
a unified sense of self and a ‘healthy’ degree of mastery and agency over the direction of 
one’s life. Trauma stands as a constant reminder that our bodily existence potentially 
exposes us to unwanted violence. In reaction to the breach of violence, it is perhaps easier 
to rush to restore the impenetrable subject of mastery, to react violently, or to perpetuate 
the logic of dominating others. 
 
However, traumatic violence need not be an argument against relationality. Violence is a 
hurtful breach of that relationality. The philosophical, ethical and political challenge is to 
find, as Butler puts it, “one of the sources of nonviolence in the capacity to grieve, to stay 
with the unbearable loss without converting it into destruction,”32 or without quickly 
seeking to impose coherence on one’s self-narrative in the aftermath of violence suffered 
in order to restore the impression of an impenetrable autonomous subject. Following 
Butler, I want to ask what could happen if we ‘stay with’ the trauma a while longer, asking 
what trauma can enable despite its nature to shatter and disconnect us. One possible 
response to this difficult question is that trauma can (though it might not) enable 
apprehension of how one is relationally constituted and dependent upon others who can 
both enrich one’s life and do it great harm. The vulnerable exposure of incoherence at the 
heart of subjectivity is often negatively portrayed; yet, as Butler shows, a greater challenge 
                                               
31 See Jenny Edkins, “Remembering Relationality: Trauma Time and Politics,” in Memory, Trauma and 
World Politics: Reflections on the Relationship Between Past and Present, ed. Duncan Bell (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 99-115. 
32 Judith Butler, “Speaking of Rage and Grief,” PEN World Voices Festival, April 2014, 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZxyabzopQi8. 
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is to think of this incoherence as an ethical resource that invites a radical revision of 
notions of ethical subjectivity and responsibility. 
 
Contemporary discourses strive to maintain the solidity of a meta-narrative of strong, 
coherent, unitary subjects. Yet, trauma narratives can occupy another space; they can 
subvert fantasies of mastery and resist psychological regimes of truth and 
power/knowledge. This apprehension may lead us to oppose the meta-narrative of a 
unified coherent pre-trauma self on one hand, and on the other, that of a broken, shattered 
post-trauma self that needs to be rebuilt. Trauma narratives, then, can have a critical 
function even in, or perhaps especially in, their supposed incoherence. A relational 
understanding of trauma and its narration does not merely emphasise that trauma – or, 
indeed, our whole life – cannot be successfully narrated, and that we would only be 
deluded in thinking that it can be. Rather, relational understandings of trauma reveal how 
human subjects are constituted in relation to their relations, to incidents, and to powerful 
discourses that regulate suffering. Certain trauma narratives and reflections on them can 
counter and defy these injunctions. This countering is not just of philosophical relevance. 
Narratives exist in social circulation, which implies that while some narratives can 
become more hardened over time, other narratives may function as subversive counter-
narratives that unsettle culturally dominant perceptions and practices. Roeder highlights 
this power of counter-narratives of trauma when she writes:  
 
The relentless cultural transmission of all stories of sexual assault – partial, 
fragmented, “imperfect” as they may be – is one way to confront the reality of rape 
and shape our knowledge of its reality. Each story of rape varies in its particulars; 
there is no one narrative that can contain these explosive and singular moments of 
disruption. Yet, placed beside each other, these experiences come to mean in a 
culture in which rape has always been a shaping factor, and function as a reminder 
of the complex power associated with not only the telling, but the hearing, of such 
stories.33 
 
                                               
33 Roeder, “‘You Have to Confess’,” 28. 
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This highlights how pre-existing schemas for adjudicating narratives may not be the most 
suited to apprehending trauma. This is consequential since the survivors’ narrative 
reconstruction of the trauma is not by itself sufficient for better well-being since what also 
needs to be addressed is what Herman calls “the social or relational dimension of the 
traumatic experience.”34 This includes the presence of an audience that receives and 
engages sympathetically with narratives of trauma, without imposing normative 
expectations or rigid narrative demands on trauma survivors. Ultimately, survivors do not 
simply narrate trauma to reconstruct personal self-coherence for its own sake, but also to 
channel one’s narrative into a public sphere that they hope would be receptive to their 
suffering.  
 
*** 
 
This chapter considered how, and the extent to which, certain forms of trauma narratives 
– such as Brison’s and Sebold’s – serve as alternative testimonies that unsettle, with 
difficulty, the social and discursive schemas that socially shape traumatic self-narration. 
This is only a critical potential, rather than a necessary actuality, which may be 
foregrounded in trauma narratives. This potential can be quickly extinguished through the 
co-option of survivors’ narratives by, for example, the discourses of the psy sciences or 
state apparatuses. The potential of trauma narrations can sway toward subversion just as 
easily as it can be swayed toward normalisation. This chapter took as its starting point the 
need for narrative coherence felt by trauma survivors who, in response to the shattering 
power of trauma, seek to narrate their life in a coherent manner in order to retain agency 
and control over their life story. It was shown how the notion of narrative coherence is 
not a neutral concern but is a possibly hegemonic norm instated and enforced through 
discourses of the psy sciences that over-emphasise the therapeutic value of narrative 
coherence. Butler’s work provides various critical resources with which to analyse this 
tendency toward coherence by presenting the activity of self-narration as a precarious 
endeavour fraught with difficulties and limits. Since individuals are relationally 
constituted, they do not have sole authority and authorship over their life narratives and, 
                                               
34 Herman, Trauma and Recovery, 183. 
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as such, a coherent, linear and masterful self-narrative is an impossibility. This does not 
imply that any political and ethical concern with self-narration is futile. Rather, Butler’s 
work enables a critical consideration of the norm of narrative coherence and its effect on 
self-narration.35 The trauma memoirs of Sebold and Brison were analysed to highlight 
how traumatised individuals attempt to narratively account for their life after trauma, but 
also to show how self-narration can function critically by foregrounding possibly 
hegemonic factors that are bearing on the activity of self-narration. 
 
The remaining two chapters will utilise the theoretical framework to trauma adopted 
throughout this thesis to other areas of application. The next chapter sustains the 
critique of narrative coherence by turning to literature from the psychological sciences 
to show how narrative coherence is a privileged norm, particularly in the context of 
trauma narratives. The ways in which different researchers in the psychological 
sciences have discussed the relation between selfhood and narrative, and narrative and 
trauma are outlined in order to argue that narrative coherence is a dominant norm that 
impacts how trauma is narrated as well as how trauma narratives are socially received. 
The last chapter then turns to another area in which this approach to trauma narratives 
can be applied, namely the process of seeking asylum. The analysis of trauma 
narratives and discourses of trauma in the asylum process draws on Foucault’s views 
on the entanglement of self-narration and power relations, Butler’s critical views on 
self-narration, and the dominant role accorded to the norm of narrative coherence in 
the psychological sciences. Together, these applications bring together the insights 
developed in this thesis to highlight the critical issues surrounding the narration of 
trauma in institutional contexts. 
 
 
                                               
35 Other recent work is also consolidating the critique of an over-emphasis on narrative coherence in the 
study of self-narratives, and the conceptual tools derived from Butler’s work is being drawn upon to conduct 
such critical work. See Renata Kokanović and Jacinthe Flore, “Subjectivity and illness narratives,” 
Subjectivity 10, no. 4 (2017): 329-339. 
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Chapter 7 The Norm of Narrative Coherence: Psy Sciences and Self-
Narration 
 
This chapter analyses approaches in the psychological sciences (henceforth, psy sciences1) 
to the activity of self-narration. Narratives occupy an important role in psychology and 
psychotherapy, particularly when the latter is seen as a site in which individuals narrate 
personal experiences. Various psychological theorists, such as Jerome Bruner, Donald 
Polkinghorne, Roy Schafer and Michele Crossley regard narrative as an important 
organising principle through which human life and the self can be understood. Such 
narrative psychologists have argued that challenging experiences, such as traumatic 
episodes, create a rupture in the self-narrative in such a way that the practice of 
psychotherapy is seen as an “exercise in story repair”2 that will ideally lead to a “more 
dynamic and thus more useful plot which serves as a more powerful and connective 
force.”3 In this chapter I will examine the way in which the relation between the self, 
narrative and trauma is theorised in different psychological theories, paying particular 
attention to how narrative coherence is privileged in such theories. The chapter thus 
connects the two main insights of the thesis: firstly, that practices of self-narration are 
embedded in various power relations that regulate and influence how one narrates one’s 
self and experiences, and secondly, that such influence manifests itself as a tendency 
                                               
1 My use of the term ‘psy’ in this context is inspired by Nikolas Rose’s work. Rose writes: “I focus upon 
the human sciences, in particular psychology and its affiliates – the endeavours which can be generically 
termed ‘psy’. I think that these types of knowledge and expertise, largely invented since the mid-nineteenth 
century, are of particular significance. For these embody a particular way in which human beings have tried 
to understand themselves – to make themselves the subjects, objects, targets of a truthful 
knowledge. And I think that they have played a constitutive role in shaping the ways in which we think of 
ourselves and act upon ourselves. That is to say, I suggest that ‘psy’ – the heterogeneous knowledges, forms 
of authority and practical techniques that constitute psychological expertise - has made it possible for human 
beings to conceive of themselves, speak about themselves, judge themselves and conduct themselves in new 
ways. But in this book I make a stronger argument. My claim is that the psy disciplines and psy expertise 
have had a key role in constructing ‘governable subjects’. Psy, here, is not simply a matter of ideas, cultural 
beliefs or even of a specific kind of practice. I suggest that it has had a very significant role in contemporary 
forms of political power, making it possible to govern human beings in ways that are compatible with the 
principles of liberalism and democracy.” Nikolas Rose, Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private 
Self, 2nd ed. (London: Free Association Books, 1999 [1989]), vii. See also Nikolas Rose, Inventing our 
selves: Psychology, power, and personhood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1-21. 
2 Crossley, Introducing Narrative Psychology, 57. 
3 Polkinghorne, Narrative Knowing and the Human Sciences, 179, cited in Crossley, Introducing Narrative 
Psychology, 58.  
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toward the privileging of narrative coherence, which is shown to be a hegemonic norm 
that operates at the level of philosophical theorising, as well as in psychological theories. 
The hegemony of this norm opens it up to scrutiny at the political level. 
 
7.1 Narrative and Psychology 
 
I “… all therapies are narrative therapies”  
 
Introducing his work on narrative and psychotherapy, John McLeod concedes that “[i]n 
preparing for this book, I have been painfully aware of how large a topic narrative therapy 
is.”4 In a survey of narrative approaches in psychology, Brian Schiff echoes this sentiment 
when he writes that “[t]he diversity of approaches to narrative in psychology is extensive 
– and exhausting. It is dizzying. My review has only scratched the surface of the 
complexity and diversity of narrative in psychology.”5 Narrative psychology or, more 
precisely, narrative therapy is often associated with Michael White and David Epston’s 
Narrative Means to Therapeutic Ends.6 However, this chapter adopts a wider perspective 
to narrative psychology that includes White and Epston’s approach as one among others. 
Indeed, McLeod concludes – absurdly, it would seem at first glance – that “all therapies 
are narrative therapies.”7 His point is that, despite the different approaches and 
suppositions, the activity that is common to most psychotherapeutic practices is “to give 
the client every opportunity to tell his or her story, to really listen to these stories, and to 
allow space for the telling of new or different stories.”8 
 
For the purposes of this chapter, storytelling (insofar as self-narration is a form of 
storytelling about oneself) is considered as a fundamental cultural activity that reflects 
how people are thinking about experiences. As a storytelling activity, practices of 
psychotherapies is equally cultural. McLeod importantly points toward how 
                                               
4 McLeod, Narrative and Psychotherapy, xi. 
5 Schiff, “Fractured Narratives,” 252.  
6 White and Epston, Narrative Means to Therapeutic Ends. 
7 McLeod, Narrative and Psychotherapy, x. 
8 McLeod, Narrative and Psychotherapy, x. 
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contemporary psychotherapy reinforces cultural trends in the direction of individualism. 
This is because, with exceptions,9 most therapeutic practices reinforce the idea of the 
person “as a discrete, separate and autonomous individual.”10 McLeod argues that 
psychotherapy plays a significant role in reinforcing particular cultural norms: “Therapy 
is one of the ways in which a culture keeps itself in existence as a system of thought and 
action.”11 This is an interesting claim that shifts between common sense and a provocative 
attack on psychotherapy. Rather than an enterprise that guides individuals to improved 
well-being according to scientifically reliable criteria, psychotherapy is presented as an 
endeavour that actively perpetuates a particular culture by proposing it as a fixed 
understanding of well-being, using the criteria of scientific validity to further fossilise the 
apparent necessity of this culture. 
 
This critical perspective adopted by McLeod toward psychotherapy is in line with a 
“postmodern impulse […] to deconstruct therapy, to strip away its claims to privileged 
scientific knowledge/power/certainty and to reveal the core of therapy as an arena for 
telling personal stories.”12 This arena is not a neutral and innocent space, outside of 
cultural pressures and norms, in which individuals voice their worries or desires. The 
therapeutic scene can be considered as a form of language game governed by implicit 
discursive rules and power relations that qualify some people as more or less “conversant 
with the nature of the therapy plot.”13 Thus, rather than regarding the psychotherapeutic 
scene as a privileged point that grants therapists access to the individual’s psyche, a 
“brutal shift in perspective”14 is called for in order to properly regard the role of narratives 
in therapy, and to apprehend the human, following MacIntyre, as “essentially a story-
telling animal.”15 Such a narrative perspective “takes therapy in the direction […] [of] 
‘moving out’ into the stories of a culture rather than ‘moving in’ to individual personal 
experience.”16 This cultural character of psychotherapy and storytelling calls into question 
                                               
9 Such exceptions include the work of Kenneth J. Gergen and White and Epston, to be discussed below. 
10 McLeod, Narrative and Psychotherapy, 19. 
11 McLeod, Narrative and Psychotherapy, 26. 
12 McLeod, Narrative and Psychotherapy, 23. 
13 McLeod, Narrative and Psychotherapy, 17. 
14 McLeod, Narrative and Psychotherapy, 27. 
15 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 216. 
16 McLeod, Narrative and Psychotherapy, 27. 
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the presumption that therapries are ‘value-free’ scientists who “are meant to be morally 
neutral.”17 McLeod claims that the conception of therapy as happening in a moral vacuum 
can be contested since “[i]mplicit in the therapist’s story is an image of the ‘good life’.”18 
Others suggest that in order to live a good life, we “need clear narratives with a beginning, 
a middle, and an end,”19 thus showing how therapists guide clients to an implicit notion 
of the ‘good life’. Reflecting on the implicit moral vision of narrative approaches to 
psychotherapy, Singer and Rexhaj claim that “[a]s a nascent perspective in psychology 
and psychotherapy, the narrative approach adopts an implicit vision of ‘the good life’.”20 
However, it can also be argued that the aim of the psy sciences is not to agree on what 
should constitute a good life. A shared conception of the ‘good life’ might not be shared 
among theorists, in much the same way that they do not agree on the terminology (and, 
one might say, on the normative implications of the terminology) used. For example, 
Singer and Rexhaj argue that “this narrative movement in psychotherapy has yet to 
coalesce around a shared terminology, set of principles, or techniques.”21 Rather than 
being a limitation, this lack of agreement is a productive one since, as they argue, 
important questions can be asked, pertaining to what is considered to be a healthy and 
good self and, by extension, a maladaptive self, and what the role of the therapist is in 
guiding individuals to what is considered as a healthy self.22  
 
In addition to these crucial issues concerning normative claims within narrative 
approaches to psychology, this chapter addresses the following question: Why is narrative 
coherence emphasised in an exaggerated manner in the psychological sciences? And by 
what means, with what effects and at what price is this done? To engage with these 
questions, this chapter looks at how self-narration is conceived through the different 
approaches in psychology in order to trace implicit theoretical and normative privileging 
of particular conceptions of self-narration – namely, coherent, linear and unitary narration 
                                               
17 McLeod, Narrative and Psychotherapy, 20. 
18 McLeod, Narrative and Psychotherapy, 26-27. 
19 Kuisma Korhonen, “Broken Stories: Narrative vs. Narration in Travelling Theories of Cultural Trauma,” 
in The Travelling Concepts of Narrative, eds. Matti Hyvärinen, Mari Hatavara, and Lars-Christer Hydén 
(Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2013), 275. 
20 Singer and Rexhaj, “Narrative Coherence and Psychotherapy,” 209 [abstract]. 
21 Singer and Rexhaj, “Narrative Coherence and Psychotherapy,” 210. 
22 See Singer and Rexhaj, “Narrative Coherence and Psychotherapy,” 210. 
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– in typical psychological and psychotherapeutic contexts. This privileging is traced in 
order to highlight one way in which the psy sciences, wittingly or not, contribute to the 
reinforcing of predominant notions of subjectivity that guide their notions of ‘healthy’ 
subjects. The dominance of the norm of narrative coherence is foregrounded in order to 
highlight how it acts on traumatised individuals, regulating what constitutes as a valid 
trauma narrative, and what amounts to a therapeutic narrative. Such a norm informs an 
understanding of what it means to be a subject in the multiple senses of the word: as an 
active author of stories and as a passive subject authored by cultural scripts that are outside 
its choosing. 
 
II Narratives in Psychology 
 
Narrative as a Root Metaphor for Psychology 
 
Since the 1980s, psychology has become preoccupied with how narratives and narration 
mark its processes and theories. Although initiated in other disciplines – the influential 
1981 book On Narrative23 serves as a reference point to this so-called narrative turn in the 
humanities – this concern with narrative in psychology can be, and often is, traced back 
to the 1986 volume edited by Theodore R. Sarbin, Narrative Psychology: The Storied 
Nature of Human Conduct, a volume that is claimed to introduce the term ‘narrative 
psychology’.24 In his contribution to this volume, Sarbin proposes that “the narrative is 
potentially a useful root metaphor for psychology and other human sciences.”25 For 
Sarbin, narrative is an organising principle through which human life can be understood. 
In opposition to other models of human life and behaviour, such as the mechanistic, 
organicist and positivist models, Sarbin proposes “the narratory principle” which he 
defines as the principle “that human beings think, perceive, imagine, and make moral 
choices according to narrative structures.”26 Sarbin draws on the human ability to connect 
                                               
23 William J. T. Mitchell, ed., On Narrative (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981). 
24 For a more extended discussion of the so-called ‘narrative turn’ that began in literary criticism and spread 
to other disciplines, including psychology, see Schiff, “Fractured Narratives,” 245-264. 
25 Sarbin, “The Narrative as a Root Metaphor for Psychology,” 4. 
26 Sarbin, “The Narrative as a Root Metaphor for Psychology,” 8. 
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a set of images into a narrative account to justify his treatment of narrative as the 
organising principle for human action. He goes on to argue, however, that narrative “is an 
achievement.”27 In light of this, one could therefore argue, as this thesis does, that a 
narrative construction of a series of events implies purposeful and intelligent manipulation 
– determined by socio-cultural factors of how this should be done – of the data presented. 
Sarbin supposes that total incorporation of life by narrative is possible, and suggests that: 
 
we can reflect on any slice of life. Our dreams […] are experienced as stories, […] 
our fantasies and our daydreams are unvoiced stories […,] rituals of daily life are 
organized to tell stories[…,] pageantry of rites of passage […] are storied actions. 
Our plannings, our rememberings, even our loving and hating, are guided by 
narrative plots.28 
 
For Sarbin, it is as though life itself appears as narrative or narratively structured – after 
all, as his volume’s subtitle suggests, human conduct has a “storied nature” – rather than 
humans imposing culturally-ridden schemas of narrative and of interpretation over life. 
He also suggests that survival is dependent on being able to make proper sense of 
narratives: “Survival in a world of meanings is problematic without the talent to make up 
and to interpret stories about interweaving lives.”29 This statement gains further traction 
when reinterpreted in light of how traumatised individuals must conform and amend their 
stories in accordance with institutionally privileged forms of self-narration in order to be 
heard and treated favourably. 
 
As support for the narratory principle, Sarbin points to the pervasiveness and centrality of 
storytelling in human life, which can be traced back to the oral tradition, Homeric epics, 
ancient parables and fables, and traditional proverbs. For him, this shows how the 
narrative model is well-suited to deal with the experiential intricacies of human life, and 
that by invoking “images of storytellers and storytelling, heroes, villains, and plots,”30 one 
                                               
27 Sarbin, “The Narrative as a Root Metaphor for Psychology,” 9. 
28 Sarbin, “The Narrative as a Root Metaphor for Psychology,” 11. 
29 Sarbin, “The Narrative as a Root Metaphor for Psychology,” 11. 
30 Sarbin, “The Narrative as a Root Metaphor for Psychology,” 11. 
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can better understand how humans relate, think and engage in moral choices. Like 
MacIntyre, Sarbin holds that narratives are central to understanding human conduct,31 but 
what he does not consider is how certain narratives and narrative forms become 
entrenched as more powerful and (morally) instructive forms of thinking and experiencing 
than others. Sarbin’s account of the narrative model is presented as an alternative to “the 
current dissatisfaction with the positivist framework”32 that associates narratives with 
fiction and is thus sceptical of the explanatory power of the narrative model in psychology. 
Sarbin’s proposal of the narratory principle has gone on to be influential in the 
development of further narrative approaches to selfhood and human psychology. 
 
Life as Narrative 
 
Further elaboration on the role of narratives in human psychology continued in the 1980s 
through Bruner’s influential work. Bruner famously distinguished between two modes of 
thought that were, for him, irreducible: the paradigmatic or logico-scientific mode and the 
narrative mode.33 He claims that, although the former mode has long been studied and 
privileged, the extent to which humans make sense of the world through the latter 
narrative mode of thought has been under- explored. In his 1987 article, “Life as 
Narrative”, he adopts a constructivist approach to the “the stories we tell about our lives: 
‘our autobiographies,’”34 to consider the role of the mind in constructing meaning. Bruner 
is interested in the question of what one does when one constructs oneself 
autobiographically, suggesting that the understanding of ‘life’ is informed by a particular 
notion of autobiography, in its structure and form. He proposes two theses that are at the 
heart of his argument about life as narrative; the first is that “[w]e seem to have no other 
way of describing ‘lived time’ save in the form of narrative,” and the second is that “the 
mimesis between life so-called and narrative is a two-way affair: that is to say, just as art 
                                               
31 See Sarbin, “The Narrative as a Root Metaphor for Psychology,” 11. 
32 Sarbin, “The Narrative as a Root Metaphor for Psychology,” 19. 
33 See Jerome Bruner, Actual Minds, Possible Worlds (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1986), 11-
43. 
34 Jerome Bruner, “Life as Narrative,” Social Research 71, no. 3 (2004): 691 [originally published in Social 
Research 54, no. 1 (1987)]. 
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imitates life in Aristotle’s sense, so, in Oscar Wilde’s, life imitates art. Narrative imitates 
life, life imitates narrative.”35 
 
He claims that, despite its being a widespread human practice, the activity of narrating 
oneself is a peculiar activity. This is because the reflexivity implied in self-narration 
marks the individual as both the narrator and the object of the narrative. Following de 
Man’s characterisation of autobiography as implying a “defacement,”36 Bruner points out 
that the enterprise of self-narration “seems a most shaky one,”37 raising problems of 
verification, problems relating to distortion of the narrator’s original intentions, and 
difficulties in accounting for oneself in terms of intentions without acknowledging that 
one’s intentions may have been determined in ways unknown to the narrating subject. 
Yet, despite the problematic nature of self-narration, he claims that “it is perfectly plain 
that not just any autobiography will do. […] One imposes criteria of rightness on the self-
report of a life.”38 Among the criteria he refers to are external criteria of verifying whether 
an event actually happened or not, and other internal criteria of psychological adequacy. 
Interestingly, however, Bruner argues that life does not appear as narrative since narrative 
reconstructions of one’s life are “always a cognitive achievement.”39 He also 
acknowledges that life stories are “highly susceptible to cultural, interpersonal, and 
linguistic influences.”40 This susceptibility implies that “life narratives obviously reflect 
the prevailing theories about ‘possible lives’ that are part of one’s culture;” furthermore, 
a culture includes “a stock of canonical life narratives,” as well as “combinable formal 
constituents from which its members can construct their own life narratives.”41 This is 
particularly relevant for the line of argument pursued in this thesis since it highlights the 
socio-cultural influences that come to bear upon the activity of self-narration. Bruner 
emphasises how the culturally available stock of narratives is taken up by individuals to 
constitute their life narrative, Moreover, these life narratives become “variants of the 
                                               
35 Bruner, “Life as Narrative,” 692. 
36 See de Man, “Autobiography as De-facement,” 919-930. 
37 Bruner, “Life as Narrative,” 693. 
38 Bruner, “Life as Narrative,” 693. 
39 Bruner, “Life as Narrative,” 692. 
40 Bruner, “Life as Narrative,” 694. 
41 All quotations in this sentence are from Bruner, “Life as Narrative,” 694. 
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culture’s canonical forms”42 in such a way that “we become the autobiographical 
narratives by which we ‘tell about’ our lives.”43 
 
To exemplify his argument, Bruner discusses one of his studies: “[w]e were interested in 
how people tell the stories of their lives and, perhaps simplemindedly, we asked them to 
do so – telling them to keep it to about half an hour, even if it were an impossible task.”44 
The sample consists of “a family – a father, a mother, and their grown son and grown 
daughter.”45 The themes foregrounded in his study include issues of home, moral 
principles, work, aspirations, hesitations and outlook on life. The sample chosen can be 
considered to be heteronormative, work-oriented, religious, marriage-driven, patriarchal: 
“Our family is headed by George Goodhertz, a hard-working heating contractor in his 
early 60s, a self-made man of moral principles, converted to Catholicism in childhood and 
mindful of his obligations.”46 Moreover, the way the themes are dissected indicates less 
an openness to the various ways in which people can narrate their lives, and more of a 
perpetuation of dominant norms that instruct how lives are to be narrated, and that dictate 
which features of life are valuable. In my view, Bruner’s study reads more like an attempt 
to transform life narratives into readable narratives, where the degree of readability is 
determined by the extent to which the narratives conform to hegemonic values. 
  
Although Bruner’s psychological theories consider how self-narratives are culturally 
informed and that they can be otherwise, he does not pay enough attention to the stringent 
ways in which self-narratives are shaped, and the extent to which self-narratives must 
submit to this shaping if they wish to be heard. In my view, this oversight deprives such 
psychological theories of their possible critical import by failing to properly locate the 
political significance of such narrative shaping. For example, in another paper, Bruner 
argues that different contexts, especially institutionalised ones such as the analyst-
analysand or lawyer-client relations, demand particular forms of narrative. This demand 
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rests on background knowledge that provides “not only bases for interpretation but, of 
course, important grounds for negotiating how a story shall be taken – or, indeed, how it 
should be told.”47 In light of this, Bruner argues that narratives are dependent on but not 
completely reducible to such cultural scripts. Several such theories in the psy sciences 
consider the extent to which actions and their meaning are informed by one’s cultural 
situatedness. Most theorists seem to regard this influence quite neutrally, if not positively, 
focusing on how situatedness benefits the subject by providing cultural belonging to 
individuals, or allowing the subject to be rooted in a community within which one’s 
actions acquire significance. The importance of such rootedness is not to be 
underestimated; after all, most individuals seek to dwell comfortably in a world where 
their relation to cultural scripts is one of smooth productive engagement. However, these 
scripts (behavioural, textual, cultural) can be problematised in the dual sense of the word 
which Foucault describes:48 first, by studying how such scripts come to be the way they 
do in particular historical moments, and second, how these cultural scripts can become a 
problem to some, or can be critically engaged with in such a way that their historically 
contingent existence is shown to be upheld by possibly contestable and unnecessary 
privileging, inequality and exclusion. 
 
Narrative Unity under Stress 
 
Other psychological theorists and practitioners have built on Bruner’s views of narrative 
as a mode of thinking, and on the role of narrative in psychotherapy. Polkinghorne 
proposes that narrative theories of the self present an alternative to theories of the self as 
a substance. Rather than being a substratum, the self is presented as a temporal process 
always in a state of becoming. Polkinghorne takes his cue from Gestalt psychology to 
argue that knowledge is organised through cognitive structuring which allows one to 
relate particulars to a conceptual whole. Likewise, the individual encounters the contents 
of human experience as intelligible: “We do not encounter a buzzing confusion of 
                                               
47 Jerome Bruner, “The Narrative Construction of Reality,” Critical Inquiry 18, no. 1 (1991): 11. 
48 See Michel Foucault, “The Concern for Truth,” in Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other 
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indistinct and unstructured perceptual elements, but a world that appears as meaningful.”49 
For Polkinghorne, narrative is what holds things together and, like Sarbin, he considers 
narrative to be a cognitive organising process that gives meaning to events and organises 
them as part of a plot. Polkinghorne elevates the narrative approach to selfhood and life 
in such a way that it guarantees cohesion. One can object by arguing that there is an 
important difference between the cohesive structure of experience on one hand, and the 
cohesion ascribed to a whole life narrative on the other, since the latter is not a perceptible 
object. Although it can and does work on particular occasions, this supposed cohesion can 
also be regarded as discursive construction open to critical scrutiny, just like other 
discourses that claim to have a hold on human subjectivity and its processes. Further 
scrutiny of this discourse of self-unity reveals underlying cultural and political factors and 
prejudices functioning to keep intact the illusion of self-unity. 
 
For Polkinghorne, although self-narratives are like other kinds of narratives insofar as 
they share a narrative structure, they are also significantly different since, unlike fictive 
narratives for example, self-narratives have a necessarily unfinished nature.50 Drawing on 
Paul Ricoeur’s concept of emplotment, Polkinghorne claims that discontinuous and 
disconnected events are woven together in a single coherent story through the process of 
emplotment.51 This process is not a unilateral one, and “often consists of multiple threads 
of subplots woven together into a complex and layered whole.”52 Referring to David 
Carr’s views,53 Polkinghorne concludes that the narrative form is not merely an external 
cover that one imposes over experience in order to structure it; rather, the narrative form 
is an inherent structure of human experience and action: “Storytelling and story 
comprehension are ultimately grounded in the general human capacity to conceptualize – 
that is, to structure experiential elements into wholes.”54 He maintains that narrative 
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human identities are continually evolving because as one progresses in life, more 
experiences are accumulated which, in turn, necessitate a revision of one’s self-narrative. 
This, for him, is generally a relatively smooth process one undergoes throughout one’s 
life, whereby the narrative revisions “incorporate the progressive layers of understanding 
that result from additional social interactions occurring throughout one’s life history.”55 
This process is regarded as “an ongoing task, sometimes a struggle, and success is a real 
accomplishment,”56 once again indicating – like Sarbin and Bruner – that the narrative 
coherence they see the self as possibly embodying is a construction, a success that is 
culturally achieved. In fact, Polkinghorne seems to agree with Karl E. Scheibe’s idea that 
self-narratives “must be embedded in and constructed out of a person’s particular cultural 
environment – that is, the specific vocabulary and grammar of its language, its ‘stock of 
working historical conventions,’ and the pattern of its belief and value system.”57 
 
Polkinghorne argues that although the integration of new experiences is generally a 
smooth process, it can be troubled by “stressful conditions”58 that cause the self-narrative 
to decompose, leaving the individual in a state of anxiety due to the meaninglessness 
purportedly brought about by the dissolution of narrative coherence. Polkinghorne frames 
this disruption in adversarial terminology: “Our adversary in the struggle is everything 
that opposes narrative integration: temporal disorder, confusion, incoherence, chaos.”59 
For Polkinghorne, without a unified sense of self, one’s well-being suffers; as a result, 
one would not be able to successfully function. In such moments, “the plots we have 
employed to identify ourselves and give meaning to our lives seem unable to integrate 
previously forgotten or new events.”60 The active verb “we have employed” makes this 
process seem more like a forceful manipulation that transforms haphazard life events into 
a narrative whole rather than an automatic or ‘natural’ cognitive process. The agency 
which prompts the individual to structure its own life narrative in certain ways can be read 
                                               
55 Polkinghorne, “Narrative and Self-Concept,” 144. 
56 Polkinghorne, “Narrative and Self-Concept,” 145. 
57 Polkinghorne, “Narrative and Self-Concept,” 144. On this idea, Polkinghorne draws on the ideas of Karl 
E. Scheibe. See Karl E. Scheibe, “Self-Narratives and Adventure,” in Narrative Psychology: The Storied 
Nature of Human Conduct, ed. Theodore R. Sarbin (Connecticut: Praeger, 1986), 129-151. 
58 Polkinghorne, “Narrative and Self-Concept,” 135. 
59 Polkinghorne, “Narrative and Self-Concept,” 145. 
60 Polkinghorne, “Narrative and Self-Concept,” 149. 
202 
 
as a social force, a power relation, or a normalising tendency, perpetuated also by the psy 
sciences, that instils the idea in contemporary society that a non-integrated self is an 
incoherent self, and that an incoherent self is an abnormal self. Teasing out the 
implications of his narrative model of selfhood for clinical practices, Polkinghorne claims 
that “[o]ne of the reasons people seek psychotherapeutic assistance is the feeling of 
despair that accompanies the dissolution of the narrative unity of their self-concept.”61 The 
dissolution of narrative unity is considered as a severe psychological problem that can 
afflict an individual. In fact, for Polkinghorne, since traumatic incidents can result in the 
shattering of the unity of the victim’s self-narrative, the principal aim of therapy is to 
restore a narrative unity that is presumed to have characterised the individual’s life before 
the trauma. He claims that what people seek in psychotherapy is a reconstruction of their 
life story in a way that integrates its contradictory elements. The therapist “assists”62 the 
individual by co-constructing the individual’s life narrative in a way that coheres. 
 
This notion of self-narrative clearly regards narrative coherence as the aim of therapy and 
as guarantor of positive psychic well-being and, correspondingly, views incoherence as 
an obstacle to be surpassed. But the prioritisation of coherence at all costs does not sit 
easily alongside what Polkinghorne himself regards as “the therapeutic commitment to 
truth,”63 which perhaps should entail embracing events irrespective of whether they fit a 
coherent therapeutic narrative or not. Nonetheless, Polkinghorne insists that the 
multiplicity of events and relationships one experiences can and should be accounted for 
coherently in one’s self-narrative. However, one may argue that this is not 
epistemologically possible, and neither might it be a desirable aim. The notion of 
subjectivity propagated through the account of self-narration that privileges coherence 
may not have sufficient regard for the reality of narrative openness brought about by one’s 
dependency and relational constitution play in the formation of subjectivity, as 
highlighted in previous chapters through Butler’s work. Theoretically, the account of 
subjectivity presupposed by this notion of self-narrative, emphasising the self’s ability to 
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integrate and incorporate all of its experiences, reflects an obsession with an expanding 
and colonising self, and could function oppressively. McLeod, in fact, regards the notion 
of narrative coherence as having “serious limitations,”64 despite its appeal and dominance. 
He argues that the notion of a coherent self-narrative rests on the assumptions that a 
unitary self is possible and that it is desirable to achieve a coherent sense of self that is 
bounded and autonomous. These assumptions reflect ideas on selfhood that are 
predominant in Western culture with its favouring of “the bounded, autonomous 
individual [who] fits into the achievement-oriented, militarist, consumer society that has 
been created in the modern world,” and, more specifically, in “Western masculinist 
culture, with its emphasis on hero myths.”65 This understanding of selfhood has been 
criticised from the perspective of transcultural psychology, among others.66 
 
Despite the critique that has been presented in response to this understanding of selfhood 
and self-narration, it remains a predominant one in psychological theory and practice, 
even if there are and have been alternative conceptualisations of the relation between 
narrative and therapy that do not place such a dominant emphasis on narrative coherence. 
In fact, the rest of this section considers two further approaches (psychoanalytic and 
postmodern) that present a different perspective to the question of narrative in psychology, 
before turning to show how the insights derived from these different approaches to 
narration can inform a critique of the hegemonic emphasis on narrative coherence in the 
context of trauma narration. 
 
Psychoanalysis and Self-Narration 
 
Although this chapter identified the 1980s as a key point in the ‘narrative turn’ in 
psychology, the history of the relation between psychology and narrative goes back much 
further than this.67 Freud’s own psychoanalytic approach, for example, and his use of the 
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‘talking cure’ has a strong narrative dimension; indeed, for Schafer, “[i]t makes sense, 
and it may be a useful project, to present psychoanalysis in narrational terms.”68 Most 
variations of psychoanalysis as a therapeutic practice hold that “[w]e are forever telling 
stories about ourselves. […] [T]he self is a telling.”69 For this reason, Jurgen Reeder claims 
that “everything in psychoanalytical work takes place within the framework of a narrating 
activity.”70 Donald Spence similarly characterises Freud as: 
 
a master at taking pieces of the patient’s associations, dreams, and memories and 
weaving them into a coherent pattern that is compelling, persuasive, and 
seemingly complete […]. Freud made us aware of the persuasive power of a 
coherent narrative – in particular, of the way in which an aptly chosen 
reconstruction can fill the gap between two apparently unrelated events and, in the 
process, make sense out of nonsense. There seems no doubt but that a well-
constructed story possesses a kind of narrative truth that is real and immediate and 
carries an important significance for the process of therapeutic change.71 
 
Schafer too characterises psychoanalysts as “people who listen to the narrations of 
analysands and help them to transform these narrations into others that are more complete, 
coherent, convincing, and adaptively useful than those they have been accustomed to 
constructing.”72 What both Spence’s and Schafer’s descriptions highlight is that 
psychoanalysis too, at least in some of its forms, is driven by a will to narrative coherence. 
Without the interpretative intervention of the psychoanalyst, “narratives are disorganized 
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and the patients are unable to tell a coherent story of their lives;”73 as Freud put it, “patients 
are altogether incapable of rendering a coherent and clear story.”74 Such psychoanalytic 
approaches rest on the tenet “that a coherent story is in some manner connected with 
mental health […]. On this reading, human life is, ideally, a connected and coherent 
story.”75 
 
However, this does not seem to be a universally accepted tenet in psychoanalytic circles. 
Although it is true that psychoanalysts make use of free association as a therapeutic 
technique “so that the ego’s demand for coherence and comprehension may be satisfied,”76 
it is also true that various psychoanalysts would hold that “there is no single, necessary, 
definitive account of a life history.”77 Schafer argues that the traditional perception of the 
process of transference as the way in which the analysand re-experiences one’s past 
through the present relationship with the analyst would be a “poor account”78 of the 
process. This is because such an account characterises “life history as static, archival, 
linear, reversible, and literally retrievable. Epistemologically, this story is highly 
problematic.”79 Schafer’s preferred approach to narration within the psychoanalytic 
dialogue “emphasizes new experience and new remembering of the past […]. If analysis 
is a matter of moving in a direction, it is a moving forward into new modes of constructing 
experience.”80 Reeder goes a step further and even questions whether psychoanalysis, 
including Freud’s formulation of it, relies at all on the assumption that a coherent and 
unified self-narration is a requirement or the aim of psychoanalysis. He argues that despite 
the common view that portrays Freud as championing the importance of a complete 
narrative as a requirement for the patient’s well-being, “he never states that the patient 
would have a psychological need of a complete story to get well. [H]e does not consider 
the complete story to be an integral part of the treatment.”81 Although coherence and 
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completeness are different aspects of the self-narrative, they are both challenged by the 
possibility of a degree of unknowingness – which psychoanalysis itself highlighted – that 
haunts the self’s desire to account for oneself, as well as the analyst’s desire to synthesise 
the patient’s narratives into a coherent and complete whole. Reeder voices this position 
thusly: 
 
behind my story there is merely the trace of something unknown and 
fundamentally ineffable and that my narrative is always merely a provisional 
arrangement. My point of articulation can be displaced at any time through the 
arrival of a new signifier, a new way of telling and therefore also of seeing and 
experiencing.82 
 
As characterised by various theorists and practitioners of psychoanalysis, the aim of the 
analytic work is for analyst and analysand to “deconstruct the original story; together they 
must discover and uncover the contradictions and incompletions that are dictated by the 
subject’s defensive operations.”83 Moreover, the analyst’s interpretations are retellings of 
the patient’s narrative in which “certain features are accentuated while others are placed 
in parentheses; certain features are related to others in new ways or for the first time; some 
features are developed further, perhaps at great length.”84 
 
Reeder argues that throughout his work Freud employed “a metaphorics concerning 
analytical work in which he likened it with an archaeological excavation.”85 This search 
for the ‘deep meanings’ of mental states is the target of Foucault’s critique of the modern 
will to knowledge which posits an authoritative figure who is able to decipher the deep 
inherent truths of subjectivity; a will to discover the truth about one’s sexuality or the 
truth about one’s desires. Schafer argues, however, that this interpretative process is not 
a unilateral one guided by the analyst, but a process of co-authoring: “The analyst’s 
retellings progressively influence the what and how of the stories told by analysands. The 
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analyst establishes new, though often contested or resisted, questions that amount to 
regulated narrative possibilities. The end product of this interweaving of texts is a 
radically new, jointly authored work or way of working.”86 Schafer regards this process 
“as a project of ‘reauthoring’ a life through ‘co-authoring’ it; ‘a dialogue’ through which 
the person’s (problematic) life story is transformed.”87 Spence too contends that therapists 
construct rather than discover meanings in individuals’ stories; the therapist is not only a 
listener nor the sole master interpreter of the patient’s narrative, but “also plays a role as 
a collaborator in the production of the story or narrative; the therapist is like the editor of 
a living text.”88 This raises questions regarding what constitutes a ‘better’ life story and 
how life stories can and whether they should be reauthored. Crossley refers to more self-
critical approaches to psychoanalysis that hold that “therapists are in the business of 
‘constructing’ rather than ‘discovering’ meanings through stories.”89 This is because the 
psychotherapeutic process effectively amounts to something other than coauthoring due 
to the inherent power imbalance of the scene of therapy: “the therapist remains in a more 
privileged and powerful position in the therapeutic situation and often operates with a 
‘master narrative’ that guides understanding,”90 and which depends upon the therapist’s 
theoretical inclinations. For Spence, the therapist’s orientation also determines how the 
patient’s narrative is heard: 
 
If, for example, the analyst assumes that contiguity indicates causality, then he will 
hear a sequence of disconnected statements as a causal chain […]. If he assumes 
that transference predominates and that the patient is always talking, in more or 
less disguised fashion, about the analyst, then he will hear the material in that 
way.91 
 
                                               
86 Schafer, “Narration in the Psychoanalytic Dialogue,” 36.  
87 Crossley, Introducing Narrative Psychology, 60. 
88 Crossley, Introducing Narrative Psychology, 59. 
89 Crossley, Introducing Narrative Psychology, 58. 
90 Crossley, Introducing Narrative Psychology, 60. 
91 Spence, Narrative Truth and Historical Truth, 129, quoted in Kenneth J. Gergen and John Kaye, “Beyond 
Narrative in the Negotiation of Therapeutic Meaning,” in Therapy as Social Construction, eds. Sheila 
McNamee and Kenneth J. Gergen (London: Sage Publications, 1992), 170 [emphasis added]. 
208 
 
This highlights the power of therapists to determine what qualifies as an appropriate self-
narration in terms of form and style, as well as how self-narratives are to be interpreted. 
In the next part of this section, I consider some psychological perspectives on selfhood 
and self-narration that can be broadly considered as ‘postmodern’, and that highlight the 
impossibility or problematic nature of coherent self-narratives. Furthermore, such 
perspectives within the psy sciences suggest that self-narratives are discursive and cultural 
products, whereby different discourses and knowledges have different power in 
determining how self-narration happens. 
 
Postmodern Counter-Currents 
 
Various researchers in the psy sciences have emphasised the role of power relations in 
therapeutic contexts, echoing Foucault’s concerns with self-narration as a product of 
discourses and power. Narrative therapy, as proposed by White and Epston in the 1980s, 
overtly cite Foucault’s works on knowledge, power, and subjectivity as an influence.92 
Narrative therapy, originally developed as a form of family therapy, attempted to move 
beyond individualising and potentially harmful outlooks in therapeutic contexts. 
Following Foucault’s account of discourse, White and Epston argue that engaging in 
language is never a neutral activity because “[t]here exists a stock of culturally available 
discourses that are considered appropriate and relevant to the expression or representation 
of particular aspects of experience.”93 Such discourses enable people’s lives to be 
organised in stories. However, as Karl Tomm puts it in his foreword to White and Epton’s 
book: “[s]tories can, of course, be liabilities as well as assets,”94 for while stories can assist 
the individual in understanding oneself and others, other stories can hinder, constrain or 
pathologise the individual. For this reason, “[n]arrative therapy seeks to externalize 
problems, seeing them not as individual problems, or even as located within the family 
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structure, but as an aspect of the dominant social structure.”95 Viewing individual 
problems from a socio-political lens allows the individual “to separate from ‘problem-
saturated’ descriptions of their lives and relationships.”96 White and Epston consider 
practices of externalising problems as critical “counter-practices to cultural practices that 
are objectifying of persons and of their bodies. These counter-practices open space for 
persons to re-author or constitute themselves, each other, and their relationships, 
according to alternative stories or knowledges.”97 For White and Epston, this gesture 
allows the therapist to collaborate with the patient to reveal social realities and dominant 
discourses that are disempowering and reinforcing obstacles to the individual. For this 
reason, they regard therapy as a political activity while recognising that not enabling 
patients to challenge techniques of power is equally political. The aim of such politicised 
therapy is to shift the focus from understanding psychological problems as inherent in 
individuals to regarding them as effects of subjugating dominant narratives. In this way, 
rather than individualising, therapy is politicised: “Recognizing that individual problems 
are connected to the larger social, political milieu means that at least sometimes the 
solution to individual problems lies in social and political change.”98 
 
Other leftist approaches to the psy sciences have emphasised the entanglement of mental 
illness with a capitalist and neoliberal culture. Mark Fisher, for example, argues that 
politicising mental illness not only highlights the explicit link between the negative effects 
of capitalism and mental illness, but also points toward other kinds of critical narratives 
that can be narrated by individuals and that counter the individualising and pathologising 
effect of dominant psy discourses and practices. As Fisher puts it in this incisive excerpt: 
 
The current ruling ontology denies any possibility of a social causation of mental 
illness. The chemico-biologization of mental illness is of course strictly 
commensurate with its depoliticization. Considering mental illness an individual 
chemico-biological problem has enormous benefits for capitalism. First, it 
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reinforces Capital’s drive towards atomistic individualization (you are sick 
because of your brain chemistry). Second, it provides an enormously lucrative 
market in which multinational pharmaceutical companies can peddle their 
pharmaceuticals (we can cure you with our SSRIs). It goes without saying that all 
mental illnesses are neurologically instantiated, but this says nothing about their 
causation. If it is true, for instance, that depression is constituted by low serotonin 
levels, what still needs to be explained is why particular individuals have low 
levels of serotonin. This requires a social and political explanation; and the task of 
repoliticizing mental illness is an urgent one if the left wants to challenge capitalist 
realism.99 
 
Other theoretical perspectives that discuss the implications of postmodernity on the psy 
sciences include Kenneth Gergen’s social constructionist positions. Gergen claims that 
the motivation to write his influential 1991 book The Saturated Self stemmed from his 
desire to account for the increasingly “complex, demanding, and engulfing” world which 
brought with it “an enormous increase in excitement, invitation, possibility, intrigue, and 
useful information [… as well as] simultaneous bewilderment at the explosion in 
responsibilities, goals, obligations, deadlines, and expectations.”100 This postmodern 
condition, which he calls social saturation, “is marked by a plurality of voices vying for 
the right to reality,”101 and brought with it significant changes in the understanding and 
experience of selfhood. Gergen does not lament any loss of the Romantic self. Although 
he thinks that certain facets of a postmodern culture can have detrimental effects on the 
experience of selfhood – for example, an increase in social isolation – his theoretical 
attitude is marked by a certain playfulness and fascination with possibilities, through 
which “one opens an enormous world of potential […]; a degree of optimism is 
merited.”102 Among the possibilities that this saturation opens up, Gergen considers how 
the postmodern world “is a world in which we no longer experience a secure sense of self, 
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and in which doubt is increasingly placed on the very assumption of a bounded 
identity.”103 The plurality of discourses in postmodernity and the lack of easy criteria by 
which to adjudicate among competing discourses, coupled with the fragmented and 
flexible sense of self, pose “a profound challenge to the concept of the autonomous self. 
Concepts of the individual – as the center of knowledge (‘one who knows’); as possessor 
of rationality; as author of his or her own words; as one who creates, decides, manipulates, 
or intends – are all placed in question.”104 Gergen is aware that this claim may seem 
paradoxical in light of the excessive and problematic emphasis on individualism in the 
contemporary age: “Western culture has long placed a strong value on the individual’s 
self-determination (usually limited to the male). It is the good person, it is said, who makes 
his own decisions, resists group pressure, and ‘does it his way.’”105 He further critiques 
this dominant conception of selfhood by arguing that the notion of autonomous 
individuals “invites people to think of themselves as fundamentally isolated, alone to 
ponder and create their own fate. Because cooperating with others means ‘sacrificing 
one’s own desire’ to the will of others, individualism also discourages cooperation and 
the development of community. A me-first attitude is also invited.”106 
 
Despite this persisting conception of selfhood as autonomous, unified and self-enclosed 
– if not narcissistic107 – Gergen embraces facets of the saturated self insofar as it contains 
the potential “to bid final adieu to the concrete entity of self, and then to trace the 
reconstruction of self as relationship.”108 This conception of relational selfhood 
philosophically, ethically and politically problematises the sovereignty of the subject. For 
Gergen, the shift toward relationality challenges the dominant vocabulary of 
individualism, and instead regards selves as “manifestations of relationship, thus placing 
relationships in the central position occupied by the individual self for the last several 
hundred years of Western history.”109 Contra critics of postmodernism, Gergen argues that 
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postmodernism does not only stand for a deconstruction of the humanist self but may also 
inspire “a new vocabulary of being,”110 namely relational being. This account of selfhood 
has implications on how self-narration can be thought. The notion and experience of 
relational selfhood requires us to consider the self as “a heteroglossia of being, a living 
out of the multiplicity of voices within the sphere of human possibility.”111 For Gergen, 
narrative coherence is both impossible (due to postmodern saturation) and undesirable 
(due to his favouring a relational ontology). In its concern with how relationality can 
trouble coherent accounts of oneself, Gergen’s outlook on narrative and selfhood can be 
seen as close to Butler’s, and his emphasis on interdependence resonates with her account 
of relationality. As can be seen in the following claims by Gergen, his views on selfhood 
in postmodernity – written in the psy register – echo Butler’s philosophical account of 
selfhood: “One’s sense of individual autonomy gives way to a reality of immersed 
interdependence, in which it is relationship that constructs the self;”112 “[w]e appear to 
stand alone, but we are manifestations of relatedness.”113 
 
This section discussed the various theoretical approaches to narrative within the psy 
sciences. Practices of self-narration have been an integral part of the psychotherapeutic 
scene, pre-dating the more explicit emphasis on narrative since the so-called ‘narrative 
turn’ in the 1980s. This section also analysed the attitudes characterising these different 
theoretical positions to the question of narrative coherence, and the extent to which one 
can coherently narrate oneself or whether coherence is a quality that one should aspire 
for. The next section considers more specifically the question of narrative coherence with 
regard to trauma narrations to highlight that an impulse toward privileging narrative 
coherence in psy therapeutic contexts exists, and to show how this will to coherence 
operates in psy contexts dealing with traumatised individuals. 
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7.2 Trauma and Narrative Coherence 
 
I “… life stories gone awry”  
 
Several theorists and therapists have interpreted Freud’s work as resting on a fundamental 
assumption that mental health corresponds to a coherent narrative account of one’s life. 
Following his lead, the practice of psychotherapy has been characterised as an “exercise 
in story repair”114 that ideally leads to a “more dynamic and thus more useful plot which 
serves as a more powerful and connective force.”115 Arthur Frank uses the term ‘narrative 
wreckage’116 to describe effects of traumatising experiences. Crossley elaborates further 
on this by arguing that “traumatizing events can be characterized as trauma precisely 
because they do not conform to our more everyday, normal sense of reality.”117 Similarly, 
the experience of mental illness has been characterised as amounting “at least in part to 
suffering from an incoherent story or an inadequate narrative account of oneself,”118 or as 
“life stories gone awry.”119 This highlights the implicit valorisation of narrative coherence 
and the presumed coherence that governs ordinary life stories, and sheds light on the 
hardness of discourses and practices that promote narrative coherence as a necessary 
requirement for legitimate self-narration. For Crossley, “[t]he plain fact is that the kinds 
of experiences most of us undergo cry out for the kind of ‘old-fashioned narrative’ [;] we 
have to have some sense of ourselves as a unified, coherent person”; “we need coherent 
subjects.”120 According to such views, coherence is the normal state of affairs: “It is 
‘normal’ for us to experience such narrative coherence in the sense that, for most of us, 
most of the time ‘things do, after all, make sense, hang together.’”121 Crossley is critical 
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of what she regards as postmodern flirtation with narrative incoherence where self-
narratives, or when self-narration in the wake of traumatic incidents, are concerned. She 
equates the wariness of narrative coherence with a celebration of shattered identities and 
incoherent self-narratives, and seems to share the view that such a position “displays a 
radical insensitivity and is difficult to reconcile with the feelings of terror and pain that 
accompany the personal fragmentation often experienced by patients entering therapy.”122 
Her criticism of postmodern outlooks on self-narratives builds on this point:  
 
Postmodern approaches such as Gergen’s considerably overplay the disorderly, 
chaotic and variable nature of contemporary human experience. On a routine, daily 
basis, there is more order and coherence than such accounts suggest. This is 
nowhere more apparent than when we examine traumatizing experiences, which 
have the capacity to painfully highlight the ‘normal’ state of narrative coherence 
which is routinely taken for granted and thus remains ‘unseen’.123 
 
Crossley draws on Martin Heidegger’s notion of angst to argue that this ‘normal’ state of 
affairs is troubled by existential crises such as bereavement, relationship breakdown or 
illness. Such experiences of loss of ‘grounding’ call into question the taken-for-granted 
“sense of implicit connection between events, people, plans, aims, objectives, values and 
beliefs.”124 Crossley maintains that, by definition, trauma is that which does not conform 
to our everyday sense of reality, where this ‘normal’ sense of reality is characterised “by 
the fact that we constantly struggle to create or maintain such stability in the face of ‘an 
ever-threatening, impending chaos at all levels, from the smallest project to the overall 
“coherence of life”.’”125 
 
This is a challenging claim, and very much the opposite of how the relation between self-
narration and narrative coherence is presented in this thesis. My view is that one of the 
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reasons why Crossley sees such difference between pre- and post- trauma selves is that 
she is reiterating the pressure imposed upon individuals to incline towards narrative 
coherence. Crossley is subscribing to the idea that the aim of therapy is and should be to 
restore the unity, coherence, integration, transparency, mastery and control that define 
“the ‘normal’ state of narrative coherence,”126 as she calls it. This is a philosophical, 
ethical and political privileging that exerts a governing influence on contemporary 
subjectivity in general, and psychotherapy in particular. This configuration is not as 
innocent, essential and timeless as it is presented to be. Theorists like Crossley worry 
about how postmodern critiques of narrative coherence risk “losing the human being in 
the process.”127 My worry is how such theorists, despite their well-meaning efforts to 
restore unified conceptions of selfhood in trauma survivors, are unable to think of the 
human without necessarily subscribing to the dictum that human life must be governed 
by coherence and unity. Rather than accusing postmodern theorists of insensitivity toward 
traumatised individuals’ fear and pain, a welcome effort – theoretically and in practice – 
would be to shift the theoretical goalposts, and regard this fear and pain as partly 
propagated by the psy sciences’ overstated and exaggerated drive toward narrative 
coherence, to the extent that an inability to smoothly conform to this injunction renders 
one’s life narrative incoherent and, by implication, unhealthy. Crossley simply states the 
injunction to narrative coherence, and identifies it as a useful norm that enables 
individuals to rebuild a coherent sense of identity after traumatic incidents, without going 
on to critically examine the notion and the power dynamics that underpin this very 
privileging of narrative coherence. 
 
Whereas, for the most part, the norm of narrative coherence is endorsed and propagated, 
some therapists gesture toward a critique of an over-emphasis on narrative coherence in 
post-traumatic. In a 2006 issue of the Journal of Constructivist Psychology, a group of 
theorists and practitioners discussed the utility of narrative coherence in clinical practice. 
Most contributors subscribed to the idea that coherent self-narratives are necessary for 
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improved well-being, with notable exceptions to be discussed below. In the opening piece 
of this issue, Giancarlo Dimaggio argues that “self-narratives used by individuals to give 
meaning to their experience need a certain degree of clarity and consistency if they are to 
promote adaptation and be effective at guiding behaviour.”128 Dimaggio notes how 
disorientated or disorganised forms of attachment can be developed by children of, for 
example, seriously ill or abusive parents, which would later in life deprive them of the 
ability to integrate their past experiences in a well-adapted manner due to the tendency to 
be diagnosed with dissociative or borderline personality disorders. Such individuals, 
Dimaggio argues, would “relate events in a confused manner, swing from one emotion to 
another, suffer memory lapses, have problems in distinguishing between fantasy and 
reality, and give others a feeling of unease.”129 He remarks that such narratives have been 
characterised in different ways: some consider such incoherence to be a narrative 
disruption,130 others regard incoherent narratives as impoverished and disorganised,131 
while others consider certain disrupted stories, such as those of schizophrenics’ or 
individuals with a dissociative disorder, as barren, cacophonous or disorganised.132 
Similarly, the incoherence brought about by trauma can disrupt various features of the life 
narrative: it can affect its plot structure, the themes present in the individual’s worldview, 
as well as the goals of the self-narrative. The point in Dimaggio’s differentiation among 
forms of narrative incoherence is not to critically examine how norms of psychotherapy 
privilege certain narrative criteria over others; on the contrary, Dimaggio supports the 
view that narrative coherence is of paramount important: “The structure of a story […] 
has to comply with certain criteria to be beneficial and promote adaptation;”133 
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“intervention […] should also result in the narrative being adequately organized. In other 
words, there needs to be a modification not only of the contents of stories, but also their 
form.”134 Here, Dimaggio is writing as a therapist: he refers to how the therapist-as-listener 
can become overwhelmed and disoriented when trying to make sense of an individual’s 
incoherent narration. In such instances, therapy takes the form of patiently retrieving 
information and memories from the individual in an attempt to “modifying the structure 
of stories, with the aim of making them clearer and more coherent.”135 The insistence on 
narrative coherence here is very apparent; Dimaggio’s language echoes a will-to-
coherence that is favoured for therapeutic reasons but which, strikingly, fails to properly 
consider the power relations that condition this drive for coherence. 
 
In another study, Sara Jirek proposes a conception of narrative coherence as a continuum, 
which she defines in this way: 
 
I identified five major components of highly coherent post-trauma narratives: (1) 
the narrator articulated a continuous and detailed storyline, without constant 
prompting, regarding her or his life before, during, and after the trauma(s); (2) the 
narrator’s life story was intelligible, organized, and logical; (3) the narrator 
articulated a clear sense of self before and after the trauma – aware of both the 
continuity and the change of the self; (4) the narrator incorporated the trauma into 
her or his worldview or belief system; and (5) the narrator incorporated the trauma 
into her or his vision of the future.136 
 
Jirek’s claim is that a decrease in symptoms of post-traumatic stress follows only if the 
reconstructed narrative by the trauma survivor is coherent. Not every narrative 
construction is viewed positively; if the construction is narratively incoherent, it is not of 
therapeutic use to the survivor, and the survivor would not be able to integrate the 
traumatic experience into their identities and life stories.  
                                               
134 Dimaggio, “Disorganized Narratives in Clinical Practice,” 106 [emphasis in original]. 
135 Dimaggio, “Disorganized Narratives in Clinical Practice,” 107. 
136 Jirek, “Narrative Reconstruction,” 172. 
218 
 
 
Echoing the sentiments of the phrase “life stories gone awry” discussed above, Jirek 
points out that the essence of a traumatic event is that it “throws a significant ‘plot twist’ 
into one’s life story, threatens the narrative coherence of that story, challenges one’s sense 
of identity, initiates a ‘crisis of meanings’, and may shatter assumptions about how the 
world works and one’s place within it.”137 Jirek recognises that “society [is] filled with 
pre-existing narratives that are widely available and readily understood,”138 out of which 
individuals construct their self-narrative. She notes that “not all narratives are equally 
valued or encouraged in a society. In fact, some stories have no accepted place in the 
discursive environment, are not validated, or are strongly discouraged.”139 This, she 
continues, calls for a closer analysis of how “narratives are influenced by the historical 
moment, social norms, politics, power, privilege, and individuals’ locations in the social 
structure.”140 The excessive emphasis placed on narrative coherence can be considered as 
one such influence, perpetuated by the authoritative status of the psy sciences, which 
determine which narrative structures are to be favoured within and beyond clinical 
settings. 
 
Jirek only tentatively refers to critics who reflect on the cultural character of the notion of 
narrative coherence in a short discussion of the possible shortcomings of her study: “it is 
important to note that some scholars have critiqued the assumption that narrative 
coherence is necessarily a positive or desirable characteristic in individuals’ stories.”141 
When Jirek provides an example of a trauma survivor with a high degree of narrative 
coherence, the conception of subjectivity presented can be critically scrutinised. She 
quotes a “Level III trauma survivor” – that is, an individual whose life narrative exhibits 
the highest category of narrative coherence – describing her post-trauma outlook on life: 
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I’ve always been really, really strong. And I’ve always been a firm believer of 
‘that which doesn’t kill you makes you stronger’ and to learn from everything. 
And as long as you like yourself now, then you shouldn’t regret anything because 
that’s what made you who you are now. And that’s pretty much what I live by.142 
 
Such embracing of personal strength of character, self-determination and self-confidence 
portrays a conception of Western liberal subjectivity that centres on autonomy while 
disregarding dependency and vulnerability. One may ask whether the narratives of “Level 
III” trauma survivors demonstrating high narrative coherence promoted by the psy 
sciences are promoted because they are indeed healthy in themselves, or because they 
reflect a socially dominant conception of subjectivity.  
 
Other commentators agree that the outcome of therapy is “to elucidate the means by which 
traumatized persons can move from chaos toward coherence.”143 However, they argue that 
self-narratives are constituted by the various discourses and themes that pervade the 
culture one inhabits. Since one’s identity is at the intersection of competing and multiple 
narratives, coherence as such is difficult if not impossible to attain: “even under favorable 
circumstances, a tendency toward narrative coherence operates as a system principle that 
is never fully achieved.”144 Thus, when thinking about the coherent integration of 
experiences, one needs to acknowledge the openness that perpetually defines self-
narratives, irrespective of whether they are haunted by trauma or not. Botella and Herrero 
argue that when faced with unexpected discontinuity in one’s self-narrative in the wake 
of traumatic incidents, individuals seek therapy and claim, ‘I want to be again as I used to 
be,’145 where the pre-trauma self is presumed to be a coherent one. Neimeyer, Herrero and 
Botella conclude that, despite the impossibility of its complete realisation, the concept of 
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narrative coherence can helpfully orient therapy; however, “the inevitability of 
incoherence”146 still lurks at the heart of subjectivity and can fruitfully motivate 
psychological growth. While a critical analysis of the value of narrative coherence does 
not seek to challenge the desires of trauma survivors, it questions contexts where this 
norm functions as a demand placed on traumatised individuals that hinders, rather than 
facilitate, traumatic self-narration. 
 
The philosophical views on subjectivity explored in previous chapters, through Foucault 
and particularly through Butler’s work, raise important questions in this regard. They 
foreground the effect of trauma on our understanding of subjectivity, and suggest a need 
to attend to philosophical ideas on vulnerability, relationality and dependency by refusing 
to perpetuate the model of subjectivity (and the models of ethics and politics that follow 
from it) associated with mastery, control and strength. Such apprehension would stop 
perpetuating the notion of a human subject who is strongly self-determining and 
autonomous, and who only becomes ‘shattered’ and ‘disrupted’ because of the traumatic 
incident without considering the extent to which dependency, vulnerability and exposure 
are constitutive features of all human subjects. A denial of this reality would be precisely 
that – a fantasy, a denial. The rest of this chapter pursues further this analysis by looking 
at how the norm of coherence has been critiqued from both within and outside the psy 
sciences. 
 
II Critique of Narrative Coherence 
 
Complementing the critique of the norm of narrative coherence in the psy sciences 
pursued in this chapter, Mark Freeman argues that certain theories of narrative psychology 
do not only posit a narrative understanding of the self but go further by also proposing 
that this narrative must also “entail the additional notion of coherence or 
connectedness.”147 This, for him, is an unjustified and unnecessary leap. Reacting to the 
dictum that a life narrative has to be coherently structured like a classical narrative with a 
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beginning, middle and end, he writes: “Is this the case? If so, when is it the case? For all 
time, across the course of history? And for whom? All people? Most? Some? Can one 
speak of narrativity without invoking this further idea of coherence? How coherent is 
experience anyway? How desirable is coherence?”148 His probing questions highlight that 
not everyone may have access – linguistically or theoretically – to the requirements of 
narrative coherence. He also alludes to how the appearance of narrative coherence can be 
used as a defence mechanism by individuals whose life narratives are riddled with 
uncertainty. This in no way trivialises some people’s need to make sense of their life 
narrative. As Freeman suggests, “sometimes people who are coming apart can benefit 
greatly from getting themselves back together. Whatever one’s theoretical commitments, 
this seems difficult to contest.”149 Therefore, Crossley’s contention that a postmodern 
worry about the possible dangers of insisting on life narrative coherence amounts to 
insensitivity is not entirely correct. Not even the most ‘postmodern’ of arguments (as also 
shown when discussing Butler’s work) would simply revel in incoherence for its own 
sake, especially in the context of psychotherapy. A distinction (admittedly not an easy 
one) needs to be drawn between the incoherence alluded to in the critique of the unitary 
self on one hand, and the incoherence associated with, for example, schizophrenia and 
dissociative disorders on the other. A failure or refusal to conform to the norms of 
narrative coherence does not reduce one to incongruent speech; incoherence need not 
amount to radical incoherence that disrupts one’s functioning in society. A regard for 
narrative incoherence or, better still, narrative openness or fluidness brought about by 
recognition of the impossibility of giving a unitary account of oneself, could be one way 
for the psy sciences and the politics they inform to creatively rethink therapy and selves 
without resorting to problematic conceptions of unitary selves. The challenge, therefore, 
is to carefully differentiate between an incoherence that is actually hindering the 
individual’s functioning, and an incoherence that calls for attention and respect without 
being easily silenced, usually by pathologising it. 
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Experiences of loss, grief and trauma can cultivate a heightened awareness that the 
presumed coherence of a non-traumatic life narrative is a fantasy; a denial of vulnerability 
that we “constantly struggle to create or maintain,”150 as Crossley puts it. Were this 
stability so ordinary and natural, it would not presumably require such purposeful effort 
to maintain it. It would seem that such a struggle to maintain this stability is a matter of 
perpetuating the norm of coherence, and of propagating the impression of a coherent self 
despite its impossibility. This is a response of denial, socially upheld and subjectively 
incorporated, that masks vulnerability and rashly seeks to transform it into a posture of 
invulnerability. Traumatic experiences, thus, highlight how such an ordered, stable and 
coherent self was never possible in the first place. One is, then, always already narratively 
incoherent. This is captured in Brison’s reflection on trauma recovery, already cited in the 
previous chapter: “Recovery no longer seems like picking up the pieces of a shattered self 
(or fractured narrative). It’s facing the fact that there was never a coherent self (or story) 
there to begin with.”151 Rather than “constantly struggle to create or maintain” such 
stability in the pre-trauma self, and rather than inscribe it at the heart of contemporary 
therapeutic practices, one wonders whether it is not time to rethink the self and 
subjectivity in light of its vulnerability, and to take stock of its narrative incoherence. This 
would result in a challenge to the psy sciences to revise their logics and intricate relations 
to predominant discourses and practices that continue to uphold contestable notions of 
self-coherence, and that seem to have a monopoly on the current definitions of psychic 
health, normality and happiness. 
 
Reflecting on the question of narrative coherence in the context of constructivist 
psychology, Dan McAdams observes that the underlying approach to narration holds that 
it “moves (ideally) in the direction of coherence.”152 Correspondingly, he argues, 
dominant therapeutic approaches demand that “therapists and their clients co-construct 
new narratives to replace disorganized or incoherent stories of self.”153 In this way, 
narrative coherence is equated with the ‘good’ and ‘healthy’ without the necessary critical 
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evaluation of what is held to constitute coherence and of whether narrative coherence is 
necessarily beneficial. McAdams refers to research that proposes that people are typically 
unable to construct causally coherent life narratives prior to their young adult years.154 
Although “temporal coherence” emerges before the age of five, other types of coherence, 
such as autobiographical, causal and thematic coherence emerge later in adolescence. 
McAdams also argues that, ultimately, “the problem of narrative coherence is the problem 
of being understood in a social context.”155 This implies that it is the social context that 
determines whether something is coherent or not. The predominant definition of 
coherence concerns “structural expectations about time, intention, goal, causality, or 
closure,”156 and if such characteristics are disrupted, as often happens in traumatic 
experiences, then the resulting narrative is deemed as incoherent. This judging of 
narratives as coherent and incoherent is reliant on norms that regulate the structure and 
content of narratives. It is not just a stylistic norm that is being debated here. What is 
being implied is that there can be no understanding of narrative coherence without the 
broader social contexts that give meaning to coherence. This is because, as McAdams 
argues, such abilities of ‘higher-order’ coherence emerge once the individual is socialised 
into society’s meaning of what constitutes a life: “As they grow older, children learn about 
what events typically make up a normal life writ large, and they internalize society’s 
expectations and assumptions about the human life course.”157 This highlights the cultural 
character of life narrative coherence, and its normalised and possibly normalising 
tendencies, to which traumatised individuals are subjected. 
 
McAdams further asks: “[b]ut is coherence […] always enough?”158 Although a coherent 
narrative may make more sense to a listener than an incoherent one, and may be better at 
“successfully integrat[ing] a life in time,”159 the therapist’s eagerness to impose coherence 
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over an individual’s life narrative may amount to a “rush to coherence.”160 This rush 
echoes Herman’s contention that, oftentimes, therapists may impose a “premature demand 
for certainty”161 over trauma victims, which may not always have the intended beneficial 
therapeutic results. As McAdams suggests, “[l]ife is messier and more complex than the 
stories we tell about it,”162 indicating that the will to narrative coherence exhibits a false 
mastery and imposes a false unity over a narrative which demands a more sensitive 
apprehension of the incoherence it manifests. McAdams suggests that a well-formed life 
narrative must necessarily attempt to give expression to a plurality of voices of the self. 
Contrastingly, life narratives that are made to fit “a single, dominant perspective, no 
matter how coherent they may seem to be, are too simplistic to be true; they fail to reflect 
lived experience.”163 At best, then, a coherent life narrative may turn out to be 
disappointingly uninformative as it may not capture the intricacies that define lived 
experience, particularly in contemporary times when “the modern self is bombarded with 
so many diverse stimuli and shifting demands that it simply cannot assume a coherent 
form.”164 At worst, as more forceful critics of narrative coherence such as Peter Raggatt 
assert: “the imposition of coherence upon modern life constitutes a hegemonic insult.”165 
 
For McAdams, closer analysis of self-narration reveals the “cultural underpinnings of 
narratives and of the very concept of coherence itself. […] [A]ny consideration of 
narrative coherence must eventually come to terms with the characteristic assumptions 
regarding what kind of stories can and should be told in a given culture, what stories are 
understandable and valued.”166 The trait of narrative coherence is itself governed by 
several cultural underpinnings, and what is deemed to be a coherent narrative usually 
refers to a narrative that replicates the kind of stories that “are understandable and valued 
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among people who live in and through a given culture.”167 Furthermore, narrative 
coherence is given a questionable normative force when it becomes entangled with 
“cultural expectations regarding what kinds of lives people should live.”168 Through a 
study he conducted, McAdams shows that “midlife American adults [… with] a highly 
productive and caring approach to social life […] tend to construct highly coherent life 
stories whose main themes constellate around the idea of redemption.”169 This idea of 
redemption is a characteristic trope that appropriates some of the deeply valued discourses 
in American cultural history, and determines what counts as a coherent narrative: 
“Protestant conversion narratives, rags-to-riches stories about the American dream, 
narratives of liberation and freedom, self-help narratives about recovery and the 
actualization of human potential, broader discourses about manifest destiny and the 
chosen people.”170 This shows how it is not only the privileged quality of narrative 
coherence that can be challenged, but also the normative characteristics that are 
contingently tied to it; characteristics that reflect models of subjectivity that have no deep 
regard for relationality, and that as McAdams himself recognises, can be critiqued “for 
their presumptuousness, their lack of ambivalence, and their exuberant celebration of the 
expansive individual self.”171 
 
Critiques of the privileging of narrative coherence, and alternatives to it, have also been 
presented in work that draws philosophical, psychological, and sociological views alike. 
In their introduction to an edited volume titled Beyond Narrative Coherence, the editors 
describe their task as that of critiquing and displacing the paradigm within narrative 
studies that treats coherence as “a virtue […,] the ultimate guarantor of the quality of 
narratives[…,] a norm for good and healthy life stories.”172 For them, this paradigm – what 
they call “the coherence paradigm” – is characterised by an understanding of a good 
narrative as one that progresses linearly, chronologically, and proceeds from a beginning 
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through a middle to an end, thus implying closure. The function of a narrative according 
to this paradigm is to create coherence in experience, which is typically regarded as 
lacking form. This paradigm equates a coherent life narrative with a life lived ethically. 
Besides theoretically and methodologically challenging the paradigm of coherence, the 
editors seek to ethically challenge the coherence paradigm by showing how it “privileges 
middle-class conventionality and marginalizes the experiences of artistically creative as 
well as politically traumatized people.”173 Drawing on a multiplicity of approaches – from 
philosophy to linguistics to psychology to historiography – the volume grapples with the 
various ways in which and reasons for which narrative coherence is privileged in, 
specifically, the areas of illness, the arts, and the management of trauma in political 
contexts. 
 
The idea of narrative coherence is often traced back to Aristotle, who regarded good 
tragedy as characterised by a beginning, middle and end.174 However, the transposition of 
criteria that were intended for drama to the realm of the humanities and social inquiry can 
be contested. Theorists like MacIntyre, for example, sustain Aristotle’s emphasis on the 
normative aspect of narrative coherence. In response to modern individualism and its 
resulting moral fragmentation, he suggests that regarding life as an evolving and coherent 
narrative will help in overcoming the modernist dilemma. His notion of narrative identity 
centred on unity and coherence, disavowing any trace of complexity, contradiction and 
undecidability that life entails.175 My counter-position to such positions is that the 
exaggerated focus on narrative coherence itself, and the lack of acknowledgement of the 
complexity of self-narratives, including their occasional resistance to coherence, fuels the 
emphasis on individualism that, in turn, further impoverishes moral language and restricts 
one’s ability to respond ethically. In my view, a more suitable alternative to narrative 
identity would take heed, as Butler does, of narrative incoherence and its possible virtues 
in order to seriously consider the role that narrative interdependence and relationality have 
in one’s ethical life. Notions of narrative revisability and fluidity ought to be granted more 
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attention than current dominant discourses oftentimes afford them. An insistence on the 
chronology and coherence of one’s life narrative “ignores the possibility of self-narrative 
as a creative study of one’s history and its complexities, and transforms it almost as a 
curriculum vitae demanded by others.”176 This does not imply that coherence should be 
done away with absolutely; its utility in particular contexts will persist. However, there 
are several cases of narration “that do not fit into the received and dominant idea about 
narrative coherence,” and they should not be made to “comply with the often implicit 
norms of narrative theory.”177 Due to the predominance of the coherence paradigm, some 
life narratives that do not lend themselves to easy coherence, including but not limited to 
trauma narratives, end up being narrated “in circumstances and settings that severely 
constrain the telling.”178 Such normative impositions on narration, especially when trauma 
survivors are involved, amount to an ethical disservice whereby the focus is placed on 
conformity with “preconceived narrative norms”179 rather than on listening to the actual 
stories. In the case of narrations of trauma in institutional contexts, the failure to listen to 
the narratives being presented, by expecting traumatised individuals to perform according 
to the culturally-specific forms of narration at all costs. Narrative coherence may turn out 
to be a harmful phenomenon in some contexts and not the guarantor of well-being that it 
is often presumed to be. For example, narrative coherence has been used ideologically to 
legitimise certain narratives while excluding from the canon other narratives – by women 
or slaves, for example – that do not fit hegemonic narrative structures.180 The configuration 
of the self implied by the paradigm of coherence thus can be viewed as “a cultural 
construction and an effect of gendered and racialized discourses and practices”181 that has 
been importantly contested by feminist and postcolonial critics. 
 
The privileging of narrative coherence is not just a descriptive matter, that is, it does not 
inconsequentially describe how narratives are coherently produced. Rather, this type of 
privileging, and the means and measures by which it is achieved are politically noteworthy 
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realities that can be contested, both on the grounds that they create conditions of 
inequality, and for being undesirable normative commitments which, although socially 
pervasive, urgently need to be exposed to critique. The privileging of coherent life 
narratives can create a situation where researchers highlight the structure and content of 
such narratives at the expense of other “more challenging cases”182 that could well equally 
rich narratives. Like the gesure of the psychotherapist gently reworking a client’s 
narrative, the demand for narrative coherence reveals a culturally and institutionally 
preferred mode of narrating, but there is nothing essential or timeless in this form, or in 
the virtues and therapeutic promises that are hegemonically attached to it. Trauma 
narratives in particular present a challenge to the excessive bias in favour of narrative 
coherence: “Extreme political traumas often seem to block the whole capacity to tell, and 
the ideal of coherent and standard narration stands in cruel contrast to what the victims 
and witnesses can actually do.”183 Narratives of political trauma, for example those 
presented to the Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC) in South Africa, tended to be 
homogenised in the clinic and, moreover, culturally and institutionally, when coherence 
was defined in terms of “the purposes of the national project of unification.”184 Rather than 
merely displacing the privileging of narrative coherence with narrative incoherence 
(which would simply replicate the exclusionary logic), this critique argues for widening 
the parameters of what constitutes a life narrative that can be accepted as such, that can 
be heard as such, and that can be responded to on its own terms. Narratives that are 
deemed incoherent can offer a challenge or invitation “to listening in new and creative 
ways.”185 
 
*** 
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This chapter considered how self-narration is theorised in the discourses of psychology 
with reference to the psychological literature on self-narration. The therapeutic value 
ascribed to narrative coherence was critiqued, as well as how it is equated with a healthy 
narration and narrator. In this chapter, narrative coherence was not viewed as a neutral 
therapeutic technique, but as connected to dominant social techniques of power that 
regulate narrations of trauma. My claim is that the drive to narrative coherence in 
institutional contexts that deal with traumatised individuals calls for a political analysis 
of the implications of this privileging. This is pursued in the next chapter, which turns to 
the role of traumatic self-narration in the asylum seeking process, identifying the form 
that the injunction toward narrative coherence takes in this institutional context of power. 
This enables a reflection on the social role of narrative coherence that goes beyond solely 
theoretical or philosophical concerns (such as those of the theoretical debates in 
psychology or philosophy, which themselves are not apolitical) to consider the explicitly 
political consequences of traumatic self-narration. Consequently, the next chapter will 
show how narratives are treated unequally in the context of the asylum process, where 
certain narratives and narrative forms are explicitly preferred and encouraged over others. 
This pressure excludes several individuals from meeting the narrative requirements 
demanded of them. When the stakes involved are one’s survival 
(asylum/detention/deportation), the analysis of self-narration garners additional urgency. 
Echoing concerns raised throughout this thesis, the next chapter examines how traumatic 
self-narration in the asylum process can be a perpetuation of hegemonic norms on one 
hand, or, on the other hand, how it can enable subversive practices. Trauma narratives can 
sway toward normalisation but they can also resist dominant discourses, opening up 
possibilities of thinking and living subjectivity, trauma, ethics and politics in different 
ways. 
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Chapter 8 Narrative Inequality and the Culture of Trauma in the 
Asylum Process 
 
This chapter sustains the critique of practices of self-narration by discussing the narration 
of trauma in the asylum seeking process, thus bringing together the various analyses 
pursued in previous chapters. In the absence of official documents, the process of seeking 
asylum is significantly dependent upon the ability of the asylum seeker to provide a 
narrative of persecution to the state authorities in order to be considered as eligible for 
asylum. The asylum seeking context makes for a rich case study which makes manifest 
the ideas pursued in previous chapters. I will use the notion of narrative inequality, 
elaborated further in relation to the asylum context by Jan Blommaert, to consider how 
the use of narratives is not a right to which everyone has equal access and that, moreover, 
whereas some narrative modes are considered as more reliable and true, others are 
disqualified from certain social contexts. This power of and around narratives could 
determine whether an asylum seeker makes a successful asylum claim or whether the 
asylum story is rendered incoherent or unbelievable according to the state-sanctioned 
criteria of what should count as a suitable narrative. Other issues which this chapter 
considers are the power relations at play when asylum seekers are ‘coached’ on how to 
perform their narrative, as well as the critical issues that arise concerning the differing 
notions of narrative coherence and of trauma employed in the asylum seeking process. In 
this way, the different but related concerns of this thesis are brought together, showing 
how power relations impact practices of traumatic self-narration. This impact can be 
analysed philosophically, as well as in relation with the psy sciences which deal with 
trauma most proximately, and in relation to its political effects. 
 
8.1 Narrative Inequality in the Asylum Process 
 
Writing from a perspective of critical discourse analysis and anthropological 
sociolinguistics, Blommaert analyses narrative inequality in the stories of African asylum 
seekers in Belgium. His study is informed by the contention that using narratives is not a 
universal right that everyone can access in an equal manner. He builds on Dell Hymes 
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and Courtney Cazden’s discussion of “rights to use narrative,”1 and the inequalities of 
opportunity that are associated with these rights. Whereas some narrative modes are 
considered as more reliable and true, others are disqualified from certain social contexts. 
This does not only mean that, for reasons of propriety or clarity, some narratives lend 
themselves better than others to a specific context. The deeper point being investigated 
here is that, in certain contexts where individuals must narrate, the narrative must be of a 
certain form if it is to be considered socially worthy and consequential. This implies that 
anyone failing to meet these narrative requirements or unable to access the resources 
required to produce that kind of narrative will be excluded from the social transaction. 
This is one important way in which trauma narratives and their social reception are 
controlled. In the asylum process, success or failure have significant consequences. In 
such a context, the narrative is more than a set of words since it is the discursive key upon 
which power is operating. An analysis of how power relations shape the activity of self-
narration must consider the techniques with which some linguistic articulations are 
rendered more suitable than others, and must seek to uncover the conditions under which 
a narrative is deemed to be reliable or unreliable. Blommaert highlights this narrative 
inequality when he shows that the institutionally favoured narrative form in the asylum 
process is one that requires “access to communicative resources that are often far beyond 
the reach of African asylum seekers not only linguistically but also narratively and 
stylistically.”2 This is a crucial point: if, in so-called ‘receiving countries’, a legal right 
such as seeking asylum is only accessible to those who can access and exhibit the form of 
narration required in order to be eligible for that right, then important questions need to 
be asked about it. 
 
Through empirical research, Blommaert shows how these institutional pressures manifest 
themselves in the Belgian asylum seeking procedure. He notes that narrative inequality is 
not a monolithic phenomenon, but rather a multi-dimensional phenomenon that assumes 
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various shapes. One of the shapes that narrative inequality takes pertains to the 
accessibility and availability of linguistic-communicative resources. Therefore, people 
who do not have access to the institutionally demanded forms of linguistic expression are, 
from the start, prejudiced against. Narrative inequality can also take the form of systemic 
refusal to attempt to culturally contextualise the narratives presented by asylum seekers: 
whereas the asylum system demands a specific context of persecution narrated in 
particular ways, asylum seekers tend to put forward ‘home narratives’ that are usually 
long and anecdotal stories about the refugees’ home societies. 
 
Narrative inequality also highlights the centrality of performance; for the institution, how 
the narrative is performed is just as important as its content. It therefore comes as no 
surprise that the asylum seeking process is often described as akin to a criminal 
investigation. The communicative resources required to feel comfortable within this 
setting are numerous, putting asylum seekers on the back foot in a situation where an open 
interview in which the asylum seeker can freely narrate “become[s] a threat rather than 
an opportunity.”3 This is because asylum seekers are vulnerable to attitudes of cross-
examination and suspicion by state officials. Referring to her study of the French asylum 
process, Carolina Kobelinsky remarks how “[s]uspicion seemed to be the primary attitude 
adopted toward asylum seekers;”4 Fassin echoes this sentiment when he writes that 
“[t]oday, the dominant ethos of the authorities with regard to asylum is suspicion.”5 This 
makes the asylum interview feel more like an examination, where the criteria of success 
are how well one can perform and how correctly one answers, judged in relation to how 
one is expected to reply: “The details given by interviewees can also backfire: details are 
open to scrutiny and one inaccuracy, inconsistency or contradiction in the story can be 
enough to disqualify asylum seekers.”6 This test-like environment is highly circumscribed 
by the discourse of public administration. Blommaert suggests that the administrative 
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scenario is governed by “the unchallenged and apparently unchallengeable assumption 
that bureaucratic and administrative clients would have complete control over the medium 
and communicative skills in which bureaucratic and administrative procedures are being 
carried out.”7 This implies that one must not only be familiar with the administrative logic 
at play, but must also possess developed literacy skills and some degree of access to a 
standardised variety of a language.8 Thus, it seems that literacy requirements “increase in 
size and scope the lower one gets into society.”9 Blommaert remarks that, in the Belgian 
context, literacy is a sociocultural given, hence the institutional expectation is that one is 
competent in standard linguistic resources, further curbing the communicative range that 
asylum seekers have access to. 
 
Accordingly, narrative coherence is defined according to the same demands, that is, a 
narrative expected of an individual who has been taught the conventions of a well-written 
linear narrative. These narrative norms, such as “textual consistency, linearity, logic, 
rationality and factuality; they require considerable attention to details; they rely on 
written language as the basic and most lasting format of declaring ‘truth’; in short, they 
are highly culture- and society-specific and reflect local ideologies of language, literacy 
and communication.”10 Moreover, it could be argued that this institutionally demanded 
narrative form, defined by coherence, linearity and consistency, does barely come natural 
under ordinary circumstances, let alone in situations where an individual may feel alien 
to the spoken language and the expected narrative form. Furthermore, difficulties arising 
from the attempt to verbalise traumatic incidents, and the limited time to formulate one’s 
asylum narrative – “restricted to a number of well defined occasions, […] sometimes (but 
by no means always) assisted by interpreters”11 – further complicate the narrative scenario, 
heightening the need to recognise the cultural specificity of the form of narration being 
privileged, and the contingency of this privileging. For this reason, this confrontation 
between institutions and the asylum seekers’ voices is regarded as “a battle with unequal 
                                               
7 Blommaert, “Investigating narrative inequality,” 417. 
8 See Blommaert, “Investigating narrative inequality,” 418. 
9 Blommaert, “Investigating narrative inequality,” 418. 
10 Blommaert, “Investigating narrative inequality,” 436. 
11 Blommaert, “Investigating narrative inequality,” 437. 
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arms,”12 where incompatible narrative conventions are treated unfairly. Also, if not whim, 
sometimes these criteria for deeming a narrative coherent or not boil down to “matters of 
style,”13 such as the comprehensibility of the way in which one communicates. 
Ungrounded moral assessments of a speaker’s character are also made based on 
communicative criteria, again including their narrative style. Equally, claims are 
sometimes disqualified on the basis that although “[t]here is no evidence offered of the 
impossibility of these facts, they just seem unlikely.”14 This curtails the individual’s 
capacity to present one’s point, whereby that which the institution wants to hear is 
privileged at the expense of that which the individual feels is of great significance to his 
or her life. Moreover, the individual – often already troubled and disrupted by the 
traumatic experience – has to police oneself and bracket one’s own experience in an 
attempt to convince the authorities that one’s story is worth hearing. Failing to convince 
in this regard may lead to deportation or criminalisation. For these reasons, then, it is right 
to say that the norms governing the asylum seeking procedure resemble those of a criminal 
investigation; failing to live up to the narrative expectations imposed by the procedure 
renders one a dubious figure. Self-narration under these dire circumstances exemplifies 
Foucault’s claim that confession demands that one adopt an attitude of suspicion towards 
oneself, where through the act of confession, one utters one’s crimes to an authority who 
has the power to chastise or forgive him or her. 
 
The oral narrative of the asylum seeker is transcribed, polished, interpreted, reinterpreted, 
quoted, disseminated and recontextualised with the institutional assumption being that the 
differences between the oral narrative and the resulting written transcript are insignificant, 
thus ensuring that the responsibility for the narrative remains on the asylum seekers’ side. 
This is so despite the fact that the narrative “is remoulded, remodeled and re-narrated time 
and time again,”15 resulting in the narrative disseminating and operating in the hands of 
bureaucracy beyond the control of the original speaker. This reshaping of asylum seekers’ 
narratives is significant and “shifts the epistemic centre from the asylum seeker to the 
                                               
12 Blommaert, “Investigating narrative inequality,” 436. 
13 Blommaert, “Investigating narrative inequality,” 437. 
14 Blommaert, “Investigating narrative inequality,” 442 [emphasis in original]. 
15 Blommaert, “Investigating narrative inequality,” 438. 
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administrator processing the application.”16 In such cases, the ‘administrator’ actively 
participates in the co-creation of the final narrative. This transformation goes beyond 
merely necessary administrative work done on oral narrations in order to render them 
useful in procedural matters, but also implies a deeper manipulation that attempts to 
standardise experiences by fitting them – sometimes uncomfortably – within rigid 
institutional confines. The matter stops being a simply bureaucratic impulse when amid 
this active translation are lives hanging on the line, and when the impulse of the 
professionals is more concerned with preserving theoretical coherence than with listening 
to trauma experiences as such. The editing is sometimes not just stylistic or formal but 
material and substantial, in which content deemed to be ‘padding’ or extra is eliminated 
so that the crux of the narrative is immediately clear. Given instances of non-native 
varieties of a language, the ‘administrator’ must impose a coherent order on the narrative, 
ensuring that the narrative is “squeezed into the boxes of a standard form.”17 
 
This ‘squeezing’ can, and often must, be subjected to critique since it is not always 
motivated by a will to benefit the asylum seeker, but instead ensures that reality is made 
to fit the historical and dominant structures of intelligibility that delineate what falls within 
the domain of the recognisable and the truthful. As Foucault argues, such a will is a 
coercive will to truth that masks its violence behind a veil of innocence that is the product 
of a long association of the true with the noble.18 A whole array of verbs can be identified 
to represent this ‘working on’ narratives, ranging from more passive to more active 
agency: “shaped,”19 “reshape,”20 “mould,”21 “reorganise,”22 “mediate,”23 “homogenized,”24 
                                               
16 Blommaert, “Investigating narrative inequality,” 441. 
17 Blommaert, “Investigating narrative inequality,” 444 [emphasis added]. 
18 See Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,” 56. 
19 Kelly McKinney, “‘Breaking the Conspiracy of Silence’: Testimony, Traumatic Memory, and 
Psychotherapy with Survivors of Political Violence,” ETHOS 35, no. 3 (2007): 266. 
20 Molly Andrews, “Beyond narrative: The shape of traumatic testimony,” in Beyond Narrative Coherence, 
eds. Matti Hyvärinen, Lars-Christer Hydén, Marja Saarenheimo, and Maria Tamboukou (Amsterdam: John 
Benjamins Publishing Company, 2010), 156. 
21 McKinney, “‘Breaking the Conspiracy of Silence’,” 287. 
22 Andrews, “Beyond narrative,” 148. 
23 Blommaert, “Investigating narrative inequality,” 414. 
24 Ross, “On having voice and being heard,” 329. 
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“adapt,”25 “teasing out,”26 “prompted.”27 This easing need not be intended as a coercive 
pressure, but nonetheless functions as an indirect agency. This is akin to how Foucault 
portrayed the functioning of power as the government of conduct: “Government, here, 
refers to all endeavours to shape, guide, direct the conduct of others.”28 
 
The pressure involved in the imposition of such cultural narratives marks the scene of 
narration as a conflictual scene defined by power asymmetry. Bureaucratic and 
administrative state procedures constitute the space in which human subjects are 
constructed as “‘[c]ases (administrative, legal, welfare, medical, educational and probably 
far more).”29 This is the space in which Foucault saw “subjects being transformed into 
knowable objects of clinical observation by means of a multi-layered complex of 
discursive and material practices.”30 This, too, is the contradictory and agonistic space of 
discourse, which Foucault saw as “an important site and object of conflict [that] can 
contribute to our own subordination.”31 The language in which trauma narratives are 
articulated, the in/direct pressures on trauma narrations, and the way in which trauma and 
traumatised subject emerge as objects of inquiry are concerns that call for a similar 
analysis. Narrative inequality proves to be an important concept that can contribute to a 
critical theorisation not only of how trauma narratives are constructed and reconstructed, 
but especially of how narratives and narrative features are unequally treated in society. 
 
The next section extends further the analysis of trauma narration by zooming in on the 
power relations that impact how trauma is narrated in the asylum process. Drawing on 
fieldwork and empirical studies done in the United States and Europe on the asylum 
process, the ways in which the narration of trauma is impacted in this process are 
examined. In particular, I emphasise how trauma narration is caught up in a precarious 
position that can serve both to crystallise as well as to strategically subvert power 
                                               
25 Blommaert, Bock, and McCormick, “Narrative inequality in the TRC hearings,” 40. 
26 Hyvärinen et al., “Beyond Narrative Coherence,” 12. 
27 Jirek, “Narrative Reconstruction,” 182. 
28 Nikolas Rose, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), 3. 
29 Blommaert, “Investigating narrative inequality,” 445. 
30 Blommaert, “Investigating narrative inequality,” 446; see Foucault, Discipline and Punish. 
31 Alcoff and Gray, “Survivor Discourse,” 260; see Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,” 52. 
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relations. In this way, I show how the process of swaying between normalisation and 
subversion – explored in a previous chapter in relation to Foucault’s views on power – 
plays out in the context of trauma narration in the asylum process. Thus, the findings of 
empirical studies on the power of psychological discourses of trauma and the role of 
narration in the asylum process are used and connected to the theoretical framework 
developed in previous chapters, the stakes of which extend beyond the purpose of more 
grounded empirical studies. This ties together the concerns raised in previous chapters on 
the politics of self-narration by also bringing these ideas in dialogue with empirical 
studies. 
 
8.2 The Power of Trauma in the Asylum Process 
 
Trauma narratives in the asylum seeking process oscillate in a difficult relationship 
between hegemony and subversion. When asylum seekers are guided and even directly 
assisted to structure their life narrative (or their ‘story of persecution’) in certain ways, 
they are made to succumb to hegemonic norms that determine which forms of life 
narration (coherent, linear, transparent) count as legitimate, and which forms of 
traumatisation (namely, those recognised under PTSD criteria) are thought to indicate a 
legitimate and ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’ demanded by nation states in order 
to qualify as a refugee worthy of legal protection.32 Trauma has a necessarily political 
valence when it is implicated within the asylum process. This is for at least two reasons. 
Firstly, the implicit rules of the power/knowledge of the psy sciences play an important 
role in the conceptualisation of trauma, in such a way that the PTSD diagnosis holds a lot 
of weight. Secondly, this same diagnosis of PTSD can be used, and is used, by asylum 
seekers and agencies aiding them to construct a self-narrative that increases their chances 
of a successful asylum claim. This tactic, despite its strategic utility in helping asylum 
seekers in their asylum application, is considered in its dynamic nature, both as a 
subversive technique – a sort of using of techniques of power against power itself – and 
                                               
32 See 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Article 1, “Definition of the 
Term ‘Refugee’”. 
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as a strategy that perpetuates hegemonic norms that regulate what counts as a suitable life 
narrative worth protecting. 
 
Under ordinary circumstances, setting foot in a country without the right documents will 
most likely amount to a legal violation. In Europe and the United States, the asylum 
seeking process is one of the extraordinary circumstances through which one may legally 
enter a country, seeking protection and asylum.33 In the absence of official documents, the 
receiving country employs an understandably complex process. Of particular importance 
to this thesis are not the legal justifications of this process or the critique that can be made 
of such practices, but the role of self-narration in this process and the power relations that 
govern it. Several sources in the academic literature that analyses the asylum process in 
different countries note how, in the absence of official documents, this process is 
dependent upon a narrative of persecution which the asylum seeker must present to the 
state authorities in order to be eligible for asylum: “a narrative of persecution is necessary 
in order to gain asylum;”34 “[w]hen someone applies for asylum in Italy, he or she is 
supposed to compose a personal story […] and to present it in front of a commission.”35 
In the US, “[i]n the absence of other documentation of a well-founded fear of persecution, 
the [Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services] B.C.I.S. depends upon asylum 
applicants’ narratives as evidence of their suffering.”36 
 
Given the criteria that determine success/failure, or what is deemed 
convincing/unbelievable, it may feel like this process is more of a test or performance: 
“During the process of narration, storytellers are expected to engage in performative 
                                               
33 For detailed analyses, besides those cited in the discussion below, of the asylum seeking process (in 
Switzerland and in the United States respectively) that highlight the relations between self-narration, 
trauma, law and power relations in this process, see Marie-Florence Burki, “Asylum seekers in narrative 
action: An exploration into the process of narration within the framework of asylum from the perspective 
of the claimants” (Master’s thesis, Université de Neuchâtel, 2015), doc.rero.ch/record/259276, and Stephen 
Paskey, “Telling Refugee Stories: Trauma, Credibility and the Adversarial Adjudication of Claims for 
Asylum,” Santa Clara Law Review 56, no. 3 (2016): 457-530. 
34 Connie G. Oxford, “Acts of Resistance in Asylum Seekers’ Persecution Narratives,” in Immigrant Rights 
in the Shadows of Citizenship, ed. Rachel Ida Buff (New York: New York University Press, 2008), 40. 
35 Virginia Signorini, “Producing memory: Narratives of suffering in the asylum experience,” Subjectivity 
8 (2015): 382 [abstract]. 
36 Amy Shuman and Carol Bohmer, “Representing Trauma: Political Asylum Narrative,” Journal of 
American Folklore 117, no. 466 (Fall 2004): 402. 
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features that include repetition, vivid concrete details, and coherence of plot.”37 Although 
it could be said that most forms of self-narration involve a performative dimension, this 
dimension is further heightened when it happens in an institutional setting, as was also 
highlighted in the analysis of court testimony by sexual trauma survivors. In the days 
leading up to the interview in which asylum seekers present their narratives to the 
authority that processes asylum claims, they are helped to compile their application and 
to prepare for their interview. Usually, this aid comes in the form of immigration 
attorneys, immigrant service providers or NGOs. Their work is to inform asylum seekers 
about what the asylum seeking process actually entails, the legal information they should 
be aware of, and to give them advice on how to construct their narrative in order to stand 
a better chance of its being accepted by the state agency processing their application. It is 
at this delicate stage that immigrant service providers attempt to approximate the asylum 
seekers’ narrative to the form and content that is implicitly or explicitly favoured by the 
state. Ultimately, “[n]arratives must conform to a story that the law recognizes.”38 This 
legal recognition is highly determined by whether the narrative reproduces the power 
relations that fuel the hegemony of the law, or whether the narrative questions the assumed 
hegemony.  
 
In this line of analysis, Connie Oxford argues that “the narrative itself emerges as either 
hegemonic or subversive.”39 Oxford’s understanding of subversion relies on Foucault’s 
elaboration of power as circulating through multiple sites, and of resistance as co-existent 
with power: “Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, 
this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power.”40 The extent of 
the subversive potential that lies in asylum seekers’ narratives is limited and complicated. 
It is true that there is an element of subversion when asylum seekers are encouraged to 
strategically present their narrative through the legally recognised criteria in order to 
                                               
37 Oxford, “Acts of Resistance in Asylum Seekers’ Persecution Narratives,” 41. 
38 Oxford, “Acts of Resistance in Asylum Seekers’ Persecution Narratives,” 41. 
39 Oxford, “Acts of Resistance in Asylum Seekers’ Persecution Narratives,” 41. It must be specified that the 
subject of Oxford’s analysis is the process of seeking asylum in the United States. However, broader 
concerns pertaining to the functioning of power in how asylum seekers are ‘processed’ apply to territories 
beyond the US. 
40 Foucault, The Will to Knowledge, 95. 
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improve the chance of success of their application. However, ultimately, this strategy also 
strengthens the grip of hegemonic power on self-narration. One wonders, then, whether 
this presumption of subversion would, in fact, be mistaking power for its ruse. As Foucault 
cautioned at the end of The Will to Knowledge: “The irony of this deployment is in having 
us believe that our ‘liberation’ is in the balance.”41 Oxford is aware of this sad irony when 
she remarks that the practice of resistance can also be a matter of accommodating 
hegemonic power: “Immigration attorneys and service providers practice resistance (and 
sometimes accommodation by conforming to the expectations regarding how stories 
should be told) by using the rules of asylum to their advantage by teaching asylum seekers 
to tell hegemonic stories.”42 
 
Many asylum seekers are initially unaware of the form of legal narrative they would be 
asked to articulate as part of the asylum seeking process. As a result, it is from the 
immigration service providers and their attorneys that they learn how to articulate the 
required narrative, typically of persecution. In a sense, asylum seekers are taught how to 
perform their traumatic narrative successfully. It is not the case that the state apparatus 
will be initially supportive or sympathetic – on the contrary, the role of the state apparatus 
is to question the validity and truth of the narrative, to ‘catch out’ the claimant, and check 
for inconsistencies and unverified information. It is amid these practices of power that 
agencies providing support to asylum seekers respond with strategically employed 
counter-practices, such as teaching asylum seekers to adjust and fine-tune their narratives 
so as to make them more understandable and acceptable by the legal criteria: “asylum 
applicants frame their claims in an effort to match their cultural circumstances with the 
legal rules for granting asylum.”43 In this regard, lawyers and immigration service 
providers have a crucial role in “reframing the [asylum] claim not only to be consistent 
with the law, but also, to correspond with current Western social values, regardless of the 
merits of any particular claim.”44 Hence, the asylum seeker must be prepared and, to an 
                                               
41 Foucault, The Will to Knowledge, 159. Although in this quotation Foucault was specifically referring to 
the deployment of the apparatus of modern sexuality, it is also a general observation on how power 
functions. 
42 Oxford, “Acts of Resistance in Asylum Seekers’ Persecution Narratives,” 42. 
43 Shuman and Bohmer, “Representing Trauma,” 396. 
44 Shuman and Bohmer, “Representing Trauma,” 398. 
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extent, trained in presenting to the authorities the story that they want to hear, or the one 
they are able to hear. One must consider, then, the highly stressful process leading to the 
interview where the asylum seeker cannot regard the narrative as his or her own life story 
but as a tool that must be invoked and used in certain ways for political and strategic 
purposes. 
 
According to this hegemonic system, it is expected that asylum seekers are versed not 
only in how their narrative must be presented, but also in what the law considers to be 
important information that contributes to the success of the narrative. It is useless for the 
asylum seeker to emphasise information that the law considers as secondary, or simply 
unimportant: 
 
At another asylum hearing, the case of an escaped high-profile member of the 
opposition government, the applicant (Henri) kept mentioning the political 
situation in the Central African Republic and the role of Libya in the various 
coups, information critically important to him, but not relevant to the hearing 
officer, who became increasingly impatient during the hearing.45 
 
This shows that no matter how crucial that information may be to the applicant, it is the 
criteria of the law that have to be satisfied if the applicant wishes the asylum application 
to be successful. There are also specific legal criteria determining what counts as political 
persecution or not, to the extent that an episode one experiences in the country one has 
escaped – no matter how traumatic – may not qualify him or her as eligible for asylum. 
This case from the Netherlands clearly demonstrates this point: ‘In Sri Lanka […] it is 
unfortunately not unusual for women to be the victim of sexual violence. […] The 
applicant is therefore not in an exceptional position.’46 Moreover, repeated narratives 
desensitise authorities, and are negatively treated due to suspicion that narratives that 
repeat certain narrative tropes are considered fabricated. As Kobelinsky notes: “The 
                                               
45 Shuman and Bohmer, “Representing Trauma,” 405. 
46 Thomas Spijkerboer, Gender and Refugee Status (Burlington: Ashgate, 2000), 125, quoted in Shuman 
and Bohmer, “Representing Trauma,” 398. 
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repetitive nature of the cases and the routinization of the decision-making processes led 
to a kind of erosion of affects. The resultant indifference of the agents was often consistent 
with the moral economy of suspicion: stories that are similar are assumed to be fake.”47 
 
To examine how the balance between hegemony and subversion oscillates in the asylum 
process, Oxford considers the case of Nicole, a psychologist who works with survivors of 
torture and who provides counselling for asylum seekers. Nicole recognises the power 
that a PTSD diagnosis holds in asylum applications. She is preoccupied by the sole and 
heightened focus placed on PTSD over other psychosocial problems. Echoing the earlier 
claim that narratives must conform to a story that the law recognises, Oxford writes that 
Nicole intentionally emphasises the PTSD diagnosis in the psychological report included 
with the asylum application “because she knows that it is the diagnosis with which asylum 
officers and immigration judges are familiar.”48 Aware of the fact that her specialised 
power/knowledge puts her in a position from where she can boost the asylum application, 
she privileges the diagnosis of PTSD, even though PTSD is not the be-all and end-all of 
the applicant’s psychological well-being, and even though this practice contributes to a 
discourse on trauma that privileges the PTSD symptomatology. In so doing, Nicole shapes 
the asylum seeker’s narrative in a way that makes it more successful in the eyes of the 
law. As she says: “PTSD is just one of the possible diagnoses that someone might have. 
But it’s a diagnosis that the adjudicators, the [Immigration and Naturalization Service] 
INS, and the judges seem to be looking for.”49 Although it is true that Nicole is, ultimately, 
helping the asylum seeker’s chances of gaining asylum, she is nonetheless contributing to 
the reiteration of hegemonic norms that consider trauma through the criteria of 
power/knowledge: “Nicole’s motivation may not be to reproduce a hegemonic narrative, 
yet that is the outcome based on the reports she submits in asylum applications.”50 Another 
case of such accommodation of hegemonic power considered by Oxford is the case of 
Margaret, an employee at an immigrant organisation that assists females who have been 
raped after they were circumcised. Margaret advises such women to present their narrative 
                                               
47 Kobelinsky, “In Search of Truth,” 82. 
48 Oxford, “Acts of Resistance in Asylum Seekers’ Persecution Narratives,” 47. 
49 Oxford, “Acts of Resistance in Asylum Seekers’ Persecution Narratives,” 46. 
50 Oxford, “Acts of Resistance in Asylum Seekers’ Persecution Narratives,” 47. 
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in such a way that portrays them as “victims of a barbaric practice.”51 Since state agencies 
would be more inclined to view this practice (rather than, in this case, the fact that they 
were raped) as barbaric, these women are advised to frame their life narrative in this way 
to increase the likelihood that their asylum application will be successful.  
 
What these cases show is that despite strategically working against institutional power 
with the plausible intentions of assisting the asylum seekers’ applications, they are still 
encouraging hegemonic narratives. These actions by immigration service providers are, 
after all, ways in which “asylum seeker’s narratives […] are remolded to fit a hegemonic 
narrative.”52 They thus contribute to reproducing institutional power rather than 
undermining it. This does not mean, however, that the potential subversion in such actions 
by immigrant service providers is negligible. The aim of resistance is not to overthrow all 
hegemonic narratives and instances of institutional power; indeed, arguably no singular 
action can achieve such an aim. As Foucault would say, there is no position that lies 
outside power relations. What one may hope for, then, are micro-practices that, within 
their limits, strategically reverse strategies of hegemonic power. 
 
This section extends the discussion of the politics of narrating trauma by using the ideas 
developed in previous chapters through Foucault’s work on self-narration to critically 
interpret findings from empirical studies on the asylum process. Rather than a mere 
‘application’ of the theoretical ideas, this section aimed to use the theoretical framework 
developed throughout this thesis to read further into related empirical work. This 
analytical gesture is crucial in order to study how power actually functions in particular 
contemporary contexts, and to analyse the broader politics of trauma. The next section 
sustains further this methodological choice by illustrating critical points made in previous 
chapters on the power of psy discourses through empirical studies of how trauma 
discourses function in the asylum process. Furthermore, I draw on empirical studies on 
trauma in the asylum process to highlight how the norm of narrative coherence – analysed 
                                               
51 Oxford, “Acts of Resistance in Asylum Seekers’ Persecution Narratives,” 48. 
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in previous chapters through Butler’s critique and with regard to the psychological 
sciences – functions as a dominant norm that circumscribes trauma narration. 
 
8.3 The Culture of Asylum; The Culture of Trauma 
 
This concluding section of this chapter presents findings of empirical studies on the 
asylum process conducted in the United States and France, extending these analyses by 
interweaving them with the theoretical framework developed throughout this thesis. This 
approach to and use of such empirical studies is not merely to serve as an illustration of 
theoretical analyses of power or trauma, but is also an attempt to widen the stakes of more 
‘local’ empirical studies by linking them to broader analyses of processes of subject-
formation and critiques of the power of legal and medical discourses, particularly as they 
manifest themselves in the context of the narration of trauma in institutional contexts. 
Literature in migration studies emphasises the cultural intricacies involved in the 
narration of trauma in the asylum seeking process. After all, narratives and self-narratives 
are culturally situated and, hence, produced out of the discourses and understandings 
present in one’s culture: “storytelling is part of people’s everyday life, a cultural and 
intersubjective experience to the core in which a person draws on the cultural repertoires 
at his/her disposal to make sense of, imagine, and negotiate with others the world around 
them.”53 The asylum process is a space where the trauma narratives presented by 
individuals with greatly differing cultural backgrounds are judged according to the 
normative and narrative expectations demanded by legal criteria that, as the dominant 
criteria in a particular context, are themselves culturally situated. The point is not just to 
emphasise the cultural situatedness of narratives, but to show the power relations 
governing this space of encounter – should the asylum seekers be unable or unwilling to 
satisfy these criteria, it is not just the viability of their life narrative that is at stake, but 
their life itself. In their analysis, Carol Bohmer and Amy Shuman foreground the cultural 
                                               
53 Nando Sigona, “The Politics of Refugee Voices: Representations, Narratives, and Memories,” in The 
Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies, eds. Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Gil Loescher, 
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specificity of the discourses that surround self-narration in the asylum process, and 
describe the cultural obstacles that asylum seekers face in adjusting their narrative in a 
way that would make their asylum application successful: “The asylum applicants’ 
discourses of fear, oppression, and flight are culturally specific; the [Bureau of Citizenship 
and Immigration Services] B.C.I.S. also has culturally specific expectations for 
representing experiences of persecution, a bureaucratic mode rarely familiar to 
individuals applying for asylum.”54 Moreover, the space where the asylum seekers’ 
narratives encounters the legal expectations of state agencies is oftentimes a tense one 
which resembles more a scene of cross-examination with state agents seeking to uncover 
inconsistencies and false claims. As Fassin and d’Halluin wrote in 2005: “A quarter of a 
century ago, asylum was a matter of trust, in which the applicant was presumed to be 
telling the truth. Today, asylum is set in a climate of suspicion, in which the asylum seeker 
is seen as someone trying to take advantage of the country’s hospitality.”55 Some officials 
of ‘receiving countries’ even pride themselves in their abilities – real or not – to ‘out’ 
asylum seekers as liars. As Bohmer and Shuman report: 
 
Another way the authorities decide if a story is ‘true’ is by judging the way the 
tellers present themselves. This is called demeanor in the law, and it is supposed 
to be a significant indication of credibility. Judges pride themselves on being able 
to tell whether someone is lying by watching how they behave when being 
questioned.56 
 
As a result, it seems that the presumption is that the narratives presented by asylum 
seekers are false until conclusively proven to hold ground: “developing a capacity to 
unearth incongruences is a central feature of the training of new recruits who […] are 
socialized in their role not so much by being taught about refugees in terms of their rights 
and options, but through techniques to unmask lies and inconsistencies in asylum seekers’ 
                                               
54 Shuman and Bohmer, “Representing Trauma,” 395. Although their analysis can be applied to other 
territories, Shuman and Bohmer’s analysis focuses on the asylum seeking process in the United States. 
55 Didier Fassin and Estelle d’Halluin, “The Truth from the Body: Medical Certificates as Ultimate Evidence 
for Asylum Seekers,” American Anthropologist 107, no. 4 (2005): 600. 
56 Carol Bohmer and Amy Shuman, Rejecting Refugees: Political Asylum in the 21st century (New York: 
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narratives.”57 For this reason, Shuman and Bohmer consider this scene of interrogation as 
regulated by radically different discourse systems, encompassing the multiple voices of 
participants in colliding worlds.58 
 
Shuman and Bohmer identify seven areas in which the discourses of the state agencies 
and the asylum seekers come into conflict. These areas include: an understanding of time 
as a Western variable through which the chronology, coherence and sequence of events 
is made intelligible; the issue of which information counts as more or less relevant to the 
narrative; the plausibility or believability of the asylum claim; and attention to details, 
dates, and evidence that can be corroborated. In view of the previous chapters on the 
problematic of narrative coherence, I will give closer consideration to two particular areas 
identified by Shuman and Bohmer: the emphasis on the chronology and coherence of the 
narrative, and the emotional presentation of the asylum seekers’ narrative. Shuman and 
Bohmer claim that “trauma narratives are rarely chronological, and their complexity is 
often read as inconsistency.”59 Institutions, particularly legal institutions, privilege the 
criteria of coherence and chronology when adjudicating life narratives. Such authorities 
subscribe to the idea that “the construction of a true story is the belief that truth is 
consistent and detailed and that traumatic events are never forgotten. Similarly, the ability 
to tell the same story repeatedly seems essential for the truth of the story to be accepted.”60 
But trauma troubles this possibility. Shuman and Bohmer argue that the sense of 
chronology within particular narratives is more of a recovery than a reproduction of a 
chronology which was already present in the narrative: “people generally do not recount 
events in the order in which they happened.”61 Nonetheless, an individual’s inability to 
present one’s narrative in a linear and legalistic way is considered “frustrating”62 by 
lawyers, even sympathetic ones: “Errors in dates of events recounted or confused remarks 
                                               
57 Sigona, “The Politics of Refugee Voices,” 374. 
58 See Shuman and Bohmer, “Representing Trauma,” 396. 
59 Shuman and Bohmer, “Representing Trauma,” 403. Shuman and Bohmer rely on Judith Herman’s 
characterisation of trauma as “encoded in the form of vivid sensations and images.” See Herman, Trauma 
and Recovery, 38, quoted in Shuman and Bohmer, “Representing Trauma,” 403. 
60 Kobelinsky, “In Search of Truth,” 76. 
61 Shuman and Bohmer, “Representing Trauma,” 402. 
62 Shuman and Bohmer, “Representing Trauma,” 401. 
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are seen not as signs of amnesia or trauma but as indicators of insincerity or deception.”63 
Bohmer, who worked as a pro bono attorney with the Columbus Refugee and Immigration 
Services (C.R.I.S.) in the US, recounts how it was very difficult to understand the story 
of a particular asylum seeker because “he did not present a narrative in what we formally 
educated Westerners define as a ‘logical manner.’”64 In such cases, despite its near-
impossibility, institutions still privilege narrative coherence and linearity: 
 
In the real world things don’t work out neatly. The B.C.I.S. wants it neat – one 
day you get a death threat, the next they come to your house […] it doesn’t work 
like that. The B.C.I.S. wants linear narratives […] all sorts of bizarre things happen 
[…] it’s not that they aren’t at risk.65 
 
This implies that, besides cultural understandings of suffering and trauma, there are also 
culturally sanctioned forms of self-narration which may be deployed in such institutional 
settings in order to bar individuals from having a successful asylum claim.  
 
Besides narrative coherence, another aspect of the asylum seekers’ narratives which plays 
an important role is emotional presentation. Shuman and Bohmer claim that, among the 
tips and tricks that asylum seekers are given by immigration service providers, “the 
narrative process involves ‘educating’ about expressing ‘suitable’ emotion when 
describing the story.”66 One can only imagine how strange this form of ‘education’ may 
appear to traumatised individuals who, after escaping from undesirable circumstances of 
persecution or torture, must understand, endure and perform successfully in order to meet 
the standards of this culturally specific understanding of ‘suitability’. It comes as no 
surprise that, due to the intensely bureaucratic nature of it all, some asylum seekers 
actually describe “the asylum process itself [as] an emotional struggle comparable to the 
experience of persecution.”67 Over and above the emotional struggles stemming from the 
                                               
63 Kobelinsky, “In Search of Truth,” 85. 
64 Shuman and Bohmer, “Representing Trauma,” 401. 
65 Shuman and Bohmer, “Representing Trauma,” 405-406. 
66 Shuman and Bohmer, “Representing Trauma,” 406. 
67 Shuman and Bohmer, “Representing Trauma,” 406. 
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traumatic episodes of persecution, the fact that the asylum seeking process itself – in its 
cultural, legalistic and bureaucratic functions – is experienced as traumatic is a reality that 
calls for critique. This critique should entail a critical engagement of both the form that 
the asylum seeking process is taking in various countries, and the cultural impositions that 
are regulating the meaning of trauma as well as the meaning of successful and acceptable 
self-narration. The emotional presentation of the asylum seeker’s narrative is a cultural 
variable that plays a significant role in the assessment of the asylum claim. Shuman and 
Bohmer remark that they have worked with several immigrants who describe their story 
without the emotional expression one would expect from the recounting of a traumatic 
episode. This is not an unusual phenomenon, in fact. As Herman describes in her 
influential account of post-traumatic subjectivity, emotional numbing (or constriction) is 
a cardinal symptom of post-traumatic stress disorder, alongside hyperarousal (its 
opposite) and intrusion: “Sometimes situations of inescapable danger may evoke not only 
terror and rage but also, paradoxically, a state of detached calm, in which terror, rage, and 
pain dissolve. Events continue to register in awareness, but it is as though these events 
have been disconnected from their ordinary meanings.”68 However, despite the 
documentation of this phenomenon, state agencies do not favourably regard asylum 
seekers’ narratives when they are accompanied by too little emotional expression. Neither 
will a narrative that is presented with what is deemed to be too much emotional expression 
be positively considered due to suspicion of exaggerated theatricality. Kobelinsky refers 
to a successful asylum claim in France of a Sudanese individual who reduced the court 
room to tears with his impassioned narration of how his entire family was murdered, and 
of another individual who elaborated on his motivations to become politically active in 
Guinea. The judge referred to the latter individual as exemplary, “by which,” Kobelinsky 
remarks, “he perhaps meant that he perfectly embodied the image of a political refugee.”69 
Thus, it seems that, in the context of the asylum process, narratives are considered as 
legitimate by authorities if they conform to the hegemonic conceptions of narrative, of 
trauma, and of truthfulness. 
 
                                               
68 Herman, Trauma and Recovery, 42-43. 
69 Kobelinsky, “In Search of Truth,” 84. 
249 
 
Thus, with regard to the emotive component of the trauma narrative, both excess and lack 
are considered pathological forms. Yet pathologisation is also a crucial way in which 
trauma is governed in the asylum seeking process. As discussed above, a PTSD diagnosis 
boosts the asylum claim. This is because the suffering and fear of persecution perceived 
by the asylum seeker is being translated into a currency that is recognised and valued by 
the state and legal authorities. This imposes a victim role on the asylum seeker, and such 
pathologisation may have a disempowering effect. This disempowering counters a 
common narrative which drives asylum seekers forward, that is, a narrative of hope, 
agency, freedom and well-being: “To reveal his scars is to suffer a further indignity. But 
portraying himself as a victim, without dignity, is the necessary price of asylum.”70 
Demanding this indignity as a necessary feature of the asylum seeking process has 
detrimental effects on the collective identity of asylum seekers. This is because their social 
recognisability depends on them conceding that they are, primarily and ultimately, 
victims: “For some applicants, describing oneself as a victim of persecution is 
incompatible with recovering a sense of dignity or personal integrity following a 
trauma.”71 The language and culture of pathologisation, with which asylum seekers might 
not be familiar, can thus hinder rather than facilitate their adjustment and social 
integration. 
 
Reflecting on the French asylum process, Fassin and d’Halluin note how in the 
contemporary culture of asylum, there is an impulse to move beyond the narratives 
presented by asylum seekers. Nation states recognise that a trauma narrative “conveys 
veracity, as long as it is placed in a certain general framework or presented in experts’ 
terms.”72 Fassin and d’Halluin note how, in contemporary times, there is an increasing 
reliance on expert knowledge, particularly medical and psy experts, to validate asylum 
narratives. For them, this dependence on expert knowledge has brought with it changes in 
the government of asylum trauma; namely, the focus on the applicant’s narrative has been 
displaced by a heightened emphasis on the body of the asylum seeker. This displacement 
                                               
70 Shuman and Bohmer, “Representing Trauma,” 403. 
71 Shuman and Bohmer, “Representing Trauma,” 406. 
72 Didier Fassin and Estelle d’Halluin, “Critical Evidence: The Politics of Trauma in French Asylum 
Policies,” ETHOS 35, no. 3 (2007): 325 [emphasis added]. 
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from the individual’s logos to the individual’s soma complements the aura of suspicion 
surrounding asylum; whereas words are seen as possibly deceiving, the marks on the body 
are indubitable when examined by a medical professional: “Under these conditions, the 
asylum seekers’ accounts, long the only evidence testifying to their story and justifying 
their request, were no longer sufficient to confirm the truth of the alleged persecution. The 
body, which could have retained a trace of it, came to be seen as potentially providing 
tangible proofs.”73 In a Foucaultian vein, Fassin notes how “the body, no longer the 
principal site at which the strength of power is manifested, has become the site where the 
truth of individuals is tested.”74 
 
For this reason, medical certificates have become a crucial instrument in asylum 
applications.75 This requirement which, of course, is not just an administrative measure 
has been subject to critique, not least because this measure is not in line with the 1951 
Refugee Convention which states that asylum must be granted on the basis of a well-
founded fear of persecution, and not on actual physical evidence of torture. Through this 
reliance on expert knowledge, “more credit is granted to the expert’s word than to that of 
the victim,”76 further highlighting how it is not only a matter of individuals narrating their 
trauma in the institutionally favoured manners, but also that expert agents must verify the 
veracity of the individuals’ claims by bypassing the narrative and ‘going straight’ to the 
body. Furthermore, some even doubt the actual effectiveness of the medical certificate in 
improving the chances of an asylum claim. Others feel ethically torn since, by issuing 
medical certificates to verify the applicants’ claims, they are participating in an unjust 
machinery which is structurally designed to limit as much as possible access to asylum 
rights. However, for strategic reasons, medical experts who are sympathetic to asylum 
seekers nonetheless choose to ‘be complicit’ in the hope that employing the power of the 
medical discourse can help asylum seekers.77 This mechanism of medical certificates has 
further consequences on the government of trauma in the asylum process. By opting for 
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75 At least in the French asylum context. 
76 Fassin and d’Halluin, “The Truth from the Body,” 602. 
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clinical, medical and scientific discourses, medical certificates greatly depoliticise, 
decontextualise and dehistoricise accounts of trauma. Medical certificates are written in 
accordance with a standardised model that flattens the individuality of narratives and is 
hesitant when it comes to speculating on the origin of the physical bodily signs. For this 
reason, according to Fassin, the concluding phrase often used in certificates intending to 
corroborate applicants’ claims – “[the physical signs] point to the truth of the facts he 
alleges”78 – reads more as a personal conviction than a medical truth. 
 
This section has emphasised how, apart from close scrutiny of the form and content of the 
traumatised individuals’, asylum claims are decided on the basis of extra-narrative 
considerations too. These elements of evaluation include: legal responsibilities imposed 
on nation states; the coherence of the individual’s story and its internal logic; the story’s 
external logic; the accuracy of the individual’s responses when interviewed by authorities; 
and the analysis of supplementary documents, such as medical certificates.79 For a 
traumatised asylum seeker to score highly on all these elements is an almost impossible 
ideal, which explains why the asylum process itself is more often experienced as a 
disempowering ordeal than a quest for justice and a liveable life. The expectations 
imposed on trauma narratives and traumatised individuals highlight how behind this will 
to truth often lies an exclusionary and violent impulse. 
  
*** 
 
This chapter highlighted the various ways in which trauma narratives are governed in the 
asylum seeking process. It was argued that different narratives have unequal currencies in 
this process. Moreover, different individuals have unequal access to the narrative 
conditions expected by authorities. Asylum seekers, many times traumatised, narrate their 
story within contexts that are heavily caught up in power relations that govern, control 
and often disempower individuals. This concluding chapter showed how Foucault’s ideas 
on how power and knowledge impact practices of self-narration, and Butler’s ideas on the 
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over-valuing of narrative coherence, can be materially seen operating in the legal contexts 
of adjudicating asylum claims. The narration of trauma within the asylum context brings 
together the various concerns that motivated this thesis. The discussion of Foucault’s 
concerns with the power of discourses was connected with an analysis of norms that 
govern trauma narration in contemporary institutional contexts, while Butler’s critique of 
the hegemony of narrative coherence was employed to study the performative conditions 
that affect the credibility of individuals narrating trauma. The method of linking 
theoretical concerns on subjectivity and power with analyses of empirical studies on 
sexual trauma and the asylum process was employed to apprehend the entanglement of 
political and legal institutions with medical and expert knowledge that determine who 
qualifies as a legitimate subject worthy of rights, recognition, sympathy or pity. 
Altogether, this highlights the various powerful ways in which the narration of trauma is 
constrained and regulated, and although possibilities of resisting by narrating otherwise 
remain, they are rendered increasingly fragile, particularly in situations as precarious as 
that of seeking political asylum. 
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Conclusion: The Political Ethics of Self-Narration 
 
This thesis analysed how experiences of trauma are narrated in institutional settings, 
particularly in medical and legal contexts, looking at how power functions to circumscribe 
and govern narrations of trauma. Questions that guided the analysis throughout the various 
chapters were: How is trauma narrated by survivors in institutional settings? What 
discourses and practices impact the reception of trauma narratives? How must trauma be 
narrated in order to be rendered intelligible and legitimate by authorities? What critical 
results can be rendered if the analysis of trauma narration is approached philosophically, 
sociologically and politically? I considered which narratives are enabled, enforced and 
perpetuated through this shaping, and why certain narrative forms are more privileged 
than others. I further asked: what, then, do these dominant narratives and narrative forms 
enable? Why not other narrative forms; why not other forms of narrating experience? 
What happens to our concepts, our philosophies, our self-understandings if lives are 
narrated in these other forms? What is upheld by this hierarchy of narrative forms? Are 
current socio-political orderings dependent on this necessary exclusion, whereby if lives 
are narrated otherwise, the narration risks endangering the appearance of social stability? 
What is it in self-narration that gives it such power to transgress and subvert, merely 
through the manner in which one speaks about oneself? 
 
This thesis concerned itself with the institutional framing, reception, management and 
creation of narratives of trauma. It was not an intention of this work to either propose a 
definition of trauma as such, or to present an account of what trauma outside power 
relations can be, if indeed it can be. Once narrated, trauma is socialised and mediated 
through historically and culturally specific frames of reference. It is for this reason that 
what this thesis attempted was a socio-political investigation of the contemporary 
government of trauma narratives in order to show that and how certain conceptions of 
subjectivity, of narration, and of trauma are privileged over others. The targets of this 
critical analysis were discourses, power relations and institutional arrangements that 
constitute the conditions for the possibility of trauma to be recognised and heard as such. 
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Following the introductory chapter on the history of trauma and issues in trauma theory, 
the different chapters employed different gestures to provide a multi-dimensional 
engagement with the politics of narrating trauma. While the chapters on Foucault and 
Butler (Chapters 2, 3 and 5) involved interpretative and theoretical work that delineated 
the different references to and analyses of practices of self-narration in their works, other 
chapters applied Foucault’s and Butler’s ideas to research avenues not directly dealt with 
by these authors. For example, in Chapter 4, Foucault’s ideas were read in relation to 
feminist analyses of consciousness-raising groups to show how this coupling can inform 
a politicised understanding of the narration of trauma. Moreover, in Chapter 6, Butler’s 
ideas on self-narration and her critique of narrative coherence were extended and applied 
in order to critically study how sexual trauma survivors have their acts of self-narration 
heavily regulated and curtailed. Other chapters are less explicitly philosophical insofar as 
they adopt a critical outlook to institutional settings in which trauma is narrated. Chapter 
7, for example, considered how self-narration is discussed and treated in literature and 
practices from the psychological sciences. With regard to the psy sciences, my main 
concern was with the privileging of narrative coherence and the implications of such 
privileging. I argued that the dominant conception of well-being as depending on narrative 
coherence, or that the latter will lead to the former, rests on a questionable supposition, 
insofar as coherent narration more easily fits the normalising expectations of how a 
‘healthy’ docile body would narrate itself. This enabled me to gauge how the account of 
practices of self-narration pursued through Foucault’s views of power and Butler’s 
critique of narrative coherence compare with empirical realities. The final chapter, then, 
tied together the various concerns of the thesis – concerns about discourses that bear upon 
trauma narration, issues of psy power, and socio-political influences on the reception and 
adjudication of trauma narratives – by analysing the narration of trauma in the context of 
the asylum seeking process.  
 
It is hoped that the analysis of traumatic self-narration pursued in this thesis yielded some 
results in the three different though related registers of philosophy, ethics, and politics. 
Philosophically, it was shown that trauma narratives present a challenge to rethink 
subjectivity in terms of relationality; trauma is a painful reminder of how individuals are 
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never solely in control over the direction of their life, and that one’s familiar being in the 
world is a precarious dwelling that can be easily undone. This has implications on how 
subjectivity is theorised in contemporary philosophy. Concerns pursued in the more 
theoretical parts of this thesis can contribute to contemporary debates on narrative 
identity, selfhood and subjectivity. The way in which I approached Foucault’s work on 
self-narration and self-writing (in Chapters 2 and 3), and Butler’s work on precariousness, 
vulnerability and self-narration (in Chapters 5 and 6), was an attempt to introduce their 
ideas in dialogue with debates on narrative identity and selfhood.1 Moreover, apart from 
historical and psychological perspectives, trauma itself was approached as an issue that 
raises various philosophical questions on, for example, self-fragmentation, the power of 
memory, and the embodied self. Such an engagement with trauma and its narration can 
invigorate as well as challenge philosophical ideas. 
 
This thesis also sought to contribute to discussions of ethics,2 and was itself motivated by 
an ethical concern with what is being done and what can be done for trauma narratives to 
avoid, as Jill Stauffer puts it, the injustice of not being heard.3 Rather than a quantitative 
proliferation of trauma narratives, the question is, as Butler asks in Precarious Life: what 
is the framing that “decides, in a forceful way, what we can hear”4 when we hear, in this 
case, trauma narratives? Are institutions, particularly institutions whose task it is to listen 
to trauma, able to apprehend the trauma, or are only the aspirations for mastery and 
resilience being heard? In foregrounding the possible violence of the will to coherence 
imposed on traumatised individuals struggling to narrate their life, this thesis sought to 
unite an ethical concern with a critique of institutions that come into contact with 
traumatised persons. An ethical openness implies a willingness on the part of those who 
                                               
1 Works that use Butler’s work in such debates include Olivia Guaraldo, “Thinkers that Matter: On the 
Thought of Judith Butler and Adriana Cavarero,” AG About Gender: International Journal of Gender 
Studies 1, no. 1 (2012): 92-117; Sarah Drews Lucas, “The Primacy of Narrative Agency: A Feminist Theory 
of the Self” (PhD diss., The University of Sydney, 2016); Lois McNay, Against Recognition (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2008), 96-125. 
2 Work on Butler’s views on ethics, and that situates her views within debates in ethics and moral philosophy 
include Carolyn Culbertson, “The ethics of relationality: Judith Butler and social critique,” Continental 
Philosophy Review 46, issue 3 (2013): 449-463; Gilson, The Ethics of Vulnerability. 
3 See Jill Stauffer, Ethical Loneliness: The Injustice of Not Being Heard (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2015). 
4 Butler, Precarious Life, 5 [emphasis in original]. 
256 
 
encounter traumatised individuals to truly listen to their narratives, to be affected by the 
power of such stories, and to respond to these narratives. An ethical response may 
sometimes require an ethic that preserves fragmentation, if not incoherence, rather than 
professionals’ inclination to brashly impose the preferred schemes of solid coherence and 
resilience. 
 
Furthermore, as this thesis emphasised, philosophical and ethical analyses must be 
politically attuned. This much is implied by Butler’s remark – which she also presents as 
a remark on Foucault’s own philosophical approach – on how “the need to give an account 
of oneself necessitates the turn to power, so that we might say that the ethical demand 
gives rise to the political account, and that ethics undermines its own credibility when it 
does not become critique.”5 In this spirit, this thesis sought to show what can be made, 
politically, of trauma narratives. Narratives, including life narratives, are amenable to 
hegemonic shaping, commodification, depoliticisation and homogenisation. However, 
there also exists a space where trauma narratives can function as parrhesiastic courageous 
truth-telling by critically by revealing the hegemony of norms that are influencing the 
intelligibility of subjects and their stories. In this way, this thesis followed Foucault’s 
claim on the centrality of the politics of ourselves by analysing micro-practices of self-
narration as a gateway to the study of processes of subject-formation and the government 
of the self in contemporary times. Although power functions intricately and intimately 
through practices of narrating oneself, such ‘small practices’ harbour a possibility of 
resistance. In this thesis, critically examining practices of self-narration meant asking 
questions about what experiences are being enabled, and what modes of relating to 
oneself, to others and to the world are being hindered by dominant discourses and 
practices. The stories we tell about ourselves can be swayed to the hard grip of 
normalising power, but stories can also reveal the fallibility of power, its finitude, and can 
present new and creative opportunities which might disclose, as Foucault puts it, “the 
possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think [… by giving] 
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new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom.”6 The critical 
outlook adopted to the activity of self-narration in this study foregrounded its ethical and 
political stakes; what can be called the political ethics of self-narration. 
 
This thesis highlighted how, despite a dominant order of discourse that tries to limit its 
critical potential, self-narration – including traumatic self-narration – can foreground the 
lack of fixity of techniques of power that uphold the appearance of social order. 
Testimonies of trauma may subvert in a parrhesiastic vein when they challenge a nation-
state’s version of events, or a state’s defense of violent practices it may employ to, 
paradoxically, prevent violence. Narratives of trauma may uncover instances when legal 
apparata not only fail to protect and empower the vulnerable, but also hinder their access 
to justice. Trauma narrations may shatter the brashness, solidity and presumptuous 
certainty with which certain policies are implemented, condemnations are made, and 
commemorations are performed. Non-conforming testimonies may reveal a potentially 
violent will to truth lurking beneath speech, transforming it to confessional discourse 
rather than critical parrhesia. The risky truth-telling of traumatised individuals may 
present a critique to the model of subjectivity upon which political practices and 
discourses of psychology are based – the resilient and free subject of self-mastery – 
enabling care of the self to mean something other than depoliticising therapeutic care. 
Such critique troubles the predominant theoretical configurations that insist on strictly 
differentiating a pre-trauma coherent self from a post-trauma broken vulnerable self. This 
subversion can thus foreground the notions of relationality, precariousness and 
vulnerability as constitutive features of subjectivity. It is in these senses that the narrative 
interventions of trauma survivors can function politically as socially engaged practices of 
parrhesia, pointing to different ways in which subjectivity and social life can be organised.  
 
Trauma has always been surrounded by power relations and discourses that impact how 
survivors narrate and which narratives have currency: from the railway accidents to the 
                                               
6 Michel Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth: The Essential Works of 
Foucault 1954-1984 Volume 1, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley et al. (New York: The New Press, 
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era of hysteria, from the false memory debates to the discrediting of sexual violence 
survivors, trauma survivors have always been subject to the violence of the will to truth. 
In certain contexts, as shown in the analysis of the asylum context, the power imbalance 
seems to be so extreme as to extinguish any possibility of critical narration. Despite any 
ambivalence or uncertainty that may govern the asylum seeking process, the asylum 
seeker has severely limited freedom to narrate oneself as one wishes, but must conform 
as best as possible to the demanded criteria. The will to truth operating in the asylum 
process has the capacity to function violently through its power to determine which lives 
are entitled to protection and which lives remain exposed to danger. But even if such 
contexts highlight the unlikelihood of resistance, disclosing some of the mechanisms that 
render some lives unliveable is an act of critical resistance, where one realises that the 
present situation need not be the way it is. 
 
Amid the field of power relations, the possibility of resistance remains and should remain; 
there is, as Foucault puts it, “a plurality of resistances, each of them a special case: 
resistances that are possible, necessary, improbable; others that are spontaneous, savage, 
solitary, concerted, rampant, or violent; still others that are quick to compromise, 
interested, or sacrificial.”7 Such resistances include: psychologists and psychiatrists who 
use their power to empower traumatised individuals and validate their narratives; soldiers 
and veterans who refuse to present war narratives within the sanctioned discourses of 
glory and refuse attempts by nation states to use them and their narratives for the purposes 
of nation-building and constructing historical memory; feminists and narratives of women 
survivors who refuse to privatise their narrative of sexual trauma and instead collectivise 
and connect their experience with broader social currents in order to contribute to the 
development of new discourses and the transgression of hegemonic gendered discourses. 
 
In this spirit, the theoretical framework developed in this thesis to analyse the political 
ethics of traumatic self-narration may inform other critical work, including empirical 
studies. In the psychological sciences, for example, further work inspired by this 
theoretical outlook can further examine the power relations at play in clinical encounters 
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as well as the views on subjectivity that such sciences propound and reinforce through the 
dominant contemporary social currency of therapeutic discourses. The approach to trauma 
narratives developed in this thesis can also be adopted sociologically to consider self-
narratives as products of socio-cultural and discursive factors with which the subject 
struggles and negotiates itself. This theoretical approach can also motivate further 
research on the social construction of experience, for example, in disability studies and 
medical humanities.8 Such an approach motivates engagement with questions regarding 
the social reception of narratives, the norms that determine the formation, shape and 
performance of narratives, the social privileging of certain narratives and narrative forms 
over others, and how these norms become entrenched in institutional practices. What I 
hope this thesis shows is that an analysis of the ethics and politics of narrating trauma 
must entail multiple vantage and discursive points which include philosophy, sociology, 
the psychological sciences, critical legal studies and political theory. 
 
Though clearly rooted in philosophy as a discipline, this thesis did not and could not 
consist solely of philosophical work in the narrow disciplinary sense. I think that it was 
necessary to adopt and employ a mixture of disciplinary discourses to conduct this 
research, as well as take into serious consideration works that employed different 
methodological (and normative) considerations. The outlook of this thesis toward other 
disciplines, such as the psychological sciences, was neither to ‘underwrite’ them nor to 
rashly critique them. The discipline of philosophy has a lot to learn from other 
methodological approaches and various fruitful efforts can be made to better weave 
philosophical theorising with empirical social scientific studies. In fact, this is the 
methodological approach that this thesis followed. The critical engagement with the 
psychological sciences in this study was not to argue that they are always already 
complicit in hegemonic exercises of power, but rather to study the diverse discursive and 
social effects of their practices. Although the analyses of psy disciplines is a critical one 
                                               
8 See, for example, Kurt Borg, “Narrating Disability, Trauma and Pain: The Doing and Undoing of the Self 
in Language,” Word and Text: A Journal of Literary Studies and Linguistics VIII (2018): 169-186, Valerie 
Raoul, Angela D. Henderson, and Carla Paterson, eds., Unfitting Stories: Narrative Approaches to Disease, 
Disability, and Trauma (Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007), Katherine Kenny, Alex Broom, 
Emma Kirby, David Wyld, and Zarnie Lwin, “Terminal anticipation: Entanglements of affect of temporality 
in living with advanced cancer,” Subjectivity 10, issue 4 (2017): 374-392. 
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on the whole, looking more closely at these other disciplines made my critique milder and 
enabled me to consider further possible critical work that can be done at the intersection 
of philosophy and psychology. Similarly, despite the avoidance of empirical studies in 
some forms of philosophising, the philosophical approach to self-narration developed in 
this thesis complemented and was enriched by the inclusion of qualitative social scientific 
studies. Thus, while philosophical theorisation informs the design of this study, it employs 
philosophy for the purpose of critiquing the present by evaluating what is socially 
possible, hearable, recognisable and privileged in the realm of narrating trauma in 
institutional contexts. Such an approach foregrounds an ethics of philosophising that 
emphasises the stakes of critique. 
 
Such ‘methodological’ considerations should not overshadow the sensitivity of the topic 
discussed throughout. Trauma narratives unsettle. Theoretical elaborations about trauma 
cannot do justice to the sheer power of survivors’ narratives. Throughout this research, I 
have been concerned not to adopt a moralising tone, or to ethically misuse trauma 
narratives, or to over-politicise (or mis-politicise) trauma. In other words, I deeply 
acknowledge “the problem of speaking for others.”9 The fineness of theoretical 
construction collapses in front of the visceral shattering of trauma, and I consider it 
inappropriate to read both by the same criteria. Aesthetics, theory and therapy should not 
be confused with each other; in this regard, I concur with Luckhurst’s observation that 
“[o]ne should not be judged by the other – it would be as perverse to demand a greater 
clarity of therapeutic outcomes from a Sebald text as to lecture Susan Brison that her 
narrativization of her experience was an unethical act that failed to respect the singularity 
of her rape trauma.”10 
 
Ultimately, the impulse that guided this thesis was a wariness with regard to a will to truth 
and knowledge, the effects of which function to circumscribe, control and influence what 
and how trauma can be narrated. Consider, by way of conclusion, the following words 
                                               
9 Linda Alcoff, “The Problem of Speaking for Others,” Cultural Critique no. 20 (1991-1992): 8. 
10 Luckhurst, The Trauma Question, 82. 
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written by Elanchelvan Rajendram, a Sri Lankan man who sought asylum in France, in 
his final appeal: 
 
I don’t know what more I can do to make people believe me.11 
 
Despite presenting his narrative account, supplementary medical documentation and even 
a letter from a hospital doctor attesting that his scars were compatible with his narrative, 
Rajendram was deported; “A few months later, on February 28, 2007, he died after being 
shot sixteen times by the Sri Lankan army during a patrol.”12 What motivated this thesis 
was an unrestrainable feeling that it is intolerable that traumatised individuals must do so 
much to make people believe them and, moreover, that they must succumb and conform 
to narrative and extra-narrative criteria before (if at all) they are heard by institutions that 
are in place precisely to listen and respond to trauma. As McLeod contends, the aim of 
therapy is “to really listen to these stories, and to allow space for the telling of new or 
different stories. […] Not listening to stories deprives both therapist and client of the most 
effective and mutually involving mode of discourse available to both of them.”13 
Similarly, Rose concludes that restraining the powerful will to knowledge when 
interacting with traumatised individuals “would require authorities to do more listening, 
rather than merely writing down a diagnostic category, but that would be all to the good.”14 
The hopes of this thesis are that things could be otherwise. While aware that it may sound 
hyperbolical, this would require another epistemology, another philosophy, another 
ethics, another psychology, another jurisdiction,15 another politics to exist. This is 
necessary to counter the problematic effects of an often violent will to knowledge that is 
constitutive of contemporary forms of government, and to safeguard the possibility for 
selves – traumatised or not – to narrate otherwise. 
 
 
                                               
11 Fassin, Humanitarian Reason, 129 [emphasis added]. 
12 Fassin, Humanitarian Reason, 129. 
13 McLeod, Narrative and Psychotherapy, x [emphasis in original]. 
14 Nikolas Rose, Our Psychiatric Future: The Politics of Mental Health (Cambridge: Polity, 2019), 92. 
15 See Leigh Gilmore, “Limit-Cases: Trauma, Self-Representation, and the Jurisdictions of Identity,” 
Biography 24, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 128-139. 
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